

It seems perhaps impossible that so monstrous a plan was to be carried out, yet this was the case. From 1927, the Italian repression took a harsher form and the acts of terrorism which hitherto had come in waves, began to be constant and systematic occurrences.

It began to be impossible for leading intellectual Slovenes to live. For example, Professor Rado Bednarzik published an "*Adriatic Almanack*." This was not merely prohibited, but Bednarzik was brought to trial for compiling this work in his own language. He was not tried before a Civil Court, but before a Court Martial held in Videm (Udine). He was sentenced to degradation to the ranks and loss of all civil rights.

The following year an avalanche of repressive orders followed. One by one the clauses of the proposals drawn up by the Fascist leaders were carried out. Yugoslav teachers were removed to Italy, and before 1928 was out all Yugoslav Societies and Associations, all newspapers and co-operatives were dissolved. Public officials and even railway workers of Yugoslav origin in the State service were removed to distant parts of Italy.

By now, these measures of repression ceased to be tempered by any considerations of justice or humanity. Not merely were organisations prohibited and dissolved, but the funds of these, often assembled from tens of years of thrifty contributions by members of small means, were seized by the Italian State. Only a very few publishing houses and the free use of the two Slav languages of this area (Slovene and Croat) in the Church still remained largely untouched. Now Slav Cultural Societies, however, were dissolved, including the venerable Croat and Slovene "Society of Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius"—cultural organisations founded in the name of the first two great Slav Apostles, whose work as we see, was done precisely for this part of the world. The light of Yugoslav life was now barely allowed to flicker.

The following year, the field of oppressive action was widened. There occurred the first of the repressive political trials of Yugoslavs by Italian courts. In districts where during the political elections revolver shots and tear-gas

bombs had been freely used by the gendarmerie to disperse Slav political gatherings, it was not surprising that there were occasional disorderly scenes. Now these murders were to be given a form of legality. As ill-luck would have it, in one of these a Croat peasant was fatally injured. This was immediately seized upon by the local Italian authorities, and a number of young men were arrested. After some months in custody, they were brought to trial. The authorised counsel for the defence was a Croat lawyer. But three days before the Court sat, he was waylaid by a group of Fascists, dragged to the office of the local House of Fascist Culture, intimidated, and eventually compelled to leave the defence of the accused to an Italian lawyer appointed by the Fascist Court.

The trial was held in Pola before one of the new Fascist "Special Tribunals." The only evidence produced was that given by two letters of introduction issued by the cultural organisation "Edinost" in Trieste, to one of the accused named Vladimir Gortan, and found in his possession.

There is really no question but that Gortan was innocent of murdering a fellow Yugoslav, though, of course, he was not innocent of supporting the proper liberties of the South Slavs of Italy. But at this stage those liberties were still not completely proscribed by the Italian State. For this reason, and further in order to suggest that any support of proper South Slav liberties was "Slav terrorism," it was necessary for Italian Fascism to suggest that Gortan was guilty of common crime. He was sentenced to death, an "exemplary" punishment, and executed within 24 hours. His remains were buried at a place unknown even to his parents.

This trial was followed by a monster political trial before a Fascist Special Tribunal in Trieste, in the following year, September, 1930. The setting for this trial was arranged on a grand scale. The 58th Fascist Legion was mobilised, strong forces of the Italian Army were assembled, and Italian war-ships were brought to anchor in the harbour.

The trial was a demonstration, and open threat of arms, against the Yugoslav population of the Julian Region and against the Yugoslav State itself. The victims of the trial

were accused of a motley of acts against the Italian State. The entire Corps of Generals of the Garrison in Trieste were present in Court in full dress uniform, and representatives of all other authorities were present in gala uniform. The Consuls of foreign powers were specially asked to attend, while hundreds of Slovenes and Croats in Trieste, Istria and Gorica were arrested by way of "precaution."

It was a political trial far removed from the usual concepts of justice. One of the defending counsel, who had quite happily accepted 30,000 lire from the parents of each of his two clients, declared that in his opinion sentence of death was inevitable. A Belgian lawyer present felt obliged to expostulate, but this Italian Counsel for the Defence replied: "Such are my orders."

On September 6, 1930, four of the accused were executed at Bazovica, near Trieste. The others were sentenced to many years' penal servitude. This mass trial was a new attempt to terrorise the Slavs of this territory by pseudo-legal methods. A new wave of free-lance terror began with an isolated and arbitrary incident, to be followed later by mass terrorism.

On October 20, 1930, a band of Fascists destroyed the offices and printing works of the only Yugoslav paper left, the "Novi List." On December 18 following, the Italians showed that even religion could not be left untouched if it was the religion of the Yugoslavs. A band of Fascists broke into the Church of Trevnik during the service of a Mass. The electric cables were cut, and the Church plunged into darkness. In the ensuing melee a number of people were seriously injured.

The "final" attack on the Yugoslavs of the Julian March was beginning. Cautious as the Italian authorities had to be in any matter affecting the Church, the free Catholic practice of religion was thenceforth under a cloud. On December 31, 1934, the Catholic Printing Press at Gorica was sealed by the Italian authorities. From now onwards the Slavonic Bible and Prayer-book were to be superseded by a Bible and Prayer-book in Italian.

CHAPTER III

THE PRELIMINARY "PRE-WAR" WORK OF ITALO SAURO

In 1934, what might be ironically called the normal forms of repression had reached their height. Not only was the use of Yugoslav speech in any public office prohibited; it had been prohibited in every school and even in all religious activities. But this was not sufficient. It is a notorious fact that the intellectual repression of a people merely drives national thought into underground channels. This is especially the case if the people whose nationality is being attacked are genuinely autochthonous inhabitants. It is easier to transform an urban population, detached from its mother soil, than a population which has been linked with the soil for many centuries.

In the introduction to this account of Italian crimes against the Yugoslavs of the Adriatic, we pointed out that in earlier centuries the Venetians had set up trading centres on the Adriatic shores which, particularly in the north of the Adriatic, had developed into small Italian cities, Italian-speaking islands on the edge of a large South-Slav sea. This situation is nowhere better illustrated than in the statistics of land ownership in the Istrian Peninsula. An ethnic map of the Peninsula shows the towns in which the majority of the inhabitants are Italian, joined by a narrow belt of territory in which the population is mixed to the major part of the Peninsula in

which there are no Italians. In this minute mixed area, where the old Austrian census of 1910 showed the Slav population to be only between 40% and 50%, it is noteworthy that—by the same statistics—only 18.20% of the land was owned by the Italians, the remaining 81.80% being owned by Yugoslavs. Where the proportion of Yugoslavs was higher—i.e., in the greater part of the territory—practically no land was Italian-owned.

But why go back to the 1910 Austrian statistics? We go back to these because since the Austrian census of 1910, less than four years before the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, there has been no census whatever of this area which give any indication at all of nationality. No Italian census has recognised nationality. Even the Austrian census did not do that. But it did recognise differences of language. It was based—as were German statistics in such areas as East Prussia—on the “*Umgangssprache*,” or language of everyday life. It quite naturally happened in many cases that the census official, questioning a not very interested bi-lingual or tri-lingual citizen of his town and naturally making his enquiries in his own language, often wrote down as “*Umgangssprache*,” a language which was not really the “national” language of the individual concerned.

Nevertheless, the Austrian statistics do give some indication, and in default of better figures, must be taken as the only statistical indication of the nature of this part of the Yugoslav lands.

Another indication is certainly provided by some of the proposals of Mussolini's personal adviser on the South Slav question. A considerable portion of the personal archives of Italo Sauro have fallen into Yugoslav hands, and it is significant that in a new proposal on how to eliminate the Yugoslavs from the proposed field of Italian expansion, made on 29 January, 1942, Sauro observed that much caution was still to be observed in the work of dispossessing the Slavs of their lands.

Some of the facts which have come to light from Sauro's files are the subject of the 46th Report of the Yugoslav State

Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the Invaders and Their Assistants. This, in itself, is of key importance concerning Italian crime against the Yugoslav people and State.

Report No. 46 shows clearly that one of the principal concerns of the Italian State before the war has been the physical dispossession of the South Slavs, who as we see, in this north-western corner of Yugoslav National territory, were not merely the principal inhabitants, but were since time immemorial the principal owners of the land. But first some details of Italo Sauro himself.

Italo Sauro (Figure 2) was an Italian Counsellor of State, and Mussolini's Personal Adviser on the work of eliminating the Slav population of the whole Adriatic coast, from Trieste in the north down to the Gulf of Kotor. We reproduce a copy of Sauro's official biography taken from Italian State Records (Figure 3). The most significant point in this curriculum vitae is the last line: “*Lavoro: A disposizione del Duce per gli slavi*”—or—“*Occupation: At the disposition of the Duce concerning the Slavs.*”

This explains how it was that after having specially asked to be included in a regiment fighting the British (who to Sauro were “*Enemy No. 2*”), Sauro obtained special permission from Mussolini to be transferred to a regiment fighting the Yugoslav people. Indeed, he seems to have taken this step as soon as plans were set for the attack on Yugoslavia. On 1 July, 1940, he wrote to Mussolini's private secretary, Oswaldo Sebastiani: “*Vi prego di dire al Duce di concedermi un altro privilegio; essere in prima linea contro il nemico del mio sangue, lo slavo.*” (Figure 4)—“*Would you kindly ask the Duce to grant me another privilege; to be in the first line against my blood enemies, the Slavs.*”

On 6 April, 1941—the XIXth year of the Fascist era, as he proudly puts at the top of his letter—we find Sauro writing “*from Klana on the Eastern Frontier*” (near Fiume) two letters. To Mussolini's secretary Sebastiani, he writes a covering letter, saying he asks “*vivamente*” (i.e., urges) to have “*this short communication of mine*” passed to the Duce,

"at this moment in which the whole people of the Adriatic turns its eyes towards him as to a beacon." (Figure 5).

If one asks how it is that Sauro assumed that the Yugoslavs of the Adriatic regarded Mussolini as a beacon, the explanation is to be found in Sauro's letter to Mussolini himself, for in this he says quite simply :

"Duce—Now that the campaign against Yugoslavia, by which a decision is to be forced, has begun, I am prepared, arms in hand, to fight the ancient enemy of my people. That has always been my sincere desire. You, to whom I have always been faithful and loyal, are my first thought The return of Dalmatia to Italy will, for all time, sweep the foreigner from the Adriatic" (Figure 6).

In fact, the whole of Sauro's activity was that of finding ways and means to sweep the Yugoslavs away for ever from the areas marked out for Italian colonisation—areas defined differently from time to time, but in Italian eyes basically corresponding to the area dominated in the Balkan Peninsula by the Roman Empire in one period or another.

The records of Italo Sauro which the State Commission possesses, make it possible to follow his correspondence with Mussolini on this subject from as far back as 1935.

We have traced the growth of Italian crime against the Yugoslav population of Istria, Trieste and the County of Gorica, up to the events of 1934. The years of the Abyssinian war (1935-37) understandably distracted some attention from the South Slav problem, but by 1939 we find Sauro developing his proposals with full energy.

On July 31, he wrote to Mussolini, from Koper in Istria, to outline his proposals for dealing with the problem at its root. The simple method of terrorism so far used had failed to produce any permanent effect on a peasant people. Sauro saw the problem as one of actual expropriation. He, therefore, suggested to Mussolini the following points :

1. That any person of South Slav origin should be debarred from purchase of land. A special Committee of Enquiry should be set up to examine the credentials of any person acquiring land, and a certificate from that Commission should

be required before deeds could be legally transferred.

2. A thorough enquiry should be made and statistics drawn up to show what land was still actually owned by Slavs. When that was done it would be possible to direct local Fascist officials to assist in the work of depriving the Slavs of their holdings.

3. Statistics should also be prepared to show what properties owned by Italians were actually cultivated by Slav tenants, so that steps could be taken to effect the deportation of these Slavs to other parts of Italy.

4. Steps should be taken to transfer land owned by absentee Italian owners to new ownership capable of ensuring that the Slav peasantry did not encroach.

Sauro offered to direct this plan himself, asking for a minimum of one or two assistants. He also proposed a number of accessory measures, such as :

1. To prohibit even the temporary visit of any other person of Slav origin to the districts to be wrested from the Slavs.

2. To effect the transfer of a number of intractable Slav priests to the interior of Italy.

3. To order all Italian school teachers (i.e., those Italian school teachers who had already been appointed to take the place of the original Slovene or Croat teachers) to remain in their villages throughout the school holidays, the reason for this being that it had been found that even if they were absent on holiday for only a few weeks, all the work they had done in getting the younger generation to speak Italian and not Slovene or Croat, was undone.

Sauro did proceed to investigate the basic land problem of Istria, Trieste and the County of Gorica. When he did so, he was dismayed to discover how large a proportion of the land was still owned by the Slavs. It was a greater proportion than he had even feared. This is the more remarkable when we bear in mind what had taken place, particularly in the Gorica area during the 1914-18 war. It is in this district that the famous town of Caporetto is situated, Kobarid in the original Slovene. The movement of battling armies through the villages of the County of Gorica resulted in great destruction

of the homesteads and farm buildings of the South Slav farmers of this county. After the war, compensation for damaged property was granted by the Italian State. But this war damage was issued in State Bonds, later to be cleared through the banks. Eventually, money was only payable against these Bonds through authorised banks, and these Italian banks issued loans for rehabilitation of property against the Bonds up to only 50% of their nominal value.

In addition, the banks themselves appointed the building contractors who were to carry out the rehabilitation. Thus, though South Slav farmers may have received new buildings, it was at the cost of loss of effective economic liberty to banks controlled by the Italian State.

After about ten years, many farmers, deep in debt, were forced to sell their farms at a loss. There were, for example, 634 enforced sales of property in the County of Gorica in 1929 alone, and 630 in 1930, when the world economic crisis struck at farmers already in difficulties. Within a single year in this period, a large part of territory which for centuries had been in the hands of the South Slavs passed to Italian hands.

Even so, the process was too slow for Italo Sauro and Italian Imperialism in this district and elsewhere. The ancient roots of the South Slavs were too old and deep to be easily torn up by mere financial methods to such an extent that the country might really become Italian and not South Slav. As we have already observed in the first paragraph of this chapter, the South Slavs represented the autochthonous and land-owning population, comparable with the yeomanry of Great Britain, in the whole of the country of Istria, Trieste and the County of Gorica.

Sauro, therefore, produced a new and more extensive plan of 16 points, which in the same year, 1939, he presented to Mussolini. The points of his new plan were :

1. To collect accurate data concerning all South Slav holdings in land, and their financial standing.
2. To take over for Italians all land either owned by credit institutions (banks, etc.) or mortgaged to these.

3. To make it impossible for Slavs to buy or take over any property or land.

4. To give land to those Friulian or other Italian families who seemed likely to be resistant to the Slavs.

5. To prevent any visit by foreign Slav families.

6. To remove Slavs from their own land in all possible ways, primarily by the refusal of credits, and secondarily by propaganda likely to attract them to urban centres.

7. To set up in Pola a powerful industrial centre likely to attract Slavs, and at the same time to develop more active propaganda for the purpose of attracting Slav workers from the neighbourhood of Trieste to distant industrial centres, thus fostering dispersion.

8. To facilitate in every way possible Slavs selling up their land.

9. To undermine Slav ownership of land by all possible credit and fiscal operations. Banks were to be ordered to charge Slavs higher interest, and tax payers were to be mulcted of excessive contributions.

10. To carry out a persistent policy for the removal of Slav workmen and professional miners to distant centres, and to the colonies by the bait of higher wages, etc.

11. To remove families of Slav workers and peasants in large groups to Eastern Africa, and there to disperse them over a large area.

12. To set up numerous elementary schools and kindergartens, and particularly in the kindergartens to keep the children all day under Italian influence.

13. In elementary schools and kindergartens to appoint Italian priests, monks and nuns as teachers.

14. To set up a dense network of espionage against Slav leaders and agitators likely to have some connection in Yugoslavia, and against all those possessing kinsfolk in Yugoslavia, or educated there, as well as against all persons of the liberal professions, and as far as possible to refuse or limit the issue or renewal of passports valid for Yugoslavia.

15. To remove all Slavs who had been sentenced by the Courts.

16. To keep a check on the work of Slav priests and set up a special fund for the maintenance of Italian theological students in the Trieste seminary.

These 16 points appear in more than one form in Sauro's archives. For example (Figures 7, 8), we find him on September 15, in the XVth year of the so-called Fascist era, that is to say, in September, 1938, submitting a set of 15 points (which are partly the same as the 16, partly the same as those sent to Mussolini in 1939) to Gianni Apollonio, then Governor of Istria, "Per una soluzione problema slavo nella V.G." ("For the solution of the Slav problem in the Julian Region.") A further note made on 19 September, at the bottom of the sheet, records Gianni's suggestions have been adopted.

In October, 1939, Sauro also wrote a special study on the position of the Slavs in the province of Trieste. He was himself in this in no doubts about the connection, which we here emphasise, between the early pre-1941 and pre-Fascist Italian acts of violence and the later Italian programme of total expropriation. In the preamble to his study he wrote triumphantly of "a glow which for Italians has begun to lighten the sky, a glow caused by the flames of these Slav strong-points, the premises of the Balkan Company, of the People's Houses, and of the office of the paper 'Edinost.'"

Proudly starting with these events of officially tolerated violence of December, 1918, of 1919 and 1920, he concluded with the following remarks: "If we follow all preceding periods step by step, what stands out is the fact that the economic prosperity of the Slavs and their yearning for their fatherland, constitute a menace . . . Immediately after the war (i.e., after 1918) as a result of profuse propaganda and our negation of their rights (i.e., after terrorism and violence) we saw them rapidly weakening. Yet in the period of assumption of authority by the Fascists, which can be called the elimination of the Slavs (*cacciata degli Slavi*) we see the Slavs resorting to methods of force and terror.

"When we come to the present, we have to admit that the Slavs have remained Slavs, that benevolent propaganda does not affect them, and that in any situation which is at all strained,

they show signs of intransigence. For these reasons, we can without fear of contradiction assert that a Slav problem exists and must be thoroughly studied both in its material and psychological aspects, if we are not either in the near or distant future to find ourselves at the eleventh hour confronted with the painful need of undertaking a purge of our frontiers just when we need to use all our forces to break down these frontiers and extend them."

This is a striking indication of the attitude of mind of Mussolini's personal adviser on the Slav question. Resistance to what he calls "benevolent propaganda" (examples of which, since 1918, we have examined) is in his eyes "resorting to methods of force and terror" by the Slavs. This is reminiscent of the attitude of Mussolini's brother, Arnaldo Mussolini. He was the editor of "Il Popolo de Trieste," and on the day after the shooting of the Bazovica victims (7 September, 1930), in his paper commented on the Slavs as follows: "But do vermin which have effected entry into your house possess nationality?"

Selecting further documents from Sauro's archives, we see that on 5 June, 1940, he again wrote to Gianni Apollonio, the Governor of Istria, to tell him what he thought the South Slavs were capable of doing both inside Italy and on the Yugoslav side of the frontier.

Gianni's reply was to suggest the establishment of concentration camps at Verona and Trento, for all "suspicious aliens." Gianni also suggested that all alien soldiers, i.e., Italian subjects of Yugoslav origin, should be removed from regiments on the frontier of Yugoslavia and immediately despatched to units either in Libya or Germany. Italo Sauro accepted Gianni Apollonio's observations, and without delay, on 10 June, 1940, submitted a concrete proposal to Guido Buddarini Ghendi, Under Secretary of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.

Less than a year later, the Axis attack on Yugoslavia began, and as we have seen, Sauro was ready "on the Eastern frontier." Hitherto he had been engaged on the suppression of the South Slavs within the territory annexed to Italy after 1918. Now

the vastly superior Axis forces over-ran the whole of Yugoslavia. Large portions were annexed to Italy, and other districts placed under the Italian Army of Occupation. The field of action of Italo Sauro and his confederates was vastly enlarged. Whereas before the war he had been obliged to elaborate complex plans to give at least a cloak of legality to the Italian attempt to exterminate the South Slavs as a people, the conditions of Nazi-Fascist rule in an occupied country made it possible for Mussolini and the Italian Government to work by entirely different methods.

The period of what must seem to the outside world pre-war crime in Yugoslav-peopled districts of Italy, was at an end. The subsequent annexation of still larger areas of Yugoslavia and the establishment of puppet administrations in still other districts, in actual fact broke down the distinction between those Yugoslavs who had for over 20 years enjoyed Yugoslav sovereignty and those who had been under Italian sovereignty. By these acts the Italian State had annulled the unjust frontier made between Yugoslavia and Italy after the last war, and the whole area, whether acquired in 1918 or only after 1941, where Italian forces moved in Yugoslavia, became a single, common area of planned and unlimited crime. This is the subject of the following chapter.



Fig. 2 (p. 20)

Italo Sauro

ITALO SAURO FU NAZARIO

classe 1910

Dottore in Scienze Politiche e Diplomatiche

Partito N.F. 23 marzo 1928 (11 leva, proveniente organizzazione giovanili 12 aprile 1922)

Milizia V.S.N. 23 marzo 1928 - sempre nei reparti Universitari C.N. sino 1932

All.Uff. 1932-34 (corsi per universitari - periodo applicativo a Moncellieri)

C.M. nov. 1934 Istruttore premilitare

Sottotenente di Fanteria 1934 - Servizio di primo nome nel 71° Regg.to F. "Puglie" (mesi sette) mitragliere

Volontario in A.O. in seguito a Domanda al Ministero della Guerra e da questo assegnato ad una Compagnia Mtg della Divisione Tevere in Somalia (21 ott. 20 dic. 1935, Italia - Sbarcato a Mogadiscio 4 gennaio 1935, sino al 5 maggio 35 del 5 maggio al 15 giugno 35 al quartiere Generale dell'Ecc. Graziani a Giggige, Harer, Diredaue. del 15 giugno al 24 ottobre alla 220 legione CC?NN a Addis Abebe, Les Addes, Duken (operazioni Grande polizia coloniale) Sbarcato in Italia il 9 nov. 36.

Tenente di Fanteria 1 luglio 1937

Volontariamente (domanda al Duce 10 giugno 1940) richiamato alla e assegnato ad un Btg. G.I.L. sul fronte occ. dal 1 luglio al 18 agosto 1940;

In seguito a domanda trasferito al 74° Regg. F. "Lombardia" sul fronte orientale in data 18 agosto

In data 18 settembre e sino al 20 luglio 1941 Comandante di una Compagnia Armi di accompagnamento (8/11) operazioni contro la Jugoslavia ed occupazione del territorio.

Distretto Militare: Trieste

Deposito Palmanova - 749 Regg.F.

Abitazione - ROMA - Viale Gorizia, 24

Lavoro: a disposizione del Duce per gli slavi.

Fig. 3 (p. 20).

ROMA, 1 LUGLIO XVIII

All' Ecc.
OSVALDO SEBASTIANI
Segretario Particolare del DUCE

Ho il piacere di comunicarVI che mi è stato concesso l'alto onore di essere chiamato alle armi per servire la Patria fascista e il DUCE.

Vi prego di confermare al DUCE tutta la mia fede e la mia assoluta devozione.

Qual'ora gli eventi dovessero volgere fortuna, si e finalmente decisivi per il vicino oriente e la terra italiana sacra a Nazario Sauro: la Dalmazia, Vi prego di dire al DUCE di concedermi un altro privilegio: essere in prima linea contro il nemico del mio sangue, lo slavo.

VIVA IL DUCE

Fig. 4
(p. 20).

1-5.

Tenente di Fanteria
ITALO SAURO
7° Regg. Fanteria

M. Claus sul fronte orientale
6 Aprile XIX

All' Sa.
Oswaldo Sebastiani
Segretario Particolare del Duce

Fig. 5
(p. 21).

Vi prego di volermi a consegnare al Duce questa mia breve indicazione nel momento in cui tutta la gente esultava quando a lui come un padre si face.

Uscita Ito Sauro

Da Klauca, nella frontiera orientale 6 Aprile XIX

Duce,

mentre si sapeva la partita con la Jugoslavia, per portarla alla forza, con una soluzione, mi trovo in crisi, come era una opinione contraria, ma mi sembra vedere della gente: ~~la gente~~ ^{la gente}, il mio amico per ora è per Voi, mi sempre ho guardato con fede e ansiosità.

In questi momenti si riaccentuano le loro opinioni nella gente venuta dalla Austria che con me è verso Voi e attende fiduciosamente.

Il ritorno alla soluzione dell'Italia, la guerra per sempre dell'Austria, lo straripare; uccidere e profughi ovunque per l'evoluzione d'Italia; solo con il

Fig. 6 (p. 21).

PER UNA SOLUZIONE DEL PROBLEMA SLAVO NELLA V. G.

1° Statistica delle proprietà in mano agli slavi. Questa statistica dovrebbe essere fatta in forma molto riservata ed accurata da un ufficio speciale dell'E.R.A. con la collaborazione dei segretari comunali. Per l'Istria questo lavoro potrebbe essere disimpegnato dal censimento per la trasformazione fondiaria dell'Istria che conosce a fondo la provincia e i suoi problemi agricoli.

2° Blocco delle vendite e deferimento ad una commissione, unica per tutta la regione, del null-osta per le vendite alle scopo di impedire ogni acquisto da parte di slavi.

3° Acquisto di tutti i terreni appartenenti a istituti di credito e di assicurazione non acquistati da privati italiani.

4° Appoderamento e assegnazione dei terreni a famiglie italiane del Veneto del Friuli e dell'Istria (che sono le più adatte a resistere agli slavi).

5° Allenare in tutte le maniere gli slavi dei propri terreni e dei paesi dell'interno.

6° Costituzione in Pola di un forte centro industriale per attirare gli slavi e nello stesso tempo fare una intensa propaganda e regolari ingaggi di operai slavi dell'interno per Trieste ma soprattutto per centri industriali lontani, con l'obbligo di stabilire ivi la propria residenza. A questa opera potrebbero contribuire anche i propri operai e tecnici, questi si potrebbe fare buona azione (lavori e servizi).

7° Favorire le alienazioni di terreni da parte di slavi.

8° Minare la proprietà slava attraverso tutte le operazioni del credito e del fisco.

9° Trasferire continuamente operai e minatori specializzati (con la prospettiva di miglioramento) in altri centri lontani del Regno e delle Colonie.

10° Costituzione di un villaggio Istria in A. dove convogliare numerose famiglie di contadini scelte in prevalenza fra gli slavi.

11° Aumento delle scuole elementari e degli asili. Più maestri maschi collegati con l'obbligo di residenza non inferiore a 11 mesi migliorando il loro trattamento economico.

12° Inviare con insegnanti elementari e maestri di asilo anche molti religiosi e religiosi italiani che costoro potranno arginare e sostituire gli slavi.

13° Costituzione di una stretta rete di sorveglianza e informazioni su coloro che operano come mestatori e agitatori slavi, e su coloro che hanno contatti con la Jugoslavia. Limitare e possibilmente impedire il rilascio dei passaporti per la Jugoslavia.

Fig. 7 (p. 25).

13° Allontanamento dei pregiudicati slavi da tutte le V.G.

14° Sorveglianza sulla attività dei Preti. Costituzione di un fondo speciale per il mantenimento di seminaristi presso il seminario I taliano di Trieste la cui costituzione deve essere favorita ad ogni modo.

15° Favorire e provocare le emigrazioni di slavi nelle Colonie.

Il fisco Apollonio il
15 lett 80a per la ricerca
me ripetuta nelle lettere S

lungo 15 lett

bonetto in signor all'aspetto
n. f. A S 19 lett

Fig. 8 (p. 25).

stri, autorità locali, tutti migliori insomma dovrebbero essere considerati collaboratori nella grande opera.

La lotta dovrà essere anzitutto decisa onde, ad esempio, ad un prete slavo se dovrà sostituire un prete italiano che parli slavo, e ciò perché in un primo tempo è bene agire lentamente per non provocare troppe opposizioni e andare facilmente in profondità. Il prete slavo dovrà in ogni caso essere ^{ben} sostituito offuscato e un italiano e poi eliminato.

Nella decisione nell'eliminare gli elementi contrari sta il primo successo. Forza e giustizia sono gli elementi sui quali gli slavi, come i popoli primitivi, fanno poggiare i troni, la forza, soprattutto, dovrà essere sempre presente per reprimere con la massima severità: con gli slavi la clemenza è debolezza.

16

11 A 14 D. u. c.

Il problema della nazionalizzazione dei territori giuliani sloveni e dalmati impone per queste province un ordinamento di tutta la azione di governo tendente ad un solo scopo: l'eliminazione dello slavismo.

I singoli Vicasteri, le varie amministrazioni dello stato e gli enti dipendenti, agiscono ognuno nel proprio campo con propri metodi per un fine generale e devono spesso trascurare il particolare e il

Nelle provincie giulie le scuole sono molto frequentate e i bimbi che ne escono parlano un bel armonioso italiano. Ma ciò è poco, perché nella casa di questi bimbi entra il prete che parla slavo ed è slavo, egli predica e fa cantare in slavo, e quelle poche notizie che arrivano sono di bocca slava.

Fig. 9 (pp. 29, 30, 51).