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From
Kosovo To Syria
Višeslav Simić (Вишеслав Симић)
2do Seminario Internacional "Análisis e incidencia de
las políticas públicas"
EGAP - Tecnológico de Monterrey - 25 y 26 de
Septiembre 2013 - México
(ovaj text na srpskohrvatskom: Од
Косова до Сирије
Вишеслав Симић - професор - Ел Текнолохико де
Монтереј, Мексико - 26. септембар 2013.)
As the so-called Kosovo "war"(1) is being used
by the United States of America as a
blueprint(2) for how the euphemistically(3)
called "international community"(4) should
militarily resolve the crisis in Syria without a
mandate from the U.N. (in spite of the U.S.
persistently insisting that it was a sui generis
case), it is becoming increasingly more
important not only finally independently to
study the "mob or sole assailant"(5) aspect of
the contemporary U.S. international approach
but, even more, to dedicate particular attention
to the post- and extra-combat involvement (or
the lack of it) of the "international community"
in the management(6) of the territories and the
people "liberated"(7) by it.
While the U.S. President announces(8) a possible
attack on a sovereign nation of Syria without
the authorization by the U.N., citing the
precedent of Kosovo as justification for it, the
U.S. Secretary of State (accused by some of
being le ministre étranger aux affaires) assures
U.S. citizens that rich Arab nations would foot
the bill(9) (attempting to relieve concerns
about the system's impending bankruptcy(10)),
and a multitude of the West's "corporate
intellectuals"(11) (especially the ones from the
so-called La Gauche Caviar) are soothing the
moral and psychological worries of its
ever-conscientious public, there are legitimate
and reliable voices who give us different points
of view about this issue, from the warnings to
the U.S. leaders that aiding a declared
enemy(12) of the U.S. would be treason(13), that
Syria's socialist secular economic/political
system(14) is the main problem for both the
neo-liberal West and the reactionary,
fundamentalist Islamist Arab regimes, to those
that the so-called opposition in Syria are "a
bunch of criminals" and not
"revolutionaries."(15)
Just a part of this list of concerns should
create a grave apprehensiveness about the
"international community's" capacity to act in
Syria militarily, but even more about its
competence to be the leader of the supposed
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.
Taking into consideration the "international
community's" aggressive and criminal March 1999
record in Serbia, November 2001 in Afghanistan,
March 2003 in Iraq, and March 2011 in Libya, its
involvement, and especially the U.S. leadership
role, should be extremely questionable(16).
It is certain that the U.S. global position was
dominant in the post-Soviet period, and that the
phrase "international community" became
synonymous with the U.S.—the main formulator of
what were dogmatically(17) believed to be
liberal(18) privatization-centered(19)
pro-democratization and economic growth policies
during the 1990s and the early 21st century.
Yet, as these policies' truthfulness and
efficacy became increasingly questioned and
challenged(20), due to their failures and
catastrophic consequences in practice(21), and
as the U.S. increasingly turned into a defender
against charges of imperialism and
aggression(22), and a coercer of unwilling
allies(23) into arrogant violations of
international law(24) than it remained a leader
of any true community of states, great
questioning(25), strong confirmations(26), and
new understandings and opinions(27) of the term
"international community" appeared.
Although there had been a few U.N. missions in
the disputed/non-sovereign territories before
the Kosovo mission was established, the fact is
that all of them were initiated properly in the
U.N., and implemented by it, including military
forces of various member states, that willingly
lent them, working in close cooperation with the
world organization.
Kosovo was a crucial turning point and the
precedent that nullified the old rules by force,
without establishing any clear and agreed upon
new ones for the future.
As the Kosovo precedent allowed for the creation
of new states, such as Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and for the establishment of new
"international communities", who justified and
implemented such acts, it became obvious that a
trend is being set and that the organization of
the United Nations is increasingly either
serving the purposes of one of the
"international communities", or that it is being
ignored by either of the "international
communities"(28) or by all of them(29). The
multitude of the small states for decades has
been pointing out the fact that they are not
even considered by the "international community"
if they disagree with its policies, or are used
to shore up its "moral imperative" when they do,
but their plight is not as important in the
"realpolitik" world as the latest warnings by
one of the greatest powers—China—about the
"improper comments in the name of the
'international community'"(30) by some Western
politicians.
Although there are some Western
intellectuals(31) and popular commentators(32)
who point this out, a blindness to these facts,
and a dogmatic, quasi-religious faith in the
only true "international community" is very
noticeable in the so-called West—not only among
its political classes but in academia as well,
where it should be happening the least,
especially taking into consideration the
plenitude of analysis of international
politics(33).
The pattern has already become a common place: a
regime is declared "rogue" for not accepting the
"international community's" dictates and not
opening its economy for a neo-liberal takeover,
and an adequate "endangered" minority is
designated a victim within the "rogue" regime's
borders, and the minority's criminal
sub-population is trained and equipped to be the
"legitimate and justified" opposition to the
regime and the future "guarantor of democracy
and economic development" of the "liberated"
nation, and an ally in mutually beneficial money
laundering operations(34). Then, cases of "human
rights violations" are exaggerated or, if
necessary, fabricated, and an insurrection by
the "democratic, free-market oriented, and
Westernized and moderate" guerrilla is
legitimized, and a "red line" is drawn, after
which a military intervention by the "morally
indignant" "international community" becomes a
must in order to save face and show the world
its dedication to peace and international
cooperation.
The "international community's" interests in the
Middle East are obvious: preventing China from
obtaining cheap oil for its economic growth and
military development; getting closer to Russia's
"soft southern belly", and increasing the
possibility of destabilizing the E.U. through
strong control and manipulation of its Moslem
population, making the "allies" long term
dependant on the "international community".
With Kosovo, it was not so obviously clear why
the "international community" got so deeply and
expensively involved in that oil-deprived
region(35). Although the territory known as
Kosovo is a landlocked, economically
undeveloped, and socially backward land of
10,887 sq. km.(36), populated by anywhere
between 1.5 to 2 million people(37), it is of a
significant geo-political and strategic
importance.
Its position at the ancient surface
crossroads—Via Militaris and Via Egnatia(38)—was
made very obvious by the placement of the U.S.
military base Bondsteel near that crucial
intersection of the roads that connect Europe
and Asia. Taking into consideration that the
planned American-backed "Nabucco"(39) pipeline,
as well as the Russian natural gas and oil
pipeline, "Southern Stream"(40), were to pass
through that area, supplying Europe with Russian
and former Soviet Central Asian states' oil and
gas, the geostrategic importance of Kosovo
becomes more prominent.
The post-intervention international
administration of a territory "liberated" by the
"international community" brings many advantages
both to the allied governments and the private
businesses from the "cooperative" nations.
The case of Kosovo is an excellent example: it
has been declared an investor's dream and a
venture capitalist's heaven(41) by its new
rulers.(42) Its labor market offers one of the
cheapest labor forces in the world. With
official unemployment rates in Kosovo reaching
50%(43), once the means of production are
secured(44), and access to global markets are
guaranteed, the investors will be attracted to
the profit-making opportunities unparalleled in
the developed world.
At the same time, the natural resources of
Kosovo are legendary–according to the World
Bank(45), 13.5 billion Euros are laying there,
waiting for investors brave enough to acquire
them: the richest lignite reserves in South
Eastern Europe, which provide for a powerful
electricity production for the whole region, as
well as abundant reserves of zinc, cadmium,
magnesium, kaolin, quartz, asbestos, chrome,
bauxite, and lead(46), along with silver and
gold–all of that under the watchful eye of the
"international community"(47), eager to help set
it to production and profit.
Yet, there are overwhelming problems and
obstacles to that. They range from linguistic,
through socio-cultural, historical and
political, to legal—especially in terms of
property law.
Thus, understanding the meaning and history of
the names in Kosovo is only the beginning of the
difficulties related to such problems.
The official and full name of the territory is
Kosovo and Metohija. The land was always (as it
still is today) known as Old Serbia(48) as well.
Kosovo, just as Metohija did, emerged as a
symbol, a reminder, a warning, and was almost
accidentally used as a territorial designation
only by the end of WWII, by the Communist party
of Yugoslavia.
The word Metohija remains as another reminder, a
public declaration by the rightful owner that
the theft hasn't been forgotten, and as a subtle
warning that order and justice shall be
restored. That is why all false claimants to the
land have insisted on the elimination of the
word Metohija from the land's name.
Kosovo, as a word, means something only in the
Serbian language(49)—the possessive adjective of
the word kos, the American robin, a black bird,
turdus merula, that flies in the skies over the
famous battlefield of 1389(50).
The meaning of Metohija is clear and recognized
easily by the Orthodox Christians. Being of
Greek origin (μετόχια), the word is a legal and
official term used to demarcate the earthly
possessions of the Orthodox Church, in this case
of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
It is very common in the West to dismiss all
factually supported Serbian historical claims to
Kosovo, while the most incredible, evidence-less
Albanian claims to the antiquity of their
possession and presence in the same territory
are accepted as valid. Very often a question is
asked by independent and reasonable observers
how far back in time should the "international
community" go, and what kind of mythical or
spectral evidence(51) would be acceptable to lay
a claim so that the matter could be settled. The
situation is very similar to the one in
Palestine at the time of the Jewish resettlement
there, when the famous British writer H. G.
Wells said: "If it is proper to 'reconstitute' a
Jewish state which has not existed for two
thousand years, why not go back another thousand
years and reconstitute the Canaanite state?"(52)
Yet, Kosovo and Metohija became an official U.N.
Protectorate, with NATO as the power that
guarantees it remains so for the time being.
Although the Albanians declared independence in
2008 and the "international community"
recognized its "sovereignty"(53), it is still
NATO that has the final authority there(54),
along with the U.N. Special Representative of
the Secretary General. Simultaneously, the U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1244 guarantees the
territorial integrity of Serbia, although some
of the powers that voted for that resolution, in
a paradoxical bipolar opposition to themselves,
recognized the self-declared independent
Republic of Kosovo.
A matter of great interest for the scholars of
international law and politics, and
international management of territories and
peoples, should be the evolution of the
post-"liberation" fate of the leaders of the
territories under "international community's"
control, especially the speed and the degree of
the degradation of their status and life.
Slobodan Milošević, the leader of Serbia, was
captured and put on a long-term trial by a
special "international community's"
tribunal(55), which terminated in his highly
suspicious death after it became increasingly
obvious that the evidence necessary for his
conviction was not going to materialize.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban were simply
scattered and replaced by a puppet government,
which still fully depends on the U.S. occupying
forces in the country. Saddam Hussein, the
leader of Iraq, was also chased away from his
seat of power, and later captured and put on
trial, but not by an international tribunal. The
experience with Milošević most certainly taught
the "international community" the risks of
exposing its own alleged crimes before the
increasingly judgmental world. The Iraqi court
expressly found him guilty and he was executed
by hanging, giving the impression that no appeal
was permitted, or a chance for a pardon either.
Libya's Moammar Gadhafi experienced no official
capture or trial. The democratic and
freedom-loving "opposition" to his regime was
allowed by the "international community" to hunt
him down like a wild animal and his slaughtering
was filmed and widely distributed on the
internet. A U.S. apparatchik to the new friendly
and allied regime of Libya was murdered in a
very similar manner a few months later. Then,
the "international community" expressed an
absolute outrage at the shocking and brutal
treatment of a human being by the,
now-legitimized, subject of international
affairs.
The "post-conflict" status of the 'liberated"
territories also differs significantly:
Kosovo seems to have been the experiment that
set too high the bar for the future, causing
extraordinary complications and embarrassing
need for legal and moral "creativity". Following
its lessons, a degradation and
de-internationalization of the status of any new
territory whose sovereignty(56) was altered has
become noticeable. There has happened a lowering
and limiting of the prerogatives of the
"governor" in the field, and, with each new
case, a gradual elimination of a significant
portion of the U.N. membership from the pool of
legal international subjects with a right to be
involved in the governing and/or supervision of
the territory.
In Kosovo, it was still the Secretary General of
the U.N. (through his Special Representative)
who was the highest civilian authority in the
official U.N. protectorate(57), although the
NATO military commander on the ground was the
highest authority "in the theater", with a right
to declare anything or anyone of "military
significance" so as to grant himself the power
to outrank the civilian authority of the U.N. at
any time.
In Afghanistan, "full sovereignty" was gradually
"restored" to the local government after the
U.S.-lead international invasion and occupation
of the land, and after the U.N. Security Council
post factum established the International
Security Assistance Force. The U.N. Assistance
Force's mandate was to oversee the security in
the country, but the Afghan "authorities"
couldn't move freely even within the capital
without full military escort by the mostly NATO
troops, while the provinces were the realm of
local warlords and, almost exclusively, of U.S.
military commanders, who had most of the U.S.
troops under their direct and separate command.
In Iraq, the U.S. attacked that sovereign U.N.
member without a declaration of war and invaded
its territory under what was later proven to be
a false pretext. After a quick military
conquest, the country was occupied by U.S.
troops. A "sovereign" puppet government was
established, but the U.S. military was in charge
of the land. The U.N. Security Council then
established a mission in Iraq, which recognized
"the responsibilities and obligations" of the
U.S. occupying force, giving legitimacy to the
illegal and criminal invasion of a sovereign
member of the U.N. The Mission still supervises
the work of the Iraqi government. The U.S.
military combat operations and occupation of
Iraq were officially declared finished by the
end of August 2010, but U.S. troops still remain
in Iraq (under separate U.S. command), together
with the troops from other nations, which are
under U.N. command.
In Libya, there was neither a U.N. mission set
up after its destruction by NATO, nor was there
an occupation of any kind by the "international
community's" military forces. The early 2011
conflict was declared a civil war, in which the
"rebels" refused all attempts, both by their
government and by the African Union, to stop
fighting. The "international community" secured
a U.N. Security Council resolution (1973), which
was to protect civilians and which allowed the
use of force against the government of Libya,
but did not allow a foreign occupation of the
country. The "international community", led by
the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,
secured the supply of arms to the rebels. The
Resolution stated that in order to "protect
civilians" "all necessary measures" were
allowed, thus, the supply of arms was
unilaterally declared permitted in spite of the
arms embargo imposed on "everyone" in Libya
(Paragraph 9). The French Air Force bombarded
the government troops, as did the U.S. and U.K.
submarines. Soon, 17 countries participated in
the military operations against the government
of Libya, with NATO taking over the command of
the operations. The "international community"
thus became the air force of the rebels,
providing them with some ground troops as well,
violating its own U.N. resolution and not
allowing for a negotiated settlement of the
conflict. After the rebels took over the capital
city of Tripoli, the U.N. recognized them as the
legitimate government of Libya. An ad hoc local
government, the National Transitional Council,
was set up and recognized by the "international
community" and left in power to run the country
as it saw fit, as long as the oil exploitation
was opened to the corporations from the
"international community's" realm—the Chinese
and Russian companies were not allowed in the
competition in the "free market" and "globalized
economy" (just as they were kept out and away by
the U.S. occupying authorities from the once
open-to-international-competition oil fields of
Iraq).
The U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo has proven
itself to be the "international community's"
experiment that set the standard for the amount
of sovereignty which were to be accorded the
inhabitants under the "international
community's" domination—none!
Thus, the sovereignty over the territory of
Kosovo was altered and the whole international
system thrown into a disarray. The overlapping
and cancelling-out of sovereignties is blatant:
the United Nations Resolution 1244 (which is
still in effect and is recognized even by the
powers(58) that officially recognized Serbia's
Albanian minority's self-declaration of
independence) recognizes the sovereignty of the
Republic of Serbia over the territory of
Kosovo(59). So does, of course, the Constitution
of the Republic of Serbia(60). At the same time,
Serbia's Albanian Moslem minority in the
Province of Kosovo and Metohija had declared the
province's independence from Serbia and claimed
sovereignty over the territory, calling it the
Republic of Kosova. It has been officially
recognized by the U.S. and many of the
individual great powers, which are members of
the European Union, although the international
organization called the European Union itself
has not recognized the self-declared independent
Republic of Kosovo, and works closely with the
U.N. on administering the Serbian province as a
U.N. protectorate(61). Simultaneously to all
this, the Constitution of the self-proclaimed
Republic of Kosovo, by its articles 147 and 153,
clearly renounces its own sovereignty and states
that the final authorities in Kosovo are the
U.N. civilian administrator and NATO military
force commander, making those who command NATO
the ultimate sovereigns over Kosovo(62).
The "international community" did the same
thing, which it did in the previously legally
established U.N. protectorates, and in the many
historical instances before the current supposed
internationalization of protectorates—the
"international community" ensured its own
fiat(63) to be the legal basis and norm for any
activity.
The first U.N. protectorate, an innovative and
an ad hoc approach to resolving international
problems insolvable by the then-current
international law, was the U.N. Temporary
Executive Authority (UNTEA)/U.N. Security Force
in West New Guinea (UNSF), established in
October 1962(64) in order to administer the
Dutch colony of West New Guinea until it was
transformed into a province of Indonesia on May
1, 1963.
The following one was established in February
1992 for Cambodia, as the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in order to
implement the Paris Accords, which ended the
civil war in that country. The U.N. was not to
have direct control of the country but was
supposed, during the 18 months of its mandate,
to foster "a neutral political environment
conducive to free and fair general
elections"(65). It was the most extensive and
costliest U.N. operation up to that time.
On December 21, 1995(66), the U.N. International
Police Task Force (IPTF) and a U.N. civilian
office in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) were
established, known as the U.N. Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). It was terminated on
Dec. 31, 2002. It invented a new supra-sovereign
office—The High Representative for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (on December 14, 1995)—by the Peace
Implementation Council(67). It was not a U.N.
mission. SFOR, a NATO-led multinational
peacekeeping force in BH, was established by the
U.N. S.C. Res. 1088, on Dec. 12, 1996, and it
lasted until Dec. 2, 2004. It was replaced by
the E.U. EUFOR Althea mission, which is still in
BH, as is the High Representative of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, who still possesses his
supra-sovereign powers and is the final
authority in that supposedly sovereign nation.
The U.N. S.C. Resolution 1037 (Jan. 15, 1996)
established the U.N. Transitional Administration
for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium (UNTAES) to monitor the demilitarization
of these regions and to ensure the peaceful
reintegration of these territories of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina into Croatia. It
ended on Jan. 15, 1998, after allowing the new
country of Croatia to take over these, formerly
Serb-majority but then Croat- and
NATO-ethnically cleansed, lands. Eventually, the
newly sovereign Croatia was fully integrated
into NATO (2009) and E.U. (2013), thus firmly
and unquestionably putting these territories
under the "international community's" control.
In 1999, the "international community"
established its most ambitious and authoritative
grasp on a territory—the U.N. Protectorate of
Kosovo.
The U.N. administration took upon itself the
public policy mission, traditionally reserved
for a sovereign state alone, to make local laws
and to enforce them, to appoint and supervise
local officials, to collect and manage local
revenue, to run local educational, health and
other social services, to supervise the economy
and finances, and even to decide in the disputes
related to the very basis of any
society—property matters.
The most illustrative example of the
“international community’s” incompetence and, if
the criteria used for ordinary people were
applied to it, all out criminality, is exactly
this area of public policy¬—privatization.
Contrary to its U.N. S.C. mandate, the U.N.
Administration of the Serbian province designed
and partially implemented a public policy of
privatization of the socially owned property
there. It was very clear that such a policy
could not be implemented(68) as the
“international community” wished it, due to its
basic illegality(69). The province’s chief U.N.
administrator, Soren Jessen-Petersen, on April
22, 2005 (UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/18), simply
decreed a fundamental change in UNMIK rules(70)
and property law(71) (undocumented in human
history, except during conquests and pillages of
ages past), providing for the privatization
agency to make “clear and final ownership
determination after a sale of assets” and not
before it, as has been the practice throughout
human history. Although Mr. Jessen-Petersen
gladly announced that “now with this change… we
no longer have to establish ownership before the
sale of the socially owned enterprise”(72), the
process of privatization in Kosovo has been
disastrous. Not even the local criminals wanted
to participate in it since it didn’t provide
them with a clear and legal title to the
property. There are many accusations that
through the process of privatization they
laundered the illegally earned funds. Knowing
that such practice would create legal
problems(73) for the U.N. staff in both the
field and in the New York City headquarters, the
U.N. ensured its employees’ immunity(74) from
legal prosecution but the local Albanians were
left to the mercies of “the market”-causing a
number of highly suspicious deaths(75) of both
high level officials in Kosovo and key witnesses
in Western countries over the last couple of
years, all of which were ruled suicides(76) by
EULEX and Western medical examiners.
This extent of legislative, executive and
judicial authority, exercised with basically no
scrutiny by anyone, with no supervision by
independent monitors, and with no accountability
to any single or collective sovereignty
(especially that of the local population(77)) is
substantially higher than that which the
colonial governors had in the past, and which
were the main reasons why the colonized peoples
fought wars of liberation. It was expected, even
by analysts from the "international community",
that even the most "benign" protectorate of this
kind would eventually turn itself into an
"oppressor-ate" that would be hated by the
population it was established to protect in the
first place.
Yet, there are no open anti-U.N. movements in
Kosovo. It seems that while the ethnic cleansing
of its Serbian citizens is yet unfinished, and
while the lucrative and unmolested businesses of
human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling, and
"privatization" of the Serbian state, social,
Church and private property are still underway,
there is no rush to end the unnatural and
contradictory parallel existence (but a
long-term partnership and symbiosis) of "local
sovereignty" and "international community's"
protectorate there.
Yet, this unnatural symbiosis only seems to be
lucrative to those with a short-term vision and
with a superficial understanding of economy and
politics.
An interesting testimony of the development
falsehood was, most likely unintentionally,
offered by a German KFOR Colonel, Günter Bonn,
published by Politika, and reported by an ethnic
Slovenian military analyst, Miroslav Lazanski,
in a report on his visit to the U.S. (KFOR) base
Bondsteel in Kosovo. It says: "There is no
industry here, no production. Only gas stations
are being opened, shopping centers and night
clubs."(78) The Colonel is reported to have
openly wondered from where all the wealth in
Kosovo was coming, comparing the apparent
high-life style of the Kosovo Albanians to his
modest life in the highly industrialized (and
yet only second tier international community's
member) Germany, especially considering his
socio-economic status as a high level military
officer of the military forces of the only
stable and growing E.U. economy. Aware that he
drives a small car there (in Germany), and
doesn't own a house there, the new, big homes,
daily built in Kosovo, and new, expensive cars
driven on the same roads he patrols in a
military jeep, make him wonder how surreal is
his task of making sure that there wouldn't be
any more suffering in the U.N. Protectorate of
Kosovo.(79)
In addition to that, it is the "international
community" that very quickly realized the true
pitfalls of such an arrangement, and the
long-term dangers to its control and welfare.
The U.N. Protectorate of Kosovo, being under the
formal legal authority of the U.N. Security
Council, could not be controlled, modified, or
terminated without Russia and/or China. Both
powers were unable to prevent its establishment
in 1999, but, since then they have grown and
strengthened their international positions,
creating a parallel and highly visible
alternative "international community", and have
created unforeseen problems for the U.S. and its
allies in Kosovo (and in other parts of the
world), especially regarding the public policy
of privatization designed and attempted to be
implemented there by the "international
community".
The Protectorate of Kosovo was most likely
designed as the ultimate triumph of the West,
but it quickly turned into its most problematic
product. With Russia and China sitting on the
U.N. Security Council, with their veto powers,
it proved impractical to set Kosovo as a
blueprint for future invasions, takeovers and
management of lands, peoples and resources, and,
thus, all evidence suggests, it was forgone as a
model.
Ever since, we have witnessed the abandonment of
the U.N. or truly international models of
behavior by the "international community",
observing the increased acting either
unilaterally (the U.S. in Iraq) or as a group of
military allies (NATO in Libya), with very
limited and vague authorization by the U.N., or
with none at all.
It is worth remembering that already in 1996, in
Buenos Aires, Michel Camdessus, Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund,
officially announced that a "silent revolution"
was taking place, and that "as regards the role
of the state, it is now nearly universally
accepted that the most effective economic
strategies are private sector-led and
outward-oriented"(80), and that "governments
must demonstrate that they have no tolerance for
corruption". Yet, it seems that the
"international community" in the end, after its
post-Kosovo experience, decided that it is much
easier and more profitable to avoid the
(semi-)state and its many layers of corrupt
officials all together, and to let the West's
private sector(81) (backed up by NATO) deal
directly with the warlords(82) in the resources
rich territories, whose sovereignty was altered,
allowing certain allies in(83), and securely
eliminating Russian and Chinese competition(84).
Although the 1989 informal Washington Consensus
by the West's economic thinkers has been
replaced by the 2010 G20 formally endorsed Seoul
Consensus for "shared growth"(85), it seems that
the "international community" has decided to
undermine the Consensus' main goal of greater
state intervention in economy and finances by
simply eliminating the state from the equation
and continuing with the old mantra of
"stabilize, privatize, and
liberalize"(86)—having already initiated that
policy in Kosovo, and persisted with it in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, attempting to
press on with it in Syria today.
For the end, another reminder: The New York
Observer warned, in 2007, "The smart money these
days is in catastrophe: Hurricanes, tsunamis,
political upheavals and wars have become the new
profit points in the age of 'disaster
capitalism,' which sees cataclysms 'as exciting
market opportunities.'”(87)
Višeslav Simić (Вишеслав Симић)
2do Seminario Internacional "Análisis e
incidencia de las políticas públicas" - EGAP -
Tecnológico de Monterrey - 25 y 26 de Septiembre
2013 - México
Footnotes:
1. Strictly legally speaking, no war was
declared by the aggressors (the U.S. called it
"hostilities" and "military operations in
Kosovo"). The government of the attacked
sovereign founding member of the U.N. didn't
denounce the aggression as war (only after the
November 2012 Strasbourg Court ruling that
"war veterans" must be paid for the time
served in the "war of 1999" did Serbia
implicitly recognize NATO aggression as a
war). The U.N. itself kept silent about the
grossest violation of its Charter since its
founding (the silence forced upon the U.N. by
the U.S. blocking any move in the U.N.
Security Council to condemn the attacks or to
order their cessation).
2. Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in
Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack;
Landler, Mark and Gordon, Michael; The New
York Times; August 23, 2013-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&
3. If asked what the priority in today's world
would be, Confucius would most likely repeat
what he said about 2500 years ago: "'What is
necessary is to rectify names.' […] 'If names
be not correct, language is not in accordance
with the truth of things. If language be not
in accordance with the truth of things,
affairs cannot be carried on to success.' […]
'Therefore a superior man considers it
necessary that the names he uses may be spoken
appropriately, and also that what he speaks
may be carried out appropriately. What the
superior man requires is just that in his
words there may be nothing incorrect.'"-The
Analects of Confucius; The Chinese Classics;
Translated by James Legge; Book XIII, Chap.
III, 2-7; Kindle location 625-626.
4. "To the extent that there is such a thing
as an international community, it owes much to
NATO." - Norris, John; Collision Course: NATO,
Russia, and Kosovo; Greenwood Publishing
Group, Preager, NY; 2005; Forward by Strobe
Talbott; page ix.
5. ”The Democrats prefer allied lynch mobs,
whereas the Republicans are more willing to
intervene without outside help. The difference
is basically the same. At the end of the day,
both Democrats and Republicans remain
committed to the same "values" of forcing
political change on foreign regimes.” -
Deliso, Christopher; Kosovo, 1999: An
Insider’s View; June 17, 2005 -
http://antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=6338
6. "...To put it in a terminology that harkens
back to the more brutal age of ancient
empires, the three grand imperatives of
imperial (American-ed.) geostrategy are to
prevent collusion and maintain security
dependence among the vassals, to keep
tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep
the barbarians from coming together." -
Brzezinski, Zbigniew; The Grand Chessboard:
American Primacy And Its Geostrategic
Imperatives; Basic Books; New York; 1997; p.
40.
7. See: The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.4655.ENR:],
or George, Amir; Liberating Iraq: The Untold
Story of the Assyrian Christians; Cardinal
Publishing Group; 2013, or Crucified Kosovo
[http://crucified-kosovo.webs.com/], or
Redmond, Helen; Their empty talk of liberating
Afghan women; SocialistWorker.org; March 23,
2011-
http://socialistworker.org/2011/03/23/empty-talk-about-liberation
8. Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in
Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack;
The New York Times; Aug. 23, 2013 -
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
9. Arab nations ready to pay for Syria strike:
Kerry - The News; Sept. 6, 2013 -
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25265-Arab-nations-ready-to-pay-for-Syria-strike-Kerry
10. Just as Standard & Poor's and Moody's
maintained the illusion of Lehman Brothers'
solidity up to six and one day respectively,
before its collapse in 2008, it seems that it
is being done for the whole West's financial
system these days. See also: US borrowing
authority to be exhausted by Oct. 17; AP -
http://news.yahoo.com/us-borrowing-authority-exhausted-oct-17-151054701--finance.html
11. Such as the ever-ready Frenchman
Bernanrd-Henri Lévy, calling the other
international community—the governments who
actually respect the international law and the
U.N. rules—"gangster states, led by their
godfather, Russia". See: ¿Qué quiere Rusia?;
El Pais, Sept. 2, 2013 -
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/08/29/opinion/1377787206_916631.html
12. Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are
jihadists or hardline Islamists, says IHS
Jane's report [by analyst Charles Lister]; by
Ben Farmer, defence Correspondent, and Ruth
Sherlock, in Beirut; The Telegraph; Sept. 15,
2013 -
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-rebel-fighters-are-jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html
13. "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United
States, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the United States or elsewhere, is
guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or
shall be imprisoned not less than five years
and fined under this title but not less than
$10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any
office under the United States."-18 USC § 2381
- Treason -
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381
14. "We trouble the West and the extremists
because we are a socialist country." - Syrian
ambassador to Serbia, H.E. Suleiman Abu-Dijab
to V. Radojević; in an interview for the
Communist Party of Serbia on Sept. 3, 2013, in
Belgrade, Serbia -
http://www.kps.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1136:intervju-ambasadora-sirije-u-beogradu-gospodin-sulejmana-abu-dijab&catid=65&Itemid=574
15. "[The West calls it] a revolution, but in
fact it has nothing to do with revolutions. A
revolution needs thinkers. A revolution is
built on thought. Where are their thinkers? A
revolution needs leaders. Who is its leader?
Revolutions are built on science and thought
not on ignorance, on pushing the country ahead
not taking it centuries back, on spreading
light not cutting power lines. A revolution is
usually done by the people not by importing
foreigners to rebel against the people. A
revolution is in the interest of people not
against the interests of people. Is this a
revolution? Are those revolutionaries? They
are a bunch of criminals." - Syria's President
Bashar al-Assad; Damascus; June 1, 2013.
16. Although these words were written with a
different context in mind, they seem
prophetic: “Every friend of freedom must be as
revolted as I am by the prospect of turning
the United States into an armed camp, by the
vision of jails filled […] and of an army […]
empowered to invade the liberty of citizens on
slight evidence.” - Milton Friedman; An Open
Letter to Bill Bennett; The Wall Street
Journal; September 7, 1989 -
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/open-letter-bill-bennett/
17. "Today we see how utterly mistaken was the
Milton Friedman notion that a market system
can regulate itself. We see how silly the
Ronald Reagan slogan was that government is
the problem, not the solution. This prevailing
ideology of the last few decades has now been
reversed." - Samuelson, Paul (Nobel Prize in
Economics, 1970); Don't Expect Recovery Before
2012 - With 8% Inflation; Global Economic
Viewpoint; January 16, 2009 -
http://www.digitalnpq.org/articles/economic/331/01-16-2009/paul_samuelson
18. ”Milton Friedman is the Establishment’s
Court Libertarian.” - Rothbard, Murray N.;
Milton Friedman Unraveled; Journal of
Libertarian Studies; Vol. 16, no. 4 (Fall
2002); pp. 37-54 -
http://mises.org/journals/jls/16_4/16_4_3.pdf
19. "It turns out that the rule of law is
probably more basic than privatization.
Privatization is meaningless if you don’t have
the rule of law. What does it mean to
privatize if you do not have security of
property, if you can’t use your property as
you want to?" - Milton Friedman. See: Gwarney,
James and Lawson, Robert; Economic Freedom of
the World: 2002 Annual Report; Preface:
Economic Freedom behind the Scenes, by Milton
Friedman; The Fraser Institute; Vancouver,
B.C.; 2002; page xviii.
20. Boas, Taylor C & Gans-Morse Jordan;
Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to
Anti-Liberal Slogan
[http://people.bu.edu/tboas/neoliberalism.pdf];
Harvey, David; Neoliberalism as Creative
Destruction; The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science
[http://ann.sagepub.com/content/610/1/21.abstract];
Weyland, Kurt Gerhard; Assessing Latin
American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a
Debate; Latin American Research Review; Vol.
39, Number 3, 2004; pp. 143-149.
21. See: The Neoliberal Deluge-Hurricane
Katrina, Late Capitalism, and the Remaking of
New Orleans; Cedric Johnson, editor; 2011;
University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis;
or, Klein, Naomi; The Shock Doctrine-The Rise
of Disaster Capitalism; Henry Holt & Co.;
New York; 2008; or, Saltman, Kenneth J.;
Schooling in Disaster Capitalism; Teacher
Educational Quarterly; Spring 2007; pp.
131-156.
22. Watts, Carl P; Is globalization another
name for US imperialism?; Politics Review
Online; Vol. 20, No. 3 (Feb. 2011).
23. Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks; BBC News;
January 23, 2003-
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm
24. Pritchard, Claire; Who Cares if We Violate
the Geneva Convention?; Chicago Policy Review;
May 31, 2013-
http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2013/05/31/who-cares-if-we-violate-the-geneva-convention/
25. Golub, Philip S; Conflict in the Balkans:
An International Community?; Le Monde
Diplomatique; June 1999-
http://mondediplo.com/1999/06/06golub
26. "The international community does exist.
It has an address. It has achievements to its
credit. And it is the only way forward."-U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan; The Address to
the 52nd DPI/NGO Conference in New York City;
September 15, 1999-
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990915.sgsm7133.doc.html
27. Ralph, Jason; Tony Blair's 'new doctrine
of international community' and the UK
decision to invade Iraq; POLIS Working Paper
No. 20; School of Politics & International
Studies; August 2005-
http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp20ralph.pdf
28. Created ad hoc after the declarations of
independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
their subsequent international recognition by
Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu,
Tuvalu (although Vanuatu, in a horribly
embarrassing manner, later withdrew it).
29. As in the case of Russia and the other
states recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and in the case of the NATO states' attack on
and destruction of Libya, which went far
beyond the U.N. mandate of ensuring a no-fly
zone over the territory of that member of the
U.N.
30. "Since the Industrial Revolution in
Britain, the self-centered way of thinking
that long formed in Western powers has been
swelling with the constantly consolidated
powers. One of the performances is that some
Western politicians often make improper
comments in the name of 'international
community' when they talk about the
international affairs or in the Western media
reports. In their eyes, they are the
'international community'" - How the world
opinion is kidnapped by West's "international
community" rhetoric; People's Daily Online;
September 1, 2013-
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7932499.html
31. See: Letter by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel to
Barack Obama (accessed on Sept. 8, 2013)-
http://www.democraticunderground.com/10023621013
32. "When you next hear the term, what is
being referred to is not the international
community at all - understood as all the
nation-states that make up the world - but
just a small sliver of it, our bit. The great
majority of the world, indeed - the west
constitutes less than one-fifth of the world's
population - is, in fact, being tacitly
ignored: unless, of course, it happens to
agree with the west, in which case it is
implicitly tagged on the end as a good old
western fellow-traveler."-Jacques, Martin;
What the hell is the international community?;
The Guardian; Aug. 24, 2006
-http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/24/whatthehellistheinternati
33. Modelski, George (Jerzy), Long Cycles in
World Politics, University of Washington
Press, 1987; Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,
Columbia University Press, 2002; Georg
Schwarzenberger, International Law, Stevens,
1949; Juraj Andrassy, International Law,
Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2010.
34. Documented widely, from The Contras,
Cocaine, and Covert Operations
[http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm],
through Albanian Mobsters: Albanian Mafia,
Rudaj Organization, Princ Dobroshi, Ismail
Lika
[http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/albanian-mobsters-books-llc/1103425185?ean=9781158328673],
to Syrian Rebels Funded by Afghan Drug Sales
[http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130411/180581557.html]
35. "It was Yugoslavia's resistance of the
broader trends of political and economic
reform--not the plight of the Kosovar
Albanians--that best explains NATO's war." -
Norris, John; Collision Course: NATO, Russia,
and Kosovo; Greenwood Publishing Group,
Preager, NY; 2005; p. xxiii.
36. Smaller than the Sea of Marmara (11,350
sq. km.), between the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles straights in Turkey, the U.S.
state of Connecticut (14,357 sq. km.), or the
U.K. county of Yorkshire (11,903 sq. km.),
about half the size of the State of Mexico and
a bit smaller than the State of Queretaro.
37. Reliable and complete census data haven't
been available for Kosovo and Metohija for at
least three decades.
38. See: Külzer, Andreas; The Byzantine road
system in Eastern Thrace; 4th International
Symposium on Thracian Studies, April 2007;
Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert; Amsterdam; 2011., or:
Tafel, Gottlieb L. F.; Via Militaris &
Egnatia; 1841; Columbia University Libraries,
Preservation Department; Master negative #:
91-80058-10; - http://
ia600804.us.archive.org/6/items/viamilitarisroma00tafe/viamilitarisroma00tafe.pdf
39. The "Nabucco" pipeline project was aborted
in the summer of 2013. -
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu-j13.html
40.
http://www.south-stream.info/en/pipeline/route/
41. Untrue, as the still non-existent economy
shows, just as in Libya today, in spite of the
positive propaganda about its "anticipated
boom in natural resources". - See: Cockburn,
Patrick; Special report: We all thought Libya
had moved on - it has, but into lawlessness
and ruin; The Independent; September 3, 2013 -
(accessed on Sept. 8, 2013)
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on--it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html
42. "Invest in Kosovo. Ignite your success!" -
Publication by the Investment Promotion Agency
of Kosovo; Ministry of Trade and Industry;
March 22, 2013 -
http://www.bitkom.org/files/documents/IPAK__PPT_General_22_03_13.pdf
43.
http://www.indexmundi.com/kosovo/unemployment_rate.html
44. And the U.N.'s Mission in Kosovo
Privatization Policy made it easier than
anywhere else in the world–means of production
and real estate may be bought disregarding
their deeds.
45. “Kosova [Kosovo] mine [mineral] resources
are worthy of 13.5 billion Euros, according to
a joint survey conducted by the Directorate
for Mines and Minerals and the World Bank.” -
http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/01/world-bank-survey-puts-kosovos-mineral.html
46. Vickers, Miranda; Between Serb and
Albanian-A History of Kosovo; Columbia
University Press; 1988; page XV.
47. George Soros, a billionaire
financier/amateur politician, eager to acquire
the Trepča mines
[http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/Johnstone/howitis.htm],
vying for it with H.R.H. Prince Michael of
Kent, according to the Kosovo Privatization
Agency Director Shkelzen Luka [as reported by
www.economy.rs/vesti/18697/Kosovo--Vojvodina-izgradila--Princ-od-Kenta-dobija-na-poklon.html].
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State at
the time of NATO war on Yugoslavia, is
contending for mobile phones and internet
opportunities in Kosovo
[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/europe/ex-us-official-pulls-bid-for-kosovo-telecom-stake.html?_r=0],
while Wesley Clark, the Supreme Commander of
NATO during the "Madeleine's War" in 1999, is
"seeking a license to explore Kosovo's
underground coal deposits to use to make
synthetic fuel for cars and planes."
[Marketplace; Oct. 26, 2012-
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/wesley-clark-puts-name-behind-kosovo-coal-project]
48. "[It] also included the Serbian province
of Sandzak and the northwestern part of
today's Macedonia." - See: Joksimovich, Vojin
Ph.D.; Kosovo is Serbia; gmbooks.com -
http://www.gmbooks.com/product/Kosovo-GM.html
49. "Proof of the Serbian origin of the name
and the loanword status of the immigrant
Albanian term is that the word "kosovo" has a
clear etymology to anyone who knows a Slavic
language, while Albanian "Kosova" is an
opaque, meaningless place name in the Albanian
language." - Maher, J. P.; Professor of
Linguistics, Emeritus; Northeastern Illinois
University; "Kosova" or "Kosovo"? - What's in
a Name?;
http://emperor.vwh.net/articles/JP%20maher/InAname.html
50. Although many scholars in the West publish
linguistically baseless claims that the word
is of "Turkish-Albanian origin", in spite of
the fact that it doesn't have any meaning at
all in either of them. See: Vickers, Miranda;
Between Serb and Albanian-A History of Kosovo;
Columbia University Press; 1988; page XIV.
51. “Spectral evidence refers to a witness
testimony that the accused person’s spirit or
spectral shape appeared to [the] witness in a
dream at the time the accused person’s
physical body was at another location. It was
accepted in the courts during the Salem Witch
Trials.” [June-September 1692] -
http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/spectral-evidence/
- It reappeared in the U.S. in 2013: “Jurors
at the Jacko trial heard testimony from a
surprise witness yesterday — the ghost of
Michael Jackson! [...] In the supernatural
tête-á-tête, Jacko’s ghost allegedly absolved
Dr. Conrad Murray of any guilt in his death
and admitted he “accidentally killed himself.”
- “Ghost” of Jacko stars at LA trial; New York
Post; June 12, 2013. -
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/ghost_of_jacko_stars_at_la_trial_Flr5EJeWiSLJQsCT9djE9L
52. Sakran, Frank C.; Palestine Dilemma: Arab
Rights versus Zionist Aspirations; Public
Affairs Press; Washington; 1948; p. 204.
53. See at least the1932 U.S. Stimson Doctrine
(on non-recognition of international
territorial changes executed by force), and
Articles 3 and 11 of the 1933 Montevideo
Convention, on the rights and duties of states
(prohibition of creation and recognition of
puppet states) and the prohibition of the use
of force in order to obtain sovereignty. The
"international community" claimed they were
obsolete until the cases of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
54. As late as July 28, 2013, the KFOR
Commander, German General Walker Halbauer,
stated that "As far as military matters are
concerned, [I] decide who may enter Kosovo.
[…] I want to emphasize that in Kosovo, both
the U.N. Resolution 1244 and the Kumanovo
Agreement, are in force." ("Када је војска у
питању ја одлучујем ко може да уђе на Косово.
[…] Хоћу да нагласим да је на Косову и даље на
снази и Резолуција УН 1244 и Кумановски
споразум.") - See: Lazanski, Miroslav; I
understand the Serbs from the Ibar River area;
Politika; July 28, 2013. -
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Razumem-Srbe-na-Ibru.sr.html
55. Totally disregarding the ex injuria jus
non oritur legal principle.
56. "The sovereignty of states is not
absolute." - Strobe Talbott; See: Norris,
John; Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and
Kosovo; Greenwood Publishing Group, Preager,
NY; 2005; Forward, by Strobe Talbott; page x.
57. Although the "international community"
allowed the U.N.'s involvement only after it
had already concluded the destruction and
subjugation of Yugoslavia/Serbia, using the
world organization as a "legal mask" to cover
up and put away brutal and criminal NATO
aggression, in which it committed crimes
against peace, humanity and war crimes with
impunity, since the U.N. transformed it into
its own Military Authority in Kosovo.
58. Even if they "creatively interpret the UN
SC Resolution 1244", knowing fully, as Carl
Bildt, Sweden's Foreign Minister, stated, that
"there are no legal grounds for doing what we
are doing, but we must preserve at least a
semblance of international law." -
http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/charts/en.html?id=478
59. Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the
Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10
June 1999: "… Reaffirming the commitment of
all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the other States of the
region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act
and annex 2…"
60. The Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia, The Preamble: "… the Province of
Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the
territory of Serbia…"
61. Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the
Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10
June 1999, authorizes the Secretary-General,
with the assistance of relevant international
organizations, "to establish an international
civil presence in Kosovo" and "decides on the
deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations
auspices, of international civil and security
presences, with appropriate equipment and
personnel as required…", "requests the
Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation
with the Security Council, a Special
Representative to control the implementation
of the international civil presence, and
further requests the Secretary-General to
instruct his Special Representative to
coordinate closely with the international
security presence to ensure that both
presences operate towards the same goals and
in a mutually supportive manner […]"
62. The Constitution of the Republic of
Kosovo; Article 147 [Final Authority of the
International Civilian Representative]:
"Notwithstanding any provision of this
Constitution, the International Civilian
Representative shall, in accordance with the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement dated 26 March 2007, be the final
authority in Kosovo…", and Article 153
[International Military Presence]:
"Notwithstanding any provision of this
Constitution […] The Head of the International
Military Presence shall, in accordance with
the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007, be the
final authority in theatre […]"
63. The U.S. Secretary of State, Richard
Olney, on July 20, 1895, wrote: "To-day the
United States is practically sovereign on this
continent, and its fiat is law upon the
subjects to which it confines its
interpretations […]." - See: Chronological
History of United States Foreign Relations
1776 to January 20, 1981; Vol. I; ed. Lester
H. Brune; Garland Publishing, Inc.; New York
& London; 1985; page 167.
64. Article 2; The New York Agreement
65. Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; Annex 1,
Section B, Paragraph 1; UN Document
A/46/608-S/23177; Oct. 30, 1991 - See:
(accessed on Sept. 8, 2013)
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/56/128_-_Cambodia_-_Human_Rights_in_Negotiating_Peace_Agreements_Edwards__Adrian__2005.pdf
66. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1035
67. Consisting of 55 countries, based on the
Dayton Peace Agreement, negotiated during Nov.
1995, formally signed in Paris on Dec. 14,
1995, after the London Conference, Dec. 8
& 9, 1995.
68. Bota Sot 2010: A failed process of
privatization in Kosovo?; Institute for
Development Research; 12. 03. 2010;
http://www.riinvestinstitute.org/index.php?gjuha=en&action=meshume&cid=10&sid=30&id=137
69. Since the U.N. S.C. Resolution 1244
mandates UNMIK only to administer such
property in Kosovo—not to change property
status—and UNMIK's own Regulation No. 2001/9,
On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo, of May 15, 2001,
Section 8.1 (q), (r ) and (u), states that
UNMIK has the "authority to administer public,
state and socially owned property, [and] the
regulation of public and socially owned
enterprises" but nothing else beyond that.
70. Yet, UNMIK Regulation No. 2005/18.15,
Section A, still stated that "the Trust Agency
[Privatization Agency] must act in the
interest of the owners of the SOEs [Socially
Owned Enterprises]", a regulation that cannot
be fulfilled if "clear and final ownership
determination [will be made] after a sale of
assets", as UNMIK new rule stated.
71. Section 8 - Establishment of Subsidiary
Corporation of Enterprises: "the requirements
of founders’ agreement and foundation meeting
of section 25 of the aforementioned Regulation
[Law on Business Organizations] shall all be
waived and that a founder’s statement signed
by a duly authorized representative of the
Agency shall be a valid substitute for a
founders’ agreement." This meant that the
Privatization Agency's representative received
the power from UNMIK to effectivelly be the
legal agent of a publicly owned enterprise and
to sell it, disregarding the Article (setion)
25 of the Law on Business Organizations, which
states: "Article 25 - Change of Registered
Agent or Office - 25.1 If a business
organization desires or is required to change
the name of the person designated as its
registered agent, it shall deliver to the
Registry a notice, signed by an authorized
person, that sets forth (i) the name of the
business organization and its registration
number, and (ii) the name of its new
registered agent."
72. Kosovo: UNMIK Changes Rules for
Privatization; ECIKS-Economic Initiative for
Kosovo; Prishtinë Kosova; April 22, 2005;
(accessed on Sept. 19, 2013) –
http://www.eciks.org/english/lajme.php?action=total_news&main_id=178.
73. Since UNMIK violated its own first
regulation—Regulation No. 1999/01, which
entered into force on June 10, 1999, the very
date the world organization passed its
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
Section 6.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/01
states that "administration by UNMIK of
[movable and immovable property in Kosovo]
shall be without prejudice to the right of any
person or entity to assert ownership or other
rights in the property"—a mandate clearly
violated by the U.N. Administrator Soren
Jessen-Petersen.
74. Already on Feb. 9, 2004, under Harri
Holkeri, Special Rep. of the Sec. General, the
UNMIK Regulation 2004/3, on the promulgation
of the law on public procurement in Kosovo
(Law No. 2003/17, meant to ensure "the most
efficient, cost-effective, transparent and
fair use of public funds and public resources
in Kosovo"; "to ensure the integrity and
accountability of public officials, civil
servants and other persons"; and "to promote
the establishment of an institutional culture
of unbiased, ethical and materially
disinterested professionalism among all public
officials, civil servants and other persons"),
in its Section # 3, on Exemptions, states that
"The present law shall not apply to […] UNMIK
[…] and an intergovernmental, bilateral,
multilateral or international financing
institution."
75. Kosovo Privatization Agency chief “stabbed
himself 11 times”; B92 & BETA Agency; June
22, 2012
-http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&dd=22&nav_id=80899;
or Government’s official commits suicide; H.S.
who has worked as an information officer at
the Prime Minister’s Office committed suicide;
Kosovapress; Jan. 29, 2013
-http://www.kosovapress.com/archive/?cid=2,85,159346;
or “Agim Zogaj, a protected witness then known
only as Witness X, was found dead, hanging
from a tree in Germany” – Close ally of Kosovo
PM cleared of war crimes for third time;
Reuters; Sept. 17, 2013 -
http://news.yahoo.com/close-ally-kosovo-pm-cleared-war-crimes-third-152716959.html
76. Kosovo privatization chief’s death ruled
suicide; Southeast European Times in Pristina;
June 16, 2013
-http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/06/16/feature-02.
77. "No Republic of Kosovo authority shall
have jurisdiction to review, diminish or
otherwise restrict the mandate, powers and
obligations [of the International Civilian
Representative and/or the International
Military Presence]" - Articles 147 and 153 of
the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.
See:
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Constitution1Kosovo.pdf
(accessed on Sept. 8, 2013)
78. „Овде нема индустрије, нема производње,
отварају се само пумпе за гориво, трговине и
ноћни клубови“ - See: Lazanski, Miroslav; One
Day In Priština; Politika; July 27, 2013. -
http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Miroslav-Lazanski/Jedan-dan-u-Pristini.sr.html
79. Compare that attitude by a foreign
governor toward citizens' welfare and honest
labor to the testimony by Count Bois-le-Comte
de Rigny, a 19th century French diplomat, who
left reports to the French Ministry for
Foreign Affairs about his interviews with
Prince Miloš of Serbia. In one of them, Prince
Miloš of the Autonomous Serbia told him that
he asked the Sultan’s Governor of Serbia, the
Vizier Mehmed, to allow the Moslem civilian
population to leave Serbia’s cities after
Serbia received its autonomy from Istanbul, or
that “if they aren’t allowed to leave, they
will starve to death”, the Vizier replied: “It
might happen but they would starve to death
anywhere else as well because they don’t want
to work. Taking that into consideration, it is
better that they die here since the Sultan
ordered that they remain here.” - See: Old
Belgrade - From Travelogues and Memoirs; edit.
Djuro Gavela; Kultura; Belgrade; 1951; Count
Bois-le-Comte de Rigny; Turks in Belgrade, pp.
69-77; (Complete memoirs: Serbian Academy of
Sciences and Arts; Spomenik XXIV for 1894).
80. Argentina and the Challenge of
Globalization; Address by Mr. Michel
Camdessus, Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund at the Academy of
Economic Science; Buenos Aires, Argentina, May
27, 1996 -
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/mds/1996/mds9611.htm
(accessed: Sept-16-2013)
81. Libyan rebels sell first oil shipment;
Boost for revolutionary leaders' credibility
and finances as 1m barrels – £77m worth – sold
to Swiss trading company; The Guardian; April
5, 2011 -
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/05/libya-rebels-sell-first-oil
82. Libyan rebel group sells first oil to U.S.
- The sale was made possible following an
April announcement by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control at the Treasury Department that
established a new licensing policy with Libya;
Crawford, Jamie; CNN National Security
Producer; June 9, 2011 -
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/08/libya.rebels.oil/index.html
83. Qatar recognizes Libyan rebels after oil
deal - Qatar is first Arab nation to recognize
Benghazi-based council after rebels announce
oil marketing deal with Gulf state; Al
Jazeera; March 28, 2011 -
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132814450241767.html
84. Europe leads Libyan oil race as rebels
warn Russia and China - Italian oil company
Eni led the charge back into Libya on Monday
as rebels swept into capital Tripoli, hailing
the end of Muammar Gaddafi's rule and warning
Russian and Chinese firms of contract
revisions; Reuters; August 22, 2011 -
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/19470/Business/Economy/Europe-leads-Libyan-oil-race-as-rebels-warn-Russia.aspx
85. The G20 Seoul Development Consensus for
Shared Growth; April 7, 2012 -
http://ausaid.gov.au/HotTopics/Pages/Display.aspx?QID=230
86. Where the "stabilize" part means
destabilization of local sovereignty and
stabilization of the "international
community's" control—as in Kosovo's
Constitution Articles 147 and 153.
87. Amidon, Stephen; Milton Friedman’s
Afterlife; New York Observer; September 18,
2007 -
http://www.naomiklein.org/shock-doctrine/reviews/milton-friedmans-afterlife
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