Jugoinfo
Della miseria della opposizione di destra in Serbia
Terza parte:
IL SOSTEGNO U.S.A. AI PARTITI ED AI MEDIA REAZIONARI
1. Interferenze esplicite del Dipartimento di Stato (Reuters 20/5/00)
2. Dibattito al Senato USA sull'appoggio alla "opposizione"
(29/7/99 - prima parte)
===
Europe, U.S. Back Further Protests Against Milosevic
4.01 a.m. ET (812 GMT) May 20, 2000
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — The United States and Europe
are coordinating initiatives to encourage strong
opposition among the Serb people to President Slobodan
Milosevic, top U.S. and European officials said.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jaime Gama,
foreign minister of Portugal which holds the European
Union presidency, told reporters they were encouraged
by public protests against Milosevic, who this week
cracked down on the independent media.
In a meeting here to prepare for next month's EU-U.S.
summit in Lisbon, Albright said they discussed ways to
"increase our support for the courageous men and women
who are demanding their rights in the cities and towns
across Serbia.'' Gama said the EU was focusing its
cooperation with Yugoslavia on "the civil society,
independent media, opposition municipalities, thus
creating conditions for a strong opposition coming
into the streets and expressing the will of the
people.''
He added: "And that's happening these last recent
months, and that's a very effective symbol of a
concrete hope for that country.''
The United States has helped coordinate the opposition
to Milosevic, condemning him for fomenting a series of
wars in former Yugoslavia culminating in NATO's air
campaign that drove marauding Serbian forces out of
Kosovo province last year.
Senior U.S. officials have held a number of meetings
with the disparate groups that oppose Milosevic, but
have been frustrated in their attempts to help forge a
united front.
Albright is due to discuss the issue with NATO allies
and with Balkan countries surrounding Serbia when she
attends a meeting of alliance foreign ministers in
Florence next Wednesday and Thursday.
BOLSHEVIK-STYLE OPPRESSION
The State Department on Wednesday condemned the
overnight occupation of the main independent
television station as an act of "desperate
Bolshevik-style oppression.''
It said Washington was adding six judges and
prosecutors linked with the crackdown to its list of
those barred from getting U.S. visas, as well as the
families of several unnamed top government officials.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told a news
briefing Washington would encourage its European
allies to join in this action and said Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright would discuss these and other
"joint actions'' during a NATO meeting in Florence
next week.
Albright said Friday that she had discussed the issue
with Gama, and said European countries "will be
considering this step.''
The U.S. list includes 808 names, not including the
six names due to be added, and is very similar to the
EU list, U.S. officials said.
In Belgrade around 2,000 opposition supporters
gathered on Friday for a third day of protests against
the government's seizure of the television station,
Studio B, but the turnout looked much smaller than
during the previous two nights.
On Thursday, hundreds of riot police broke up a rally
of around 10,000 at the same place, firing tear gas
and using batons. Several people were injured in the
clashes.
The opposition has accused the leftist-nationalist
authorities of leading the Balkan country into a state
of emergency and open dictatorship by seizing the
station.
===
STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG
Dear friends,
As the attack on Serbs and others continues in Kosovo and the US tries
to
assemble the forces to crush Serbia, it is very important to understand
just
how people like Richard Gelbard, formerly special Envoy to the Balkans,
view
the Serbian "Opposition." This is spelled out in detail in the text of
the
July 29, 1999 Senate hearings, supposedly concerning democratization of
Serbia. The text is most revealing. In it these officials state
plainly
that they view a CONTYROLLED opposition as a key part of their arsenal
of
weapons against Serbia. I have divided it into two emails, which follow.
Best regards,
Jared Israel
JULY 29, 1999, THURSDAY
HEARING OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
"PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA"
WITNESSES: ROBERT GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
JAMES PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
OF
STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION
CHAIRED BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH (R-OR)
SEN. G. SMITH: (Sounds gavel.) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot today. But we
adjourn (sic) this Subcommittee on European Affairs to discuss the
prospects
for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the United States can do to assist
those
in Serbia who seek to oust the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Our first panel consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, special
representative
of the president and the secretary of State for implementation of the
Dayton
peace accords, and Ambassador James Pardew, deputy special advisor to
the
president the secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation.
After we hear from administration representatives, the committee will
welcome
Ms. Sonja Biserko -- I apologize if my pronunciation is incorrect --
chairperson of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr.
James
Hooper, executive director of the Balkan Action Council [Hooper has been
adviser to the KLA]; Father Irinej Dobrijevic, executive director of the
Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the
United
States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the Open
Society
Institute. [Soros group]
This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series for this
committee on
United States policy in the Balkans. This afternoon we're going to focus
specifically on what is happening in Serbia right now as opposition
parties
are rallying their supporters to take to the streets against Milosevic,
as
army reservists are launching protests after their return from Kosovo,
as the
Serbian Orthodox Church has at least spoken out in favor of replacing
the
regime for the good of the Serbian people. In the fall, we will examine
the
course of political and diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing
in
Kosovo, as well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can
learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has enormous
implications for NATO and its future. In addition, I'm pleased that
Senator
Rod Grams will convene a hearing in September to look into the response
of
UNHCR to the Kosovo- Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with Senator Grams
that
assessing the performance, both positive and negative, of UNHCR can be
useful, if and when we are faced with another refugee explosion in the
future.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to appear before
the
committee to share their thoughts and expertise on the prospects for
democracy in Yugoslavia.
We have an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass.
Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo. And I feel
that
for the first time, many average citizens of Yugoslavia have finally
decided
that they've had enough as well of his policies of repression and
destruction.
He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to be in
vulnerable
positions before, always managing to outmaneuver his opponents. He seems
to
be able to divide and conquer that way.
Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I can only
imagine
that his desperation to hang on to power has intensified. Since the end
of
the war in Kosovo, opposition leaders in Serbia have launched
demonstrations
throughout the country. But thus far they have been unable to coordinate
their message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of the
population.
If these opposition forces have any hope of ousting Mr. Milosevic, it
seems
obvious to me that they must put aside personal differences and
political
ambition and for the sake of their country work together.
Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very hard on this
issue. And I hope that in your comments you can offer me and other
members
who will join us some hope that we're moving in the right direction.
Furthermore, there are several other actors in this process: Montenegran
President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the student
movement
which was so active in the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations
like the
independent media and trade unions. I'm interested in exploring what
role
they can play in bringing about democratic change for Serbia.
I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was introduced by Senator
Helms
in March that I co-sponsored along with 11 other senators. Specifically,
the
legislation authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia
over
the course of the next two years. This is critically important. We must
help
those who are trying to establish democracy in their country. I'm
pleased
that the administration agrees with this approach, and I understand that
tomorrow in Sarajevo the president will announce that the United States
will
dedicate $10 million for this purpose.
I encourage the administration to quickly identify appropriate
organizations
in Serbia so that this money can begin to have an effect as soon as
possible.
Milosevic must get this message: his days in power are over.
I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other members, but
without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador Gelbard, and we well
welcome
you and look forward to your remarks.
MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you particularly for giving
me
the opportunity once again to appear before the committee to discuss the
status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. With your permission, sir, I'd like to enter the full text
of
this statement for the record,
SEN. G. SMITH: Without objection, we'll receive that.
MR. GELBARD: This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for
the
future of Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast European region. The
success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the
establishment of the U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left
President
Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited domestically,
as
well as internationally.
Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an international pariah and
an
indicted war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in
Belgrade,
Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of
nations,
nor can they join the process of Euro- Atlantic integration symbolized
tomorrow by the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by
President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the
United
States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will
continue our policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to
provide the
people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international
organizations like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political
cronies
to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges
would
funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolonging the current regime and denying
Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We must keep Milosevic isolated.
Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working
closely
with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any
attempt at
weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of
democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's citizens
have
spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger
for
democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout
the
country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage
of
the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own
rallies and
are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia's
independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the
weight
of a draconian and repressive media law. These are all very positive
signs,
and we want to nurture them.
At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the
possibility
that the Milosevic regime will fall soon. Milosevic continues to hold
the
main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police
and
the state-owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult
even for
a united opposition in Serbia, but sadly the Serbian opposition remains
far
from united.
In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders -- and I am in
regular
contact with every segment of the democratic opposition -- we have urged
them
to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for the
common
good of Serbia and their people. I have repeatedly told opposition
leaders --
and I want to emphasize here that the United States, and the
international
community more broadly, cannot do their job for them.
Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside, which
means
from us. We can buttress the opposition's efforts; we can provide
training
and technical assistance to opposition parties; we can even provide
equipment, and we can help widen the reach of the independent media, but
we
cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can only
happen
if the opposition unites around a strong platform for positive change, a
platform that must emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic's
policies
and presents a viable democratic alternative. It's not for us to pick a
single winner out of the opposition pack. It is for them to combine
their
different strengths in service for a great goal.
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing
our
efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY.
Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the very short term,
our
support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's and
Yugoslavia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by
any
means here. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we spent
$16.5
million on programs in support of Serbia democratization. The beginning
of
the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in
Belgrade
by necessity cut short some of our programs, but we're now revitalizing
our
democracy support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. government's efforts on Serbia democratization
into
five categories. First, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure
that
Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our
sanctions
policy, which means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer
wall,
the Kosovo- related sanctions started a year and a half ago, and then
the
wartime sanctions, including the fuel embargo, but also the visa ban,
which
has had a demonstrably negative effect on members of the Milosevic
regime
psychologically and in real terms, and, of course, the The Hague
Tribunal
indictments.
Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of democratic groups,
including NGOs, political parties, independent media, youth
organizations and
independent labor unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. Third, we are
consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our
activities
both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally. Fourth, we are
encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in Southeast
Europe,
and particularly the neighbors, to harness their expertise with
democratization and transition. And fifth, we're providing strong
support for
the reform government in the FRY Republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in greater detail.
As I
mentioned, over the past two years U.S. agencies such as AID, as well as
NGOs
such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy have spent $16.5
million
on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil
society in the FRY. The situation this year was complicated by the
outbreak
of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the
pipeline
for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects, and we're using
it
right now.
I am working closely with the National Endowment family, including IRI
and
NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and,
crucially,
to encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among
the
experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide
them
with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kinds
that
may seem commonplace to us but represent a whole different way of
thinking to
them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia.
Youth
and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were
very
active in the '96-97 demonstrations in Serbia, and will undoubtedly be
important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's
Solidarity
Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and with our
support is now readying a new program for interaction.
On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Private
Enterprise
is preparing a program aimed at business leaders and independent
economists
in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in
Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society.
In short, by working with these groups, we want to show the people of
Serbia
that our policy is not aimed against them but against their leadership.
With
regard to independent media, we are moving on two fronts. First, in
order to
increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian
population, we are nearing completion of what we call the ring around
Serbia,
a network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and other international news programs on FM
frequencies
throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian language
broadcasting to 13-1/2 hours daily.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own
independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from
their
own sources, in their own context. To this end, AID, together with other
international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent
electronic media network in Serbia, that would assist individual
television
and radio stations, as well as create new links among them.
Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications,
and
utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the administration
does
support the Serbian Democratization Act sponsored by Senator Helms and
you,
Mr. Chairman, and 11 others.
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I'd like to highlight is
our
cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength
during
the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity has continued to be the
rule,
not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular
consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on
issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia as well as periodic meetings at
the
expert level. The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia
and
agree that isolating
Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy.
We have pushed back on some efforts to lift selectively the oil embargo
and
provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia, not
because
we object to helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a
fungible commodity. And its distribution in Serbia would inevitably
benefit
Milosevic's regime. The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to
promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their
democratization projects as well as to ensure that we are all sending
the
same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.
The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the countries of
Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of these
countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in
Sarajevo
under the rubric of the new stability pact for the region. At that
meeting
participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development
and
express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the
summit because of the Milosevic regime.
We believe the countries of Central and Southeast Europe with their vast
experience in the transition to democratic and market- oriented
societies
have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging
NGOs and
governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia
and
to share the benefits of the wisdom they've gained over the past decade.
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we
assign
special importance to our cooperation with and support for the
government of
Montenegro.
This morning, I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing
the
United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find astonishing in its
absolute incorrectness and the fact that it's totally wrong. We weren't
consulted on that editorial, of course. The fact is that over two years
ago
we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an
effective
counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began
meeting
with Djukanovic regularly, even before he became the president of
Montenegro
a year and a half ago. I was with him during his inauguration when we
felt
that a strong international presence, a public presence, would deter a
Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in budgetary
support
over the last several months, when no other countries stepped in to fill
the
gap, and we're prepared to do more.
We established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of
modernizing
the Montenegrin economy. We allowed Montenegrin-owned ships to enter
U.S.
ports during the conflict, and we provided a blanket waiver for
Montenegro
from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning as a way of
stimulating
their economy.
Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic coalition
government that focused on political and economic reform and integration
with
the European mainstream. He and his government have consistently
demonstrated
courage and determination in implementing reform and in resisting
Belgrade's
attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result,
we
have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial
and
technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance, with many
millions
of dollars through UNHCR.
Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible and
powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that President
Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting
democratic change in Serbia, too. While it's too small to change Serbia
directly, it can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition.
What
Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in
concrete
terms and particularly the same kind of sanctions waivers that we have
provided all along. We've urged the Europeans to take a more
forward-leaning
approach to Montenegro and come through in concrete terms.
Mr. Chairman, it's clear that we have not reached the point where we can
say
that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now,
however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the
indigenous
Serbian opposition to focus their energies and more effectively
articulate
their anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term,
we can
cultivate and strengthen these forces that will carry the democracy
banner as
long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these are important goals.
U.S.
leadership in this endeavor is critical, and your support is essential.
As I said, the proposed Serbian Democratization Act, which would
authorize
$100 million over two years for democratization projects, is an
excellent
example of the convergence of administration and congressional
perspectives
on the Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with
Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and restore real stability to the region......
[continued, following email]
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Terza parte:
IL SOSTEGNO U.S.A. AI PARTITI ED AI MEDIA REAZIONARI
1. Interferenze esplicite del Dipartimento di Stato (Reuters 20/5/00)
2. Dibattito al Senato USA sull'appoggio alla "opposizione"
(29/7/99 - prima parte)
===
Europe, U.S. Back Further Protests Against Milosevic
4.01 a.m. ET (812 GMT) May 20, 2000
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — The United States and Europe
are coordinating initiatives to encourage strong
opposition among the Serb people to President Slobodan
Milosevic, top U.S. and European officials said.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jaime Gama,
foreign minister of Portugal which holds the European
Union presidency, told reporters they were encouraged
by public protests against Milosevic, who this week
cracked down on the independent media.
In a meeting here to prepare for next month's EU-U.S.
summit in Lisbon, Albright said they discussed ways to
"increase our support for the courageous men and women
who are demanding their rights in the cities and towns
across Serbia.'' Gama said the EU was focusing its
cooperation with Yugoslavia on "the civil society,
independent media, opposition municipalities, thus
creating conditions for a strong opposition coming
into the streets and expressing the will of the
people.''
He added: "And that's happening these last recent
months, and that's a very effective symbol of a
concrete hope for that country.''
The United States has helped coordinate the opposition
to Milosevic, condemning him for fomenting a series of
wars in former Yugoslavia culminating in NATO's air
campaign that drove marauding Serbian forces out of
Kosovo province last year.
Senior U.S. officials have held a number of meetings
with the disparate groups that oppose Milosevic, but
have been frustrated in their attempts to help forge a
united front.
Albright is due to discuss the issue with NATO allies
and with Balkan countries surrounding Serbia when she
attends a meeting of alliance foreign ministers in
Florence next Wednesday and Thursday.
BOLSHEVIK-STYLE OPPRESSION
The State Department on Wednesday condemned the
overnight occupation of the main independent
television station as an act of "desperate
Bolshevik-style oppression.''
It said Washington was adding six judges and
prosecutors linked with the crackdown to its list of
those barred from getting U.S. visas, as well as the
families of several unnamed top government officials.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told a news
briefing Washington would encourage its European
allies to join in this action and said Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright would discuss these and other
"joint actions'' during a NATO meeting in Florence
next week.
Albright said Friday that she had discussed the issue
with Gama, and said European countries "will be
considering this step.''
The U.S. list includes 808 names, not including the
six names due to be added, and is very similar to the
EU list, U.S. officials said.
In Belgrade around 2,000 opposition supporters
gathered on Friday for a third day of protests against
the government's seizure of the television station,
Studio B, but the turnout looked much smaller than
during the previous two nights.
On Thursday, hundreds of riot police broke up a rally
of around 10,000 at the same place, firing tear gas
and using batons. Several people were injured in the
clashes.
The opposition has accused the leftist-nationalist
authorities of leading the Balkan country into a state
of emergency and open dictatorship by seizing the
station.
===
STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG
Dear friends,
As the attack on Serbs and others continues in Kosovo and the US tries
to
assemble the forces to crush Serbia, it is very important to understand
just
how people like Richard Gelbard, formerly special Envoy to the Balkans,
view
the Serbian "Opposition." This is spelled out in detail in the text of
the
July 29, 1999 Senate hearings, supposedly concerning democratization of
Serbia. The text is most revealing. In it these officials state
plainly
that they view a CONTYROLLED opposition as a key part of their arsenal
of
weapons against Serbia. I have divided it into two emails, which follow.
Best regards,
Jared Israel
JULY 29, 1999, THURSDAY
HEARING OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
"PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA"
WITNESSES: ROBERT GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
JAMES PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
OF
STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION
CHAIRED BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH (R-OR)
SEN. G. SMITH: (Sounds gavel.) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot today. But we
adjourn (sic) this Subcommittee on European Affairs to discuss the
prospects
for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the United States can do to assist
those
in Serbia who seek to oust the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Our first panel consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, special
representative
of the president and the secretary of State for implementation of the
Dayton
peace accords, and Ambassador James Pardew, deputy special advisor to
the
president the secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation.
After we hear from administration representatives, the committee will
welcome
Ms. Sonja Biserko -- I apologize if my pronunciation is incorrect --
chairperson of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr.
James
Hooper, executive director of the Balkan Action Council [Hooper has been
adviser to the KLA]; Father Irinej Dobrijevic, executive director of the
Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the
United
States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the Open
Society
Institute. [Soros group]
This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series for this
committee on
United States policy in the Balkans. This afternoon we're going to focus
specifically on what is happening in Serbia right now as opposition
parties
are rallying their supporters to take to the streets against Milosevic,
as
army reservists are launching protests after their return from Kosovo,
as the
Serbian Orthodox Church has at least spoken out in favor of replacing
the
regime for the good of the Serbian people. In the fall, we will examine
the
course of political and diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing
in
Kosovo, as well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can
learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has enormous
implications for NATO and its future. In addition, I'm pleased that
Senator
Rod Grams will convene a hearing in September to look into the response
of
UNHCR to the Kosovo- Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with Senator Grams
that
assessing the performance, both positive and negative, of UNHCR can be
useful, if and when we are faced with another refugee explosion in the
future.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to appear before
the
committee to share their thoughts and expertise on the prospects for
democracy in Yugoslavia.
We have an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass.
Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo. And I feel
that
for the first time, many average citizens of Yugoslavia have finally
decided
that they've had enough as well of his policies of repression and
destruction.
He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to be in
vulnerable
positions before, always managing to outmaneuver his opponents. He seems
to
be able to divide and conquer that way.
Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I can only
imagine
that his desperation to hang on to power has intensified. Since the end
of
the war in Kosovo, opposition leaders in Serbia have launched
demonstrations
throughout the country. But thus far they have been unable to coordinate
their message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of the
population.
If these opposition forces have any hope of ousting Mr. Milosevic, it
seems
obvious to me that they must put aside personal differences and
political
ambition and for the sake of their country work together.
Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very hard on this
issue. And I hope that in your comments you can offer me and other
members
who will join us some hope that we're moving in the right direction.
Furthermore, there are several other actors in this process: Montenegran
President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the student
movement
which was so active in the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations
like the
independent media and trade unions. I'm interested in exploring what
role
they can play in bringing about democratic change for Serbia.
I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was introduced by Senator
Helms
in March that I co-sponsored along with 11 other senators. Specifically,
the
legislation authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia
over
the course of the next two years. This is critically important. We must
help
those who are trying to establish democracy in their country. I'm
pleased
that the administration agrees with this approach, and I understand that
tomorrow in Sarajevo the president will announce that the United States
will
dedicate $10 million for this purpose.
I encourage the administration to quickly identify appropriate
organizations
in Serbia so that this money can begin to have an effect as soon as
possible.
Milosevic must get this message: his days in power are over.
I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other members, but
without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador Gelbard, and we well
welcome
you and look forward to your remarks.
MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you particularly for giving
me
the opportunity once again to appear before the committee to discuss the
status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. With your permission, sir, I'd like to enter the full text
of
this statement for the record,
SEN. G. SMITH: Without objection, we'll receive that.
MR. GELBARD: This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for
the
future of Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast European region. The
success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the
establishment of the U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left
President
Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited domestically,
as
well as internationally.
Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an international pariah and
an
indicted war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in
Belgrade,
Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of
nations,
nor can they join the process of Euro- Atlantic integration symbolized
tomorrow by the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by
President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the
United
States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will
continue our policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to
provide the
people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international
organizations like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political
cronies
to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges
would
funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolonging the current regime and denying
Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We must keep Milosevic isolated.
Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working
closely
with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any
attempt at
weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of
democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's citizens
have
spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger
for
democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout
the
country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage
of
the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own
rallies and
are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia's
independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the
weight
of a draconian and repressive media law. These are all very positive
signs,
and we want to nurture them.
At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the
possibility
that the Milosevic regime will fall soon. Milosevic continues to hold
the
main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police
and
the state-owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult
even for
a united opposition in Serbia, but sadly the Serbian opposition remains
far
from united.
In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders -- and I am in
regular
contact with every segment of the democratic opposition -- we have urged
them
to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for the
common
good of Serbia and their people. I have repeatedly told opposition
leaders --
and I want to emphasize here that the United States, and the
international
community more broadly, cannot do their job for them.
Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside, which
means
from us. We can buttress the opposition's efforts; we can provide
training
and technical assistance to opposition parties; we can even provide
equipment, and we can help widen the reach of the independent media, but
we
cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can only
happen
if the opposition unites around a strong platform for positive change, a
platform that must emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic's
policies
and presents a viable democratic alternative. It's not for us to pick a
single winner out of the opposition pack. It is for them to combine
their
different strengths in service for a great goal.
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing
our
efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY.
Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the very short term,
our
support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's and
Yugoslavia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by
any
means here. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we spent
$16.5
million on programs in support of Serbia democratization. The beginning
of
the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in
Belgrade
by necessity cut short some of our programs, but we're now revitalizing
our
democracy support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. government's efforts on Serbia democratization
into
five categories. First, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure
that
Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our
sanctions
policy, which means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer
wall,
the Kosovo- related sanctions started a year and a half ago, and then
the
wartime sanctions, including the fuel embargo, but also the visa ban,
which
has had a demonstrably negative effect on members of the Milosevic
regime
psychologically and in real terms, and, of course, the The Hague
Tribunal
indictments.
Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of democratic groups,
including NGOs, political parties, independent media, youth
organizations and
independent labor unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. Third, we are
consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our
activities
both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally. Fourth, we are
encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in Southeast
Europe,
and particularly the neighbors, to harness their expertise with
democratization and transition. And fifth, we're providing strong
support for
the reform government in the FRY Republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in greater detail.
As I
mentioned, over the past two years U.S. agencies such as AID, as well as
NGOs
such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy have spent $16.5
million
on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil
society in the FRY. The situation this year was complicated by the
outbreak
of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the
pipeline
for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects, and we're using
it
right now.
I am working closely with the National Endowment family, including IRI
and
NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and,
crucially,
to encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among
the
experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide
them
with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kinds
that
may seem commonplace to us but represent a whole different way of
thinking to
them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia.
Youth
and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were
very
active in the '96-97 demonstrations in Serbia, and will undoubtedly be
important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's
Solidarity
Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and with our
support is now readying a new program for interaction.
On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Private
Enterprise
is preparing a program aimed at business leaders and independent
economists
in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in
Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society.
In short, by working with these groups, we want to show the people of
Serbia
that our policy is not aimed against them but against their leadership.
With
regard to independent media, we are moving on two fronts. First, in
order to
increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian
population, we are nearing completion of what we call the ring around
Serbia,
a network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and other international news programs on FM
frequencies
throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian language
broadcasting to 13-1/2 hours daily.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own
independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from
their
own sources, in their own context. To this end, AID, together with other
international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent
electronic media network in Serbia, that would assist individual
television
and radio stations, as well as create new links among them.
Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications,
and
utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the administration
does
support the Serbian Democratization Act sponsored by Senator Helms and
you,
Mr. Chairman, and 11 others.
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I'd like to highlight is
our
cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength
during
the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity has continued to be the
rule,
not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular
consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on
issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia as well as periodic meetings at
the
expert level. The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia
and
agree that isolating
Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy.
We have pushed back on some efforts to lift selectively the oil embargo
and
provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia, not
because
we object to helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a
fungible commodity. And its distribution in Serbia would inevitably
benefit
Milosevic's regime. The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to
promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their
democratization projects as well as to ensure that we are all sending
the
same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.
The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the countries of
Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of these
countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in
Sarajevo
under the rubric of the new stability pact for the region. At that
meeting
participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development
and
express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the
summit because of the Milosevic regime.
We believe the countries of Central and Southeast Europe with their vast
experience in the transition to democratic and market- oriented
societies
have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging
NGOs and
governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia
and
to share the benefits of the wisdom they've gained over the past decade.
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we
assign
special importance to our cooperation with and support for the
government of
Montenegro.
This morning, I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing
the
United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find astonishing in its
absolute incorrectness and the fact that it's totally wrong. We weren't
consulted on that editorial, of course. The fact is that over two years
ago
we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an
effective
counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began
meeting
with Djukanovic regularly, even before he became the president of
Montenegro
a year and a half ago. I was with him during his inauguration when we
felt
that a strong international presence, a public presence, would deter a
Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in budgetary
support
over the last several months, when no other countries stepped in to fill
the
gap, and we're prepared to do more.
We established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of
modernizing
the Montenegrin economy. We allowed Montenegrin-owned ships to enter
U.S.
ports during the conflict, and we provided a blanket waiver for
Montenegro
from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning as a way of
stimulating
their economy.
Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic coalition
government that focused on political and economic reform and integration
with
the European mainstream. He and his government have consistently
demonstrated
courage and determination in implementing reform and in resisting
Belgrade's
attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result,
we
have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial
and
technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance, with many
millions
of dollars through UNHCR.
Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible and
powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that President
Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting
democratic change in Serbia, too. While it's too small to change Serbia
directly, it can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition.
What
Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in
concrete
terms and particularly the same kind of sanctions waivers that we have
provided all along. We've urged the Europeans to take a more
forward-leaning
approach to Montenegro and come through in concrete terms.
Mr. Chairman, it's clear that we have not reached the point where we can
say
that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now,
however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the
indigenous
Serbian opposition to focus their energies and more effectively
articulate
their anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term,
we can
cultivate and strengthen these forces that will carry the democracy
banner as
long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these are important goals.
U.S.
leadership in this endeavor is critical, and your support is essential.
As I said, the proposed Serbian Democratization Act, which would
authorize
$100 million over two years for democratization projects, is an
excellent
example of the convergence of administration and congressional
perspectives
on the Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with
Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and restore real stability to the region......
[continued, following email]
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Della miseria della opposizione di destra in Serbia
Quarta parte:
DIBATTITO AL SENATO U.S.A. (2/2; per la parte 1/2 si veda:
http://www.egroups.com/message/crj-mailinglist/221?&start=218 )
===
Part 2 of Senate Hearings
Ambassador Gelbard, I wonder if Balkan ghosts are still alive even in
Serbia
that these opposition forces can actually unite to extricate Mr.
Milosevic,
what are the odds? I mean, you see it happening? There's a number of
parties
here:
Mr. Draskovic, Mr. Djindjic. I mean, can they put aside personal
ambition for
national good in this effort?
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, Mr. Chairman, one thing I've learned after a
number
of years working in the Balkans is that I don't give odds.
SEN. SMITH: (Laughs.)
MR. GELBARD: I like to be pleasantly surprised, if that should happen.
The biggest obstacle right now, as I said, has been the fractiousness of
some
elements of the opposition and the possibility that they may not have
learned
from the mistakes they committed in the past, where they allowed their
egos,
personal differences, and perhaps even some ideological differences to
get in
the way from achieving the ultimate goal that they all say they desire.
As
you know, Mr. Chairman, and as Senator Biden knows very well, the
Zajedno
group blew their opportunity during the winter of '96-'97, when they had
victory in their hands. And a principal reason for that was, indeed, the
personality differences between Draskovic and Djindjic. Over the last
year
and a half some elements of the opposition appear to have learned from
this.
Several coalition groups have developed in a very positive way,
including the
Alliance For Change, the Alliance For Democratic Political Parties, and
others. And their message appears to be a constructive one, a
forward-looking
one about the future that could be that of Serbia and the FRY.
Our message to the opposition has been that this time they need to learn
from
the mistakes of the past because they have such an extraordinary
opportunity
now, and they need to find a way, if they can't construct a single
opposition
front, then at least to develop a loose coalition that follows the same
line
to avoid undercutting each other. There have been a number of
non-aggression
pacts signed among opposition groups and parties, so far. That's a
positive
sign, and we think it's critical that they continue to move forward on
this
kind of code of conduct, as well as similar platforms in their
demonstrations
as they move forward.
SEN. G. SMITH: As you look into the future, you think of Montenegro and
what
they're doing, is Montenegro something of a model for how Kosovo could
develop?
And is Montenegro likely to go independent as well?
MR. GELBARD: Well first, we have, as I said in my written testimony,
continued to point to the government, the ruling party, the ruling
coalition
in Montenegro as the right kind of example for Serbia in the sense that
they
have developed a multi-ethnic democratic coalition, which, incidentally,
includes Serbs, Montenegrans, Albanians, Bosniacs, lots of others. In
that
sense, we would hope that the Serbian political parties and NGOs, labor
unions and the like, could learn from this.
And it's very interesting for me that Serb opposition leaders really
look up
to President Djukanovic, not just because he's 6'-5", but because he is
somebody who clearly has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to
construct a democratic coalition that functions and that pursues
free-market
economic policies. So we certainly hope that whether it's the people of
Serbia and their leadership, their political parties, or in Kosovo, that
this
can be a kind of example.
At the same time, our preference, of course strong preference, as I have
repeatedly told President Djukanovic, is for Montenegro to remain an
integral
part of the The --
SEN. G. SMITH: Is that likely, or what do you suspect is happening?
MR. GELBARD: Well, President Djukanovic is looking for a fairer deal
under
the constitution that exists.
The constitution itself isn't bad. It has been the way Milosevic has
twisted
it over the last seven or eight years. And Djukanovic is now looking for
more
autonomy under this constitution, as a way of keeping Montenegro inside
of
Yugoslavia, and we don't disagree with that.
We want to continue to see Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia. And we feel
that
a country made up of equal republics is a reasonable and decent way to
go.
SEN. G. SMITH: Ambassador Pardew, without a democratic change in
Belgrade --
I mean, is it realistic for Kosovo to be a truly autonomous province of
Serbia?
MR. PARDEW: On the long run, we have to have a democratic change in
Belgrade.
We are going to do everything that we possibly can to create the
institutions
of democracy in Kosovo with or without regard to what happens in
Belgrade.
But you're right; there are limits to how far you can go with the
current
regime in Belgrade. So I agree with you.
SEN. G. SMITH: Senator Biden?
SEN. BIDEN: Gentlemen, they are both good statements I believe -- and so
much
to ask. Let me start by picking up where the chairman left off.
Montenegro has basically issued an ultimatum to Serbia. And it says
that: "We
want greater autonomy. We want to be able to conduct relations with
other
countries without Belgrade's interference." And it set a deadline for
that to
occur. They are going to hold a referendum. That's been pushed back
until, as
I understand it, until September, the ultimatum.
I don't know where that goes. I mean, Milosevic, it seems to me, if he
accedes to that, demonstrates he has even less power than he's trying to
portray he has hold of, and if he doesn't, there's nothing he can do to
stop
what Montenegro's going to do. And I don't know how they stop that from
rolling down the -- that ball from rolling. Would you comment on that,
Ambassador Gelbard?
MR. GELBARD: First, under the constitution of the FRY, the federal
constitution, and under Montenegro's constitution, they do have certain
rights which go further than we would normally expect part of a
sovereign
state to have. For example, they do have legitimately their own foreign
minister and ability to conduct some foreign policy functions
constitutionally. They also have the right to have a referendum on
independence under their constitution.
My sense is that right now the vote would not go in favor of
independence.
But what's very clear, Senator, is that Milosevic has been the one who
has
pushed the Montenegrin people in this direction over the course of the
last
two years. As I mentioned in my testimony, Milosevic and his puppet, the
former president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, tried to overthrow
Djukanovic before he was inaugurated as president on June 15th, 1998.
They
also increased the size of the army, the VJ, in Montenegro during the
conflict in Kosovo from 9,500, which is its usual size, up to 40,000 by
adding on reservists and some other regular army personnel. And it was a
very
delicate dance that took place there between the VJ and the police,
which
come under the Montenegrin government.
I think Milosevic knew that if the army tried to overthrow Djukanovic,
there
was likely to be civil war, the army was likely to fracture; and the
police
are quite strong. Nonetheless, the Montenegrin government is showing
prudence
in how it's trying to proceed. Djukanovic, by his own public statements,
has
said that he doesn't want independence; what he wants is equal
opportunity
inside of the FRY.
SEN. BIDEN: But he's threatened a referendum, hasn't he?
MR. GELBARD: He's threatened a referendum, which, as I said, is
legitimate
under their constitution.
SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.
MR. GELBARD: So I wouldn't want to give you a hypothetical answer about
where
this is going.
But Djukanovic is trying to keep his coalition to gether, he's trying to
cope
with the significantly increased percentage of the population who are
now
tremendously frustrated by Milosevic's boycotts and blockades against
the
Montenegrin people, and I think President Djukanovic deserves a great
deal of
credit for trying to walk a very delicate line right now, even as he's
trying
to stay inside Yugoslavia.
SEN. BIDEN: Great non-answer. (Laughter.) And I appreciate it very much.
It
seems to me, because I'm not a diplomat and most people don't care about
foreign policy and they forget what I have to say anyway --
MR. GELBARD: I never do, Senator.
SEN. BIDEN: It seems to me that Djukanovic has himself -- and I'm not
being
critical of him -- I mean, I think he's looking around and saying, "How
do I
cut my deal so that I get a major piece of this reconstruction that's
going
to go on in the Balkans here?" Not a whole lot that Serbia can do to
block
access now; boycotts are aren't going to matter a whole lot if, in fact,
they
attempt to.
And I just wonder how this is playing in Belgrade, whether or not they
fear a
referendum or Djukanovic fears a referendum more than Belgrade fears a
referendum, but you've -- you know, you've answered it as you probably
should.
We talk about -- Ambassador Pardew -- we talk about supporting the
media, a
free and open media. How? How do we do that? I thought you had said
that, or
maybe you said that --
MR. PARDEW: Yes. Yes.
SEN. BIDEN: Either one of you or both of you. Mechanically, how do we do
that?
MR. PARDEW: Well, we work through nongovernmental organizations. We have
established, as Ambassador Gelbard mentioned, a ring around Serbia,
which is
using international broadcasts, but we're offering that to independent
voices
in Serbia. We are using international facilities to make -- and making
them
available to independent groups.
SEN. BIDEN: Let me put it another way. We can make facilities available;
are
we prepared to shut down facilities that spew propaganda?
MR. GELBARD: Well, we have, senator.
SEN. BIDEN: We have. I mean --
MR. GELBARD: During the --
SEN. BIDEN: -- over the long haul? Is this the --
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, during the conflict in Kosovo we and our
allies --
SEN. BIDEN: No, I know that. I want to know from now.
MR. GELBARD: Well, the -- as far as I'm aware, Serb television has still
been
cut off the (EUTELSAT ?) facilities, and we've made sure that whenever
they
made an attempt -- and there was a brief moment when they got back on
another
satellite -- we shut them off those. What we're really trying to do, the
use
of the international facilities that Ambassador Pardew referred to,
particularly the RFE, RL, and the ring around Serbia, is a temporary
measure.
What we're trying to do over the long term is support an alternative
indigenous voice for the Serbian people through mechanisms such as ANEM,
the
Network of Independent Radio and Television. We have funds available
that we
were just about to deliver when the conflict broke out and Milosevic
switched
them off. But we have funds available that we are on the verge of
providing
to them again so that independent television and radio can be augmented
throughout Serbia. We're supporting Montenegran television and radio so
that
they can be another voice for the Serb opposition and the Serb people as
well
as, of course, for the Montenegran people. And we're looking at other
means
to really augment the capability or start up again the capability of
free
Serbian voices inside of Serbia.
MR. PARDEW: Can I add to that, senator?
SEN. BIDEN: Yes.
MR. PARDEW: We are -- the international community is promoting printing
of
newspapers that were previously printed in Kosovo now being printed in
Macedonia and distributed in Kosovo free of charge. You will hear from
John
Fox (sp) later, I think, from the Soros Foundation. They've been
instrumental
in putting funding in to independent radio in Kosovo. We encourage that.
The
former Serbian radio and TV in Pristina has been taken over by the
international community, and we've denied one access to one group to
dominate
that because we don't want a single voice, and we will ensure that there
are
multiple voices on this.
So there are a range of programs ongoing in Kosovo, as Bob mentioned.
SEN. BIDEN: What can we do about inside Serbia? For example, Draskovic
continues to deny access to Studio B, which is supposedly, as I
understand it
-- he's not?
MR. GELBARD: No, he's actually given access to Studio B -- excuse me;
given
access of Studio B to Radio B-92. And my understanding is that Radio
B-92,
one of the independent voices, has just reopened as Radio B-292. We want
Draskovic to open up Studio B to the rest of the opposition, and that's
a
message that he'll be getting from us in the next few days.
SEN. BIDEN: Last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman?
SEN. G. SMITH: Sure.
SEN. BIDEN: We all say, including me, that ultimately there is no
long-term
integration of the Balkans into an undivided Europe until Milosevic
goes. I
wonder whether we're saying that too much these days, including me. Let
me be
more precise.
As long as there is success in Sarajevo today -- I guess it's today or
tomorrow -- tomorrow, as long as the commitments are real, as long as
the
civilian police force is put in place, the media is not dominated, the
reconstruction of Kosovo and Macedonia and Montenegro and the
surrounding
areas really begins in earnest, with the European Community taking the
lead,
I don't know what Serbia can do, under Milosevic's leadership, that can
much
effect whether or not we succeed in that part. In other words,
admittedly, at
the end of the day, until the Serbian people have come to terms with
their
leadership and what was done, you can't have a solution here. But I
don't
know what Milosevic and an antagonistic Serbia can do, as a practical
matter,
to effect about 500 things we've got to do in the meantime anyway, to
begin
to put together, economically and politically, a larger plan for the
Balkans.
Am I missing something here?
MR. GELBARD: Senator, I believe that Milosevic has an infinite
capability for
creating damage. Even while he had so many problems at home, he tried to
overthrow the Dodik government, the moderate Bosnian Serb government in
Republika Srpska. We were able to stymie that, and the Dodik -- Dodik
and his
government emerged strong after the conflict --
SEN. BIDEN: Is that related to his ability if it -- when it was even a
possibility, to his ability to provide force to back up any effort that
would
be undertaken, ultimately? The ability to provide assistance?
MR. GELBARD: He still has the capability of providing force, not in
Bosnia,
but in Montenegro, and in his own perverse way --
SEN. BIDEN: How can he do that? Be specific --
MR. GELBARD: Through the army.
SEN. BIDEN: If in fact that occurs, I can't imagine that the
international
community and KFOR will not come down on that effort like a God- -- a
gosh-darn mountainside being blown up. I don't understand that. I mean,
do
you mean -- is there any doubt on the part of the alliance that if there
is
use of military force, of the VJ, in Montenegro, that we won't use all
force
available to us to take them out?
SEN. SMITH: Or are you telling us that we won't? I mean, I don't --
MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain that that is something which is in -- that
is
not necessarily in NATO's agreed NATO action at this point, or when the
current mandate terminates. If it isn't --
SEN. BIDEN: But --
MR. GELBARD: -- what I worry about is that Milosevic survives by
creating
trouble. He is in the worst trouble he's ever been. He's in a corner.
The
economy has collapsed totally. Real wages were at the same level as the
early
1950s before the conflict, and right now they have virtually no reserves
left. But this is why it is imperative to see a change in the regime, to
have
democratic government arrive in Belgrade as a way of having the region
whole.
That's why we --
SEN. BIDEN: I couldn't agree more, but let me --
MR. GELBARD: -- consider that to be an imperative in our foreign policy.
SEN. BIDEN: As you know, there has been no one that you have known in
Congress that has been more supportive of arriving at that conclusion,
but I
like to think I am a realist.
The idea that we are going to produce a democratic government in Serbia,
between now an d the end of the year, is about as likely as this podium
getting up and walking to the back of the room. And what I want to sort
of
disabuse everybody of here is a new State Department-arrived-at notion
that,
through State Department-speak, we are going to arrive at something
that's
not possible. The most likely thing to do is nail the son of a gun by
literally going in and getting him and dragging him to The Hague. If we
had a
brain in our collective heads, that's what we would do; literally, not
figuratively. But we are not going to do that because our European
friends
all lack the will, and we will lack the willingness to push that
forcefully.
And so I just hope that we make it clear that the idea that he may be
alive
and well in Serbia does not mean that we -- the isolation of Serbia and
him
in fact -- and him in particular does not allow us to pursue all our
other
objectives in the meantime. If they want to wither on the vine and die,
so be
it -- so be it -- which takes me to a question relating to aid.
We are saying -- we and the Europeans are saying that we will provide
humanitarian financial -- we are not planning financial assistance or
reconstruction aid but that we will provide humanitarian assistance. I
think
that is a very, very, very fine line to draw. And I think that we should
be
very aware that his ability to create mischief and gain credibility will
relate to how tightly we parse that.
How do we prevent Milosevic from claiming credit for Western assistance
to
Serbia, particularly when the media is still not a free media?
So I just -- I'm not even asking you to respond, because it's unfair. If
you'd like to, I'd welcome it. But I just think that this ain't over
till
it's over. It's not over till he's gone. But we cannot assume as long as
he's
[not?]gone we can hedge our assessment of what we're able to do outside
of
Serbia, in my humble opinion.
SEN. G. SMITH: I'd like to follow on to what Senator Biden is saying
here.
One of the reasons that I voted to support President Clinton and the
allies
in this action in Kosovo was my belief that if Milosevic could work this
kind
of mischief, we would be pinned down in Bosnia for a long, long, long
time,
and that by defanging his military, we could go home earlier. Is that a
naïve
belief on my part?
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, to answer Senator Biden's question --
SEN. G. SMITH: And by the way, I think he's going to commit mischief if
we're
saying that we're not willing to do anything.
MR. GELBARD: First to answer Senator Biden, though, Senator, I agree
with you.
That's why we are continuing to press ahead on all other initiatives and
we're working with the Europeans on the stability pact, which is a
regional
effort, a regional approach regarding democracy, security and economic
development. And that's what we feel it has to be, a regional focus on
every
place.
The line -- the fine line you ask about, I agree with you again. That's
why,
again, we're not trying to play games on the issue of assistance; we're
saying humanitarian assistance means food and medicine. We have looked
at
other types of possible assistance, but we feel, as I said in my
statement,
that it's imperative to maintain the isolation with the three layers of
sanctions -- the outer wall, Kosovo-related sanctions, and the wartime
sanctions.
And the -- President Clinton and the administration, entire
administration,
feel very strongly that we should be maintaining all these sanctions
until --
as a way of maintaining this type of isolation, because you're right, it
would be very easy to begin to blur the line. And I know, as you know,
Senator, there are countries out there that are interested in moving
over
different lines over time.
SEN. BIDEN: And I'm worried about us setting the bar so high that we
build in
failure here, because if a year from now there is not democracy in
Serbia,
after we keep talking this claptrap about, you know, democratic -- there
aren't any democratic forces in Serbia now. Draskovic ain't a Democrat.
This
guy is no box of chocolates. He's better than the other guy, but this is
no
box of chocolates. I think we should be honest about this.
And look, just to make it clear to you where I am, and just speaking as
one
senator, there's a big difference between clearing the bridge -- the
bridge
debris out of the Danube so our allies can use the Danube, and building
a new
bridge. I'll clear it. I will do everything in my power here to make
sure
there's not a cent that can be spent to build it.
And I just think that they've got to come to their -- the realization of
what
they have enabled Milosevic to do, and until there are democratic forces
there, I am -- like for example, the press asks me all the time, we
voted 100
-- what was it? -- $100 million in the Serbian -- I don't know who to
give it
to? Okay?
I mean, I know how -- I know what I'd like to give it to. But we
Americans
tend to think, whether it was Ronald Reagan in, you know, in Latin
America or
us in the Balkans, that there's some Jeffersonian democrat waiting to
spring
up somewhere to lead a -- you know, a democratic rival there. There
ain't no
Democrats in Serbia, that I've found. I mean -- democratic leadership,
that
has any realistic possibility of moving. So I guess what I'm trying to
say to
you is this. I just think it's a little bit like -- the secretary got
mad at
me when I a month ago said stop talking about Rambouillet, stop talking
about
how we want to bring them back to the table. We don't want to bring them
back, we want to beat the hell ou t of them until they stop. That's what
we
want. And that's the only thing that worked.
And I think this idea that we're really in effect saying we're not going
to
succeed until we have a democratic Serbia, then that is ultimate
success. But
I'm afraid you're going to have people up here saying, well, geez, it's
been
-- it's been four months, you know? -- don't have it yet, so I guess we
shouldn't be spending all this money doing this other stuff over here.
MR. GELBARD: Well, in fact, I said in my statement that in the short
term
it's hard to imagine that it will be able to achieve a democratic
solution in
Serbia. That's why we have to be prepared to support democratic forces
--
SEN. BIDEN: And there are democratic forces.
MR. GELBARD: Well --
SEN. BIDEN: Ain't much democratic leadership.
MR. GELBARD: Tomorrow a representative of the democratic opposition,
Draguslav Ovramovic (sp), will be in Sarajevo for the summit. This is a
man
who is a very high common denominator. He is part of the alliance for
change.
Vuk Draskovic is a really flawed individual. But --
SEN. BIDEN: He is the Rasputin of the 21st century, about to be. I mean,
we're not quite there yet.
MR. GELBARD: I'll tell him you said it. (Laughs.)
SEN. BIDEN: I told him that.
MR. GELBARD: Yeah.
SEN. BIDEN: So I -- I'd tell him. I --
MR. GELBARD: We still hope that he can be part of the solution here --
SEN.
BIDEN: I hope so, too, but he's going to take work.
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman -- he's going to take a lot of work.
SEN. BIDEN: That's a very high maintenance fellow.
MR. GELBARD: I know. Believe me, I know. (Laughs.)
Mr. Chairman, regarding your question, the -- (stops) -- the Republika
Srpska
has emerged, coming out of the conflict, if anything with significantly
strengthened moderate leadership. The Dodik government is stronger than
they
were at the beginning of the year. They are stronger than they were
after the
elections in September.
When I last met with Prime Minister Dodik, about a month ago, he was
much
more comfortable, much more confident about his ability to govern. We
are
seeing that the extremes, who were weakened after the September national
elections, are becoming weaker still. High Representative Carlos
Westendorp,
whose last day is tomorrow, banished President Poplasen, the leader of
the
Radical Party, from his position, and it's now very clear that his
Radical
Party is weaker than ever, as is Karadzic's SDS. We see prospects for
the
moderates better than ever. And while there's still a ways to go, the
prospects look much better.
SEN. G. SMITH: Thank you.
MR. PARDEW: Could I just comment on the democracy issue? We don't have
any
illusions about who we're dealing with here, but I do think democracy is
an
aspiration of many of the Serb people. And in that regard, I don't think
we
ought to stop talking about it, Senator. I think we ought to -- we ought
to
continue to discuss it as an issue of --
SEN. BIDEN: I'm not suggesting we don't talk about it; I'm suggesting we
talk
about it realistically. I mean, for example, it's amazing what can
happen
when you eliminate the extremes. I mean, the single best thing that ever
happened to the Republic of Srpska is we kicked the living hell out of
Milosevic. There ain't no alternative left. That's the reason why it
happened. It had nothing to do with elections, it had to do with the
fact
that Westendorp had the right idea, number one; and number two, there
ain't
no alternative. Belgrade's no beacon, no help, no place to go. So there
is no
alternative. It's amazing what a salutary impact that has upon extremes
in
countries.
And that's why the single best thing we -- my dream is to visit
Milosevic in
prison. (Laughter.) I mean that sincerely. I'm not being facetious.
Because
you put Milosevic in prison, and things in the region will change
drastically.
If you said to me, "You can leave him where he is or give him a plane
ticket
to take off to some -- like the former leader of Uganda, well, you know,
we
gave him -- what was his name? -- Idi Amin -- we can give him an "Idi
Amin
passport"
and he would leave; I'd say no, leave him there, leave him there till we
get
him. Put him in jail. Short of that, I don't know how we get to the
point.
And by the way, I often wondered, Karadzic's party, the SDS, the only
misnomer, it should have dropped the "D." I mean, these guys are BAD
guys.
BAD guys. They're no good. SEN. G. SMITH: When Senator Biden makes that
visit
to that prison, I want to be your junior companion.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it.
SEN. BIDEN: Thanks.
END
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
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------------------------------------------------------------
Quarta parte:
DIBATTITO AL SENATO U.S.A. (2/2; per la parte 1/2 si veda:
http://www.egroups.com/message/crj-mailinglist/221?&start=218 )
===
Part 2 of Senate Hearings
Ambassador Gelbard, I wonder if Balkan ghosts are still alive even in
Serbia
that these opposition forces can actually unite to extricate Mr.
Milosevic,
what are the odds? I mean, you see it happening? There's a number of
parties
here:
Mr. Draskovic, Mr. Djindjic. I mean, can they put aside personal
ambition for
national good in this effort?
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, Mr. Chairman, one thing I've learned after a
number
of years working in the Balkans is that I don't give odds.
SEN. SMITH: (Laughs.)
MR. GELBARD: I like to be pleasantly surprised, if that should happen.
The biggest obstacle right now, as I said, has been the fractiousness of
some
elements of the opposition and the possibility that they may not have
learned
from the mistakes they committed in the past, where they allowed their
egos,
personal differences, and perhaps even some ideological differences to
get in
the way from achieving the ultimate goal that they all say they desire.
As
you know, Mr. Chairman, and as Senator Biden knows very well, the
Zajedno
group blew their opportunity during the winter of '96-'97, when they had
victory in their hands. And a principal reason for that was, indeed, the
personality differences between Draskovic and Djindjic. Over the last
year
and a half some elements of the opposition appear to have learned from
this.
Several coalition groups have developed in a very positive way,
including the
Alliance For Change, the Alliance For Democratic Political Parties, and
others. And their message appears to be a constructive one, a
forward-looking
one about the future that could be that of Serbia and the FRY.
Our message to the opposition has been that this time they need to learn
from
the mistakes of the past because they have such an extraordinary
opportunity
now, and they need to find a way, if they can't construct a single
opposition
front, then at least to develop a loose coalition that follows the same
line
to avoid undercutting each other. There have been a number of
non-aggression
pacts signed among opposition groups and parties, so far. That's a
positive
sign, and we think it's critical that they continue to move forward on
this
kind of code of conduct, as well as similar platforms in their
demonstrations
as they move forward.
SEN. G. SMITH: As you look into the future, you think of Montenegro and
what
they're doing, is Montenegro something of a model for how Kosovo could
develop?
And is Montenegro likely to go independent as well?
MR. GELBARD: Well first, we have, as I said in my written testimony,
continued to point to the government, the ruling party, the ruling
coalition
in Montenegro as the right kind of example for Serbia in the sense that
they
have developed a multi-ethnic democratic coalition, which, incidentally,
includes Serbs, Montenegrans, Albanians, Bosniacs, lots of others. In
that
sense, we would hope that the Serbian political parties and NGOs, labor
unions and the like, could learn from this.
And it's very interesting for me that Serb opposition leaders really
look up
to President Djukanovic, not just because he's 6'-5", but because he is
somebody who clearly has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to
construct a democratic coalition that functions and that pursues
free-market
economic policies. So we certainly hope that whether it's the people of
Serbia and their leadership, their political parties, or in Kosovo, that
this
can be a kind of example.
At the same time, our preference, of course strong preference, as I have
repeatedly told President Djukanovic, is for Montenegro to remain an
integral
part of the The --
SEN. G. SMITH: Is that likely, or what do you suspect is happening?
MR. GELBARD: Well, President Djukanovic is looking for a fairer deal
under
the constitution that exists.
The constitution itself isn't bad. It has been the way Milosevic has
twisted
it over the last seven or eight years. And Djukanovic is now looking for
more
autonomy under this constitution, as a way of keeping Montenegro inside
of
Yugoslavia, and we don't disagree with that.
We want to continue to see Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia. And we feel
that
a country made up of equal republics is a reasonable and decent way to
go.
SEN. G. SMITH: Ambassador Pardew, without a democratic change in
Belgrade --
I mean, is it realistic for Kosovo to be a truly autonomous province of
Serbia?
MR. PARDEW: On the long run, we have to have a democratic change in
Belgrade.
We are going to do everything that we possibly can to create the
institutions
of democracy in Kosovo with or without regard to what happens in
Belgrade.
But you're right; there are limits to how far you can go with the
current
regime in Belgrade. So I agree with you.
SEN. G. SMITH: Senator Biden?
SEN. BIDEN: Gentlemen, they are both good statements I believe -- and so
much
to ask. Let me start by picking up where the chairman left off.
Montenegro has basically issued an ultimatum to Serbia. And it says
that: "We
want greater autonomy. We want to be able to conduct relations with
other
countries without Belgrade's interference." And it set a deadline for
that to
occur. They are going to hold a referendum. That's been pushed back
until, as
I understand it, until September, the ultimatum.
I don't know where that goes. I mean, Milosevic, it seems to me, if he
accedes to that, demonstrates he has even less power than he's trying to
portray he has hold of, and if he doesn't, there's nothing he can do to
stop
what Montenegro's going to do. And I don't know how they stop that from
rolling down the -- that ball from rolling. Would you comment on that,
Ambassador Gelbard?
MR. GELBARD: First, under the constitution of the FRY, the federal
constitution, and under Montenegro's constitution, they do have certain
rights which go further than we would normally expect part of a
sovereign
state to have. For example, they do have legitimately their own foreign
minister and ability to conduct some foreign policy functions
constitutionally. They also have the right to have a referendum on
independence under their constitution.
My sense is that right now the vote would not go in favor of
independence.
But what's very clear, Senator, is that Milosevic has been the one who
has
pushed the Montenegrin people in this direction over the course of the
last
two years. As I mentioned in my testimony, Milosevic and his puppet, the
former president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, tried to overthrow
Djukanovic before he was inaugurated as president on June 15th, 1998.
They
also increased the size of the army, the VJ, in Montenegro during the
conflict in Kosovo from 9,500, which is its usual size, up to 40,000 by
adding on reservists and some other regular army personnel. And it was a
very
delicate dance that took place there between the VJ and the police,
which
come under the Montenegrin government.
I think Milosevic knew that if the army tried to overthrow Djukanovic,
there
was likely to be civil war, the army was likely to fracture; and the
police
are quite strong. Nonetheless, the Montenegrin government is showing
prudence
in how it's trying to proceed. Djukanovic, by his own public statements,
has
said that he doesn't want independence; what he wants is equal
opportunity
inside of the FRY.
SEN. BIDEN: But he's threatened a referendum, hasn't he?
MR. GELBARD: He's threatened a referendum, which, as I said, is
legitimate
under their constitution.
SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.
MR. GELBARD: So I wouldn't want to give you a hypothetical answer about
where
this is going.
But Djukanovic is trying to keep his coalition to gether, he's trying to
cope
with the significantly increased percentage of the population who are
now
tremendously frustrated by Milosevic's boycotts and blockades against
the
Montenegrin people, and I think President Djukanovic deserves a great
deal of
credit for trying to walk a very delicate line right now, even as he's
trying
to stay inside Yugoslavia.
SEN. BIDEN: Great non-answer. (Laughter.) And I appreciate it very much.
It
seems to me, because I'm not a diplomat and most people don't care about
foreign policy and they forget what I have to say anyway --
MR. GELBARD: I never do, Senator.
SEN. BIDEN: It seems to me that Djukanovic has himself -- and I'm not
being
critical of him -- I mean, I think he's looking around and saying, "How
do I
cut my deal so that I get a major piece of this reconstruction that's
going
to go on in the Balkans here?" Not a whole lot that Serbia can do to
block
access now; boycotts are aren't going to matter a whole lot if, in fact,
they
attempt to.
And I just wonder how this is playing in Belgrade, whether or not they
fear a
referendum or Djukanovic fears a referendum more than Belgrade fears a
referendum, but you've -- you know, you've answered it as you probably
should.
We talk about -- Ambassador Pardew -- we talk about supporting the
media, a
free and open media. How? How do we do that? I thought you had said
that, or
maybe you said that --
MR. PARDEW: Yes. Yes.
SEN. BIDEN: Either one of you or both of you. Mechanically, how do we do
that?
MR. PARDEW: Well, we work through nongovernmental organizations. We have
established, as Ambassador Gelbard mentioned, a ring around Serbia,
which is
using international broadcasts, but we're offering that to independent
voices
in Serbia. We are using international facilities to make -- and making
them
available to independent groups.
SEN. BIDEN: Let me put it another way. We can make facilities available;
are
we prepared to shut down facilities that spew propaganda?
MR. GELBARD: Well, we have, senator.
SEN. BIDEN: We have. I mean --
MR. GELBARD: During the --
SEN. BIDEN: -- over the long haul? Is this the --
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, during the conflict in Kosovo we and our
allies --
SEN. BIDEN: No, I know that. I want to know from now.
MR. GELBARD: Well, the -- as far as I'm aware, Serb television has still
been
cut off the (EUTELSAT ?) facilities, and we've made sure that whenever
they
made an attempt -- and there was a brief moment when they got back on
another
satellite -- we shut them off those. What we're really trying to do, the
use
of the international facilities that Ambassador Pardew referred to,
particularly the RFE, RL, and the ring around Serbia, is a temporary
measure.
What we're trying to do over the long term is support an alternative
indigenous voice for the Serbian people through mechanisms such as ANEM,
the
Network of Independent Radio and Television. We have funds available
that we
were just about to deliver when the conflict broke out and Milosevic
switched
them off. But we have funds available that we are on the verge of
providing
to them again so that independent television and radio can be augmented
throughout Serbia. We're supporting Montenegran television and radio so
that
they can be another voice for the Serb opposition and the Serb people as
well
as, of course, for the Montenegran people. And we're looking at other
means
to really augment the capability or start up again the capability of
free
Serbian voices inside of Serbia.
MR. PARDEW: Can I add to that, senator?
SEN. BIDEN: Yes.
MR. PARDEW: We are -- the international community is promoting printing
of
newspapers that were previously printed in Kosovo now being printed in
Macedonia and distributed in Kosovo free of charge. You will hear from
John
Fox (sp) later, I think, from the Soros Foundation. They've been
instrumental
in putting funding in to independent radio in Kosovo. We encourage that.
The
former Serbian radio and TV in Pristina has been taken over by the
international community, and we've denied one access to one group to
dominate
that because we don't want a single voice, and we will ensure that there
are
multiple voices on this.
So there are a range of programs ongoing in Kosovo, as Bob mentioned.
SEN. BIDEN: What can we do about inside Serbia? For example, Draskovic
continues to deny access to Studio B, which is supposedly, as I
understand it
-- he's not?
MR. GELBARD: No, he's actually given access to Studio B -- excuse me;
given
access of Studio B to Radio B-92. And my understanding is that Radio
B-92,
one of the independent voices, has just reopened as Radio B-292. We want
Draskovic to open up Studio B to the rest of the opposition, and that's
a
message that he'll be getting from us in the next few days.
SEN. BIDEN: Last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman?
SEN. G. SMITH: Sure.
SEN. BIDEN: We all say, including me, that ultimately there is no
long-term
integration of the Balkans into an undivided Europe until Milosevic
goes. I
wonder whether we're saying that too much these days, including me. Let
me be
more precise.
As long as there is success in Sarajevo today -- I guess it's today or
tomorrow -- tomorrow, as long as the commitments are real, as long as
the
civilian police force is put in place, the media is not dominated, the
reconstruction of Kosovo and Macedonia and Montenegro and the
surrounding
areas really begins in earnest, with the European Community taking the
lead,
I don't know what Serbia can do, under Milosevic's leadership, that can
much
effect whether or not we succeed in that part. In other words,
admittedly, at
the end of the day, until the Serbian people have come to terms with
their
leadership and what was done, you can't have a solution here. But I
don't
know what Milosevic and an antagonistic Serbia can do, as a practical
matter,
to effect about 500 things we've got to do in the meantime anyway, to
begin
to put together, economically and politically, a larger plan for the
Balkans.
Am I missing something here?
MR. GELBARD: Senator, I believe that Milosevic has an infinite
capability for
creating damage. Even while he had so many problems at home, he tried to
overthrow the Dodik government, the moderate Bosnian Serb government in
Republika Srpska. We were able to stymie that, and the Dodik -- Dodik
and his
government emerged strong after the conflict --
SEN. BIDEN: Is that related to his ability if it -- when it was even a
possibility, to his ability to provide force to back up any effort that
would
be undertaken, ultimately? The ability to provide assistance?
MR. GELBARD: He still has the capability of providing force, not in
Bosnia,
but in Montenegro, and in his own perverse way --
SEN. BIDEN: How can he do that? Be specific --
MR. GELBARD: Through the army.
SEN. BIDEN: If in fact that occurs, I can't imagine that the
international
community and KFOR will not come down on that effort like a God- -- a
gosh-darn mountainside being blown up. I don't understand that. I mean,
do
you mean -- is there any doubt on the part of the alliance that if there
is
use of military force, of the VJ, in Montenegro, that we won't use all
force
available to us to take them out?
SEN. SMITH: Or are you telling us that we won't? I mean, I don't --
MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain that that is something which is in -- that
is
not necessarily in NATO's agreed NATO action at this point, or when the
current mandate terminates. If it isn't --
SEN. BIDEN: But --
MR. GELBARD: -- what I worry about is that Milosevic survives by
creating
trouble. He is in the worst trouble he's ever been. He's in a corner.
The
economy has collapsed totally. Real wages were at the same level as the
early
1950s before the conflict, and right now they have virtually no reserves
left. But this is why it is imperative to see a change in the regime, to
have
democratic government arrive in Belgrade as a way of having the region
whole.
That's why we --
SEN. BIDEN: I couldn't agree more, but let me --
MR. GELBARD: -- consider that to be an imperative in our foreign policy.
SEN. BIDEN: As you know, there has been no one that you have known in
Congress that has been more supportive of arriving at that conclusion,
but I
like to think I am a realist.
The idea that we are going to produce a democratic government in Serbia,
between now an d the end of the year, is about as likely as this podium
getting up and walking to the back of the room. And what I want to sort
of
disabuse everybody of here is a new State Department-arrived-at notion
that,
through State Department-speak, we are going to arrive at something
that's
not possible. The most likely thing to do is nail the son of a gun by
literally going in and getting him and dragging him to The Hague. If we
had a
brain in our collective heads, that's what we would do; literally, not
figuratively. But we are not going to do that because our European
friends
all lack the will, and we will lack the willingness to push that
forcefully.
And so I just hope that we make it clear that the idea that he may be
alive
and well in Serbia does not mean that we -- the isolation of Serbia and
him
in fact -- and him in particular does not allow us to pursue all our
other
objectives in the meantime. If they want to wither on the vine and die,
so be
it -- so be it -- which takes me to a question relating to aid.
We are saying -- we and the Europeans are saying that we will provide
humanitarian financial -- we are not planning financial assistance or
reconstruction aid but that we will provide humanitarian assistance. I
think
that is a very, very, very fine line to draw. And I think that we should
be
very aware that his ability to create mischief and gain credibility will
relate to how tightly we parse that.
How do we prevent Milosevic from claiming credit for Western assistance
to
Serbia, particularly when the media is still not a free media?
So I just -- I'm not even asking you to respond, because it's unfair. If
you'd like to, I'd welcome it. But I just think that this ain't over
till
it's over. It's not over till he's gone. But we cannot assume as long as
he's
[not?]gone we can hedge our assessment of what we're able to do outside
of
Serbia, in my humble opinion.
SEN. G. SMITH: I'd like to follow on to what Senator Biden is saying
here.
One of the reasons that I voted to support President Clinton and the
allies
in this action in Kosovo was my belief that if Milosevic could work this
kind
of mischief, we would be pinned down in Bosnia for a long, long, long
time,
and that by defanging his military, we could go home earlier. Is that a
naïve
belief on my part?
MR. GELBARD: Well, first, to answer Senator Biden's question --
SEN. G. SMITH: And by the way, I think he's going to commit mischief if
we're
saying that we're not willing to do anything.
MR. GELBARD: First to answer Senator Biden, though, Senator, I agree
with you.
That's why we are continuing to press ahead on all other initiatives and
we're working with the Europeans on the stability pact, which is a
regional
effort, a regional approach regarding democracy, security and economic
development. And that's what we feel it has to be, a regional focus on
every
place.
The line -- the fine line you ask about, I agree with you again. That's
why,
again, we're not trying to play games on the issue of assistance; we're
saying humanitarian assistance means food and medicine. We have looked
at
other types of possible assistance, but we feel, as I said in my
statement,
that it's imperative to maintain the isolation with the three layers of
sanctions -- the outer wall, Kosovo-related sanctions, and the wartime
sanctions.
And the -- President Clinton and the administration, entire
administration,
feel very strongly that we should be maintaining all these sanctions
until --
as a way of maintaining this type of isolation, because you're right, it
would be very easy to begin to blur the line. And I know, as you know,
Senator, there are countries out there that are interested in moving
over
different lines over time.
SEN. BIDEN: And I'm worried about us setting the bar so high that we
build in
failure here, because if a year from now there is not democracy in
Serbia,
after we keep talking this claptrap about, you know, democratic -- there
aren't any democratic forces in Serbia now. Draskovic ain't a Democrat.
This
guy is no box of chocolates. He's better than the other guy, but this is
no
box of chocolates. I think we should be honest about this.
And look, just to make it clear to you where I am, and just speaking as
one
senator, there's a big difference between clearing the bridge -- the
bridge
debris out of the Danube so our allies can use the Danube, and building
a new
bridge. I'll clear it. I will do everything in my power here to make
sure
there's not a cent that can be spent to build it.
And I just think that they've got to come to their -- the realization of
what
they have enabled Milosevic to do, and until there are democratic forces
there, I am -- like for example, the press asks me all the time, we
voted 100
-- what was it? -- $100 million in the Serbian -- I don't know who to
give it
to? Okay?
I mean, I know how -- I know what I'd like to give it to. But we
Americans
tend to think, whether it was Ronald Reagan in, you know, in Latin
America or
us in the Balkans, that there's some Jeffersonian democrat waiting to
spring
up somewhere to lead a -- you know, a democratic rival there. There
ain't no
Democrats in Serbia, that I've found. I mean -- democratic leadership,
that
has any realistic possibility of moving. So I guess what I'm trying to
say to
you is this. I just think it's a little bit like -- the secretary got
mad at
me when I a month ago said stop talking about Rambouillet, stop talking
about
how we want to bring them back to the table. We don't want to bring them
back, we want to beat the hell ou t of them until they stop. That's what
we
want. And that's the only thing that worked.
And I think this idea that we're really in effect saying we're not going
to
succeed until we have a democratic Serbia, then that is ultimate
success. But
I'm afraid you're going to have people up here saying, well, geez, it's
been
-- it's been four months, you know? -- don't have it yet, so I guess we
shouldn't be spending all this money doing this other stuff over here.
MR. GELBARD: Well, in fact, I said in my statement that in the short
term
it's hard to imagine that it will be able to achieve a democratic
solution in
Serbia. That's why we have to be prepared to support democratic forces
--
SEN. BIDEN: And there are democratic forces.
MR. GELBARD: Well --
SEN. BIDEN: Ain't much democratic leadership.
MR. GELBARD: Tomorrow a representative of the democratic opposition,
Draguslav Ovramovic (sp), will be in Sarajevo for the summit. This is a
man
who is a very high common denominator. He is part of the alliance for
change.
Vuk Draskovic is a really flawed individual. But --
SEN. BIDEN: He is the Rasputin of the 21st century, about to be. I mean,
we're not quite there yet.
MR. GELBARD: I'll tell him you said it. (Laughs.)
SEN. BIDEN: I told him that.
MR. GELBARD: Yeah.
SEN. BIDEN: So I -- I'd tell him. I --
MR. GELBARD: We still hope that he can be part of the solution here --
SEN.
BIDEN: I hope so, too, but he's going to take work.
MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman -- he's going to take a lot of work.
SEN. BIDEN: That's a very high maintenance fellow.
MR. GELBARD: I know. Believe me, I know. (Laughs.)
Mr. Chairman, regarding your question, the -- (stops) -- the Republika
Srpska
has emerged, coming out of the conflict, if anything with significantly
strengthened moderate leadership. The Dodik government is stronger than
they
were at the beginning of the year. They are stronger than they were
after the
elections in September.
When I last met with Prime Minister Dodik, about a month ago, he was
much
more comfortable, much more confident about his ability to govern. We
are
seeing that the extremes, who were weakened after the September national
elections, are becoming weaker still. High Representative Carlos
Westendorp,
whose last day is tomorrow, banished President Poplasen, the leader of
the
Radical Party, from his position, and it's now very clear that his
Radical
Party is weaker than ever, as is Karadzic's SDS. We see prospects for
the
moderates better than ever. And while there's still a ways to go, the
prospects look much better.
SEN. G. SMITH: Thank you.
MR. PARDEW: Could I just comment on the democracy issue? We don't have
any
illusions about who we're dealing with here, but I do think democracy is
an
aspiration of many of the Serb people. And in that regard, I don't think
we
ought to stop talking about it, Senator. I think we ought to -- we ought
to
continue to discuss it as an issue of --
SEN. BIDEN: I'm not suggesting we don't talk about it; I'm suggesting we
talk
about it realistically. I mean, for example, it's amazing what can
happen
when you eliminate the extremes. I mean, the single best thing that ever
happened to the Republic of Srpska is we kicked the living hell out of
Milosevic. There ain't no alternative left. That's the reason why it
happened. It had nothing to do with elections, it had to do with the
fact
that Westendorp had the right idea, number one; and number two, there
ain't
no alternative. Belgrade's no beacon, no help, no place to go. So there
is no
alternative. It's amazing what a salutary impact that has upon extremes
in
countries.
And that's why the single best thing we -- my dream is to visit
Milosevic in
prison. (Laughter.) I mean that sincerely. I'm not being facetious.
Because
you put Milosevic in prison, and things in the region will change
drastically.
If you said to me, "You can leave him where he is or give him a plane
ticket
to take off to some -- like the former leader of Uganda, well, you know,
we
gave him -- what was his name? -- Idi Amin -- we can give him an "Idi
Amin
passport"
and he would leave; I'd say no, leave him there, leave him there till we
get
him. Put him in jail. Short of that, I don't know how we get to the
point.
And by the way, I often wondered, Karadzic's party, the SDS, the only
misnomer, it should have dropped the "D." I mean, these guys are BAD
guys.
BAD guys. They're no good. SEN. G. SMITH: When Senator Biden makes that
visit
to that prison, I want to be your junior companion.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it.
SEN. BIDEN: Thanks.
END
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
A.A.A. OCCASIONISSIMA
Vendesi prezzo stracciato Costituzione repubblica "fondata sul lavoro"
cinquantenne come nuova (usata pochissimo) causa ingombro in guerre di
aggressione contro paesi vicini. Rivolgersi: Ciampi Azeglio, Piazza del
Quirinale, Roma, Stati Uniti d'America
To sell: Constitution of a Republic "based on its citizen's work", 50
years old but looks like new (scarcely used). Reason: uncomfortable in
case of aggressions to nearby countries. Inquiries to: Ciampi Azeglio,
Quirinale Square, Rome, U.S.A.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Vendesi prezzo stracciato Costituzione repubblica "fondata sul lavoro"
cinquantenne come nuova (usata pochissimo) causa ingombro in guerre di
aggressione contro paesi vicini. Rivolgersi: Ciampi Azeglio, Piazza del
Quirinale, Roma, Stati Uniti d'America
To sell: Constitution of a Republic "based on its citizen's work", 50
years old but looks like new (scarcely used). Reason: uncomfortable in
case of aggressions to nearby countries. Inquiries to: Ciampi Azeglio,
Quirinale Square, Rome, U.S.A.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
* ROMA - TRIESTE - UDINE - TORINO
* 3 GIUGNO 2000: "TRIBUNALE CLARK"
* 11 GIUGNO 2000: "ROMPERE L'EMBARGO"
NOTA: Il 1 Giugno l'Iniziativa di Vicenza è Rinviata
Per problemi tecnici l'iniziativa del 1 giugno a Vicenza è rinviata. Per
Informazioni: sparta@...
===
ROMA
Libreria Internazionale «il manifesto"Via Tomacelli 144 - Roma
Giovedì 25 Maggio alle ore 17.00
“ORIZZONTI JUGOSLAVI”
Quale ricostruzione in Serbia?Quale futuro per i profughi dal Kosovo?
A nome dei lavoratori e degli sfollati, porteranno lo loro
testimonianza:Sreten MILICEVIC, presidente sindacato ZASTAVA autoveicoli
Svetlana ZIRKOVIC, ex direttrice della scuola di Economia di Urosevac
Dragan PETKOVIC, ex avvocato di Pristina
Parteciperanno al successivo dibattito:Fabio Alberti, (Un Ponte per…),
Tommaso Di Francesco, (il manifesto),
Carlo Pona, (Servizio Civile Internazionale),
Loris Campetti, (il manifesto)
“Un Ponte per…” associazione di volontariato per la solidarietà
internazionalevia della Guglia, 69/a – 00186 – Roma – tel. 066780808
===
TRIESTE
Internazionalismo e solidarietà wrote:
>
> L'Associazione "Internazionalismo e solidarietà" aderisce
> all'appello e sarà presente all'assemblea nazionale del
> Tribunale Clark a Roma il 3 giugno.
> Diamo inoltre comunicazione dell'iniziativa prevista a Trieste il
> 26 maggio prossimo.
>
> p. l'ass.
> Giorgio Ellero
> Trieste
> <glr_y@...>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------
>
> TRIBUNALE CLARK:
>
> INCONTRO A TRIESTE IL 26 MAGGIO 2000
>
> L' Associazione Internazionalismo e solidarietà
> promuove l'iniziativa pubblica :
>
> IL "TRIBUNALE INTERNAZIONALE CLARK"
>
> E LA GUERRA DELLA NATO NEI BALCANI
>
> Saranno discusse le conseguenze ambientali dei
> bombardamenti, gli aspetti giuridici dell'intervento e l'uso
> dell'informazione prima, durante e dopo la primavera del '99.
>
> Interverranno :
>
> Carlo PONA - Per il Tribunale Clark - fisico
>
> Predrag POLIC - Professore di Chimica applicata presso
> l'Università di Belgrado;
>
> Andrea MARTOCCHIA - Per il Comitato Scienziate/i contro la
> guerra - fisico
>
> Pasquale VILARDO - Per il Tribunale Clark - avvocato
>
> L'incontro si terrà presso l'Aula Magna del Dipartimento di
> Storia dell'Università di Trieste, androna Economo 4,
> Venerdi' 26 maggio 2000 alle ore 16.30.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------end
===
UDINE
IL VIAGGIO DELL'URANIO
Da Aviano a Belgrado una lunga scia di veleni
Attraverso l'Adriatico, fino ai Balcani, i caccia NATO hanno ucciso
anche l'aria, l'acqua e la terra. Un dibattito sugli effetti ambientali
della guerra in Jugoslavia
moderatore: A. Misdariis - segr. circolo PRC Udine
I. Scotti (biologo, PRC Udine): introduzione
R. Antonaz (cons. reg. PRC): motivazioni della guerra in Jugoslavia
Com. Unitario contro Aviano 2000: impatto ambientale della base USAF
P. Polic (chimico, comm. ambiente ONU): l'uso del DU nella RFJ
C. Pona (fisico, trib. Clark): conseguenze ambientali dei bombardamenti
A. Martocchia (fisico, trib. Clark): legalita' e disinformazione
R. Mantovani (resp. naz. PRC Esteri): conclusioni
SABATO 27 MAGGIO 2000 ORE 17
Palazzo Kechler (Piazza XX Settembre), Udine
udine@...
===
TORINO
CULTURA, SCIENZA e INFORMAZIONE di fronte alle nuove guerre
Politecnico di Torino, Sala del Consiglio di Facoltà, 22-23 giugno 2000
Giovedì 22 giugno
9.00 - Presentazione del convegno a nome del comitato Scienziate e
Scienziati contro la guerra (Elisabetta Donini e Massimo Zucchetti)
Saluti da parte dei Rettori del Politecnico e dell' Università
9.30 - I sessione : INFORMAZIONE E DISINFORMAZIONE: CULTURA, SCIENZA E
GUERRE (coordinanatori: Giulia Barone e
Chiara Cavallaro)
Angelo D'Orsi "Uso strumentale della storia"
Giovanni Salio: "Ricerca scientifica e ricerca per la pace nella
prospettiva della trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti"
10.30 - Dibattito
11.00 - Pausa
11.30 - G.Barone, G.Carpi, F.Marenco, A.Martocchia "Disinformazione e
guerra- Problemi della ricostruzione storica della guerra dei Balcani,
1991-2000"
Antonino Drago "Modelli logici, matematici e fisici dei conflitti e
delle loro soluzioni"
Angelo Raffaele Meo "I miti della ricerca militare"
Enrico Peyretti "Giornalismo di pace"
Adriana Valente " Documentazione, comunicazione scientifica e tecnologie
dell'informazione tra guerra e pace"
12.30 - Dibattito
13.00 - Pausa
14.30 - II sessione : CONSEGUENZE ECOLOGICHE E SANITARIE DELLE GUERRE
(Coordinatori: Alberto Tarozzi e Massimo
Zucchetti)
Paolo Bartolomei, Carlo Pona "Problematiche relative all'uso dell'uranio
impoverito in ambito militare"
Ivan Greztic "Effetti ambientali della guerra in Jugoslavia"
Mica Saric "Conseguenze igienico-sanitarie dei bombardamenti NATO sul
complesso industriale di Pancevo"
16.00 - Dibattito
16.30 - Pausa
17.00 - C. Bracci, A. Di Napoli, N. Eminovic, L. Khosrawi, M Ferraro,
A.Taviani, E. Zerbino : "Un 'nuovo modello' militare: produrre vittime"
Mauro Cristaldi : "Reti di biomonitoraggio per valutazioni preventive di
rischio territoriale"
Cristina Giannardi, Daniele Dominici : "Munizioni con uranio impoverito:
una stima per la guerra del Kosovo"
Natasha Lazovic : "Il problema dell'inquinamento chimico nelle falde
sotterranee della Vojvodina"
18.00 - Dibattito
18.30 - Rinfresco
20.00 - Riunione del comitato
Venerdì 23 giugno
9.00 - III sessione: QUESTIONI STRATEGICO-MILITARI (Coordinanatori :
Luigi Cortesi e Angelo Raffaele Meo)
Angelo Baracca, Francesco Polcaro : "La nuova corsa al riarmo e i rischi
crescenti di uso effettivo di armi di distruzione di massa"
Alberto Di Fazio : "Questioni strategico-militari, negoziati UN, e
problema energetico"
10.00 - Dibattito
10.30 - Pausa
11.00 - Guido Carpi "Il Kosovo nella politica estera italiana del
Novecento"
Gastone Dall'Asen "La guerra 'umanitaria contro la Repubblica Federale
Jugoslava nella giurisprudenza penale nazionale"
Luciano Vasapollo "Nuovi scenari geoeconomici dello sviluppo
internazionale: il controllo dell'area balcanica"
Pasquale Vilardo "Stato delle denunce del tribunale Ramsey Clarke"
12.00 - Dibattito
12.30 - Pausa
14.30 - Tavola rotonda: SCIENZE E TECNOLOGIE: SAPERI E RESPONSABILITA'
DIGUERRA E DI PACE (Coordinatore: Claudio
Cancelli)
18.00 - Fine del convegno
Home page del Convegno :
http://www.iac.rm.cnr.it/~marco/SP/convegni/index.html
===
ROMA 3 GIUGNO 2000
VIA PIETRO COSSA 40 – SALA UNIVERSITA’ VALDESE
DALLE ORE 9.00
PROIEZIONE VIDEO, MOSTRE FOTOGRAFICHE
TRIBUNA APERTA TRA I COMITATI E LE ASSOCIAZIONI
ORE 15.00
SESSIONE FINALE DELLA SEZIONE ITALIANA DEL
TRIBUNALE INDIPENDENTE CONTRO I CRIMINI DELLA
NATO IN JUGOSLAVIA
Il 31 luglio 1999 hanno avuto inizio a New York le attivita' del
"TRIBUNALE
INTERNAZIONALE INDIPENDENTE CONTRO I CRIMINI DELLA NATO IN
JUGOSLAVIA", promosso da Ramsey Clark, con la stesura di 19 punti di
accusa contro la NATO
ed i governi occidentali.
Le attivita' del "Tribunale" hanno trovato seguito in molti altri paesi
del mondo. In Italia il primo
novembre 1999 alla presenza di Ramsey Clark ha preso il via la sezione
italiana del Tribunale. Nel
corso di questi mesi, confortati dal crescente interesse suscitato e
dalle numerose iniziative di
presentazione del "Tribunale Italiano" in molte citta', abbiamo potuto
verificare con dati oggettivi
la veridicita' delle nostre accuse.
A completamento del lavoro svolto in questi mesi, noi sottoscritti
firmatari di questo appello
accusiamo le massime autorità della Repubblica in carica nel marzo 1999
- in particolare il
presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri Massimo D'Alema e i ministri del
governo per la
partecipazione alla guerra illegale e il Presidente della Repubblica
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro per non
aver difeso la Costituzione - nonchè i loro successori per quanto
attiene ai crimini in continuità
con l'aggressione armata, ciascuno secondo la personale responsabilità
scaturente dalle diverse
competenze, azioni e
omissioni:
per avere collaborato attivamente all'aggressione contro la Repubblica
Federale Jugoslava, paese
sovrano da cui non era venuta nessuna minaccia nè all'Italia nè ai suoi
alleati;
per avere violato tutti i principi del diritto internazionale e in
particolare la Carta delle Nazioni
Unite, i principi del Tribunale di Norimberga, le Convenzioni di Ginevra
e i protocolli aggiuntivi
sulla tutela delle popolazioni civili nonchè lo stesso trattato
istitutivo della NATO;
per aver consentito che dal proprio territorio partissero attacchi
contro istallazioni e popolazioni
civili, condotti su obiettivi e con armi appositamente studiate per
infliggere il massimo danno,
anche protratto nel tempo, alle persone e alle loro condizioni di vita
(attacchi deliberati contro
strutture civili, bombe a grappolo);
per aver danneggiato l’economia della costa adriatica con la chiusura
degli aeroporti civili;
per aver consentito lo smaltimento nelle acque territoriali italiane di
ordigni bellici non utilizzati
causando danni alle persone, all’ambiente all’economia;
per aver consentito l'utilizzo in maniera massiccia di proiettili e
missili all'uranio impoverito
causando danni incalcolabili e per un tempo indeterminato contro le
popolazioni della Federazione
Jugoslava e dei paesi limitrofi, con enormi rischi attuali anche per i
volontari civili e per i militari
italiani impegnati nel Kosovo.
per aver partecipato al bombardamento di impianti chimici e farmaceutici
causando
deliberatamente danni ambientali di enorme rilevanza tali da configurare
una vera e propria guerra
batteriologica, chimica e nucleare;
per aver violato la Costituzione italiana e aggirato le procedure che
essa impone in caso di guerra
(concepibile solo come difesa da attacchi contro il nostro paese e i
suoi alleati);
per aver collaborato alla politica della forza di occupazione della NATO
che obiettivamente ha
portato alla instaurazione di un potere criminale nella provincia
jugoslava del Kosmet e alla
persecuzione ed espulsione della popolazione di etnia serba e di altre
etnie non albanesi, nonchè
degli albanesi considerati indesiderabili dal nuovo potere;
per avere obiettivamente tollerato l'emergere e il consolidarsi di un
potente centro di attività
criminali a ridosso del nostro paese nel triangolo
Albania-Kosovo-Montenegro;
per avere attivamente collaborato ad affamare e sacrificare la
popolazione della Jugoslavia con
l'imposizione di misure di embargo internazionalmente illeggittime;
per avere attivamente collaborato a esercitare pressioni e ingerenze
contro un paese sovrano e le
sue legittime istituzioni;
per avere inviato truppe e personale civile a governare territori
ridotti di fatto a nuovi protettorati e
colonie in violazione della stessa risoluzione ONU 1244;
per aver messo in piedi al fine di giustificare l'intervento militare
la scandalosa campagna della
MISSIONE ARCOBALENO e per avere mentito al popolo italiano al fine di
convincere l'opinione
pubblica della necessità di partecipare alla guerra;
per avere rinunciato all'esercizio della sovranità del nostro paese e al
diritto-dovere di controllo di
tutte le attività che vi svolgono comandi, strutture e mezzi militari
stranieri;
per avere acconsentito a modificare, senza nessuna decisione del
Parlamento, lo statuto della
NATO.
Queste accuse, saranno esposte e ampiamente documentate il 3 giugno a
Roma nella sessione
plenaria del Tribunale Indipendente contro i crimini NATO costituitosi
in Italia che si terrà presso
l'Università Valdese (via Pietro Cossa 40) e saranno quindi portate a
New York, dove il 10 giugno
si riunirà il Tribunale Internazionale Indipendente promosso dall'ex
Ministro della Giustizia USA
Ramsey Clark.
Invitiamo tutti i cittadini, le associazioni, le personalità consapevoli
della necessità di impedire
che tali crimini siano perpetuati e diventino anzi la norma delle
relazioni internazionali, a sostenere
l'iniziativa della sezione italiana del Tribunale Clark e la raccolta di
testimonianze e documenti e
partecipare attivamente all'assemblea del 3 giugno a Roma.
===
11 GIUGNO 2000
Giornata Nazionale di Raccolta Firme per "Rompere l'Embargo"
all'Iraq
a chiusura della campagna
io rompo! rompi anche tu
Organizzando banchetti, assemblee, proiezioni e dibattiti,
petizioni ai sindaci e ai comuni, sit-in e qualunque altra idea ti
venga in mente
Contattaci per farti inviare il materiale (manifesti, pieghevoli e
adesivi), gli
originali della petizione e del volantino, comunica le iniziative
a:
Tel. 06/6780808, Fax 06/6793968, Mail
rompere-lembargo@...
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
* 3 GIUGNO 2000: "TRIBUNALE CLARK"
* 11 GIUGNO 2000: "ROMPERE L'EMBARGO"
NOTA: Il 1 Giugno l'Iniziativa di Vicenza è Rinviata
Per problemi tecnici l'iniziativa del 1 giugno a Vicenza è rinviata. Per
Informazioni: sparta@...
===
ROMA
Libreria Internazionale «il manifesto"Via Tomacelli 144 - Roma
Giovedì 25 Maggio alle ore 17.00
“ORIZZONTI JUGOSLAVI”
Quale ricostruzione in Serbia?Quale futuro per i profughi dal Kosovo?
A nome dei lavoratori e degli sfollati, porteranno lo loro
testimonianza:Sreten MILICEVIC, presidente sindacato ZASTAVA autoveicoli
Svetlana ZIRKOVIC, ex direttrice della scuola di Economia di Urosevac
Dragan PETKOVIC, ex avvocato di Pristina
Parteciperanno al successivo dibattito:Fabio Alberti, (Un Ponte per…),
Tommaso Di Francesco, (il manifesto),
Carlo Pona, (Servizio Civile Internazionale),
Loris Campetti, (il manifesto)
“Un Ponte per…” associazione di volontariato per la solidarietà
internazionalevia della Guglia, 69/a – 00186 – Roma – tel. 066780808
===
TRIESTE
Internazionalismo e solidarietà wrote:
>
> L'Associazione "Internazionalismo e solidarietà" aderisce
> all'appello e sarà presente all'assemblea nazionale del
> Tribunale Clark a Roma il 3 giugno.
> Diamo inoltre comunicazione dell'iniziativa prevista a Trieste il
> 26 maggio prossimo.
>
> p. l'ass.
> Giorgio Ellero
> Trieste
> <glr_y@...>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------
>
> TRIBUNALE CLARK:
>
> INCONTRO A TRIESTE IL 26 MAGGIO 2000
>
> L' Associazione Internazionalismo e solidarietà
> promuove l'iniziativa pubblica :
>
> IL "TRIBUNALE INTERNAZIONALE CLARK"
>
> E LA GUERRA DELLA NATO NEI BALCANI
>
> Saranno discusse le conseguenze ambientali dei
> bombardamenti, gli aspetti giuridici dell'intervento e l'uso
> dell'informazione prima, durante e dopo la primavera del '99.
>
> Interverranno :
>
> Carlo PONA - Per il Tribunale Clark - fisico
>
> Predrag POLIC - Professore di Chimica applicata presso
> l'Università di Belgrado;
>
> Andrea MARTOCCHIA - Per il Comitato Scienziate/i contro la
> guerra - fisico
>
> Pasquale VILARDO - Per il Tribunale Clark - avvocato
>
> L'incontro si terrà presso l'Aula Magna del Dipartimento di
> Storia dell'Università di Trieste, androna Economo 4,
> Venerdi' 26 maggio 2000 alle ore 16.30.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------end
===
UDINE
IL VIAGGIO DELL'URANIO
Da Aviano a Belgrado una lunga scia di veleni
Attraverso l'Adriatico, fino ai Balcani, i caccia NATO hanno ucciso
anche l'aria, l'acqua e la terra. Un dibattito sugli effetti ambientali
della guerra in Jugoslavia
moderatore: A. Misdariis - segr. circolo PRC Udine
I. Scotti (biologo, PRC Udine): introduzione
R. Antonaz (cons. reg. PRC): motivazioni della guerra in Jugoslavia
Com. Unitario contro Aviano 2000: impatto ambientale della base USAF
P. Polic (chimico, comm. ambiente ONU): l'uso del DU nella RFJ
C. Pona (fisico, trib. Clark): conseguenze ambientali dei bombardamenti
A. Martocchia (fisico, trib. Clark): legalita' e disinformazione
R. Mantovani (resp. naz. PRC Esteri): conclusioni
SABATO 27 MAGGIO 2000 ORE 17
Palazzo Kechler (Piazza XX Settembre), Udine
udine@...
===
TORINO
CULTURA, SCIENZA e INFORMAZIONE di fronte alle nuove guerre
Politecnico di Torino, Sala del Consiglio di Facoltà, 22-23 giugno 2000
Giovedì 22 giugno
9.00 - Presentazione del convegno a nome del comitato Scienziate e
Scienziati contro la guerra (Elisabetta Donini e Massimo Zucchetti)
Saluti da parte dei Rettori del Politecnico e dell' Università
9.30 - I sessione : INFORMAZIONE E DISINFORMAZIONE: CULTURA, SCIENZA E
GUERRE (coordinanatori: Giulia Barone e
Chiara Cavallaro)
Angelo D'Orsi "Uso strumentale della storia"
Giovanni Salio: "Ricerca scientifica e ricerca per la pace nella
prospettiva della trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti"
10.30 - Dibattito
11.00 - Pausa
11.30 - G.Barone, G.Carpi, F.Marenco, A.Martocchia "Disinformazione e
guerra- Problemi della ricostruzione storica della guerra dei Balcani,
1991-2000"
Antonino Drago "Modelli logici, matematici e fisici dei conflitti e
delle loro soluzioni"
Angelo Raffaele Meo "I miti della ricerca militare"
Enrico Peyretti "Giornalismo di pace"
Adriana Valente " Documentazione, comunicazione scientifica e tecnologie
dell'informazione tra guerra e pace"
12.30 - Dibattito
13.00 - Pausa
14.30 - II sessione : CONSEGUENZE ECOLOGICHE E SANITARIE DELLE GUERRE
(Coordinatori: Alberto Tarozzi e Massimo
Zucchetti)
Paolo Bartolomei, Carlo Pona "Problematiche relative all'uso dell'uranio
impoverito in ambito militare"
Ivan Greztic "Effetti ambientali della guerra in Jugoslavia"
Mica Saric "Conseguenze igienico-sanitarie dei bombardamenti NATO sul
complesso industriale di Pancevo"
16.00 - Dibattito
16.30 - Pausa
17.00 - C. Bracci, A. Di Napoli, N. Eminovic, L. Khosrawi, M Ferraro,
A.Taviani, E. Zerbino : "Un 'nuovo modello' militare: produrre vittime"
Mauro Cristaldi : "Reti di biomonitoraggio per valutazioni preventive di
rischio territoriale"
Cristina Giannardi, Daniele Dominici : "Munizioni con uranio impoverito:
una stima per la guerra del Kosovo"
Natasha Lazovic : "Il problema dell'inquinamento chimico nelle falde
sotterranee della Vojvodina"
18.00 - Dibattito
18.30 - Rinfresco
20.00 - Riunione del comitato
Venerdì 23 giugno
9.00 - III sessione: QUESTIONI STRATEGICO-MILITARI (Coordinanatori :
Luigi Cortesi e Angelo Raffaele Meo)
Angelo Baracca, Francesco Polcaro : "La nuova corsa al riarmo e i rischi
crescenti di uso effettivo di armi di distruzione di massa"
Alberto Di Fazio : "Questioni strategico-militari, negoziati UN, e
problema energetico"
10.00 - Dibattito
10.30 - Pausa
11.00 - Guido Carpi "Il Kosovo nella politica estera italiana del
Novecento"
Gastone Dall'Asen "La guerra 'umanitaria contro la Repubblica Federale
Jugoslava nella giurisprudenza penale nazionale"
Luciano Vasapollo "Nuovi scenari geoeconomici dello sviluppo
internazionale: il controllo dell'area balcanica"
Pasquale Vilardo "Stato delle denunce del tribunale Ramsey Clarke"
12.00 - Dibattito
12.30 - Pausa
14.30 - Tavola rotonda: SCIENZE E TECNOLOGIE: SAPERI E RESPONSABILITA'
DIGUERRA E DI PACE (Coordinatore: Claudio
Cancelli)
18.00 - Fine del convegno
Home page del Convegno :
http://www.iac.rm.cnr.it/~marco/SP/convegni/index.html
===
ROMA 3 GIUGNO 2000
VIA PIETRO COSSA 40 – SALA UNIVERSITA’ VALDESE
DALLE ORE 9.00
PROIEZIONE VIDEO, MOSTRE FOTOGRAFICHE
TRIBUNA APERTA TRA I COMITATI E LE ASSOCIAZIONI
ORE 15.00
SESSIONE FINALE DELLA SEZIONE ITALIANA DEL
TRIBUNALE INDIPENDENTE CONTRO I CRIMINI DELLA
NATO IN JUGOSLAVIA
Il 31 luglio 1999 hanno avuto inizio a New York le attivita' del
"TRIBUNALE
INTERNAZIONALE INDIPENDENTE CONTRO I CRIMINI DELLA NATO IN
JUGOSLAVIA", promosso da Ramsey Clark, con la stesura di 19 punti di
accusa contro la NATO
ed i governi occidentali.
Le attivita' del "Tribunale" hanno trovato seguito in molti altri paesi
del mondo. In Italia il primo
novembre 1999 alla presenza di Ramsey Clark ha preso il via la sezione
italiana del Tribunale. Nel
corso di questi mesi, confortati dal crescente interesse suscitato e
dalle numerose iniziative di
presentazione del "Tribunale Italiano" in molte citta', abbiamo potuto
verificare con dati oggettivi
la veridicita' delle nostre accuse.
A completamento del lavoro svolto in questi mesi, noi sottoscritti
firmatari di questo appello
accusiamo le massime autorità della Repubblica in carica nel marzo 1999
- in particolare il
presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri Massimo D'Alema e i ministri del
governo per la
partecipazione alla guerra illegale e il Presidente della Repubblica
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro per non
aver difeso la Costituzione - nonchè i loro successori per quanto
attiene ai crimini in continuità
con l'aggressione armata, ciascuno secondo la personale responsabilità
scaturente dalle diverse
competenze, azioni e
omissioni:
per avere collaborato attivamente all'aggressione contro la Repubblica
Federale Jugoslava, paese
sovrano da cui non era venuta nessuna minaccia nè all'Italia nè ai suoi
alleati;
per avere violato tutti i principi del diritto internazionale e in
particolare la Carta delle Nazioni
Unite, i principi del Tribunale di Norimberga, le Convenzioni di Ginevra
e i protocolli aggiuntivi
sulla tutela delle popolazioni civili nonchè lo stesso trattato
istitutivo della NATO;
per aver consentito che dal proprio territorio partissero attacchi
contro istallazioni e popolazioni
civili, condotti su obiettivi e con armi appositamente studiate per
infliggere il massimo danno,
anche protratto nel tempo, alle persone e alle loro condizioni di vita
(attacchi deliberati contro
strutture civili, bombe a grappolo);
per aver danneggiato l’economia della costa adriatica con la chiusura
degli aeroporti civili;
per aver consentito lo smaltimento nelle acque territoriali italiane di
ordigni bellici non utilizzati
causando danni alle persone, all’ambiente all’economia;
per aver consentito l'utilizzo in maniera massiccia di proiettili e
missili all'uranio impoverito
causando danni incalcolabili e per un tempo indeterminato contro le
popolazioni della Federazione
Jugoslava e dei paesi limitrofi, con enormi rischi attuali anche per i
volontari civili e per i militari
italiani impegnati nel Kosovo.
per aver partecipato al bombardamento di impianti chimici e farmaceutici
causando
deliberatamente danni ambientali di enorme rilevanza tali da configurare
una vera e propria guerra
batteriologica, chimica e nucleare;
per aver violato la Costituzione italiana e aggirato le procedure che
essa impone in caso di guerra
(concepibile solo come difesa da attacchi contro il nostro paese e i
suoi alleati);
per aver collaborato alla politica della forza di occupazione della NATO
che obiettivamente ha
portato alla instaurazione di un potere criminale nella provincia
jugoslava del Kosmet e alla
persecuzione ed espulsione della popolazione di etnia serba e di altre
etnie non albanesi, nonchè
degli albanesi considerati indesiderabili dal nuovo potere;
per avere obiettivamente tollerato l'emergere e il consolidarsi di un
potente centro di attività
criminali a ridosso del nostro paese nel triangolo
Albania-Kosovo-Montenegro;
per avere attivamente collaborato ad affamare e sacrificare la
popolazione della Jugoslavia con
l'imposizione di misure di embargo internazionalmente illeggittime;
per avere attivamente collaborato a esercitare pressioni e ingerenze
contro un paese sovrano e le
sue legittime istituzioni;
per avere inviato truppe e personale civile a governare territori
ridotti di fatto a nuovi protettorati e
colonie in violazione della stessa risoluzione ONU 1244;
per aver messo in piedi al fine di giustificare l'intervento militare
la scandalosa campagna della
MISSIONE ARCOBALENO e per avere mentito al popolo italiano al fine di
convincere l'opinione
pubblica della necessità di partecipare alla guerra;
per avere rinunciato all'esercizio della sovranità del nostro paese e al
diritto-dovere di controllo di
tutte le attività che vi svolgono comandi, strutture e mezzi militari
stranieri;
per avere acconsentito a modificare, senza nessuna decisione del
Parlamento, lo statuto della
NATO.
Queste accuse, saranno esposte e ampiamente documentate il 3 giugno a
Roma nella sessione
plenaria del Tribunale Indipendente contro i crimini NATO costituitosi
in Italia che si terrà presso
l'Università Valdese (via Pietro Cossa 40) e saranno quindi portate a
New York, dove il 10 giugno
si riunirà il Tribunale Internazionale Indipendente promosso dall'ex
Ministro della Giustizia USA
Ramsey Clark.
Invitiamo tutti i cittadini, le associazioni, le personalità consapevoli
della necessità di impedire
che tali crimini siano perpetuati e diventino anzi la norma delle
relazioni internazionali, a sostenere
l'iniziativa della sezione italiana del Tribunale Clark e la raccolta di
testimonianze e documenti e
partecipare attivamente all'assemblea del 3 giugno a Roma.
===
11 GIUGNO 2000
Giornata Nazionale di Raccolta Firme per "Rompere l'Embargo"
all'Iraq
a chiusura della campagna
io rompo! rompi anche tu
Organizzando banchetti, assemblee, proiezioni e dibattiti,
petizioni ai sindaci e ai comuni, sit-in e qualunque altra idea ti
venga in mente
Contattaci per farti inviare il materiale (manifesti, pieghevoli e
adesivi), gli
originali della petizione e del volantino, comunica le iniziative
a:
Tel. 06/6780808, Fax 06/6793968, Mail
rompere-lembargo@...
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
