>The Rockford Institute
>CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
>www.rockfordinstitute.org
>
>Report on TRI/CFIA Conference
>AMERICAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION:
>L E A D E R S H I P O R M A R G I N A L I Z A T I O N ?
>held in Washington D.C. on November 14, 2000
>
>Contents:
>I - INTRODUCTION: Conference Objective
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>IV - CONCLUSION
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>===========================================
>I - THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Rockford Institute's Center for International Affairs takes an active
>interest in Balkan affairs not because Southeast Europe is an inherently
>important part of the world - which it is not - but because American
>policies in that region over the past decade have come to embody all that
>is wrong with the fundamental assumptions, values, and modus operandi of
>the decision-making community in Washington.
>
>It is our considered opinion that a thorough revision of those policies,
>and the subsequent new approach of the United States to the Balkans would
>be an important step towards a new, national interest-based foreign policy
>formulation in general. Accordingly, we saw the election of Vojislav
>Kostunica as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the
>downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, as a welcome opportunity to make that step.
>
>Aware of the importance of time, and apprehensive that in the absence of
>specific alternative proposals the outgoing national security team's
>prejudices and bureaucratic inertia may impose a negative continuity on the
>new Administration, we convened a conference in the nation's capital on
>November 14 to discuss these issues. We gathered a team of analysts who
>take an active interest in Southeast Europe and who share the desire for an
>active, national interest-based U.S. foreign policy, free from passionate
>attachments and ideological straightjackets, in the Balkans or any other
>part of the world.
>
>The panel, chaired by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director of TRI's Center for
>International Affairs, included Gary Dempsey of CATO Institute, Dr. John C.
>Hulsman of Heritage Foundation, Cliff Kincaid (Washington-based
>investigative reporter and broadcaster), Bill Lind (Free Congress
>Foundation), Dr. Branko Milanovic who is a senior economist with The World
>Bank, The Hon. Branko Terzic of Deloitte & Touche, Benjamin Works
>(SIRI-US), as well as senior policy analysts and advisors from both the
>U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. While the individual speakers
>offered thoughts on a variety of topics relevant to American policy toward
>post-Milosevic Serbia, the overall consensus of the panelists and
>participants is summarized in the following policy recommendations for the
>incoming administration in Washington. Also included are some suggestions
>for the newly elected government in Belgrade.
>
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>
>1. All key European countries have moved rapidly to reestablish normal
>relations with Belgrade based on Serbia's unique position in the heart of
>the Balkans. America's failure to follow suit will cause rift with
>Europeans and turn American leadership into self-imposed marginalization.
>In order to avoid such outcome, detrimental to its interests, the United
>States must move away from the now evident failure of a policy toward
>Serbia publicly based only on the personality of one man - Slobodan
>Milosevic - and predicated on the unrealistic notion that his removal from
>power would solve all outstanding regional problems. While his downfall has
>vastly improved the prospects for repairing historically close ties between
>the U.S. and Serbia, the new Washington Administration should define a new,
>national interest-based approach to the former Yugoslavia without delay.
>
>2. A national interest-based policy ought to reassess U.S. relations
>with Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) on the basis of prospects for (i)
>regional stability and development and (ii) promotion of American
>commercial interests. It must avoid every temptation to vindicate ex post
>facto the failed 1990s policy premised on treating the Serbian nation not
>as an integral part of an extended European economic and political
>structure but as an inherently antagonistic entity and a permanent black
>hole at the center of the region. The departure from office of persons
>inseparable from the Clinton Administration's failures - notably Secretary
>of State Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke, and President Clinton himself -
>will greatly improve prospects for this reassessment.
>
>3. The new team in Washington should be aware of the damage caused to
>American interests by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and by the
>ongoing, open-ended, and ultimately futile "nation-building" mission in
>Kosovo. The new Administration should take note of legislative efforts,
>such as the Warner/Byrd amendment in the Senate and the Kasich amendment in
>the House of Representatives, which reflect an increasing Congressional
>awareness of that damage. It should support such efforts. Far from
>constituting some ill-defined "isolationist" retreat from America's
>international responsibilities, they reflect the desire of elected
>representatives of the American people to impose reasonable burden-sharing
>criteria on the Kosovo mission. These efforts are a positive step in the
>achievement of a national interest-based reassessment of American policy
>and of an early American disengagement from Kosovo.
>
>4. The United States should stop the current efforts by the outgoing
>Administration and supporters of its policy in the Congress and in NGOs to
>impose a de facto (and, later, de jure) independent status for Kosovo.
>These efforts are manifested in the re-launching of the long-discredited
>notion of Kosovo as a third republic in Yugoslavia, and in willful efforts
>to misconstrue the wording of Security Council Resolution 1244 as not
>specifying that Kosovo is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic
>of Serbia as well as that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If
>continued, U.S. support for Kosovo independence will have twofold effect.
>It will unnecessarily further impair regional stability, which remains the
>only real American interest in the Balkans. Moreover, it will further
>damage American relations with our allies, who are opposed to Kosovo
>independence. The recent elections favoring moderate forces associated with
>Ibrahim Rugova (who also favors Kosovo independence but who has
>demonstrated a dedication to nonviolent methods distinctly different from
>those of the Clinton Administration's favored entity, the Kosovo Liberation
>Army) lends some hope that some reasonable solution among the parties can
>be found. In summary, the next Administration should base its Kosovo policy
>on
>(i) the need for the parties, if possible, to work a settlement out for
>themselves, and
>(ii) to follow the lead of out European allies in facilitating a solution,
>rather than trying to dictate one as the current Administration is
>inclined.
>
>5. Similarly, the United States should cease efforts to pressure
>Belgrade to accept the independence of Montenegro, a status the people of
>Montenegro have not indicated they desire. Even if it is accepted that the
>U.S. is no longer formally encouraging the secessionist minority in
>Podgorica, some segments of the bureaucracy (notably at the Department of
>State) and NGOs with known close links to the Clinton Administration are
>still effectively doing so.
>
>6. The United States should expeditiously follow the lead of our
>European allies in removing of all sanctions against Yugoslavia, including
>the so-called outer wall. Continued use sanctions against the new
>democratic government in Belgrade to force compliance with preexisting
>demands by the Clinton Administration is counterproductive. It effectively
>prevents American companies from taking optimal advantage of the many
>business opportunities that are opening up in Serbia - opportunities that
>will be taken by their European competitors. It is noted that despite
>hortatory language in current legislation regarding such demands, the
>President currently has full legal authority to lift sanctions, and he
>should use it as soon as possible. This should be done
>(i) immediately, with respect to compliance with sanctions still formally
>in effect, and
>(ii) as quickly as possible, with respect to formal lifting of sanctions
>imposed by legislation or by executive order.
>The United States should favor immediately rescinding resolutions by the
>Security Council imposing sanctions, most notably SC747 of May 30, 1992.
>The United States, both bilaterally and in international bodies, should
>support efforts to provide appropriate aid to Yugoslavia for economic
>reconstruction.
>
>7. The United States should cease all efforts to coerce the new
>government in Belgrade into surrendering persons indicted by The Hague war
>crimes tribunal. These efforts may result in further dangerous precedents
>contrary to the American interest in opposing the establishment of a
>standing international criminal court, for which The Hague tribunal for
>Yugoslavia and its counterpart for Rwanda are precursors. Such coercion is
>also counterproductive in that, if successful, it would undercut the
>legitimacy of the new government in Belgrade, which was elected as an
>authentic expression of the national will by an electorate that uniformly
>regards The Hague tribunal as politicized tool of American policy rather
>than a judicial body. The United States should favor the repatriation of
>the tribunal's functions to the Yugoslav successor states, including
>Serbia-Montenegro. In particular, the United States should regard as
>sufficient for the purposes of justice forthcoming steps by the new
>authorities in Belgrade to hold its own citizens responsible for violations
>of domestic law.
>
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>
>While the focus of the conference was to arrive at specific recommendations
>to the new American Administration, there was also a consensus on
>suggestions for the new democratic government in Belgrade and for President
>Kostunica:
>
>1. Belgrade should move to repair relations with Washington, and the
>re-establishment of full diplomatic relations will be a welcome first step.
>At the same time, such efforts should be pursued in a quiet, businesslike
>way at the diplomatic "working level." Any high-visibility state visits at
>the head of state or foreign minister level would be counterproductive
>prior to the departure of the current Administration. If such contacts are
>inevitable, they should take place in third countries, in the context of
>multilateral gatherings. Belgrade's current focus on Europe is entirely
>appropriate and should continue for the time being. In all contacts with
>the outgoing Administration the Yugoslav government should not hesitate to
>raise unresolved issues that the Clinton team can and should rectify,
>including the unconditional removal of the outer wall of sanctions and the
>granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Yugoslavia.
>
>2. Belgrade should move with deliberation on economic reconstruction.
>While the outline of transition suggested by the G-17 group of economists
>is useful, the new Yugoslav authorities should take note of the
>difficulties experienced by other formerly socialist economies during the
>past decade. It should not neglect broader public interest in favor of the
>models of transition and theories of political economy that may result in a
>Gaydar-like de-industrialization. The government in Belgrade should be
>aware that
>(i) the record of the IMF in promoting sustained economic development is
>ambiguous; and
>(ii) the European Union, while an essential partner in the economic
>recovery of Yugoslavia, may be more interested in it as a pool of
>inexpensive labor than as a potential equal partner.
>In each instance, outside advice and assistance should be accepted in a
>discriminating manner. Foreign investment is to be encouraged, but measures
>should be taken to ensure that foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises
>do not result in asset-stripping. The development of a patriotic business
>culture in Serbia is inseparable from the reassertion of the country's
>self-respect, dignity and sovereignty.
>
>3. The new government in Belgrade should not compromise on the
>principle that Kosovo is sovereign Serbian, as well as Yugoslav territory.
>At the same time, based on existing realities, it should begin to establish
>dialogue with other essential parties. In particular, Belgrade should
>insist that UNMIK and KFOR comply with provisions of UNSC Resolution 1244
>regarding reintroduction of Yugoslav forces into Kosovo, particularly with
>reference to restoring the integrity of Kosovo's border with neighboring
>states. Belgrade should insist that UNMIK and KFOR live up to their
>responsibility to demilitarize the former elements of the Kosovo Liberation
>Army (which remain under arms) and to protect all persons in Kosovo
>regardless of ethnicity or religion. It should be insisted that a workable,
>short-term plan be reached for the return to their homes of persons who
>fled or were driven out of Kosovo since the end of the war and for their
>subsequent protection. The Belgrade government should make efforts to
>conduct a dialogue with moderate (i.e., non-KLA) Albanians on achieving a
>peaceful solution.
>
>4. The Belgrade government absolutely should not surrender any person
>to The Hague war crimes tribunal. While the consensus of the conference was
>against any cooperation with the tribunal (including establishment of an
>office in Belgrade), it was suggested that some contact might be useful
>(i) only if such contacts on the territory of Serbia or Montenegro are not
>investigatory but purely for exchange of information, and
>(ii) as a means to transfer functions currently claimed by the tribunal to
>national courts.
>It was recommended that the Belgrade authorities should expect any
>cooperation to presuppose a willingness of the tribunal to take appropriate
>action with respect to violations of the laws of war by persons acting on
>behalf of the countries supporting the tribunal. It was specifically
>suggested that materials relating to the activities of Agim Ceku both
>during "Operation Storm" and in Kosovo, as well as any available
>information about other relevant activities, be provided to the tribunal's
>representatives as a test case of their willingness to act as a legitimate
>instrument of justice. It was suggested that all related statements by
>current Administration's officials - such as James O'Brien's warning to
>Belgrade that Washington expects Yugoslavia to fully cooperate with The
>Hague by April 2001 - should be treated as an exercise in rhetorical
>bravado, since no current official can impose conditions on a foreign party
>that would be binding for the new Administration. It was unanimously
>concluded that Belgrade's refusal to allow the tribunal's jurisdiction in
>Yugoslavia and to surrender its citizens is the greatest single service
>that the Serbs can render to the real international community - the
>community of people, in America and elsewhere, who reject the notion of
>supranational authority.
>
>IV - CONCLUSION
>
>In our view it is both possible and desirable that the relations between
>the United States and Yugoslavia will improve and develop on the basis of
>mutual respect, friendship and common interest.
>
>The regime of Slobodan Milosevic was one obstacle to the development of
>such relations, and his removal provides an opportunity to make a fresh
>start. The other obstacle to such relations is the ideology of hegemonist
>interventionism that prevails in America's current foreign policy
>establishment. It is contrary to the authentic tradition of the American
>republic, to its true interests, and to the will of the American people. It
>should be replaced by national interest-based policies, in the Balkans and
>elsewhere.
>
>By revising its approach to Yugoslavia, and developing truly even-handed
>policies that will be free from ideological and special interest pressures,
>the next Administration will act in the true American interest, and in the
>interest of peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans.
>
>By standing firm on the key issues that affect its own national interest,
>and especially by refusing to compromise its sovereignty (The Hague) and
>territorial integrity (Kosovo), the government of Yugoslavia will also help
>promote such new policies in Washington. If it bases its strategy firmly on
>the principle of enlightened nationalism, and refuses to be drawn into any
>arrangements that may erode those fundamental principles, Belgrade will
>best defend its own interests while at the same time contributing to the
>abandonment of the insidious path of imperial over-reach in Washington.
>
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Conference was honored by a video address by the President of
>Yugoslavia, Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, that contained his views on the current
>state of relations between his country and the United States and his
>thinking on the ways to overcome existing problems in the period ahead.
>Here is the transcript of the address:
>
>"Regardless of who emerges as the winner from the present electoral
>imbroglio, we can safely assume that by the end of January there will be a
>new Administration in Washington.
>"When it comes to the Balkans, that Administration will be as "new" as the
>newly elected President wants it to be. In my opinion this provides both
>our countries with a unique opportunity to turn a new page, not only in
>rhetoric but also in fact, and to make a fresh start after a very difficult
>decade in our relations.
>"Some of the wounds of that decade will take time to heal, and the healing
>process will not be aided by our pretending that they do not exist. And
>yet, there are times when the opportunities for a change of course simply
>must be taken, when it would be foolish, or tragic, not to make the
>attempt. In Belgrade it would be foolish; in Washington it would be tragic.
>We are fully prepared to do our part. We hope and trust that America will
>do hers.
>"Let me deal briefly with the legacy of the past, and then look ahead.
>"There are no inherent disputes between our two countries, which had been
>friends and allies for most of the past century. Those problems that do
>exist could have been avoided, and are not insoluble.
>"One such problem is Kosovo. While a complete normalization of relations
>between our countries would be much easier if NATO were not in occupation
>of our sovereign territory, making progress in other areas will facilitate
>the quest for a lasting solution in the southern Serbian province. There is
>no easy, obvious, or early solution. We know this, and by now Washington
>also knows this better than it did.
>"We should turn our sadly shared experience into a more common attitude,
>and move towards a shared judgment. Milosevic did not invent the Kosovo
>problem, and his disappearance by itself cannot solve the historic
>difficulties that he made so much worse.
>"His crimes must be properly assessed. This is just as important for you
>as it is for us. Important for us because his orders were executed by our
>citizens in our sovereign jurisdiction; important for you because his
>crimes were given such ideological and mesmerizing importance, and even
>invented when there were not enough of them. The crimes and criminality of
>the "KLA," so obvious to us, were - in this mesmerized environment -
>largely invisible to ordinary Americans, and ignored by their leaders.
>"The first thing we can all do is stop pretending that there is a story of
>blame from which we ourselves are exempt, or from which anyone is exempt.
>We must break the cycle of blame. This rupture is an essential part of
>peace-making at every level.
>"This brings me to the question of war crimes. We have exactly the same
>problem with international jurisdictions as Americans do. Like you, we know
>enough about the world to know that international politics can distort the
>idea of justice. Let me assure you: anti-Serbianism is as common a
>prejudice in the Balkans as is anti-Americanism on the world stage. The
>essential case for justice, the need for it, is simply this: that the human
>heart craves it.
>"We accept that the judicial process should be an integral part of eventual
>reconciliation. But the instrumentalization of judicial retaliation can
>only postpone effective reconciliation, and make it more difficult. Sooner
>rather than later the work of the Hague Tribunal - with which we shall find
>modes of cooperation - should be repatriated to the successor states of the
>former Yugoslavia. If there is to be a supra-national alternative, it could
>only be a world tribunal to which all members of the United Nations submit
>their jurisdiction and their sovereignty. I am not suggesting that the
>creation of such a body is desirable, let alone inevitable; I am simply
>stating a fact.
>"Kosovo, The Hague, and other problems need resolving, but they should not
>be allowed to dominate the dialogue between our countries. There are many
>areas of potentially fruitful cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange
>that can and should be developed. America's creativity, so impressively
>evidenced in science, technology, and sustained economic growth, and
>America's inexhaustible entrepreneurial drive can help us rejoin the ranks
>of European nations to which we rightfully belong.
>"I hope that the Rockford Institute conference on American policy in the
>Balkans in the coming decade will make a real contribution to the
>attainment of that objective. I extend my best wishes to all its
>participants, and look forward to seeing their specific recommendations."
>****************************************
>Report prepared by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director
>Center for International Affairs of The Rockford Institute
>
>HEAD OFFICE CHICAGO AREA OFFICE
>928 N Main Street 4722 Oakton Street
>Rockford, IL 61103 Skokie, IL 60076-3012
>(815) 964-5054 (847) 679-9850
>Facsimile 964-9403 Facsimile 679-9851
>
>Attachment Converted: C:\CYBERNET\EUDORA\ATTACH\TRIDCDCo.doc
>
---
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>CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
>www.rockfordinstitute.org
>
>Report on TRI/CFIA Conference
>AMERICAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION:
>L E A D E R S H I P O R M A R G I N A L I Z A T I O N ?
>held in Washington D.C. on November 14, 2000
>
>Contents:
>I - INTRODUCTION: Conference Objective
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>IV - CONCLUSION
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>===========================================
>I - THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Rockford Institute's Center for International Affairs takes an active
>interest in Balkan affairs not because Southeast Europe is an inherently
>important part of the world - which it is not - but because American
>policies in that region over the past decade have come to embody all that
>is wrong with the fundamental assumptions, values, and modus operandi of
>the decision-making community in Washington.
>
>It is our considered opinion that a thorough revision of those policies,
>and the subsequent new approach of the United States to the Balkans would
>be an important step towards a new, national interest-based foreign policy
>formulation in general. Accordingly, we saw the election of Vojislav
>Kostunica as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the
>downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, as a welcome opportunity to make that step.
>
>Aware of the importance of time, and apprehensive that in the absence of
>specific alternative proposals the outgoing national security team's
>prejudices and bureaucratic inertia may impose a negative continuity on the
>new Administration, we convened a conference in the nation's capital on
>November 14 to discuss these issues. We gathered a team of analysts who
>take an active interest in Southeast Europe and who share the desire for an
>active, national interest-based U.S. foreign policy, free from passionate
>attachments and ideological straightjackets, in the Balkans or any other
>part of the world.
>
>The panel, chaired by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director of TRI's Center for
>International Affairs, included Gary Dempsey of CATO Institute, Dr. John C.
>Hulsman of Heritage Foundation, Cliff Kincaid (Washington-based
>investigative reporter and broadcaster), Bill Lind (Free Congress
>Foundation), Dr. Branko Milanovic who is a senior economist with The World
>Bank, The Hon. Branko Terzic of Deloitte & Touche, Benjamin Works
>(SIRI-US), as well as senior policy analysts and advisors from both the
>U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. While the individual speakers
>offered thoughts on a variety of topics relevant to American policy toward
>post-Milosevic Serbia, the overall consensus of the panelists and
>participants is summarized in the following policy recommendations for the
>incoming administration in Washington. Also included are some suggestions
>for the newly elected government in Belgrade.
>
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>
>1. All key European countries have moved rapidly to reestablish normal
>relations with Belgrade based on Serbia's unique position in the heart of
>the Balkans. America's failure to follow suit will cause rift with
>Europeans and turn American leadership into self-imposed marginalization.
>In order to avoid such outcome, detrimental to its interests, the United
>States must move away from the now evident failure of a policy toward
>Serbia publicly based only on the personality of one man - Slobodan
>Milosevic - and predicated on the unrealistic notion that his removal from
>power would solve all outstanding regional problems. While his downfall has
>vastly improved the prospects for repairing historically close ties between
>the U.S. and Serbia, the new Washington Administration should define a new,
>national interest-based approach to the former Yugoslavia without delay.
>
>2. A national interest-based policy ought to reassess U.S. relations
>with Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) on the basis of prospects for (i)
>regional stability and development and (ii) promotion of American
>commercial interests. It must avoid every temptation to vindicate ex post
>facto the failed 1990s policy premised on treating the Serbian nation not
>as an integral part of an extended European economic and political
>structure but as an inherently antagonistic entity and a permanent black
>hole at the center of the region. The departure from office of persons
>inseparable from the Clinton Administration's failures - notably Secretary
>of State Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke, and President Clinton himself -
>will greatly improve prospects for this reassessment.
>
>3. The new team in Washington should be aware of the damage caused to
>American interests by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and by the
>ongoing, open-ended, and ultimately futile "nation-building" mission in
>Kosovo. The new Administration should take note of legislative efforts,
>such as the Warner/Byrd amendment in the Senate and the Kasich amendment in
>the House of Representatives, which reflect an increasing Congressional
>awareness of that damage. It should support such efforts. Far from
>constituting some ill-defined "isolationist" retreat from America's
>international responsibilities, they reflect the desire of elected
>representatives of the American people to impose reasonable burden-sharing
>criteria on the Kosovo mission. These efforts are a positive step in the
>achievement of a national interest-based reassessment of American policy
>and of an early American disengagement from Kosovo.
>
>4. The United States should stop the current efforts by the outgoing
>Administration and supporters of its policy in the Congress and in NGOs to
>impose a de facto (and, later, de jure) independent status for Kosovo.
>These efforts are manifested in the re-launching of the long-discredited
>notion of Kosovo as a third republic in Yugoslavia, and in willful efforts
>to misconstrue the wording of Security Council Resolution 1244 as not
>specifying that Kosovo is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic
>of Serbia as well as that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If
>continued, U.S. support for Kosovo independence will have twofold effect.
>It will unnecessarily further impair regional stability, which remains the
>only real American interest in the Balkans. Moreover, it will further
>damage American relations with our allies, who are opposed to Kosovo
>independence. The recent elections favoring moderate forces associated with
>Ibrahim Rugova (who also favors Kosovo independence but who has
>demonstrated a dedication to nonviolent methods distinctly different from
>those of the Clinton Administration's favored entity, the Kosovo Liberation
>Army) lends some hope that some reasonable solution among the parties can
>be found. In summary, the next Administration should base its Kosovo policy
>on
>(i) the need for the parties, if possible, to work a settlement out for
>themselves, and
>(ii) to follow the lead of out European allies in facilitating a solution,
>rather than trying to dictate one as the current Administration is
>inclined.
>
>5. Similarly, the United States should cease efforts to pressure
>Belgrade to accept the independence of Montenegro, a status the people of
>Montenegro have not indicated they desire. Even if it is accepted that the
>U.S. is no longer formally encouraging the secessionist minority in
>Podgorica, some segments of the bureaucracy (notably at the Department of
>State) and NGOs with known close links to the Clinton Administration are
>still effectively doing so.
>
>6. The United States should expeditiously follow the lead of our
>European allies in removing of all sanctions against Yugoslavia, including
>the so-called outer wall. Continued use sanctions against the new
>democratic government in Belgrade to force compliance with preexisting
>demands by the Clinton Administration is counterproductive. It effectively
>prevents American companies from taking optimal advantage of the many
>business opportunities that are opening up in Serbia - opportunities that
>will be taken by their European competitors. It is noted that despite
>hortatory language in current legislation regarding such demands, the
>President currently has full legal authority to lift sanctions, and he
>should use it as soon as possible. This should be done
>(i) immediately, with respect to compliance with sanctions still formally
>in effect, and
>(ii) as quickly as possible, with respect to formal lifting of sanctions
>imposed by legislation or by executive order.
>The United States should favor immediately rescinding resolutions by the
>Security Council imposing sanctions, most notably SC747 of May 30, 1992.
>The United States, both bilaterally and in international bodies, should
>support efforts to provide appropriate aid to Yugoslavia for economic
>reconstruction.
>
>7. The United States should cease all efforts to coerce the new
>government in Belgrade into surrendering persons indicted by The Hague war
>crimes tribunal. These efforts may result in further dangerous precedents
>contrary to the American interest in opposing the establishment of a
>standing international criminal court, for which The Hague tribunal for
>Yugoslavia and its counterpart for Rwanda are precursors. Such coercion is
>also counterproductive in that, if successful, it would undercut the
>legitimacy of the new government in Belgrade, which was elected as an
>authentic expression of the national will by an electorate that uniformly
>regards The Hague tribunal as politicized tool of American policy rather
>than a judicial body. The United States should favor the repatriation of
>the tribunal's functions to the Yugoslav successor states, including
>Serbia-Montenegro. In particular, the United States should regard as
>sufficient for the purposes of justice forthcoming steps by the new
>authorities in Belgrade to hold its own citizens responsible for violations
>of domestic law.
>
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>
>While the focus of the conference was to arrive at specific recommendations
>to the new American Administration, there was also a consensus on
>suggestions for the new democratic government in Belgrade and for President
>Kostunica:
>
>1. Belgrade should move to repair relations with Washington, and the
>re-establishment of full diplomatic relations will be a welcome first step.
>At the same time, such efforts should be pursued in a quiet, businesslike
>way at the diplomatic "working level." Any high-visibility state visits at
>the head of state or foreign minister level would be counterproductive
>prior to the departure of the current Administration. If such contacts are
>inevitable, they should take place in third countries, in the context of
>multilateral gatherings. Belgrade's current focus on Europe is entirely
>appropriate and should continue for the time being. In all contacts with
>the outgoing Administration the Yugoslav government should not hesitate to
>raise unresolved issues that the Clinton team can and should rectify,
>including the unconditional removal of the outer wall of sanctions and the
>granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Yugoslavia.
>
>2. Belgrade should move with deliberation on economic reconstruction.
>While the outline of transition suggested by the G-17 group of economists
>is useful, the new Yugoslav authorities should take note of the
>difficulties experienced by other formerly socialist economies during the
>past decade. It should not neglect broader public interest in favor of the
>models of transition and theories of political economy that may result in a
>Gaydar-like de-industrialization. The government in Belgrade should be
>aware that
>(i) the record of the IMF in promoting sustained economic development is
>ambiguous; and
>(ii) the European Union, while an essential partner in the economic
>recovery of Yugoslavia, may be more interested in it as a pool of
>inexpensive labor than as a potential equal partner.
>In each instance, outside advice and assistance should be accepted in a
>discriminating manner. Foreign investment is to be encouraged, but measures
>should be taken to ensure that foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises
>do not result in asset-stripping. The development of a patriotic business
>culture in Serbia is inseparable from the reassertion of the country's
>self-respect, dignity and sovereignty.
>
>3. The new government in Belgrade should not compromise on the
>principle that Kosovo is sovereign Serbian, as well as Yugoslav territory.
>At the same time, based on existing realities, it should begin to establish
>dialogue with other essential parties. In particular, Belgrade should
>insist that UNMIK and KFOR comply with provisions of UNSC Resolution 1244
>regarding reintroduction of Yugoslav forces into Kosovo, particularly with
>reference to restoring the integrity of Kosovo's border with neighboring
>states. Belgrade should insist that UNMIK and KFOR live up to their
>responsibility to demilitarize the former elements of the Kosovo Liberation
>Army (which remain under arms) and to protect all persons in Kosovo
>regardless of ethnicity or religion. It should be insisted that a workable,
>short-term plan be reached for the return to their homes of persons who
>fled or were driven out of Kosovo since the end of the war and for their
>subsequent protection. The Belgrade government should make efforts to
>conduct a dialogue with moderate (i.e., non-KLA) Albanians on achieving a
>peaceful solution.
>
>4. The Belgrade government absolutely should not surrender any person
>to The Hague war crimes tribunal. While the consensus of the conference was
>against any cooperation with the tribunal (including establishment of an
>office in Belgrade), it was suggested that some contact might be useful
>(i) only if such contacts on the territory of Serbia or Montenegro are not
>investigatory but purely for exchange of information, and
>(ii) as a means to transfer functions currently claimed by the tribunal to
>national courts.
>It was recommended that the Belgrade authorities should expect any
>cooperation to presuppose a willingness of the tribunal to take appropriate
>action with respect to violations of the laws of war by persons acting on
>behalf of the countries supporting the tribunal. It was specifically
>suggested that materials relating to the activities of Agim Ceku both
>during "Operation Storm" and in Kosovo, as well as any available
>information about other relevant activities, be provided to the tribunal's
>representatives as a test case of their willingness to act as a legitimate
>instrument of justice. It was suggested that all related statements by
>current Administration's officials - such as James O'Brien's warning to
>Belgrade that Washington expects Yugoslavia to fully cooperate with The
>Hague by April 2001 - should be treated as an exercise in rhetorical
>bravado, since no current official can impose conditions on a foreign party
>that would be binding for the new Administration. It was unanimously
>concluded that Belgrade's refusal to allow the tribunal's jurisdiction in
>Yugoslavia and to surrender its citizens is the greatest single service
>that the Serbs can render to the real international community - the
>community of people, in America and elsewhere, who reject the notion of
>supranational authority.
>
>IV - CONCLUSION
>
>In our view it is both possible and desirable that the relations between
>the United States and Yugoslavia will improve and develop on the basis of
>mutual respect, friendship and common interest.
>
>The regime of Slobodan Milosevic was one obstacle to the development of
>such relations, and his removal provides an opportunity to make a fresh
>start. The other obstacle to such relations is the ideology of hegemonist
>interventionism that prevails in America's current foreign policy
>establishment. It is contrary to the authentic tradition of the American
>republic, to its true interests, and to the will of the American people. It
>should be replaced by national interest-based policies, in the Balkans and
>elsewhere.
>
>By revising its approach to Yugoslavia, and developing truly even-handed
>policies that will be free from ideological and special interest pressures,
>the next Administration will act in the true American interest, and in the
>interest of peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans.
>
>By standing firm on the key issues that affect its own national interest,
>and especially by refusing to compromise its sovereignty (The Hague) and
>territorial integrity (Kosovo), the government of Yugoslavia will also help
>promote such new policies in Washington. If it bases its strategy firmly on
>the principle of enlightened nationalism, and refuses to be drawn into any
>arrangements that may erode those fundamental principles, Belgrade will
>best defend its own interests while at the same time contributing to the
>abandonment of the insidious path of imperial over-reach in Washington.
>
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Conference was honored by a video address by the President of
>Yugoslavia, Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, that contained his views on the current
>state of relations between his country and the United States and his
>thinking on the ways to overcome existing problems in the period ahead.
>Here is the transcript of the address:
>
>"Regardless of who emerges as the winner from the present electoral
>imbroglio, we can safely assume that by the end of January there will be a
>new Administration in Washington.
>"When it comes to the Balkans, that Administration will be as "new" as the
>newly elected President wants it to be. In my opinion this provides both
>our countries with a unique opportunity to turn a new page, not only in
>rhetoric but also in fact, and to make a fresh start after a very difficult
>decade in our relations.
>"Some of the wounds of that decade will take time to heal, and the healing
>process will not be aided by our pretending that they do not exist. And
>yet, there are times when the opportunities for a change of course simply
>must be taken, when it would be foolish, or tragic, not to make the
>attempt. In Belgrade it would be foolish; in Washington it would be tragic.
>We are fully prepared to do our part. We hope and trust that America will
>do hers.
>"Let me deal briefly with the legacy of the past, and then look ahead.
>"There are no inherent disputes between our two countries, which had been
>friends and allies for most of the past century. Those problems that do
>exist could have been avoided, and are not insoluble.
>"One such problem is Kosovo. While a complete normalization of relations
>between our countries would be much easier if NATO were not in occupation
>of our sovereign territory, making progress in other areas will facilitate
>the quest for a lasting solution in the southern Serbian province. There is
>no easy, obvious, or early solution. We know this, and by now Washington
>also knows this better than it did.
>"We should turn our sadly shared experience into a more common attitude,
>and move towards a shared judgment. Milosevic did not invent the Kosovo
>problem, and his disappearance by itself cannot solve the historic
>difficulties that he made so much worse.
>"His crimes must be properly assessed. This is just as important for you
>as it is for us. Important for us because his orders were executed by our
>citizens in our sovereign jurisdiction; important for you because his
>crimes were given such ideological and mesmerizing importance, and even
>invented when there were not enough of them. The crimes and criminality of
>the "KLA," so obvious to us, were - in this mesmerized environment -
>largely invisible to ordinary Americans, and ignored by their leaders.
>"The first thing we can all do is stop pretending that there is a story of
>blame from which we ourselves are exempt, or from which anyone is exempt.
>We must break the cycle of blame. This rupture is an essential part of
>peace-making at every level.
>"This brings me to the question of war crimes. We have exactly the same
>problem with international jurisdictions as Americans do. Like you, we know
>enough about the world to know that international politics can distort the
>idea of justice. Let me assure you: anti-Serbianism is as common a
>prejudice in the Balkans as is anti-Americanism on the world stage. The
>essential case for justice, the need for it, is simply this: that the human
>heart craves it.
>"We accept that the judicial process should be an integral part of eventual
>reconciliation. But the instrumentalization of judicial retaliation can
>only postpone effective reconciliation, and make it more difficult. Sooner
>rather than later the work of the Hague Tribunal - with which we shall find
>modes of cooperation - should be repatriated to the successor states of the
>former Yugoslavia. If there is to be a supra-national alternative, it could
>only be a world tribunal to which all members of the United Nations submit
>their jurisdiction and their sovereignty. I am not suggesting that the
>creation of such a body is desirable, let alone inevitable; I am simply
>stating a fact.
>"Kosovo, The Hague, and other problems need resolving, but they should not
>be allowed to dominate the dialogue between our countries. There are many
>areas of potentially fruitful cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange
>that can and should be developed. America's creativity, so impressively
>evidenced in science, technology, and sustained economic growth, and
>America's inexhaustible entrepreneurial drive can help us rejoin the ranks
>of European nations to which we rightfully belong.
>"I hope that the Rockford Institute conference on American policy in the
>Balkans in the coming decade will make a real contribution to the
>attainment of that objective. I extend my best wishes to all its
>participants, and look forward to seeing their specific recommendations."
>****************************************
>Report prepared by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director
>Center for International Affairs of The Rockford Institute
>
>HEAD OFFICE CHICAGO AREA OFFICE
>928 N Main Street 4722 Oakton Street
>Rockford, IL 61103 Skokie, IL 60076-3012
>(815) 964-5054 (847) 679-9850
>Facsimile 964-9403 Facsimile 679-9851
>
>Attachment Converted: C:\CYBERNET\EUDORA\ATTACH\TRIDCDCo.doc
>
---
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