

THE TRIAL  
OF  
DRAGOLJUB-DRAŽA  
MIHAILOVIĆ

STENOGRAPHIC RECORD AND DOCUMENTS FROM  
THE TRIAL OF DRAGOLJUB-DRAŽA MIHAILOVIĆ

BELGRADE 1946



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THIS RECORD OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES TAKEN AT  
THE TRIAL OF THE TRAITORS AND WAR CRIMINALS LED  
BY DRAGOLJUB-DRAZA MIHAILOVIC, CONTAINS ONLY  
THOSE PARTS OF THE INDICTMENT, THE EXAMINA-  
TION, EVIDENCE AND OTHER MATTER WHICH RELATE  
DIRECTLY TO THE TRAITOR MIHAILOVIC.

### INTRODUCTION

*On June 10, 1946, before the Military Council of the Supreme Court of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia began the trial of 24 traitors and war criminals, including the leading criminal Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović.*

*The trial took place in the Summer Hall of the Infantry Training School at Topčider, and lasted till July 15, when sentence was passed. It was attended every day by hundreds of men and women from Belgrade and other parts of the country. A total of about 30,000 persons attended this trial.*

*The accused were tried before the Military Council of the Supreme Court of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of the President, Colonel Mihailo Đorđević and the members of the Council, Lieutenant-Colonel Milija Laković and Lieutenant Mihailo Janković; the secretary was Lieutenant Todor Popadić and the assistant judges, Major Nikola Stanković and Major Radomir Ilić.*

*The prosecution was represented by the Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Yugoslav Army, Colonel Miloš Minić, with his assistant Captain Miloš Jovanović.*

*The accused were Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, Dr. Stevan Moljević, Dr. Mladen Žujović, Dr. Živko Topalović, Đuro Vilović, Radoslav-Rade Radić, Slavoljub Vranješević, Miloš Glišić, Slobodan Jovanović, Božidar Purić, Dr. Momčilo Ninčić, Petar Živković, Radoje Knežević, Dr. Milan Gavrilović, Živan Knežević, Konstantin Fotić, Dragomir-Dragi Jovanović, Tanasije-Tasa Dinić, Velibor Jonić, Đura Dokić, Kosta Mušicki, Boško Pavlović, Dr. Lazar-Laza Marković and Dr. Kosta Kumanudi. The following were tried in their absence: Slobodan Jovanović and Božidar Purić, premiers of the emigrant government, Petar Živković, Dr. Momčilo Ninčić and Dr. Milan Gavrilović, ministers of the emigrant government, Radoje Knežević, minister of*



the court in emigration, Konstantin Fotić ambassador of the emigrant government to the USA, Major Živan Knežević, director of the military chancellery of the presidium of the emigrant government, Dr. Živko Topalović and Dr. Mladen Žujović, political leaders of the Ravna Gora Četnik organization, who had fled abroad.

All the accused were represented by counsel, as follows: Dragoljub-Dražo Mihailović, by the barristers Nikola Donović and Dragić Joksimović; Duro Vilović, by Dr. Milan Omčikus, barrister; Dragoljub-Draži Jovanović, by Slavko Dukanac, barrister; Tanasije Dinić, by Dr. Bogoljub Jovanović, barrister; Velibor Jonić, by Milan Živadinović, barrister; Duro Dokić, by Dragoljub Joksimović, barrister; Dr. Lazar Marković, by Aleksandar Nikolić, barrister; Dr. Kosta Kumanudi, by Dr. Friedrich Pops, barrister, all of which were chosen by the accused themselves. The other accused were defended by counsel chosen by the Court: Radoslav Radić, by Lazar Vučetić, barrister; Slavoljub Vranješević and Miloš Glišić, by Blažo Radović, barrister; Kosta Mušicki, by Đorđe Ćirić, barrister; Boško Pavlović, Radoje Knežević, and Dr. Milan Gavrilović by Slobodan Subotić, barrister; Dr. Mladen Žujović and Dr. Živko Topalović, by Nikola Radovanović, barrister, Slobodan Jovanović, by Miloš Terzić, barrister; Božidar Purić and Petar Živković, by Pavle Miljaković, barrister; Dr. Momčilo Ninčić, by David Alkalaj, barrister, and Živan Knežević and Konstantin Fotić, by Dragutin Tasić, barrister.

The trial of the traitors and war criminals in Topčider was attended by more than 100 journalists of whom about 60 were from abroad, representatives of all big world papers and agencies. Special correspondents were sent by the agencies TASS, ČTK, PAP, Reuter, Associated Press, Agence France Presse, United Press, Overseas News Agency, International News Service, the Jewish News Agency, TelePress, the Albanian Telegraph Agency and the newspapers: Pravda, Izvestia, London Times, Daily Worker, New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, News Chronicle, Daily Express and others. In order to facilitate speedy communication for the foreign journalists, who had come from the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, China, Hungary, Roumania, Denmark and other countries, a special office for telegraph and telephone service was established at Topčider.

The entire proceedings of the trial were translated into Russian, French and English, so that the foreign correspondents were enabled to follow directly every word of the Court and the accused. In this way the correspondents were able to send to their agencies

and editors their reports on statements and facts which had been heard in Court a few minutes previously.

Special correspondents of the papers of all the People's Republics of Yugoslavia were also present.

The Belgrade Radio Station transmitted the whole course of the proceedings, so that the entire country and the world public could listen to every word pronounced at this stupendous trial.

Many hundreds of thousands of persons throughout Yugoslavia listened with the greatest attention to the transmission of the Topčider trial, in workshops, institutions, houses and squares, in all towns and villages.

## INDICTMENT

## THE ACCUSED AND THEIR DEEDS

*The Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Yugoslav Army, Colonel Miloš Minić, after the trial was declared open, read the following indictment:*

Military Prosecution of the Yugoslav Army, № 711/46, May 31st 1946, Belgrade, — to the Supreme Court of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia — Military Council, Belgrade.

On the basis of Art. 46 of the Law concerning the organization of the People's Courts and Art. 14, item 2, of the Law concerning Criminal Acts against the People and the State, and in accordance with Art. 7 and Art. 19 of the Law concerning the Organization and Competence of the Military Courts of the Yugoslav Army, I submit to this Court the indictment of the following persons:

1. **Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović**, born April 27, 1893, at Ivanjica, son of Mihailo and Smiljana, maiden name Petrović, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, married, father of two children, before the war colonel of the former Yugoslav Army, during the occupation promoted to the rank of army general, was minister of war in the emigrant government and chief of staff of the Supreme HQ of the so-called Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland — now in prison.

2. **Dr. Stevan Moljević**, born January 6, 1888, at Rudo, son of Jovan and Mitra, maiden name Babić, married, father of two children, obtained his degree in law in Zagreb, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war lawyer in Banja Luka, during the occupation member of the General Staff of D. M. (Abr. for Draža Mihailović — Translator's note) — now abroad.

3. **Mladen Žujović**, born January 5, 1895 in Belgrade, son of Jevrem and Danica, before the war an assistant lawyer in Belgrade, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, absent — now abroad.

4. **Dr. Živko Topalović**, born March 21, 1886 at Užice, son of Periša and Mihava, married, lawyer in Belgrade, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, absent — now abroad.



5. **Duro Vilović**, born December 11, 1889 at Brela, son of Duro and Simone, maiden name Šašić, Croat, Yugoslav citizen, obtained his degree in philosophy and theology, by profession a writer and journalist, during the occupation member of the Central National Committee of D. M. organization and President of the Committee for Propaganda — now in prison.

6. **Radoslav-Rade Radić**, born in 1890 at Jašavka, Banjaluka District, son of Novak and Stoja, maiden name Spasojević, merchant, married, father of three children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, during the occupation Četnik commander in Bosnia and member of the Central National Committee of D. M. organization — now in prison.

7. **Slavoljub Vranješević**, born January 10, 1905 in the village of Kravica, Srebrenica District, son of Dušan and Danica, maiden name Kojić, former Yugoslav major, married, father of one child, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, last function commander of the D. M. organization in Western Bosnia — now in prison.

8. **Miloš Glišić**, born February 27, 1910 at Užička Požega, son of Stojadin and Stanka, maiden name Bogićević, captain of the former Yugoslav Army, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, married, father of two children, — now in prison.

9. **Slobodan Jovanović**, born November 21, 1869 in Belgrade, son of Vladimir and Jelepa, bachelor, former professor of the Belgrade University, during the war and the occupation vice-premier and later prime minister of the royal Yugoslav emigrant government and deputy-minister of war, absent — now abroad.

10. **Dr. Božidar Purić**, born February 6, 1890 in Belgrade, son of Luka and Milica, married, former official of the ministry of foreign affairs, during the occupation prime minister of the royal Yugoslav emigrant government, absent — now abroad.

11. **Dr. Momčilo Ninčić**, born May 28, 1876 at Jagodina, son of Aron and Pole, married, father of two children, Yugoslav citizen, during the war and occupation minister of foreign affairs in the royal Yugoslav emigrant government, absent — now abroad.

12. **Petar Živković**, born January 23, 1879 at Negotin, son of Rako and Sava, bachelor, Serb, Yugoslav citizen. Before the war he was an army general and during the war and occupation member of the royal Yugoslav emigrant government, deputy supreme commander of the Yugoslav Army and at one time minister of war, absent — now abroad.

13. **Radoje Knežević**, born August 20, 1901 at Stragari, son of Lazar and Mileva, maiden name Veljković, married, father of two



children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war professor in Belgrade, during the occupation minister of the emigrant court, absent — now abroad.

14. **Dr. Milan Gavrilović**, born November 23, 1882 in Belgrade, son of Uroš and Agnjica, maiden name Vasić, married, father of two children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war councillor of legation in retirement and ambassador, during the occupation member of the royal Yugoslav emigrant government, absent — now abroad.

15. **Živan Knežević**, born June 15, 1906 at Vranje, son of Lazar and Mileva, maiden name Veljković, married, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war major of the Yugoslav Army and during



Colonel Mihailo Đorđević, president of the Council, and Lieutenant-Colonels Milija Laković (left) and Mihailo Janković (right), members.

the occupation secretary of the war cabinet of the royal Yugoslav emigrant government, and military attaché to Ambassador Fotić, absent — now abroad.

16. **Konstantin Fotić**, born February 17, 1891 at Šabac, married, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war deputy minister and plenipotentiary minister, and during the occupation ambassador of the Yugoslav government in Washington, absent — now abroad.

17. **Dragomir-Dragi Jovanović**, born July 27, 1903 at Požarevac, son of Ljubomir and Vilma, maiden name Draškoci, married, father of one child, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war chief of the Belgrade Police, and during the occupation held the same post, and was also Mayor of Belgrade, chief of the Serbian State Security Department and special commissioner for the town of Belgrade and the districts of Vračar and Gročan — now in prison.

18. **Tanasije-Tasa Dinić**, 55 years old, son of Đorđe and Paraskeva, maiden name Jovanović, born in Niš, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, married, no children, before the war retired infantry colonel of the former Yugoslav Army and ex-member of Parliament, during the occupation special commissioner for Personnel, assistant to the commissioner of the interior, minister of the interior and minister of social welfare — now in prison.

19. **Velibor Jonić**, born February 12, 1892 in the village of Krnjevo, Orašija District, son of Krsto and Sofija, maiden name Veljković, married, father of one child, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war professor of the Military Academy and journalist, during the war and occupation commissioner of the Ministry of Education and later minister of education in Nedić's government — now in prison.

20. **Duro Dokić**, born at Užice in 1874, son of Lazar and Katarina, maiden name Lazarević, married, father of one child, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war reserve army general, and during the occupation minister of communication in Nedić's government from 3. X. 41 till the end — now in prison.

21. **Kosta Mušicki**, born April 7, 1897 at Slavonski Brod, son of Milan and Jelena, maiden name Mihailović, married, father of two children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, active colonel of engineers in the former Yugoslav Army, during the war commander of the Serbian Voluntary Corps and as such promoted to the rank of general — now in prison.

22. **Boško Pavlović**, born April 7, 1892 at Jajce, son of Vukašin and Katarina, maiden name Antras, married, father of two children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, before the war commander of the State Police Guards in Zagreb, during the occupation deputy commander of the Serbian State Guards and undersecretary of state in Nedić's government — now in prison.

23. **Dr. Lazar-Laza Marković**, born September 21, 1882, in Belgrade, son of Petar and Stana, maiden name Petrović, widower, father of one child, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, former minister in retirement — now in prison.

24. **Dr. Kosta Kumanudi**, born in 1874 in Belgrade, son of Dimitrije and Emina, maiden name Holcer, married, father of three children, Serb, Yugoslav citizen, former minister — now in prison, for committing the following criminal acts:

**Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović**, for committing the following criminal acts:

IN THE PERIOD FROM JULY TO THE END OF NOVEMBER 1941:

1. Mihailović organized in occupied Yugoslavia a Četnik organization (which he called »the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland«) and as soon as the struggle for liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia



Military prosecutor Colonel Miloš Minić reading the indictment; Captain Miloš Jovanović, assistant prosecutor (right)

against the invaders began, he entered into collaboration with the Germans and Italians and their servants and used his organization to suppress the struggle for liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia and to commit countless war crimes of all kinds.

2. In August 1941, Mihailović, although he had come to an agreement with representatives of the Valjevo Partisan Detachment that the Četniks and Partisans would not attack each other,

treacherously made a sudden attack on a platoon of the Valjevo Partisan Detachment in the village of Planinica (near Mionica). In this attack Mihailović personally commanded the Četniks, who killed two Partisans, wounded several and captured a few.

3. At the time of the outbreak of the people's uprising in Serbia, when the insurgents began liberating the towns, Mihailović secretly made contact with the traitor Milan Nedić. At Nedić's call, on August 29, 1941, the day of the formation of Nedić's Government — Mihailović sent a delegation to Belgrade consisting of Major Aleksandar Mišić and two high ranking officers, authorized to negotiate and conclude an agreement with Nedić about the joint struggle for the suppression of the people's uprising in Serbia. After the negotiations, which lasted from August 29 to September 5, 1941, Mihailović's Delegation concluded with Nedić the following agreement:

a) Nedić, that is Nedić's government, and Draža Mihailović shall collaborate in the struggle against the Partisans with the aim of annihilating them;

b) Nedić is immediately to extend financial help to Mihailović's organization so that Mihailović may pay salaries to the officers and non-commissioned officers and feed his army;

c) Nedić is immediately to appoint a liaison officer who will be constantly attached to Mihailović;

d) Nedić is to arrange with the Germans that Mihailović and his Četniks shall not be persecuted;

e) after the formation of the armed detachments of Nedić's government, Nedić and Mihailović shall make a joint plan of operation for the purging of Serbia of the Partisans.

On the basis of this concluded agreement Mihailović's Delegation received financial help from Nedić and immediately returned to Mihailović's Headquarters in Ravna Gora.

On the basis of this agreement and acting upon the orders of General Dankelmann who, on being informed by Nedić about the agreement concluded with Mihailović, approved of this agreement, the German units of occupation did not take any measures against Mihailović and his Četniks.

On the basis of this agreement, Pipan, Mihailović's liaison officer with Nedić, in the middle of September 1941, went to Mihailović's Headquarters together with the Deputy-Commander of Nedić's Government Lt. Colonel Marko Olujević, appointed by Nedić as liaison officer with Mihailović's Headquarters. Olujević carried with him Nedić's operational plan for the purging of Partisans from Serbia, in which the collaboration of Nedić's and Mihailović's detachments in

the purging operations was provided for — but Olujević fell into the hands of the Partisans with this plan in his possession.

In the greatest secrecy, having entered into collaboration with the quisling Nedić, Mihailović carried out preparations for the suppression of the liberation uprising in Serbia together with the invader and Nedić. But, in order to conceal his premeditated treason, he assured the Partisan representatives that his Četniks would never attack the Partisans and that he would enter into the struggle against the invader, but would do so at a time which he considered favourable. At the same time he organized the most active propaganda among the people to the effect that they should not rise in arms, that the uprising was premature, that »it is not yet time« for an armed fight against the invader, that the invader would annihilate the Serbian people by reprisals. By such propaganda, Mihailović wanted to intimidate and demoralize the popular masses who were rising in arms against the invader. By such propaganda, Mihailović, was already at that time helping the invaders who tried by all possible means to suppress the National Liberation uprising of the Serbian people.

4. Although in September 1941, the general liberation uprising embraced the whole of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Lika, and the Partisan war spread more and more throughout Yugoslavia and some of Mihailović's detachments in Serbia began to join the Partisans in the fight against the German invaders, in spite of the fact that he had forbidden them to do so, yet even in such a situation, he continued in the greatest secrecy to prepare for a general attack against the Partisans and while working on this:

he took into his command a large number of Kosta Pećanac's commanders, who had openly entered the service of the Germans, as for example Budimir Cerski, Jovan Škava, Nikola Kalabić, Boža Javorac and others.

In September 1941 he issued orders to his commanders Miloš Glišić and Vučko Ignjatović to attack the Partisans in the liberated town of Požega and occupy it.

He permitted his officers Glišić and Ignjatović and their detachments at Požega to disarm the Partisan couriers and smaller Partisan groups, to stop trains running from Čačak to Užice with supplies of wheat to feed the population, and other transports of arms and ammunition which were being sent from Užice to the front for the fighters who were waging fierce battles against the Germans, to remove from a train the Commander of the First Šumadija Partisan Detachment Milan Blagojević, who was returning





were checking the penetration of German forces from Obrenovac towards Valjevo through Posavina and Tamnava, in the first phase of the First Enemy Offensive, and to the fighters who were holding the blockade of Valjevo in sanguinary battles against the strong German garrison of that town.

Since he could not prevent the liberation uprising in Serbia, and fearing that he would remain completely alone and deserted by the whole people, on October 26, 1941 Mihailović concluded an agreement with the Commander of the National Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, Tito, regarding the joint struggle of the Četniks and Partisans against the invaders and their servants. But after concluding this agreement he continued to prepare secretly a general attack against the Partisans with the object of annihilating them, and thus making impossible any struggle for the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Shortly after arrival at his headquarters of Major Zaharije Ostojić and Mirko Lalatović from abroad sent by the emigrant government and the Supreme Command, and of the British Captain Hudson sent from Cairo, Mihailović issued an order on November 1, 1941, to the commanders of all his detachments to withdraw all their units from the fronts facing the Germans and to launch a general attack against the Partisans. Thus he violated the agreement made with Tito which he had signed five days earlier. Mihailović issued this order after having already carried out the necessary preparations for a general attack against the Partisans, and also in accordance with the message which Hudson conveyed to him from his (Hudson's) superiors and which read: »that Yugoslavs are to fight for Yugoslavia and not transform the fight into a rebellion of communists on behalf of Soviet Russia«.

In accordance with Mihailović's orders, all his detachments in Serbia withdrew from the front facing the Germans, thus leaving the road open to the German forces for their penetration into liberated territory, and launched a general attack against the Partisans, as follows.

On the night between November 1st and 2nd the Četniks, under the command of Glišić and Ignjatović, attacked at Užice the positions called Trešnjica (only a few kilometers from Užice), but after heavy fighting they were beaten and then after a counter-attack by the Partisans they were driven out of Požega.

On the night between November 1st and 2nd, Boža »Javorac« (who had placed himself under the command of Glišić and Ignjatović)

suddenly attacked Ivanjica, but after heavy fighting was routed and put to flight by the Partisans.

On November 6 the Četnik forces, who a few days earlier had withdrawn from the front near Valjevo, thus opening the way to the Germans into the liberated territory, made a sudden treacherous attack first on the Partisan tank unit and artillery, which consisted of tanks and guns seized from the Germans, destroying the tank and artillery crew, and then attacked Čačak from all sides, but after bitter fighting they were routed and withdrew in scattered groups towards Ravna Gora, closely pursued by the Partisans and deserted by an enormous number of their fighters;

The Četnik detachment of Captain Račić launched another attack on Užice, but on the Crnokos position it was quickly smashed, and fled in scattered groups towards Ravna Gora, deserted also by a large number of its fighters.


The Četnik detachment of Captain Neško Nedić and Lt. Voja Popović attacked the Kolubara Partisan battalion on the positions of Bačevci—Krčmar—Prijezdici—Zarubi—Ravni (near Valjevo). This battalion had been waging sanguinary battles for two months in this position against the Germans who tried to penetrate with strong forces from Valjevo towards Užice into the liberated territory; these Četnik forces were also routed after several days fighting.

In all other parts of Serbia also, wherever there were Četnik detachments, the Četniks attacked the Partisan units, with the exception of the Četnik Detachment of Father Vlada Zečević and Lt. Martinović, who abandoned Mihailović and continued to fight together with the Partisans against the invader.

The general attack of Mihailović's Četniks on the Partisans was soon completely smashed. After the failure of the Četnik attack against the Partisans, Mihailović continued the fight against the Partisans, encouraged by the radio broadcasts of the Yugoslav emigrant government which, even during the general Četnik attack against the Partisans, announced that Mihailović was the only authorized representative of the King and the emigrant government in the occupied country and that all fighting forces should place themselves under his command. When the situation became serious for him, when the rapid deterioration of his detachments ensued, Mihailović, by the unanimous decision of his entire staff, went with his officers, Major Aleksandar Mišić, Colonel Branislav Pantić and Captain Nenad Mitrović, to the village of Divci (10 km. from Valjevo) and at an inn met representatives of the Germans: Chief of Staff of the German Military Commander for Serbia, the Gestapo officer Cap-

tain Dr. Matel and several other high-ranking German officers. The meeting was held in the greatest secrecy under the protection of German armoured cars and a large number of German soldiers. Through the British Intelligence Service Mihailović informed the emigrant government by radiogram of this meeting both before and after the meeting was held.

5. On the same night, between November 13 and 14, after this meeting with the Germans, by Mihailović's orders, his commander Jovan Škava handed over some 365 Partisans to the Germans in the village of Slovak (5 km. from Divci). These Partisans were captured by the Četniks by a ruse in the course of fighting on various fronts, and from Ravna Gora, where they were concentrated, they were transferred to the village of Mionica on November 13 and handed over to Jovan Škava. Several days later, after being handed over to the Ger-



Draža Mihailović on the prisoner's bench bows under the weight of his crimes as they are being proved in the court.

mans, all these Partisans were shot, with the exception of 30 of them who survived, after spending a long time in concentration camps.

6. Although on November 20, 1941, an agreement regarding a truce between the Partisans and the Četniks was concluded by Mihailović's authorized representatives and the representatives of the Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia,

and although Mihailović bound himself by this agreement to continue the fight against the invader in collaboration with the Partisans, three days later, on November 23, 1941, when the second and main phase of the First Offensive of German invaders against the liberated territory had begun from Kraljevo—Kragujevac—Rudnik—Valjevo—Ljubovija in the direction of Užice, Mihailović, after having again broken the agreement concluded with the Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan Detachments, rejected the call of Tito to enter the fight against the German forces which were penetrating into the liberated territory, and issued an order to all his commanders that nowhere and under no conditions were they to enter the fight against the invader units which were attacking the liberated territory.

#### THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 1941 TO THE END OF NOVEMBER 1942.

7. After the end of the First Offensive of the German invaders, in the course of which superior German forces, with the help of Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments, succeeded in re-occupying the liberated territory in Serbia, and forced the bulk of the Partisan forces with the Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia to withdraw towards Sandžak, a large number of Mihailović's commanders of detachments, after receiving instructions from Mihailović at a conference of commanders held at Ravna Gora on November 30, 1941, went each to his own terrain and, acting on instructions, »legalized« themselves with the invader. That is, they entered publicly and openly into the service of the Germans, and during the whole of 1942 participated together with the Germans and Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments in numerous battles against the Partisan detachments, which had remained in Serbia after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Partisan forces. These Mihailović's »legalized« detachments were armed, fed and clothed by the Germans, and were used under their command in the operations against the Partisans and also utilized as police forces, with the help of which tens of thousands of arrests were made of Serb patriots who helped the Partisans in the general people's uprising, and in addition to this, these detachments committed mass murders of Partisan sympathizers. Thus, the following Mihailović commanders with their detachments »legalized« themselves: Lt. Predrag Raković at Čačak, Glišić and Ignjatović at Požega, Pantelić at Loznica, Živan Lazović in the Belgrade District, Captain Borivoje Rajković and Captain Mladenović



at Kosjerić, Captain Mitić, Matić, Budimir Cerski, Jovan Škava, Mašan Đurović and others.

Although these Mihailović commanders and detachments by »legalizing« themselves with the invader, came under Nedić's command, they continued to recognize Mihailović's command and more or less secretly were in constant touch with him, receiving and executing his orders for the annihilation of the Partisans, submitting reports on their work to him and receiving from him approval of their actions.

Apart from the »legalized« detachments, Mihailović had several detachments in Serbia which did not openly place themselves under the command of Nedić and the Germans, but received arms and ammunition from the Germans more or less secretly and openly participated with the Germans, Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments and Mihailović's »legalized« detachments in fights against the Partisans. These detachments handed over captured Partisans and arrested sympathizers to the Germans, and together with the invader and his servants took part in the execution of numerous crimes against the civil population in Serbia. Thus, for instance, in the fights against the Partisans Mihailović's commanders Captain Neško Nedić and Lt. Voja Popović participated in fighting around Valjevo during the winter 1941/42. Mihailović was also constantly in touch with these detachments, he gave orders to them, received reports from them and approved their action.

It this period Mihailović established connections with a large number of Nedić's officers who commanded the armed detachments of Nedić's government, placed those officers under his command, and issued orders and instructions to them, received reports from them and approved their work, although they still remained under Nedić's command. Thus for instance Lt. Colonel Milan Kalabić and Captain Radovan Stojanović, who during the winter 1941/42 took part in the operation against the Valjevo group of Partisan detachments and in the Spring 1942 against the Požarevac Partisan detachments, placed themselves under Mihailović's command.

Thus all Mihailović's officers and detachments in Serbia in this period, acting upon his instructions and orders, openly entered the service of the invader in the struggle against the National Liberation Partisan Detachments and the National Liberation Movement in general, except a very small number of his officers who, together with him, in order not to get compromised as traitors, moved about, more or less secretly, under the protection of his »legalized« or »semi-legalized« units and Nedić's detachments, which had also placed themselves under his command.

Господине Министре.

Мој командант г.војвода Трифуновић-Бирчанин чије се здравље наменада погоршило до те мере, да се сваког часа може очекивати и најгоре, у немогућности да Вас обавести о једном важној догађају, који се одиграо у току 22 ов. месеца, наредио ми је да ја то учиним

Доводите ми стога да одмах пређем на ствар

Командант овдашњег XVIII италијанског армиског корпуса генерал г.Спиго, по наређењу претпостављеног му команданте армије генерала г.Роате, после депеше коју је г.војвода послао генералу г.Роати /а чији Вам је препис већ достављен/, замолио је г.војводу, да га посети, како би изгледали настале инциденте Војвода мада тешко бољестан, прихватио тај позив и одлази на разговор ; италијанску команду, без знања и одобрења лекара, чиме је нагло погоршао стање свог здравља. Командант је био донео чврсту одлуку, да ни отворено и у лице каже све шта мисли, што је, како ћете видети из приложеног описа разговора, и учинио. Уздрицао се ипак да прекине досадању колаборацију пре, него то би наредите, а да би добио у времену док добије Ваш одговор, он је починио и привремено ликвидирао затегнуте односе.

Противно саветима лекара који су наредили апсолутан мир и изолованост, г.војвода је наредио да дођем, па ми је лемећи славим гласом, тако да сам га једва разумео, рекао. "Обавестите Господина Министра о састанку и замолите га у моје име да ми објасни, дали да прекинем или продужим колаборацију"

Достављам у прилогу опис разговора између г.војводе и генерала г.Спиго, којем разговору сам имао част да присуствујем

Молим Вас, Господине Министре, да изволите примити изразе моје безграничне оданости

С ВЕРОМ У БОГА ЗА КРАЉА И ОТАЉИНУ!

23 октобра 1942 године  
С п л и т

одељак штабних капетана класе  
*Ivanović*

Report of the Cetnik general staff officer Ivanišević from Split on the cooperation of the Cetnik commander Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin with the Italians.

8. In December 1941, Mihailović sent his officers Milivoje Nedeljković and Perhinek to Montenegro, with the task of establishing contact with the Četnik commanders in Montenegro and Sandžak, that is, with General Blažo Đukanović, Colonel Bajo Stanišić, Major Đorđe Lašić and Captain Pavle Đurišić, and to deliver to them his instructions for fighting against the Partisans. Towards the end of 1941, these Četnik commanders, organized their detachments with the full help of the Italian invaders, and together with them participated

in the fighting against the Partisans, receiving arms, food and pay from the Italians.

In Sandžak towards the end of 1941, Mihailović succeeded in placing Sandžak Četnik Detachments under his command. These, like the Četnik detachments in Montenegro, had openly entered the service of the Italians and taken part in the fights against the Partisans as early as November 1941.

In the winter of 1942, Mihailović, in his radiograms dispatched to the Četnik commanders in Montenegro and Sandžak, announced his approval of their action and gave them instructions to intensify the struggle against the Partisans and to use »discretion« with the Italians, i. e., to cooperate with the Italian invaders in the struggle against the Partisans.

9. In the autumn of 1941, Mihailović sent to Bosnia and Hercegovina his officers Major Boško Todorović, Lt. Mutimir Petković, Captain Sergije Mihailović, Lt. Momčilović and others, not counting Gendarmerie Major Jezdimir Dangić, whom he had already sent to East Bosnia at the time of the uprising in Serbia.

Mihailović appointed Major Boško Todorović commander of East Bosnia and Hercegovina. Acting on Mihailović's instructions and orders, Major Boško Todorović entered into negotiations with the Italian invader in Hercegovina in December 1941 through Captain Mutimir Petković, the journalist Milan Šantić and Dobrosav Jevđević; and in January 1942 Boško Todorović, Dobrosav Jevđević and Mutimir Petković met with the OVRA (Organizzazione volontaria repressione antifascista) Captain Demateis, and concluded a written agreement concerning the collaboration of Mihailović's Četniks and Italian invaders in the struggle against the Partisans.

Acting upon Mihailović's instructions and orders, his officers in East Bosnia quickly succeeded in making an end to the cooperation between the Četniks and the Partisans in the struggle against the invader and the Ustašas, and when the German punitive expedition penetrated into East Bosnia in January 1942, Major Dangić ordered all his detachments to withdraw from the fronts, thus opening the way to the German punitive expedition and enabling it to penetrate quickly into East Bosnia and inflict unexpected heavy blows upon the Partisan Detachments; shortly after, he established contact with the Gestapo Captain Dr. Matel at Banja Koviljača, and immediately after the meeting with that Gestapo representative, left for Belgrade with the knowledge and approval of Mihailović, in order to ask help from Nedić and the Germans for the struggle against the Partisans in East Bosnia.

The local Četnik commanders in East Bosnia: Father Savo Božić, Cvjetin Todić and others who put themselves under the command of Mihailović's officer Captain Račić, who in December 1941, had crossed into East Bosnia, concluded agreements with the Ustaša authorities concerning collaboration, with the aim of annihilating the Partisans, and together with the Ustašas fought against the Partisan detachments in East Bosnia.

10. In the winter of 1942, Mihailović's officer Boško Todorović established contact through Radmilo Grdić, one of the leaders of the Hercegovina Četniks, with Ilija Trifunović, called Birčanin, who organized the Četnik Detachments in South West Bosnia and Lika in the closest collaboration with the Italian invaders, and who lived entirely legally with his staff and worked at Split protected by the Italian Carabinieri.

1.. At this time Mihailović sent his officer Major Novak to Slovenia. In close collaboration with the invaders and the quisling »White Guard«, he organized the Slovene Četniks known under the name of »Blue Guard«. Small in number, Mihailović's units in Slovenia, under the command of Major Novak, openly collaborated with the invaders and the Slovene quisling »White Guard«.

Having established contact in December 1941 and during the first months of 1942 with almost all the Četnik detachments in Serbia, Bosnia, Sandžak, Montenegro, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Lika and Slovenia, and after having put all these Četnik detachments under his command, although all of them openly collaborated with the German and the Italian invaders and quisling forces of Nedić, Ljotić, Pavelić and the Slovene »White Guard«, Mihailović, at the peak of the Third Offensive of the invader against the bulk of the Partisans forces in Montenegro and Sandžak, left Serbia, and in May 1942 arrived on Mount Zlatar in Sandžak, where he summoned the members of his Supreme Command Major Ostojić and Major Lalatović. On Zlatar he was met by his officer Petar Bačović with about 300 Četniks from East Bosnia.

Before his arrival on Zlatar, Major Ostojić, Chief of the operative, organization and intelligence department of Mihailović's Supreme Command, commanded all the Četnik forces which in the Third Offensive of the invaders, together with the Italians, the Germans, and the Ustašas, participated in the battles against the Partisan forces in Montenegro, Sandžak and East Bosnia. After his arrival on Zlatar, Mihailović took over the command of the Četnik forces, endeavouring to bring about the annihilation of the bulk of the Partisan forces. In the course of the operations Mihailović was only a few kilometres away from the sector of the front on the river Lim.

On this sector, the following Mihailović forces fought against the Partisans: the detachments of Vučko Ignjatović and Miloš Glišić from Serbia, of Petar Bačović from East Bosnia, parts of the detachment of Pavle Đurišić from one part of Montenegro and one part of Sandžak, »legalized« detachments of Captain Nikola Bojović, Vuk Kalaitović, »vojvoda« Irača and Rade Korda. Četnik detachments were helped in their operation by the artillery of the Italian units which were in Plevlje, Prijepolje, Bijelo Polje and Priboj, while the detachments of Glišić and Ignjatović were supplied with arms, ammunition, food and money by Nedić and the German invaders. At Mihailović's order all the detachments were placed under the command of Miloš Glišić, who was promoted commander of the Corps by Mihailović and commander of the Sandžak Četnik detachment by Nedić.

On the second sector of the front, on Mount Sinjajevina, Mihailović's detachments of Đorđe Lašić, Pavle Đurišić, Ivan Ružić and some Četnik forces from Serbia participated in this offensive. These forces of Mihailović were supplied with food, arms, ammunition, mortars and helped in their operations with artillery by the Italians.

On the third sector of the front in this offensive, Mihailović's detachments fought under the command of Bajo Stanišić, Jakov Jovović and Sima Mijušković (all of whom were under the command of General Đukanović, whose staff was with the Italian staff at Cetinje). On this sector of the front Mihailović's Četniks on both parts of the sector (Nikšić—Golija and Nikšić—Šavnik) were mixed with Italian forces and they received pay from the Italians amounting to 15 lire daily for each Četnik as well as special rewards in money or flour for every Partisan killed, and in addition to this, the Italians supplied them with arms, ammunition and food, and helped in operations with their artillery, and treated wounded Četniks in Italian hospitals.

All the Četnik detachments in the course of the Third Offensive were being transported from position to position on Italian lorries and the Četnik commanders travelled from town to town in Italian limousines.

In the middle of June 1942, pushing the Partisans towards Bosnia, the forces of Bajo Stanišić and the Italians met with the Četnik forces of Father Perišić from Hercegovina and with Italian forces from Gacko, and after the battle at Orlovac and at Gacko in July 1942, they succeeded in driving the bulk of the Partisan forces out of Montenegro.



In the middle of July 1942, Mihailović issued an order to Petar Baćović to attack Ćurevo (frontier of Bosnia and Sandžak) where the main Partisan hospital with a great number of wounded was situated. Baćović was instructed to do this with all the Četnik forces which he commanded, and they were supplied with Italian arms, ammunition and food. Following this order, Četnik detachments with superior forces attacked Ćurevo and after bitter fighting captured it. Thus Mihailović personally issued an order for operations against the Partisans. With this operation ended the Third Offensive of the invader and the Četniks, in the course of which the bulk of the Partisan forces, during heavy fighting against the overwhelmingly superior enemy, were forced to leave the liberated territory of Montenegro and Sandžak, where the Italian invaders reestablished their authority and gave Mihailović's Četniks full liberty of organization and action.

All the Četnik detachments which together with the Italians participated in the Third Offensive against the Partisans, collaborated with the Italian invaders in obedience to the instructions and orders of the accused Mihailović.

When towards the end of the Third Offensive the Četnik forces from the sector of the front on the Lim river broke through to the line Tara—Drina, there broke out between the Italians and the Četniks on the one side, and the Germans and the Ustašas on the other, a dispute as to who should hold Foča; in order that Foča might come under the Italian occupation zone, in which the Četniks enjoyed full assistance from the Italians, Mihailović ordered Pavle Đurišić to go to Cetinje and intervene with the Italians to insist that Foča come under the Italian zone of occupation and under the Četniks, and he ordered his officer Glišić to go to Belgrade and ask Nedić to persuade the Germans to cede Foča and order the Ustašas to withdraw from it.

Mihailović's officer Petar Baćović tried to take Foča by an attack against the Ustašas who were there and thus solve the dispute which had arisen. At the very beginning of the attack, however, Baćović received an order from the Commander of the Italian division »Pusteria« to retreat immediately from the line Vikoč—Hum; Baćović immediately executed this order and according to the order of the Italian commander of the division, released a certain number of captured Ustašas, after having taken written statements from them that they had been well treated and that all their arms had been returned to them; he later sent these statements to the commander of the »Pusteria« division and to Mihailović.

12. In the course of the final and fiercest battles in the Third offensive, Mihailović reached the vicinity of Šahovići in Montenegro,

and then went over to Mojkovac, and on June 10 arrived in the village Podgora under the mountain Durmitor in the vicinity of Žabljak where the Italian units were stationed.

On July 13, 1942, Mihailović went from the village Podgora to Zimonjića Kula (Avtovac) in Herzegovina and there held a meeting with the commanders and leaders of his detachments: Ilija Trifunović, called Birčanin, Petar Bačović, Dobrosav Jevđević, Pavle Đurišić, Father Perišić, Milorad Popović, Captain Ivanišević, Milan Šantić, and



Mihailović's commanders with the invader (from left to right): 1) Colonel Lučić, 2) Major Dangić, formerly of the Yugoslav Army, Četnik commander, cooperator with the Germans and Nedić men, 3) Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, Mihailović's commander for Dalmatia, 4) Milorad Ljanovski, 5) Doka Težanović, Četnik commander, and 6) Lieutenant Ignjatović. A German officer is shown by a cross.

Zaharije Ostojić. At this meeting Mihailović appointed Birčanin Commander of Dalmatia, Lika and West Bosnia and Captain Ivanišević Chief of Birčanin's staff, also, Petar Bačović commander of Hercegovina and East Bosnia, Pavle Đurišić commander of Montenegro up to Nikšić, Bajo Stanišić commander of Old Montenegro, and placed Đurišić and Stanišić under the command of General Blažo Đukanović, whom he had already appointed Commander of Montenegro. Mihailović knew that all these commanders of his had entered openly and pu-

blicly the service of the Italian invaders together with all the detachments which were under their command and that they had fought with the Italian invaders against the Partisans.

At the meeting Mihailović gave instructions to his commanders both regarding the organization of the further fight against the Partisans with the aim of annihilating them, and regarding coordination of their actions with the operations of the Italian invaders, ordering them, as he put it, to »exploit« the Italian invaders in the fight against the Partisans as much as possible.

On his return from Avtovac to Krš, Mihailović met Colonel Bajo Stanišić, whom he had appointed Commander of Old Montenegro, who already on March 6, 1942, concluded with »il colonello capo di stato maggiore signor Zeglioni,« a written agreement on collaboration with the object of annihilating the Partisans. On reaching Krš (about 14 km. from Žabljak), Mihailović settled down with his General Staff and radio stations not far from the village Njegobude (2 km. from Krš) where the Headquarters of the Italian division with units were situated. A short while after, he moved to the village of Gornje Lipovo (7 km. from Kolašin) where were the Italians and his Četniks; his Headquarters remained at this village all the time until his return to Serbia. At that time Hudson, now major of the British Army, sent a request to Mihailović to, as he put it, "meet with Captain Đurišić and Captain Stanišić and the other leaders who so successfully fought against the communists and liberated their country from them" ... so that "it would be as beneficial as possible for your (i. e. Draža's — Prosecutor's note) organization" ... and "in what way your cause could best be helped" (Mihailović's cause — Prosecutor's note).

At the end of the Third Offensive when the Partisans, after bitter fighting, left Sinjajevina, Mihailović began to receive through the emigrant Yugoslav government from abroad, assistance in arms, ammunition, clothing, food, as well as in gold and paper money in enormous quantities. He distributed all this material and money to the commanders of his detachments who were anyway abundantly supplied by the Italian invaders and who used the arms received from the Italian invaders, or obtained from abroad through the emigrant Yugoslav government, exclusively in the fighting against the Partisans in which they collaborated with the Italians.

13. On August 28, 1942, Mihailović ordered his commanders of East Bosnia, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Lika and South West Bosnia to launch an attack on the liberated Partisan territory in West Bosnia. The plan for these operations was made by Petar Baćović and Ilija

Trifunović-Birčanin, with the assistance of Dobrosav Jevđević, (who from the beginning of 1942 till the capitulation of Italy, was the link between Mihailović and the commanders of the Italian occupation units and organizer of the collaboration between the Četniks and the Italians). After deciding upon a plan, Birčanin and Jevđević met with



Četniks handing over Mileta Okiljević, a Partisan whom they have taken prisoner, to the Germans in Montenegro.

the command of the Italian units in order to work out a joint plan for these operations; and together with the Italian officers they drew up a plan according to which the operation was to be carried out jointly by Četnik and Italian units. This plan was carried out only in October 1942. In these operations the forces of Mihailović's commanders Baćović, Trifunović, Father Đujić and others took part. The

units attacking from Hercegovina in the direction of Prozor—Bugojno, were commanded jointly by Četnik commanders and the Italian lieutenant Vidiak. In the course of the operations and at their termination Mihailović regularly received reports from Bačović, Jevđević and Birčanin and from these reports he knew of the collaboration of his units with the Italian invaders in the operations against the Partisans, and he gave his approval of such work of his commanders, since in doing so they were only carrying out his instructions.

14. In the spring of 1942, through his officer Captain Račić (who was on Mount Majeveca with the Četnik commander Father Sava Božić), Mihailović placed under his command all the Četnik detachments in West Bosnia which were united under the command of Radoslav-Rade Radić. These Četnik detachments concluded written agreements with the Ustašas and Germans concerning the joint struggle against the Partisans, as early as the spring of 1942, and together with the Germans and Ustašas participated in the operations against the Partisan forces, receiving arms and ammunition from the Germans and Ustašas. Mihailović was informed of all this through Captain Račić, he approved of the action of Rade Radić and his commanders, and in August 1942 he sent one of his officers to Rade Radić's Headquarters, Major Slavoljub Vranješević. In February 1942, when this officer left the command of Nedić's Gendarmerie in Belgrade where he had been on duty up to that time, he placed himself at Mihailović's disposal and was appointed by Mihailović as Dangić's chief of staff and then as Botić's (Mihailović's commander in East Bosnia). Mihailović appointed Vranješević as chief of staff to Rade Radić and from that time he regularly received reports from Vranješević through couriers and by radiograms, and sent him orders for the operation against the Partisans, while fully aware of the fact that Vranješević and Rade Radić and all their subordinate commanders (Drenović, Tešanović, Mišić and others) had openly collaborated with the Germans and Ustašas at Banja Luka in all the operations against the Partisans.

15. With Mihailović's knowledge and approval his commander Pavle Đurišić met, in early November 1942, at Kolašin, the Italian Governor of Montenegro, Army General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, who with several other Italian generals was visiting Montenegro so as to convince himself personally whether the Četniks were everywhere loyal to the Italian invaders. Đurišić organized a pompous reception for Pirzio Biroli and before a solemn gathering greeted him in a servile speech, and on November 7, 1942, informed Mihai-



lović about it in a letter enclosing the text of his speech. He also informed Mihailović by letter that Pirzio Biroli knew that Mihailović's Supreme Command was in the village of Gornje Lipovo and that Biroli had told him that the Italian units would hold manoeuvres around Kolašin, but that they would not go further than Donje Lipovo, and Đurišić therefore assured Mihailović that he should fear nothing, that there was no danger, that the Supreme Command could remain where it was, that all the radio stations could continue their work unhindered and that he — Đurišić — would be with the Italian units which would hold manoeuvres in the direction of Gornje Lipovo (where Mihailović and his Supreme Command were situated).

#### THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 1942 TO THE END OF 1943

16. Mihailović, as Commander in Chief, directed the operations of all Četnik units from Montenegro, Sandžak, Hercegovina, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Lika, which collaborated openly with the Italians, Germans and Ustašas in the Fourth Offensive of the invader against the forces of the Army of National Liberation, which lasted from January 15 till the middle of April 1943.

Hitler himself ordered the Fourth Offensive and also outlined the plan for the operations. By carrying out the Fourth Offensive, Hitler wanted to annihilate the forces of the National Army and in that way to consolidate Pavelić's Independent State of Croatia, and later on, after the annihilation of the National Liberation Army forces, to withdraw all the German divisions to the Eastern Front, to mobilize manpower in Croatia and send it to Germany, and also to create the possibility of sending Pavelić's troops to the Eastern Front.

The plan of the Fourth Offensive was worked out at the meeting of Hitler, Colonel-General Löhrr and Pavelić, held in November 1942 at Hitler's Headquarters at Vinitza.


In December 1942 negotiations were carried on between the Italian and German General Staff regarding the coordination of the operations of the German and Italian units in the Fourth Offensive. On January 3, 1943 a meeting was held in Rome between Colonel-General Löhrr, one of Pavelić's generals, the Italian generals Roata, Robotti and Cavallero in the presence of Mussolini, and at this meeting the plan for the Fourth Offensive was definitely settled.

For the operations in the first phase of the Fourth Offensive it was decided to use the following German divisions: 7SS »Prinz Eugen«, the 369 infantry division, the 717 Jäger division, and the 718 reserve division. The Italian divisions: »Lombardia«, »Re«, and

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»Sassari« were also to be used and two Ustaša brigades. The disposition of forces was: the 7SS »Princ Eugen« division on the Karlovac sector, the 369th division together with two Ustaša brigades on the Sisak—Sunja—Kostajnica sector, the 717th on the Sanski Most sector, and the 718th (in reserve) in the neighbourhood of Zagreb; the »Lombardia« division on the Ogulin sector, the »Re« division on the Vrhovine—Gospić—Lovinac sector, the »Sassari« division on the Gračac—Knin sector. According to the plan all these forces were to surround the National Liberation Army forces on the Bihać—Bosanski Petrovac line and then tighten the ring until the annihilation of the forces of the National Liberation Army was complete.

Simultaneously with the preparations made by the Germans and Italians, Mihailović was concentrating his units to attack the forces of the National Liberation Army in West Bosnia.



КОМАНДАНТУ МЕСТА

ПАРАЏИН

По куриру слау Вам се два немца које су наше трупе одробиле од партизана сетим да их продате немачким војним властима у Параџину.  
С вером у Бога и Краља и Отачину.

Командир-мајор.



A communication from the Staff of the Paraćin Četnik detachment concerning their returning two Germans who had been taken prisoners by the Partisans.

On January 2, 1943, he issued instruction No. 1 in which he defined the positions of the units at the commencement of operations as follows: the 1st Corps, 2000 strong under the command of Major Bjelajac in the environs of Otočac, the 2nd Corps numbering 2000 under the command of Father Đujić in the locality of Gračac, the 3rd Corps under the command of Major Bačović, numbering 3000, in the locality of Knin, the 2nd Kosovo Brigade, 600 strong, under the command of Novak Mijović, in the locality of Drniš, the 4th Corps

under the command of Colonel Bajo Stanišić, 300 strong, in the area Donja Jablanica—Rama, the 5th Corps, 3000 strong, under the command of Captain Bora Mitranović, in the area Ključ and Manjača. In addition Mihailović provided a reserve numbering 4—5000 men under the command of Pavle Đurišić for this operation. To direct the operations Mihailović formed an Advance Section of his General Staff headed by Major Zaharije Ostojić, the chief of the operative, organizational and intelligence sections of his General Staff. For liaison with the command of the Italian units at Sušak, Mihailović delegated Dobrosav Jevđević, whom he sent to Sušak with the task of offering the Italians participation of Mihailović's forces in the Fourth Offensive. Mihailović sent Pavle Đurišić to Cetinje to ask arms and ammunition from the Italians and transport facilities for his troops.

Mihailović's delegate Dobrosav Jevđević, in negotiating with the Italians, succeeded in obtaining consent from the Italian General Staff and Mussolini for the participation of Mihailović's Četniks in the Fourth Offensive with the Italian forces.

When in the first phase of the Fourth Offensive heavy fighting took place between the National Liberation Army forces and the German, Italian and Ustaša units, beginning on January 15 and lasting for three weeks, Mihailović's Četniks, according to his orders, participated in the operations mixed with the Italian troops and supplied by Italians with arms, ammunition and food. In the first phase of the Fourth Offensive Mihailović's forces operated from Otočac, Gračac and Knin. The Četnik columns attacked together with the Italian columns from Ogulin in the direction of Slunj, from Vrhovine in the direction of Bihać—Slunj communications, from Perušić in the direction of Korenica, from Lovinac in the direction of Udbine and from Gračac in the direction of Donji Lapac and Srb, while the Četnik forces, under the command of Bačović, attacked from Knin in the direction of Bosansko Grahovo. Simultaneously from the other side the Partisan forces were attacked by the "Prinz Eugen" SS division from Karlovac in the direction of Slunj—Bihać, by the 369th German division with two Ustaša brigades from the Sisak—Kostajnica sector in the direction of Cazin—Bihać, and by the 717th German division from Sanski Most over Grmeč Mountain in the direction of Bosanski Petrovac, and also by the Četnik forces of Bora Mitranović.

However the plan of annihilation of the National Liberation Army forces in the first phase of the Fourth Offensive suffered complete failure, because in the heavy and sanguinary fighting against the Germans, Italians, Ustašas and Četniks the National Liberation Army succeeded in preventing the enemy columns from encircling

them, and the main bulk of the forces of the National Liberation Army retreated in good order, in the direction of Glamoč—Livno—Prozor. Having passed into counter-offensive, they captured Prozor on February 18, took Ivan Sedlo, occupied Drežnica, Jablanica and Rama, forced the Neretva river near Jablanica and Rama, and with one column attacked Konjic, while with another one they mopped up the valley of the Neretva river to within ten kilometres from Mostar, completely destroying the "Murge" division. Panic-stricken by the counter-offensive of the National Liberation Army, the Italians quickly transported to Mostar by train and lorries about 5000 Četniks under the command of Bajo Stanišić, with the knowledge and approval of Mihailović. In addition Mihailović sent about 500 Četniks to the Prenj Mountain under the command of Major Radulović, and another 5.000 of his Četniks under the command of Major Voja Lukačević (Cavalry Corps) to defend Konjic together with the Italians, Ustašas and one battalion of the German 718th division from the attacks of the units of the National Liberation Army. At the request of the Italians, although the second phase of the Fourth Offensive was due to start on February 25, the Germans began operations four days earlier, as follows: the 7SS "Prinz Eugen" division advanced towards Imotski, the 369th German division in the direction of Kupres—Zvornjača—Prozor, the 717th German division from Bugojno towards Prozor and the 718th German division from Sarajevo over Ivan Sedlo towards Konjic with the aim of encircling the forces of the National Liberation Army and of annihilating them with the assistance of the Italian and Četnik units.

In this difficult situation for the National Liberation Army units, Mihailović issued an order to Colonel Bajo Stanišić, Major Radulović and Major Lukačević to launch an offensive from Mostar, Prenj, and Konjic in order to annihilate the former in the pocket of the Neretva river. After short and bitter fighting, however, the Četnik offensive failed, in spite of the fact that the operations of the Četnik units were helped by Italian and German guns, mortars, and troops, and in spite of the fact that the Četnik units in the operations, at the request of Mihailović and Major Ostojić, were helped by German and Italian aeroplanes which bombed the positions of the National Liberation Army units, while they dropped arms, ammunition and food for Mihailović's Četniks.

However, although the Četnik offensive suffered defeat, and accordingly the forces of the National Liberation could have continued the advance towards Hercegovina and Montenegro, the units of the National Liberation Army were obliged to return to the right

bank of the Neretva river, destroying all the bridges on the Neretva, and to retreat also from Drežnica, Jablanica, Rama, Konjic and Ivan Sedlo towards Prozor, which was being attacked by the entire 717th and 369th German divisions, threatening the hospital at Prozor which contained 4.000 wounded.

Mihailović then ordered the forces of Major Lukačević, Major Radulović and Colonel Bajo Stanišić to cross the Neretva and take up positions on the banks of this river. He had reinforced them with about 3.000 Četniks under the command of Major Bačović, who had arrived in Mostar from Knin with his forces, in Italian lorries.



Italians and Četniks in Hercegovina photographed before their joint action against the Partisans.

During this time the major forces of the National Liberation Army routed the 717 German division in a fierce attack and forced them to retreat from Prozor; and immediately after, the bulk of the National Liberation Army, with the hospital and the wounded, proceeded again in forced marches towards the Neretva, where bitter fighting took place between these forces on the one side, and the combined forces of Mihailović's Četniks, Italians, Germans and Ustašas on the other. In this fighting also, at the request Mihailović and Major Ostojić, submitted to the Italians through Dobrosav Jevđević and to the Germans through Major Voja Lukačević, the Četnik units were helped during operations by German and Italian planes, artillery and



mortars while the Italians and Germans supplied the Četnik units with ammunition, arms and food.

In spite of all this, the forces of the National Liberation Army broke through the Italian, Četnik, German, Ustaša front and forced the Neretva river near Jablanica and Rama, so that the bulk of the forces of the National Liberation Army, with the hospital, crossed the river by a provisional bridge at Jablanica, and, waging fierce battles against the enemy, penetrated into Hercegovina.

Mihailović tried again to halt the break-through of the National Liberation Army units into Hercegovina, by concentrating strong forces on the positions at Čičevo and Glavatičevo. After a sanguinary battle, however, at Čičevo and Glavatičevo, the National Liberation Army units routed the Četniks and very rapidly arrived near Kalinovik where Mihailović was with the Advance Section of his Supreme Command and whence he commanded the operations. After fierce fighting on the positions in front of Kalinovik, where Mihailović threw into the battle his last reserve of about 5000 Četniks under the command of Pavle Đurišić, the Italo-Četnik forces were beaten and retreated to Foča. Mihailović also, together with the Advance Section of his Supreme Command, retreated to Foča, where he settled down under the protection of the Italian forces which held that place. Together with the Italian forces, Mihailović hastily reestablished the front on the Drina, and on that occasion he personally issued orders as to which positions were to be taken by particular Italian units together with his forces. But the forces of the National Liberation Army quickly broke the Italo-Četnik front on the Drina. After that came the complete dispersal of the Četnik units, and Mihailović, accompanied by a small party, escaped from Foča to Gornje Lipovo (near Kolašin) where his Headquarters, with the foreign missions, were situated. The forces of the National Liberation Army reached Montenegro through Hercegovina and Sandžak, in the middle of April, 1943.

Thus the joint plan of Hitler, Mussolini, Pavelić and Mihailović to destroy the forces of the National Liberation Army in the Fourth Offensive fell through.

Throughout the Fourth Offensive Mihailović commanded personally or through Major Ostojić all Četnik units which, armed with Italian and German arms, participated together with the Germans and Italians in the operations aimed at the annihilation of the forces of the National Liberation Army. At that time the British colonel Bailey, who was with Mihailović's Supreme Command at Lipovo and was fully cognizant of the plan and the development of the operations which were being carried out by Mihailović, said that the

Allies were preparing a landing on the Adriatic Coasts for the Spring of 1943 and that "the communists should be liquidated" in order that he might have a clear hinterland, and thus be able to take possession of the Dalmatian Coast with his forces without hindrance.

Mihailović, in the course of the operations, was also being given moral and political support by the Yugoslav emigrant government which, although informed by sources whose information could not be doubted, that Mihailović collaborated with the invader in the struggle against the National Liberation Army, still developed a big campaign in which it denied all reports that Mihailović was collaborating with the invaders and spread false news about the struggle of Mihailović against the invaders. At the same time it gave him its consent to such collaboration by means of cipher messages transmitted through the B. B. C.

The arms, ammunition and money which he received from abroad through the medium of the Yugoslav emigrant government, Mihailović distributed to his units. Armed with Italian and German arms, equipped with Italian and German equipment, they were carrying on, together with the Germans and Italians and Ustašas, sanguinary battles against the National Liberation Army. They also made use of arms dropped by planes.

Bereft of his units, Mihailović left Montenegro, and on June 1, 1943, arrived in Serbia with his supreme command, his radio stations, and an enormous quantity of gold which he had received from abroad.

17. In Serbia in 1943, Mihailović withdrew some of his detachments from the towns, seeing that open collaboration with the invader compromised his whole movement. However all his detachments continued to collaborate with the Germans and Nedić's and Ljotić's units in the fight against the Partisan detachments and units of the National Liberation Army, and in the suppression of the National Liberation Movement thus putting into effect the directives and orders given by him. For example, Captain Raković, — commander of the 2nd Ravna Gora Corps and Lt. Vučković — commander of the 1st Ravna Gora Corps already in February 1943 met Krüger, the German commander of Gornji Milanovac, in the vicinity of Milanovac, and concluded an agreement that the Germans should give them ammunition and that the Četniks should participate in the operations against the Partisans on Rudnik. The Germans, at one time only, gave them about 5000 rounds, with which Lt. Vučković supplied his units and then immediately participated in the fighting against the Partisans near Rudnik.

Like Raković and Vučković, all Mihailović's other commanders collaborated more or less openly with the Germans, in all actions aimed at the annihilation of the National Liberation Movement in Serbia.



Mihailović's commander, Father Đujić, with an Italian officer.

18. After the capitulation of Italy, all Mihailović's detachments in Slovenia, Lika, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Hercegovina, Montenegro and Sandžak, (that is, what was till then the Italian occupation zone) carrying out his directives and orders, entered into open collaboration with the Germans. In these regions Mihailović's Četniks received arms and ammunition from the Germans and participated with them in actions against the units of the National Liberation Army.

Mihailović's detachments in Bosnia, with the knowledge and approval of Mihailović, concluded a series of agreements with the Ustašas and Germans on collaboration in the fight against the units of the National Liberation Army.

Mihailović's detachments in Serbia openly collaborated with the Germans, Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments, the Bulgarian occupation units, and units of the Russian White Guard Corps.

The arms and ammunition which Mihailović received in 1943 through the Yugoslav government abroad, were used in the fighting against the Partisans in which his units took part, together with the Germans, the Bulgarian occupation troops, Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments and the Slovene White Guards.

19. In November 1943, the Sixth German Offensive began, and on Mihailović's orders his Zlatibor, Javor and Požega Corps together with the Germans, as well as with Bulgarian units, Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments, and units of the Russian White Guard Corps fought in positions directed against the units of the Second and Fifth divisions of the National Liberation Army, which had penetrated from Sandžak into Serbia in the direction of Užice. At the same time, in the course of the Sixth Offensive, Mihailović's units in East Bosnia and Sandžak participated, together with the Germans, in operations against the forces of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments.

#### THE PERIOD FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1944 TO THE END OF AUGUST 1944

20. In January 1944, Mihailović issued orders to his units in the Višegrad—Priboj sector, of which Major Zaharije Ostojić was in command, to attack the 2nd Proletarian Brigade together with the Germans and Ljotić's men. From Major Ostojić he received regular reports about the operations of the units on this sector, and so he knew that his units fought shoulder to shoulder with the Germans and Ljotić's men.

21. On January 30, 1944 Mihailović issued an order to his commanders Đurišić, Drašković, Kalaitović and Cvetić to attack, together with the Germans and Ljotić's men, the units of the National Liberation Army near Priboj, Plevlje and along the Lim river. He specially advised them to attack from the rear units of the National Liberation Army at a time when they were fighting against the Germans. In March 1944, together with the Germans and Ljotić's men, his units carried out this order and participated in the fighting against the units of the National Liberation Army. The commanders

of his units gave him daily reports of the operations, and he was thus authentically informed that they were collaborating with the Germans and Ljotić's men.

22. In February 1944, Mihailović ordered Pavle Đurišić to cooperate with the Germans in the operations in Sandžak against the units of the National Liberation Army. Đurišić carried out his order and fought with his units shoulder to shoulder with the German units in Sandžak.

23. At the end of March or in the beginning of April 1944, Mihailović's commander in Serbia, General Trifunović, known as Dronja, held a meeting in the village of Vranjići (in the District of Ljubić near Čačak at the home of Čolić, with the German agent Milan Aćimović (president of the first commissary administration formed immediately after the occupation of Serbia) and the Councillor of the Administrative Staff of the German Military. Commander in Serbia, the German Starker. He negotiated with Starker with the aim of making an agreement with the Germans regarding the collaboration in the fight against the National Liberation Army and regarding the supply of arms and ammunition by the Germans to the Četniks. For these negotiations Mihailović gave orders to General Trifunović, and appointed the accused Živko Topalović as negotiator (former leader of the Socialist party, who in 1943 joined Mihailović and became a member of his »Central National Committee«). However, Živko Topalović did not arrive in time and therefore the meeting was held without him.

24. At the end of April 1944, according to Mihailović's order, General Trifunović, Živko Topalović and Captain Raković met again with Aćimović and Starker, in the village of Trbušani at the home of Vladan Lukanović, and continued the negotiations from the previous meeting. Captain Raković made and submitted to Starker and Aćimović a list of arms and ammunition which he, Trifunović and Topalović requested from the Germans.

After this meeting Mihailović's Četnik detachments received large quantities of arms and ammunition from the Germans.

25. At the end of April or in the beginning of May 1944, at Mihailović's orders, General Trifunović held a meeting with Dimitrije Ljotić and Nedić's deputy Ilija Mihailović, in the village of Brđani (Ljubić District near Čačak) and concluded an agreement with them regarding the collaboration of the Četniks, Ljotić's and Nedić's men in the fights against the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments. The agreement provided that Ljotić and Nedić should supply Mihailović's Četniks with war material, that Mihailović should



permit Ljotić to supplement his units by mobilizing younger men in the villages.

26. When, in April 1944, the Second Proletarian and the Fifth Shock division of the National Liberation Army penetrated from Sandžak into Serbia in the direction of Valjevo, Mihailović gathered together the following corps: the Javor, Požega, Zlatibor, Valjevo, Cer, the First Ravna Gora corps, two corps of the »Mountain Guard« and the Second Ravna Gora Corps. Placing them under the command



The traitor, Rade Radić, Colonel of the Homeguards, Cerner, and General Stahl of the German Army, during the offensive against Partisan units in Kozara, in July, 1942.

of Mirko Lalatović a member of his Supreme Command, he threw them into the fight against the 2nd and 5th division of the National Liberation Army together with the Germans, Bulgarians, the Ljotić and Nedić men and the units of the Russian »White Guard Corps«. The task he set them was the annihilation of the 2nd and 5th division of the National Liberation Army. During the operation his units were crossing over with German lorries from position to position, and were getting arms and ammunition from the Germans from Valjevo and Užice even at the front. They were sending their wounded to German hospitals, and receiving food from the German kitchens. At that time the Četniks freely moved about in towns in which the German

garrisons were situated. In the course of the operations, his commanders Račić, Vučković, Marković, Radović, Neško Nedić, Kalabić, Tufegdžić and others constantly kept in touch with the staffs of the German, Bulgarian, Nedić, Ljotić and Russian White Guard units and several times visited the positions at the front together with German commanders.

In the course of these operations against the Second and Fifth division Mihailović was informed daily and in detail by radio and by the reports of his commanders, of the development of operations and of the close collaboration of his units with the Germans, Bulgarians, Nedić's and Ljotić's men and the Russian White Guard Corps. Through Mirko Lalatović, member of his Supreme Command, Mihailović commanded all operations and also issued personal orders for these operations.

27. In Bosnia, during the Seventh German offensive against the National Liberation Army, Mihailović's Četniks, under the command of Major Slavoljub Vranješević and Rade Radić, placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans and, as they knew the terrain well, served as guides for the German units in their operations. In addition to this, they attacked and destroyed small groups of Partisans who, in the course of heavy fighting with the Germans, lost contact with their main forces. Major Vranješević informed Mihailović by radiogram of all this and Mihailović always replied to these reports: that the chief aim was to destroy the communists (as he called all the participants in the fight against the invader) and that discretion should be used towards the invader and that he should be utilized for the supply of arms and ammunition.

28. In the summer of 1944, Mihailović established permanent connection with the traitor Milan Nedić through Milan Aćimović. He appointed Captain Predrag Raković as liaison officer with Nedić, while Nedić, on his part, appointed Ilija Mihailović (former member of Parliament and member of the executive of the former »Yugoslav National party«).

In the middle of the summer of 1944, Mihailović's delegate Captain Raković came to Belgrade, where he stayed in the home of Milan Aćimović, visited Nedić daily and coordinated the work of the armed detachments of Nedić's Government and Mihailović's units in the struggle against the units of the National Liberation Army in Serbia, which grew rapidly in strength and increased in number through the influx of a large number of new fighters from the villages and towns. Through Raković, Nedić sent arms and ammunition which he got from the Germans to Mihailović's units.

Shortly after the arrival of Captain Raković in Belgrade, Nedić put him in contact with the German Commander for Serbia, General Felber, and his Chief of Staff General Geitner, and from that time Captain Raković maintained this contact between the German military commander for Serbia and Mihailović's Supreme Command, using it to get arms and ammunition from the Germans and to coordinate operations of German and Četnik units in Serbia in operations against the National Liberation Army.

Majors Bačović and Lukačević, on their return from Cairo after the King's wedding, communicated a message to Mihailović from the British General Masterson, »to liquidate the communists as soon as possible, and that afterwards more favourable conditions would arise for us (i. e. for Četniks — Prosecutor's note) and that they (the British) would change their attitude, their propaganda, and their policy towards us (towards Mihailović — Prosecutor's note).«

At that time an American colonel McDowell, Chief of the American Military Mission to Mihailović's HQ, landed at the airfield at Pranjani (near Čačak). As soon as he met Mihailović he said to him: »We Americans are not interested in your fight with Germany. They have to go out of Yugoslavia through the action of the Allies. It is up to you to keep your hold on the people... America is helping exclusively you and your movement in Yugoslavia.« (Mihailović's movement — Prosecutor's note).

29. In July 1944, on Kopaonik, near Kruševac, Mihailović gathered a number of corps under the command of Major Keserović and the Fourth Group of Storm Corps under the command of Major Račić. The Fourth Group of Storm Corps consisted of two »guard corps« under the command of Nikola Kalabić, the Second Ravna Gora Corps under the command of Captain Raković and the Cer Corps. Mihailović placed Keserović's units also under the command of Major Račić, and he gave Major Račić the order to destroy, with all these forces, in collaboration with the German punitive expedition, (this expedition consisted of German, Bulgarian, Nedić's and Ljotić's units), the units of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments which had liberated the territory at Toplica and Jablanica.

In the course of operations, which developed in July and August 1944 at Toplica and Jablanica, Mihailović's units carried out his orders and participated — together with German, Bulgarian, Nedić's and Ljotić's units — in heavy battles against the units of the National Liberation Army. A German Captain Weil was with Major Račić's Staff as liaison officer. He coordinated the Četnik operations with those of the Germans and other quisling units.

In addition to this, Major Račić and Nikola Kalabić went on several occasions to Kruševac to meet the staff of the German units, with the object of coordinating a plan of operations and obtaining arms and ammunition. Before the beginning of operations all Četnik units were supplied by the Germans with large quantities of arms and ammunition.

30. With the knowledge of, and with instructions given by Mihailović, his staff in Belgrade collaborated with the Special Police



Četnik commander Pavle Đurišić making a speech to the Četniks in the presence of General Pirzio Biroli, Italian governor of Montenegro.

and Dragi Jovanović. From April 1944, Mihailović's commander of Belgrade, Saša Mihailović, placed under his command Dragi Jovanović and the whole Belgrade Police with the Special Police and a detachment of the Serbian State Guards. Saša Mihailović informed the accused Dragoljub Mihailović of this and was given instructions by him that the followers of the National Liberation Movement in Belgrade should be destroyed. This collaboration lasted until the flight of Saša Mihailović and the Special Police from Belgrade.

31. About August 20, 1944, Mihailović met the traitor Milan Nedić in the village of Ražana near Kosjerić, at night, in the greatest secrecy. Mihailović was accompanied by Major Mirko Lala-

tović, Major Račić and Nikola Kalabić, and Nedić by General Damjanović (Nedić's Chief of Cabinet) and Dragomir Jovanović (Prefect of the Belgrade Prefecture — founder of the Special Police and of Banjica Camp). After the negotiations Mihailović concluded an oral agreement with Nedić, the contents of which are as follows:

a. Nedić's Government shall give Mihailović financial help to the extent of one hundred million dinars per month;

b. Nedić undertakes the obligation to obtain from the Germans and deliver to Mihailović 30.000 rifles, 3 million rifle and machine gun rounds, 500 machine guns and 500 mortars.

c. Mihailović guarantees to Nedić that these arms shall under no conditions be used against the Germans, while Nedić takes upon himself the responsibility for this before the Germans;

d. Nedić and his Government shall, in so far as the invader permits, place all their armed formations under the command of Mihailović for the purpose of coordination of action against the National Liberation Army;

e. Nedić's Government shall, in so far as it can obtain them, deliver to Mihailović an indefinite number of uniforms and footwear;

Mihailović's officer Captain Predrag Raković was, by mutual consent, appointed as liaison officer between Nedić and Mihailović. It was also settled by that agreement that Mihailović's commanders should not directly turn to Nedić for help in arms and other equipment, as they did formerly. Mihailović specially requested of Nedić that the agreement should be kept in the greatest secrecy.

Immediately after the conclusion of this agreement, Mihailović received from Nedić through the latter's »Serbian State Guards« 10.000 rifles and one million rounds of ammunition. The rifles and ammunition were given to Nedić by the Germans, after he had informed them about the agreement which he had made with Mihailović and after the Germans approved of it. In addition to this, Mihailović was given a hundred million dinars by Nedić, and about 20.000 uniforms. Everything that he received from Nedić or through Nedić from the Germans, Mihailović used for the improvement of the arms and equipment of his units, which later, together with the Germans, the Nedić and Ljotić men, fought against the units of the National Liberation Army and Partisan detachments.

32. In August 1944 in the village of Rošci (Ljubić District near Čačak), in the vicinity of the Caganj school, Mihailović held a meeting with the Chief of the Administration Staff of the German Military Commander of Serbia — Neubacher. A member of his Supreme Command, Colonel Baletić and the American colonel McDowell were also



present at this meeting, as well as Milan Aćimović, Starker and Captain Raković.

In the beginning of September 1944, Mihailović met Starker (Neubacher's deputy) in the vicinity of the village of Pranjani. The American Colonel McDowell also attended the meeting. At this meeting McDowell demanded of Starker that the Germans should surrender exclusively to Mihailović.

#### THE PERIOD FROM THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER 1944 TO THE MIDDLE OF MAY 1945

33. When, in September 1944, strong National Liberation Army forces penetrated into Serbia from Montenegro, Sandžak and Bosnia, Mihailović's units fought on all the sectors, together with the Germans, Nedić's and the Ljotić's men, to check further penetration of the units of the National Liberation Army into Serbia.

On October 6, 1944, Mihailović placed under his command the whole of Nedić's »Serbian State Guards« — SDS. Mihailović's Commander of Serbia, General Trifunović, formed the »Serbian Shock Corps« (SUK) from Nedić's SDS. General Trifunović appointed General Radovanović, former commander of the SDS in Belgrade, as Commander of the SUK and, as his deputy, General Borivoje Jonić, former commander of the whole SDS. Thus Mihailović also took over the command of the armed formations of the traitor Nedić, with the aim of intensifying the struggle against the units of the National Liberation Army which, in its victorious advance, was liberating the country from the invader.

34. In the course of the operations in October and November 1944, Mihailović's forces were defeated in Serbia, by the units of the National Liberation Army, and Mihailović, fleeing from Serbia, went over into Bosnia with the remainder of his forces, after crossing the Drina near the village of Badovinci (Mačva). In their flight from Serbia, his units, both those which fled with him and those which fled with Nedić's SDS (called SUK by Mihailović), and also his forces from Sandžak and Montenegro, all withdrew together with the German columns which were also fleeing from Serbia. His units, while retreating, fought together with the German units, against the units of the National Liberation Army.

In the retreat towards Bosnia, Mihailović again met with Starker and Milan Aćimović, near the village of Draginje. The American Colonel McDowell was also present at this meeting.

35. When Mihailović gathered the remnants of his units in East Bosnia, he established connection, through his officer Colonel Borota,

with the command of the German units in Sarajevo, and issued orders to Colonel Borota to negotiate with the Germans, and to conclude an agreement by which the latter would give his units arms, ammunition, medical supplies and food, while the Četniks would help the Germans in fighting against the units of the National Liberation Army which were attacking the German units and liberating the country from the invader. In carrying out Mihailović's instructions



Chief of the British Military Mission, General Armstrong, with Predrag Raković, commander of the Second Ravna Gora Corps. At the trial Mihailović admitted that Captain Raković was his link with Nedić and that through him he received for his troops ammunition from the Germans.

Colonel Borota and also Nikola Kalabić, after successful negotiations with the Germans, received ammunition, arms, food and medical supplies, which were distributed to Mihailović's men. All Mihailović's other commanders also received arms and ammunition from the Germans. In these last battles for the liberation of the country from the yoke of the invader, his units, under his leadership, openly and publicly participated in fighting against the units of the National Liberation Army, thus helping the German invaders.

36. In the winter of 1944/45, Mihailović twice met Starker in the Sarajevo region. He had also met him and negotiated with him previously.

37. In January 1945, Mihailović had a meeting with the Gestapo agent Gašparević, who was sent by the Gestapo from Vienna with a group of 60 men, trained at the Gestapo school in Austria for diversionary acts, assassinations, sabotage and espionage, with the task of crossing over into liberated Serbia to organize an espionage network, and, with the help of a radio station which he brought along with him, to send information to the Gestapo in Vienna, and in addition to this, to carry out sabotage, diversionary actions and various terrorist acts. Mihailović learnt from Gašparević the sort of task assigned to the latter by the Gestapo, and yet he agreed to transfer Gašparević's group through his channels into Serbia and to assign 30 of his men to that group. These men were trained in Mihailović's school as "commandos" (groups for espionage, diversionary actions and sabotage). Mihailović gave Gašparević the task of maintaining regular contact with him, and sending him information — and Gašparević agreed to carry out all orders which Mihailović gave him by radio. Through his own channels, Mihailović sent Gašparević's group to Serbia, together with 30 of his Četniks headed by Lieut. Nedeljković, and received from Gašparević confidential telegrams, although he knew that Gašparević sent the same telegrams to the Gestapo in Vienna. Mihailović also sent instructions by radiogram to Gašparević. Besides Gašparević's group, Mihailović also sent to Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia more of his »commandos« who, even after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia, killed members of the peoples' committees, looted village cooperatives and warehouses, and private property.

38. Mihailović's officers Col. Pavlović, Mitić and Andrić (who were situated in his vicinity) through the Gestapo agent Schwarz, who belonged to Gašparević's group, sent a written request to the Gestapo in Vienna that, on German territory, an illegal radio station should be set up for transmitting Četnik news, that the Gestapo should send several instructors to Mihailović's school for the training of commandos, that the Gestapo should send the Četniks five small radio stations, medical supplies and arms, that the Germans should agree, when the German spring counteroffensive began in the Balkans, to allow Mihailović to occupy Serbia with his forces and that, as compensation for all this, Mihailović's units would participate with the Germans in the operations against the National Liberation Army.

39. In the winter of 1945, Mihailović established contact with Dimitrije Ljotić through the radio station of Dobrosav Jevđević, who was at that time in the Julian March, and agreed that Ljotić should send a delegation to him to negotiate about the unification of all

Ljotić, Četnik, and other quisling forces in the Julian March under the command of Mihailović. Mihailović received Ljotić's delegation, which consisted of General Parac, who, before his flight from Belgrade, belonged to Mihailović's Belgrade Staff, and Ljotić's private secretary, Boško Kostić, through whom Mihailović maintained courier connections with the emigrant government during the whole of the occupation, through Major Perić in Istanbul. After negotiating with this delegation Mihailović accepted Ljotić's plan regarding the uniting of all traitors in the Julian March under Mihailović's command, and sent his officers there, the generals Damjanović (who was Nedić's Chief of Cabinet until his flight from Belgrade), Siniša — known as Pazarac, and Ljuba Jovanović — known as Patak. For the command of the units in the Julian March, Mihailović formed the so-called Advance Section of the Supreme Command, headed by general Damjanović. On his instructions, the latter formed the so-called »Šumadija« Division out of Ljotić's »Serbian Volunteers Corps«, (SDK), the Četniks of Father Đujić and Jevđević and of quisling refugees, and informed Mihailović of this. Being in constant contact with Mihailović through radio stations, General Damjanović participated with his »Šumadija Division«, together with the Germans, in the operations against the units of the National Liberation Army in the Julian March. Mihailović was in contact with General Damjanović right up to May 1945, when the units of the National Liberation Army destroyed the remnants of his forces and he lost his radio stations.

40. In March 1945, Mihailović sent Janko Brašić to Zagreb. He was a lawyer, who was with General Trifunović's Staff, and was given the task of establishing connection with Maček's followers, Archbishop Stepinec and Pavelić. In Zagreb Brašić established connections with Pavelić, Stepinec and Maček's followers. Towards the end of March or at the beginning of April, Brašić returned from Zagreb and reported to Mihailović that Maček's followers requested Mihailović to appoint a delegation for negotiations, and that Pavelić requested Mihailović to come to Zagreb personally for consultation about the joint struggle against the National Liberation Army. Mihailović appointed a delegation for negotiations consisting of Stanković, an engineer and member of his so-called Central National Committee, and General Trifunović. Mihailović also sent Brašić two letters, one for him personally in which he told him to inform Pavelić that he could not come to negotiate because his commanders did not agree that he should leave his units, but that he was sending two delegates to negotiate with full authorization and to assure Pavelić that he and his assistants would strictly observe the proposed agree-

ment, which his delegates would conclude with Pavelić. The other letter was for Archbishop Stepinac, in which he appealed to the latter to use all his authority with the Croat people in order that the Croats should rise up together with Mihailović against the »Bolshevik danger«.

#### WAR CRIMES

41. Through numerous circulars, communications, radiograms, directions sent to all his commanders, as well as to some commanders in particular cases, beginning in the Autumn of 1941, Mihailović issued strict orders to annihilate mercilessly all fighters of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, captured or wounded fighters, all followers of the National Liberation Movement, and everybody who helped in any way the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, calling all adherents of the National Liberation Army in his messages, circulars and directions: communists, Bolsheviks, Ustaša-Bolshevik bands, etc.

42. Mihailović also issued orders to his commanders to annihilate the Moslems (whom he called Turks) and the Croats (whom he identified with the Ustašas).

43. Mihailović introduced the method of killing men without trial and without any investigation of guilt. Death sentences were pronounced by him and he bestowed this right on all his commanders of corps, brigades and battalions. Those who were sentenced to death were placed under the letter »Z«.

44. For the execution of death sentences by the method of the letter »Z« (the letter »Z« is the first letter of the word »zaklati«, which means to cut the throat of, and the persons placed under this letter were to be murdered), Mihailović gave instructions that every one of his brigades should form »Black Threes« who worked as conspirators. By Mihailović's instructions the commanders of brigades chose bloodthirsty men for the »Black Threes«, who, when entering the »Black Threes«, agreed to carry out every order without mercy, while in the case of non-execution of orders they were to be shot. Mihailović, what is more, gave the »Black Threes« instructions how to cut throats. The Chief of the Četnik »Black Threes« was Mihailović himself.

45. Besides his orders to the »Black Threes«, Mihailović frequently issued orders that every commander of the Corps should organize flying brigades whose exclusive task was to clear their terrain of Partisans (or as he says communists) and their sympathisers and all other persons who did not agree with his organization — and not to enter into any conflicts with the invader.



46. In accordance with Mihailović's orders, his commanders, his corps and brigades, his »Black Threes« and flying brigades perpetrated in the course of the war and occupation numerous war crimes in all parts of Yugoslavia, in Serbia, Montenegro, Sandžak, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Croatia (especially in Dalmatia and Lika) and in Slovenia; thus:

In November 1941, the Četniks shot in the village of Brajići (Takovo District) at the place called Drenovi Vrh, some 500 captured Partisans and adherents of the Liberation struggle. The place where the Partisans were shot is not far from Ravna Gora where Mihailović's HQ were situated.

On the night of November 13—14, 1941, the Četnik commander Jovan Škava, by order of Mihailović, handed over about 365 Partisans to the Germans in the village of Slovac (near Valjevo). The Germans took them to Valjevo and shot them at a place called Krušik, near the latter town.

In the beginning of November 1941, at a place called Ridovi, in the vicinity of Kosjerić, Mihailović's commander Ajdačić slaughtered 13 Partisan followers including Jelena Subić-Gmizović and Mileva Kosovac, women teachers, whom the Četniks violated, and mutilated with red hot irons before murdering.

On November 4, 1941, near Ravna Gora, the Četniks killed about 30 Partisans, who were captured by a ruse. This number included 18 girls, who had been sent to Užice as nurses.

In December 1941, at Čačak, Mihailović's Četniks together with the Germans shot 80 adherents of the National Liberation Movement at one time.

In December 1941 in the Požega District, the mixed German-Četnik corps on one occasion sentenced to death 12 Partisan adherents.

In December 1941 and during January 1942 the Četniks slaughtered over 2000 Moslems — men, women and children from the outskirts of Foča, Čajniče and Goražde. These slaughters were perpetrated on the bridges across the Drina at Foča and Goražde.

During the month of December 1941 and in the course of the whole of 1942, Mihailović's "legalized" Četniks arrested and handed over to the Germans in various parts of Serbia thousands of Partisan followers who were shot by the Germans in the camps at Banjica, Šabac, Niš, Užice, Čačak and elsewhere, while in addition to this, the Četniks themselves killed thousands of Partisan followers, plundered many villages, flogged thousands of men, and violated a large number of women and girls from Partisan families.

On April 1, 1942, the Četniks of Rade Radić killed 20 wounded Partisans at Jošavka among whom was Dr. Mladen Stojanović, who was seriously wounded.

In April 1942, the Četniks of Lazar Tešanović and Rade Radić, (who placed themselves under the command of Mihailović's officer Captain Rašić) killed 70 wounded Partisans.

Towards the end of April 1942, Spasoje Dakić, commander of Mihailović's battalion in East Bosnia, killed the British major Terence Atherton and one of his radio telegraphists — a British sergeant.

In June 1942, Mihailović's Četniks burned down the hospital with ten seriously wounded Partisans, near Gacko in the village of Izgori.

In June 1942, Mihailović's detachment under the command of Captain Vladimir Đukić, took out of prison at Nikšić 25 followers of the National Liberation Movement and, together with the Italians, shot them.

In August 1942, Mihailović's commander Baćović killed Rade Bravica, judge, Toma Galep, Jova Ljubibratić, Budimir Ukropina and Tasa Kosović, followers of the National Liberation Movement.

In August 1942, Mihailović's Četniks under the command of Petar Baćović, during the capture of Foča, slaughtered there and in a group of villages, called Bukovica, about 100 Moslems, among whom were about 300 women, children and old men.

In August 1942, in the district of Ustikolina and Jahorina (East Bosnia) Mihailović's Četniks, under the command of Zaharije Ostojić and Petar Baćović, slaughtered about 2.500 persons of Moslem faith and burned down the villages.

In September 1942, at Makarska, the Četniks of Petar Baćović killed 900 Croats, skinned alive several catholic priests, and burnt down 17 villages.

In October 1942, the Četniks of Petar Baćović, together with the Italians who were under the command of Lt. Vidiak, killed about 2.500 Moslems and Croats in the environs of Prozor. Among them were women, children and old men. They also burnt a large number of vilages.

In October 1942, in the villages of Gata, Niklica and Čislo (all villages of Dalmatia), the Četniks of Petar Baćović, together with the Italians, killed 109 Croats who were sympathizers of the National Liberation Movement.

In autumn 1942, at Drežnica (Hercegovina), the Četniks from the environs of Gacko, while moving towards Prozor, slaughtered 100 persons of the Moslem faith.

In December 1942, in the village of Brainci (Mrkaić — East Bosnia) and in the neighbouring villages, the Četniks of Mihailović's commander Rajko Čelonja, killed 160 peasants and burned down the village of Brainci and several other villages. Among the killed were women and children.

In January 1943, Mihailović's Četniks killed Father Isaković and 18 other followers of the Partisans in the village of Banja (near Arandelovac).

In January 1943, Major Cvetić slaughtered 16 captured Partisans in the district of Užice.

In January 1943, under the command of Komarčević, Mihailović's Četniks slaughtered 72 Partisan sympathizers in the Posava District.

In January 1943, the Četniks of Pavle Đurišić killed about 400 men and about 1.000 women and children of Moslem faith in the Bijelo Polje District.

In February 1943, the Četniks under the command of Zaharije Ostojić, Petar Bačović, Pavle Đurišić, Vojislav Lukačević, Vuk Kalaitović and others slaughtered 1.200 men, and 8.000 old men, women and children in the districts of Plevlje, Čajniče and Foča. They looted and burned down about 2.000 houses at the same time.

In the middle of July 1943, in the village of Cikoti (East Bosnia) the Četniks discovered 80 wounded men of the First Proletarian Division. They took their arms, and the following day brought the Germans who killed and then burned them.

In July 1943, at Bišina (Birač), the Četniks discovered 120 wounded men of the First and Second Proletarian Brigades and handed them over to the Germans who shot them.

In December 1943, at Kolašin, the Četnik commander Major Petričević shot 28 captured Partisans and 6 peasants, Partisan followers.

In December 1943, in the village of Selevac (Belgrade District) the Četnik commander Živan Lazović murdered 15 peasants, Partisan followers.

In December 1943, the Četniks slaughtered 137 captured Partisans in the environs of Bosansko Grahovo.

In December 1943, the Četniks slaughtered 28 captured Partisans in the village of Tičevo near Drvar.

In December 1943, at Zeta (Montenegro), the Četniks slaughtered 8 peasant-delegates at the First Antifascist Assembly of Montenegro.

In December 1943, the Četniks of Nikola Kalabić slaughtered 24 peasants, Partisan followers, in the village of Kopljari (near Aranđelovac).

In December 1943, the Četniks of Vuk Kalaitović shot 18 Partisan followers in the Sjenica District (Sandžak).

In December 1943, in the village of Vranjić (Posava District, Belgrade County), the Četniks, under the command of Lt. Colonel Miodrag Palošević and Major Sveta Trifković, slaughtered 72 persons, among whom were one child of two years, another of three months. They castrated one of the victims. Besides this they plundered large number of peasant homes.

From July 1941, to March 1943, Mihailović's Četniks, under the command of Pavle Đurišić, sentenced to death and shot about a thousand Montenegrin Partisans and peasants, because they participated in the Liberation uprising in Montenegro.

On April 29, 1944, the Četnik detachments of Captain Živojin Lazović, Major Svetislav Trifković, Nikola Kalabić, Dragutin Bojović, Sveta Bogičević, Radovan Dokmanović and Sveta Radičević, in the village of Drugovac (Podunava District — Belgrade County) slaughtered 73 persons among whom were 9 women. On that occasion 37 other persons were ill-treated and 220 houses were looted and then burned down.

In April 1944, the Četniks slaughtered 8 Partisan sympathizers near Bajina Bašta.

In May 1944, the Četniks of Dragutin Keserović discovered a Partisan hospital at Jastrebac, and shot some 24 wounded men and 4 nurses there.

In May 1944, Četniks from Majevica discovered a Partisan hospital in Semberia and killed about 300 seriously wounded.

In the summer of 1944, the Četniks in the village of Balinovići burned alive Živan Đurđević, a peasant from Balinovići, in the presence of 20 men, and then killed his son.

In the beginning of August 1944, Dušan Radović, known as Kondor, commander of Mihailović's Zlatibor Corps, murdered two American airmen of French origin, who were forced to land by parachute, near the Lim river.

In August 1944, the Četnik detachment of Sveta Bogičević caught Sava Sremčević, Konstantin Vojinović, Ilija Radojević and Ilija Jakovljević, in the village of Sepci (Kragujevac District), and, after cruelly torturing them in order to force them to admit their collaboration with the Partisans, slaughtered all four of them.

47. The crimes enumerated are only a small part of the crimes which Mihailović's Četniks committed in all parts of Yugoslavia in compliance with his orders and instructions.

In addition, tens of thousands of men were tortured and flogged by Četniks, while in Montenegro a special system of flogging was introduced, utilising the »rogalj« (a kind of stake).

Mihailović's commanders sent lists of the Partisan followers to the invaders and quislings on the basis of which they were arrested and shot. Mihailović's Belgrade organization especially closely collaborated with the Special Police in the annihilation of the Partisan followers in Belgrade.

(The prosecutor then read the indictment of all the other accused persons).

On the basis of all that has been presented, I propose that the Military Council of the Supreme Court of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia appoint a public trial and bring before the Court the accused mentioned in this charge from the custody of the Military Court of the Belgrade Command, and also call upon the following to attend the public trial:

1. The Deputy Prosecutor of the Yugoslav Army.
2. Counsel for the Defence of the accused.

I also propose that all the proofs mentioned in this indictment, which are enumerated in the lists appended to the indictment as a component part of it, be set forth at this trial.

I also propose that this Court, on the basis of Article 15 item 3 of the Law concerning Criminal Acts against the People and State, appoint Counsel for the Defence for the accused who are absent.

Finally, I propose that the Court, after the completion of the trial and upon the examination of all the proofs, pass sentence according to the Law.

#### ARGUMENTATION

All that has been stated in this indictment is supported by written documents, testimonies, complete or partial confession by the accused, or other evidence.

From the documents relating to the case the following can be seen:

First, that the accused Dragoljub Mihailović and his collaborators for a short time secretly and then openly collaborated with the German-fascist invaders in the fight against the Liberation Movement

of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Among Mihailović's collaborators are also the accused Slobodan Jovanović and others who lived abroad during the war enjoying the hospitality of the allied countries. They also helped the invader in the suppressing of the Liberation struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia, although at first sight this seems paradoxical. They helped the invaders by directing together with the accused Mihailović the traitorous Četnik organisation. Under their leadership this organisation openly collaborated with the invaders in the struggle against the Liberation Movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Second, that the accused Dragomir Jovanović, Tanasije Dinić and other collaborators of the traitor Milan Nedić from the very beginning of the occupation placed themselves openly in the service of the invader, and formed an executive apparatus through which they carried out the instructions and orders of the invader. They helped the invader with all their might in the suppression of the liberation struggle of the Serbian people.

Third, that the accused Mihailović and his collaborators and the accused Dragomir Jovanović, Tanasije Dinić and others of Nedić's collaborators, during the course of the occupation committed countless serious crimes of all kinds.

Fourth, that the accused Lazar Marković and Kosta Kumanudi, guided by the same purposes as the accused Mihailović and others, helped the traitors and war criminals Mihailović and Nedić, being at the same time exceedingly careful not to compromise themselves publicly either in their collaboration with the enemy or with Mihailović and Nedić.

The work of all these servants and assistants of the invader during the war and occupation was directed towards one and the same purpose. Their common aim was identical with the aim of the German-fascist invaders: suppression of the Liberation Movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

In their endeavours to achieve their common purpose, the assistants and servants of the invaders maintained mutual connection and worked in close collaboration, while in the final phase of the war and the occupation they formally and publicly united all their forces in order to suppress the Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia which was carrying on a heroic struggle against the enemy and all his servants in the country.

This is why they stand today before the just tribunal of the peoples of Yugoslavia and will have to give account of their treasonable and criminal activity.



## I.

All the criminal acts of which Dragoljub Mihailović and others are accused have been proved by the mass of evidence contained in the documents relating to their case.

It can be seen from the relevant documents that the work of the accused Dragoljub Mihailović, Stevan Moljević, Živko Topalović, Slobodan Jovanović and others was intended to render impossible any liberation struggle in Yugoslavia and to annihilate in collaboration with the enemy the democratic and liberation forces, so that, with the help of the invader, a regime of open dictatorship and national oppression might be established, and even the extermination of certain nationalities in various regions accomplished.

From the very beginning the accused Mihailović, together with the emigrant government, spread the propaganda that it was not yet time for the struggle against the enemy, and that the moment for the fighting would come when the Allied forces landed in the Balkans. However, from the very beginning Mihailović started to fight against all those who arose in arms in the Liberation struggle against the invader, thus spreading fratricidal war for the benefit of the Germans, Italians, Bulgarians and Hungarians. Therefore, all the assertions which Mihailović and his clique made in this country and abroad that they looked upon the Germans as their enemies and that they were only waiting for a convenient moment to attack them, do not correspond to the facts, because Mihailović, from the very first, considered that the moment was favourable for fighting against the forces of resistance, and entered into collaboration with the invaders, remaining in collaboration with them right up to the capitulation of Germany. The slogan of Mihailović and his clique — that it was not time for the fight against the invader, meant not only a fight against the uprising but also a direct link with the invaders and the realisation of their policy, which was to make the peoples of Yugoslavia their peaceful, obedient slaves who would not interfere in their plunder of the country and in troop movements, and whom they could mobilize as manpower and gun-fodder on the fronts against the Allies.

Mihailović and Nedić usually justified their collaboration with the enemy by pointing out the need of saving Serbian lives. The fratricidal war, started by Draža Mihailović for the benefit of the enemy, actually led to the annihilation of tens of thousands of Serbs, to mass extermination of the Serbian people both by the enemy and Mihailović's Četniks together and by the Četniks alone.

Mihailović undertook the extermination of Croats and Moslems under the pretext that this was a reprisal for the slaughter of Serbs

committed by the Ustašas, while in fact he collaborated with the Ustašas against the Serbian and Croatian peoples.

Mihailović and the emigrant government in London usually represented themselves, in their statements, as friends of the Allies, especially of England and America. In this way, Mihailović and the emigrant government desired to achieve the following: first, to conceal their collaboration with the invader from the Allied public; second, to mislead a part of the population of this country; third, to ensure the legality and continuity of the emigrant government and the monarchy in the eyes of the Allies; fourth, under the pretext that they were carrying on a struggle against Bolshevism, to create abroad a false impression that in Yugoslavia it was not a question of a struggle for liberation of the peoples against the enemy, but of a civil war, and on this basis to obtain support and justification for their collaboration with the enemy.

It is therefore clear that Mihailović, while collaborating with the enemy, weakened the general war effort of Yugoslavia in the struggle against Germany and her allies, and in this way weakened the front of the Allied nations against the common enemy.

In the course of the investigation it was established that the accused Mihailović committed, during the war and occupation, treason towards his own country and that, from 1941 up to the end of the war, he collaborated with the German-fascist invaders in the fight against the National Liberation Movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Our peoples know this, since they witnessed with their own eyes and experienced personally the traitorous work of the accused Mihailović and the Četnik bands which he commanded. However, there are people outside our country who assert that Mihailović's collaboration with the invader began only in 1944. The relevant documents, however, contain conclusive proof that Mihailović's cooperation with the invader in the fight against the National Liberation Movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia began as far back as 1941, that it began first in Serbia and then it spread to the whole of Yugoslavia. His collaboration with the invader was concealed in the beginning, but by December 1941, Mihailović had entered into open collaboration while still endeavouring to save himself and his closest circle of officers from being compromised, although he placed all his armed formations publicly and openly in the service of the invader. That this is true and undeniable, can be seen from the various quotations taken from the evidence at hand, which we shall present here.

Speaking about the delegation which he sent to Nedić, Mihailović made the following statement to the examining authorities:

"Towards the end of August or beginning of September, Živojin Đurić, ex-lieutenant-colonel of the Yugoslav army, came to see me and brought me a letter from Nedić. The letter was very short, only two lines, and in it Nedić invited me to come to Belgrade to meet him. With the letter Đurić gave me an identity card provided by Nedić for the journey". Further:

"Aca Mišić told me: "You won't go". I had already decided not to. Then Mišić said: "I'll go".

And further:

"As far as I remember, the delegation left on August 29 or 30, and returned, I know this for certain, exactly on September 6, 1941, in the evening."

The traitor Milan Nedić made the following statement to the examining magistrate concerning the negotiations of this delegation and their result:

"The aim of this delegation was to establish contact between myself and Draža, on the basis of the struggle against the Partisans. They showed me an authorization signed by Draža personally whereby they were empowered to negotiate with me and take any necessary decision." Further:

"I agreed to the collaboration with Draža Mihailović and promised to help him. This decision was reached during the negotiations between myself and this delegation." And further:

"A written agreement between myself and this delegation was not made in view of the fact that all three officers in the delegation were my officers and very well known to me, and I therefore considered that there was no need for a written agreement, and they did not demand it.

We agreed upon the following:

1. On collaboration between myself, i. e. my government, and Draža Mihailović in the struggle against the communists, with the aim of annihilating them.
2. To give him immediate help in money so that he might give salaries to officers and non-commissioned officers, and also to enable him to buy food for his army.
3. Immediately to appoint a liaison officer who would be constantly attached to Mihailović's Headquarters.
4. To obtain through the Germans the "legalization" of Draža Mihailović and his Četniks so that they might not be persecuted by the Germans and might move about freely.

5. That after the purging or annihilation of the communists in Serbia, my government was to extend the necessary help to Draža Mihailović in order to suppress civil war in Bosnia and Montenegro.

6. That after the formation of the government detachments, which was already in progress, an operational plan should be drawn up between myself and Draža Mihailović, for the purging of Serbia of the communists.

These were the main provisions of the agreement on collaboration between myself and Draža Mihailović".

Nedić continued:

"Of this agreement on collaboration the following points were immediately carried into effect:

1. I issued help in money — I can't remember how much — and the delegation took it with them.

2. I immediately went to the Commander for Serbia, General Dankelmann, and informed him of the arrival of the delegation of Draža Mihailović and the agreement reached. I told Dankelmann that Draža asked for the legalization of his Četniks and himself, so that they might move about undisturbed without fearing persecution, or getting shot by the Germans, in order to launch the attack against the communists. Dankelmann immediately agreed to this legalization, and gave instructions accordingly to the German units.

3. I appointed staff Major Marko Olujić to serve as liaison officer between myself and Draža Mihailović.

Here I want to mention that Marko Olujić did not immediately proceed to Mihailović's Headquarters. I cannot recall how much time elapsed before his departure to Mihailović, since he was captured en route to Suvobor by the communists, together with the operational plan for military collaboration between the government detachments and Draža Mihailović's Četniks, for the purging of Serbia."

In his testimony, Nedić further declared:

"I was informed that Draža approved of the entire agreement, i. e. the provisions of the agreement concluded between the delegation and myself."

Nevertheless, when the general people's uprising against the invaders and their servants broke out in Serbia, and when many of his units demanded to enter into the armed struggle against the enemy, Mihailović was obliged to conclude a false agreement with

the Partisans on a joint struggle against the German invaders. Regarding the reasons which induced the accused Mihailović to order his units to enter the struggle against the Germans, the witness Radoslav Đurić says:

*"Draža's captain Reljić explained to me, in the village of Brajići, that Draža had actually ordered a general mobilization and attack on the Germans, together with the Partisans. Afterwards, when I asked Draža about this, he personally declared that this was true, but that he had been forced to enter the struggle against the Germans prematurely, because the Partisans had begun an uprising, which would rally all the people to them, and that he — Draža — would be left alone. Draža told me among other things that he had really sent Živojin Đurić and Aleksandar Mišić to Belgrade to talk to Nedić and seek his aid, but he asserted that he did not tell Živojin that he might remain with the Germans, nor did he tell Mišić that I would remain as liaison officer with Nedić. When I asked him why he wanted to talk with Nedić, Draža replied that he wanted to make use of him" — (record dated April 23, 1946, page 3)*

However, although on October 26, 1941, Mihailović had concluded a written agreement with Tito, the Commander in Chief of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, on a joint struggle of Četniks and Partisans against the invader, he continued, in the greatest secrecy, to prepare for the annihilation of the Partisans in Serbia. At that time, in the middle of October 1941, Major Zaharije Ostojić and Mirko Lalatović came to his Headquarters. They were sent to him by the Command of the Yugoslav army in emigration.

Shortly afterwards, on November 1, 1941, ignoring the agreement concluded with Tito, Mihailović ordered his forces to withdraw from the front against the Germans and undertake an all-out attack against the Partisan forces with the object of annihilating them.

The witness Radoslav Đurić says in connection with this order issued by Mihailović:

*"On November 2, I received a strictly confidential order, addressed to me personally by Draža Mihailović, saying that I should immediately raise the siege of Kraljevo and attack Čačak, which was in Partisan hands — (record dated April 23, 1946, page 3, written in the office of the public prosecutor of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia).*

This order is mentioned in a note written by Mihailović himself in his diary:

*"Only Đurić is with the Partisans. Orders for lifting blockade of Kraljevo shown to Molo; attack on Čačak postponed for three days, during which time I invited commanders to supper."*

When the Partisan forces broke the attack of Mihailović's units on all sectors, and, pursuing the broken Četnik detachments, approached the immediate vicinity of Ravna Gora, Mihailović established contact with the Germans and met the German representatives on the night of November 13—14, 1941. Mihailović's account of this meeting is as follows:

*"I met the Germans in the second half of November 1941, I cannot exactly remember the date, in an inn at the village of Divci".*

(Mihailović could not recall the exact date of the meeting but by the testimony of witnesses it has been indisputably ascertained that this meeting took place on the night of November 13—14, 1941 — Prosecutor's note).

*"The Germans present were: Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief for Serbia. I cannot recall his name. The interpreter was a Volksdeutscher, a physician, who worked in the Gestapo, as I learned later, in the office of Brandt — Section for Draža Mihailović. In addition to these two, there were ten Germans altogether, all in the uniform of German officers. I don't know their ranks.*

*I, Draža Mihailović, Colonel Pantić, Captain Nenad Mitrović and Major Aleksandar Mišić (were present on the Četnik side — Prosecutor's note)".*

*"I left Struganik with my party and proceeded across Mionica, together with Aleksandar Mišić. We stopped our party before we arrived at the Kolubara River, and told them to await our return. Mišić and I walked alone up to the bridge where we were met by Brana Pantić, Nenad Mitrović and professor Mantel. We crossed over the demolished bridge to the other side, and entered an automobile, which took us to the inn at Divci. In front of the inn there were many German soldiers. It was late at night. We were shown into the inn at Divci and immediately sat around a long table. I sat opposite the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief for Serbia. Aca Mišić was on my left, Brana Pantić on the left of Mišić, and on my right sat Nenad Mitrović. About ten Germans were also sitting around the table.*



*Here I'd like to mention that the Germans were guarding the road from the bridge to the inn with armoured cars and motorcycles. This greatly surprised me."*

In reply to the question of the Prosecutor, as to what time of the night the meeting took place, Mihailović answered:

#### И з в е с т а ј

И са одржане седнице на Равној Гори 30 новембра 1941 године и према добијеним инструкцијама, ноћу између 30/31 децембра сам са одредом из пошту ина где сам био на положају, у срез Јурићко, на свој ред, дан 1 децембра освајао сам у Гор.Горевци. Јог. Јана 3 доор. возачи и одред из Чачка у пратају 3 немачка авиона дошао је до осм. школе у Гор.Горевци где сам се са њима састао. Са на ору. и на аутом. оружја сам ја са једном десетаном једном воду добровољаца и кад су видели да нећу да изиђу на њих почели смо пријатељски разговор. Командант о доор. одреда, на ср. и иначе ступа и пуковник Марисав Петровић. Поштом ми је питање о сави, шта онде радим и даље идем. Одговорио сам му да имам одред од 200 људи са 20 аутом. оружја итд. је једнака било ност на. Рендо сам му да сам одред 1 пуковника драге и да сам престрота бивших одреда. На шта се онко миша војске драге, одговорио сам да има око 20.000 неоружаних вој. ина. Јада се Марисав двоко на страку са својим ступама официјима нешто ратко конференцио, па је затим замолио мене да са својим одредом идем у претрес терена Горав Горевнице и чинише од он, шта што сам и учи. Иако сам користи од онога, јер чет ина вметали са добровољцима, снабдели су се од њих муницијом, које нисам имао вр. што, тко да сам при растанку могао и борбу водити са њима. Још нешто, четници о, причају добровољцима, како су војске херојске борбе против немца и које оста у оном крају, под најтежим временским при. лима иако се оскудевало у одени храни и муницији. То је импоновало добровољцима обученим у тога одела добро обучени и са муницијом снабдевени, он. Јојма је имао кулне возећа, јер су се сви људи, који нису сви. отићевца дивили голим, боери и испаднелим четницима.

Истог дана увече по завршеном претресу терена, Марисав не је озвучио да пође са њих у Чачак и уредио однос овог одреда. Ј. Ј. Ј. према

*Фрике*

*Фрике*

*Васа*  
*Драгиша Васић*

Report of Predrag Raković «Frike» concerning «legalization» of Cetniks by the Germans, and Mihailović's note at the foot of the report: «It is excellent work, Frike; to be given to čika Vasa» (i. e. to Dragiša Vasić).

*"I think about 9 p.m." — (all excerpts from Mihailović's Record, page 45 and 46).*

During the same night November 13—14, 1941, Mihailović's commander Jovan Škava handed over 365 Partisans to the Germans

at the village of Slovac, 4 to 5 kilometres from Divci. The handing over of the Partisans took place at about 11 p.m. and Škava, with his detachment, escorted them to Valjevo in German lorries together with the Germans. Jovan Škava, examined as a witness, declared to the examining magistrate that he had delivered the captured Partisans according to the instructions of Mihailović, conveyed to him through his superior commander Dača Popović.

After this, a truce was agreed on between the Četniks and Partisans and fighting was discontinued. According to this agreement Mihailović bound himself to fight against the Germans together with the Partisans.

However, when towards the end of November 1941, the German offensive against the liberated territory in West Serbia was under way, Mihailović violated the truce once more, by ordering his units to proceed each to its own terrain without fighting the German columns which were advancing towards the liberated territory. Mihailović makes the following statement about this:

*»The Germans launched an offensive against Užice and Čačak. Marshal Tito telephoned me, and that was our last talk. The Marshal asked me what I was going to do in this offensive, and then explained that he was going to accept battle against the Germans. I answered that I could not engage in a frontal battle, and that I had to return my detachments to their terrain, and that I was left with about 200 men on Ravna Gora. My detachments stole through the German lines and went in the direction of their terrain, and the Partisan forces took up the battle at Bukovi, Crnokosa, Ponikovica and farther on across Zlatibor« — (Mihailović's Record page 18).*

But Mihailović did not only limit himself to ordering his commanders to go each to his own terrain and avoid any action against the Germans. He even instructed his commanders to »legalize« their detachments with the Germans by placing themselves under the command of Milan Nedić and use all their means for the annihilation of the Partisan forces which remained in Serbia after the withdrawal of their main forces to Sandžak.

In connection with this the accused Miloš Glišić says:

*»A conference of the detachment commanders and Draža was held on Ravna Gora. The commanders were present in person. On this occasion Draža ordered contact to be made with Nedić's detachments in order to improve the situation. He said that the detachments still remained under his command, and that this was only a temporary solution (I personally was*

not present at this conference, but I was informed of it through the commanders Manojlo Korać and Ignjatović). I forgot to state that Manojlo Korać came to our detachment a few days before the attack on Užice. He came from the Višegrad region and participated in the attack on Užice. After this consultation the detachment crossed Ravna Gora, spent one day in the village of Ba, and then was received by Relja Dodor of the Ljig detachment, spent several days convalescing there, and then left for Belanovica, Manojlo Korać having contacted the detachment and agreed that it should be placed under Kalabić's command. In order to arrange this matter in the best possible way, young Nikola Kalabić went to his father. This took place at the end of November 1941. At that time the question of the »legalization« of the Četniks had not yet been discussed nor was anything done in this direction. The »legalization« of the Četnik detachments, as well as the placing of them under Nedić's command, was carried out in January 1942. The detachment was »legalized« but it still remained under Draža's command«. — (Glišić's record, page 7.).

Captain Predrag Raković, Mihailović's commander of the First Ravna Gora Corps, described in an undated report the manner in which he had carried out the instructions he had received from Mihailović at the above-mentioned conference. Raković's report is as follows:

»After the meeting held on Ravna Gora on November 30, 1941, acting according to instructions received on the night of November 30—December 1, I proceeded with my detachment from Koštunići, where I was on the terrain of the Ljubić District, which was my sector. On December 1, early in the morning, I reached Gornja Gorevnica. On that day, the 5th Ljotić's Voluntary Detachment from Čačak, accompanied by three German planes, reached the elementary school at Gornja Gorevnica, and it was there that I met them. I approached with a group of ten men armed with rifles which they aimed at a platoon of volunteers, and when they saw I did not open fire, we began a friendly conversation. The commander of the 5th Voluntary Detachment, Petrović, a corporal who was irregularly promoted colonel during the occupation, asked me who I was, what I was doing there and where I was going. I answered that I had a detachment of 200 men with 20 automatic weapons, which was the truth. I told him that my detachment belonged to Colonel Draža and that I was the vanguard of his

detachments. When he asked me how many men Draža had, I said that he had about twenty thousand armed men. Then Marisav left us and held a short consultation with his officers, after which he asked me to proceed to reconnoitre the terrain of Gornja Gorevnica and to purge it from communists. I profited from this, because the Četniks mixed with the volunteers, and supplied themselves with ammunition which was very scarce, so that on leaving I might have even fought against them...

That night, after reconnoitring the terrain, Marisav invited me to go with him to Čačak and regulate the relations of my detachment with the Germans... and on December 1, I proceeded with him to Čačak... In short, that evening we agreed that I would remain with my detachment on the terrain in order to purge it from communists, which was in fact my duty when I left Ravna Gora for my terrain.

At the beginning, as early as December, I clearly saw the following: the aim of the Ljotić troops, supported by the Germans, was first to collaborate with us until the destruction of the communists, and then, with the aid of the Germans, to liquidate our organization and our detachments. The annihilation of the communists was necessary to me, to the Germans and to the Ljotić troops, and so we united in this business and became »allies«. At that time I used to go to the commander near Gornji Milanovac to submit reports to him. He permitted me even to »legalize« my detachment. Through Marisav I even succeeded in meeting the German commander Fricke. Marisav, on his departure from Čačak, recommended me to Fricke, saying that it was best that I should take Čačak over from him. On May 1, I took over the command of the town of Čačak with my detachment, though I had not been legalized. At the beginning Fricke could not tolerate me. I assured him that I was legalized and under the command of Nedić, which satisfied him... Naturally, in such circumstances I was obliged to go to Belgrade, and in the course of seven days I was daily received by Ceka Đorđević, and three times by Masalović and Nedić. Even today I cannot but wonder how I fooled them all and succeeded in legalizing a detachment of 150 men under my command. I was allotted the territory of Ljubić District with its headquarters at Čačak...

On the back of Capt. Predrag Raković's report Mihailović personally wrote the following remarks: »Fricke (pseudonym of Rako-

vić — Prosecutor's note) excellent work — to be given to Čika Vasa — (nickname for Dragiša Vasić — Prosecutor's note).«

Thus in December 1941 Mihailović »legalized« his detachments in Serbia. The »legalization« of Mihailović's detachments was only the formal aspect of his open collaboration with the enemy in the struggle against the Partisans and the whole National Liberation Movement in Serbia.

It is evident that, at the end of 1941, Mihailović had already passed from secret collaboration with the invader and the quisling Nedić, to open collaboration in the struggle against the Partisans and the whole National Liberation Movement. From that time onwards, till the fall and destruction of his organization, in 1942, 1943, 1944 and the first half of 1945, the collaboration between Mihailović and the German fascist invaders, as well as the Serbian, Croat and Slovene quislings, namely Nedić, Pavelić's Ustašas and Rupnik's »White Guards«, deepened and became ever-increasingly overt, until by the end of the second half of 1944 and the first half of 1945, complete unification of all the quisling forces in Serbia under the command of Mihailović (Nedić's and Ljotić's detachments) took place, and Mihailović's connection and collaboration with the Gestapo and Pavelić was carried out.

That this is true, is proved by numerous written documents from different sources, mostly Četnik, with the addition of those of German, Italian, Ustaša and Nedić men, which are attached to the indictment, as well as by a certain number of witnesses whom it is proposed to examine at the public trial. We shall quote only a few short excerpts from the relevant documents for the confirmation of the statement on his open collaboration with the hirelings, from December 1941, up to the collapse and destruction of his organization.

The accused Miloš Glišić, speaking about the collaboration of Mihailović's Četniks in the Third Enemy Offensive against the Partisan forces in Sandžak and Montenegro, described it as follows:

*»We received food from the Italians through Pavle's man (Đurišić — Prosecutor's note), and munition as well. Ammunition was transported from Berane.« (Glišić's record page 10.). Further on he says: »We travelled on Italian lorries, all men and commanders, (they travelled to Bijelo Polje — Prosecutor's note), with Italian drivers and on these lorries we were transported from Prijepolje to Bijelo Polje«. — (Record as above). He continues: »I know it was the Plevlje garrison (Italian — Prosecutor's note) that participated with its forces in the struggle against the Partisans in the course of these operations. I don't know their strength« — (same record).*

Speaking about the collaboration between the Četniks and Italians, in the Third Offensive, Major Baćović writes in an undated letter »To the Minister of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland — General Draža Mihailović«:

*»The Četnik detachments of Captain Pavle Đurišić have been engaged for the last fifteen days in fierce battles with the Partisans on the front around Mojkovac and Kolašin... Captain Pavle Đurišić now disposes of 2000 active Četniks and twice as many reserve troops. His active Četniks are well armed and well supplied. In addition to a great number of automatic weapons, they have a large number of mortars and mountain guns. Đurišić has received arms from the Italian military authorities. His active Četnik detachments receive part of their arms from the Italian authorities, as well as food and regular pay...«*

To the same Pavle Đurišić, Mihailović announces in a radiogram:

*»Number 21 for Pavle Đurišić. »Mandušić« key 6, 7, 3, 8,... April 18, 1942. I have heard of your work and am very glad you are so brave. My aim is to help you as soon as possible. This is dependent on a reliable link. I am sending you a radio station through Lazarević with directions and wavelength... If contact is established I shall be able to inform you immediately by plane, and drop all necessary arms and other material. Therefore find out and secure the necessary terrain for the reception of material, which will be parachuted.*

*I hope I shall soon send you one of my officers for the solution of all questions in connection with the action in Montenegro. It is essential that you continue on the same national line. Purge communists wherever you can... It is necessary that our right wing Mojkovac — Kolašin is secured. We intend to send you aid in the direction of Brodarevo—Barica. The first object of the action in Montenegro is to free the region Šavnik—Sinjajevina of communists and render it safe, and secure supplies for our army in Montenegro.*

*Plan your present work according to this. Greetings. General Mihailović«.*

Speaking on the situation in Hercegovina, Major Baćović in his letter dated July 16, 1942, writes to Mihailović:

*»All the Četnik detachments on the territory of Hercegovina are legalized by the Italians, and receive food, arms*



and ammunition. They receive no salary, but they are sometimes allotted small sums of money».

On the collaboration of the Četniks with the Germans in 1942 there exist numerous documents. Here are some excerpts from these documents:

»No. 3434 from Ištvan, 5, XII, 42; 211 (Bačović). According to the report of the commander of the Kladanj Brigade dated November 26, bitter fighting has been raging for five days between the Četniks and the Partisans on Majevica. The Četniks are supported by the Germans, the Croat Home-Guards and the Ustašas. One section of the Četniks has joined the Partisans. Račić has deserted Majevica and crossed to Serbia. Numerical strength of the Partisans 8 to 10 thousand. The Partisans have seized Bijeljina, Lopari and broken through to Gornja Tuzla«. — (Telegram from Major Bačović to Mihailović).

Major Ostojić reports to Mihailović:

»No. 3972 from 222, (Ostojić) 23. XII, No. 49: The situation in East Bosnia, sections Zvornik—Kladanj. Mitranović and Momčilović report: Third and Sixth communist brigades on Majevica have been defeated. They were attacked by the Germans and the Četniks from Majevica, Trebava and Ozren.«

The Četniks concluded a series of agreements with the Ustašas in 1942. Their collaboration with Nedić's and Ljotić's men has already been mentioned.

There exist not only numerous documents from 1942 concerning the open collaboration of Mihailović and his Četnik organization with the invaders, but also a huge number of documents proving the fact that the collaboration of Mihailović with the enemy and his servants in the country, in the struggle against the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, was continued and strengthened in the course of 1943 and 1944 and in the first half of 1945.

In spite of all this, there are some people abroad who, in defending Mihailović, are really trying to defend themselves, — for they extended moral, political and material help to Mihailović in the course of the war. They admit that »certain of Mihailović's commanders« collaborated with the invaders, but assert that Mihailović himself did not approve of such action on the part of his commanders and that he personally never collaborated either with the invader or the quislings. The documents attached to this indictment, however, when presented at the public trial, will convince these people that facts

are »stubborn things« and that they cannot be refuted by any campaign, no matter how skilfully organized. They will show them that every person who helped Mihailović, in any way or for any reasons, helped the German-fascist invaders at the time of their war against the great Allied forces and all the freedom-loving peoples of the world, who fought together for the annihilation of fascist Germany and her allies. And here are some excerpts from documents which prove beyond question that Mihailović personally not only approved of the collaboration of his commanders and troops with the invader and other hirelings of the enemy, but even gave instructions to his commanders and units to collaborate with the invaders with the aim of annihilating the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia.

In the course of the preparations which Mihailović made for the operations of the Četniks during the Fourth enemy Offensive, in one of his telegrams despatched to Major Ostojić, he issued the following order:

*»2428—222 (Ostojić) December 31, 1942: Bajo has already gathered 1200 men. Pavle has already gathered 3000 men. Bajo's men are at Ostrog, and Pavle's at Kolašin. Tetkići (The Četniks' nickname for the Italians — Prosecutor's note) say that the decision falls on January 2. So far they allow movement to Nikšić only. Pavle would not bother about what movement they allow if the question of food, one million and a half rounds, footwear and arms, was not still under discussion. There is a particularly great shortage of footwear. Pavle, Ivanišević and Rakočević spent the whole night with me, working. Today Rakočević guaranteed that he will get food and shoes. He is convinced that he will get these. Whether he gets them or not, Pavle will set out, but it is better to be shod than to go barefoot. Arrange contacts and all the rest in order to complete the preparations. What about Plečaš? Did you establish contact with Bjelajac and Mitrović?*

*Mitranović with the Dinara men could tear the Soviet republic in two. Therefore Mitranović should have the strongest forces in the action. If Pavle goes by land, he should go across Ščepan Polje. It is very likely that he will ride...«*

In this telegram Mihailović, among other things, mentions that the Italians announced that on »January 2 the decision will be taken«. This was the decision of the representatives of the German and Italian General Staff made on January 3, 1943, at the meeting in Rome, on the launching of the Fourth Offensive.

As evidence of the attitude of Mihailović's Četniks and Mihailović himself in the Fourth Offensive of the invaders against the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, we quote several extracts from the investigation material.

Jevđević informs Major Ostojić:

»№ 423 from Ištvan (Bačović), № 40. 18. I. 1943 —; Today permission arrived from Rome for the Montenegrins to go across Hercegovina. Our troops will be allowed to move when the Montenegrins start from Prozor. Our direction is Grahovo —Glamoč. The Italians give food, staff for the radio-station, supplies and medical staff. They are keeping Bjelajac for a special action they are carrying out with him in order to purge Lika. The Germans and the Italians are cutting off the retreat. To our men they give 100 rounds per soldier and one thousand machinegun rounds to every machine gunner, as well as ten heavy mortars with three thousand grenades. The commander of the army declared that he admired our army and would supply it with everything. The organization of the liberated zone was left to us. Today I leave for Hercegovina. My passport is in order, and I am taking with me a radio-telegraphist from the submarine. — Jevđević.«

Major Ostojić writes to Jevđević:

»To Jevđević: I beg you to obtain most urgently an order through the Sixth Corps to the effect that the Taurinense division from Plevlje across Foča should supply 5800 Četniks from the territory of the Governor of Montenegro who have arrived at Kalinovik. These include the forces of: Đurišić, Vesković, Ružić and Glumac. Branko.«

Major Ostojić writes to Dobrosav Jevđević:

»Lukačević only had on the left bank 700 orthodox Christians and 400 Moslems. The Moslems scattered after the first encounter, so that only our men remained.

Demand that the Italians hold out at all costs only until tomorrow noon, because by noon tomorrow Vojo will receive reinforcements, 1500 Montenegrins, and will then undoubtedly check the communists.

Let the Italians bomb the communists ceaselessly and ask for help from the German column from Bradina. Tell Lukačević, who has introduced himself as Capt. Nikola Đujić, deputy for Jovanović, that he must at all costs hold the line: Zlatar—Konjic—Paklena—Godevac—Borašnica—Osobac, for which he will receive a reinforcement of 1500 men tomorrow noon.

*If by chance Konjic should fall, organize a supply of food and ammunition to be dropped to our men, 500 of them, in the hamlet of Borčevina near the village of Borci, near the church, and later, at Čičevo. The sign will be two sheets folded into a rectangle in the direction of the wind. This is indispensable, for men without food and ammunition cannot fight, and this would be terrible. I hope that Voja will hold out until the arrival of reinforcements, because he is a first-class officer and fighter, but has worked with strangers.*

*Our troops march daily in the direction: Miljevina—Kalinovik—Glavatičevo—Borci; see to it that they are not bombed. Reply immediately. Branko.*

Captain Lukačević in a letter to Major Ostojić (»Čika Branko«) writes in his report of February 23, 1943, from Konjic:

*»Dear Čika Branko,*

*Just as I had finished writing yesterday's report in the village of Džep, I received an urgent call from Vukčević and the Italian command in Konjic to come to their aid, because on February 22, during the day, the Partisans broke through the defence line of Vukčević, captured both Gornja and Donja Bjela and severed communication between Glavatičevo and Konjic.*

*I left Džep speedily with the Zagora battalion and my suite, got to the road and followed it into Konjic, where I encountered real panic.*

*After the soldiers had rested a bit, I went and carried out a short-distance bombing attack against the Partisans, who were located between Bijela and Ljubinja... The battle lasted continuously from 1 a. m. to 4 p. m. I believe that by nightfall we will hold out in our original positions...*

*The Italian command last night showed me a radiogram sent by Jevđević, in which he asks that I leave as soon as possible in the direction of Jablanica, because the situation of the Italian garrison there is critical...*

*Because of the situation in Bijela and environs of Konjic, I was unable to carry out any movement whatever in the direction of Jablanica.*

*To make up for this I reported that the Italian garrison should hold out, and that I was coming...*

*Yesterday about 10 a. m., 22. II, a Germano-Croat (i. e. Ustaša—Prosecutor's note) column arrived at Konjic. It started out in the direction of Pazarić—Tarčin—Sedlo—Bradina—Brđani—Podorašac—Konjic.*

*I saw the commander of this German column on the eve of its departure for a night attack, and got the following information from him.*

*The direction of his column from Konjic is to be Rama — Jablanica—Mostar. In addition to this column, another German column is advancing from the direction Pazarić—Tarčin. The direction of this second column is approximately parallel to the direction of the first column. One strong German column is advancing in the direction of Donji Vakuf—Prozor—Mostar.*

*Both the first and second German columns suffered serious losses in the battles on Ivan mountain and Bradina. The second German column seems to have been held up somewhere along the line Lepovci—Bale.*

*Have received your orders this moment. I see that we agree in general and that you are informed of the movement of the Germans, but as I have already written to you, with these small forces and by desperate efforts I have repulsed the first onrush of the communists against Konjic and Bijela.*

*Since Jablanica has already fallen, there is no need for me to hurry, and I am changing my decision in so far as I shall spend tomorrow in collecting my forces, particularly since I am now receiving so many reinforcements, so that, perhaps the day after tomorrow, 25. II., I shall launch a general counter-attack.*

*According to reports which are coming in, we inflicted serious losses upon the Partisans last night and today. My work is hampered because every now and then I must rush to Konjic and bolster up the morale of the Italian command, who shamefully lose it when I am not present.*

*With faith in God — for King and Fatherland!*

*Dražo leads us to glory and freedom! Konjic, 23/II/43, at 4.45 p. m., Commander Capt. Voj. S. Lukačević. (signed).*

*Make Jevđević insist upon the dropping of arms and ammunition by plane since this garrison is lacking in them.*

*This was the attitude of Mihailović's Četniks during the Fourth Offensive of the enemy against the Army of National Liberation and Partisan Detachments. As proof of this there are also several of Mihailović's letters, 28/III/43 Čika Đoka (Mihailović — Prosecutor's note) writes to Branko (Major Ostojić) in his own hand:*

*»Dear Branko,*

*We can have no better line than the Drina—Piva as a defence line. We must defend it with strong forces who have*

a high morale. Although not abandoning flying brigades, we will content ourselves with a reduced number of them. In addition to those of Momčilović, which have crossed over, I think that at present one unit of at most 300 well-chosen men, should be sent from Mratinja to Đurevo, but these should not be Mratinja men as they are to remain at their positions, and only furnish the former with guides.

The communists by now must be preparing something, after the blow they received; the following are the possibilities:

1) They might prepare plans for crossing over; in this case they would be out of reach of artillery fire. This means from Brod, and Brod itself, and then to the south and from midway between Foča—Ustikolina and thence northwards. As new 22 (Italian — Prosecutor's note) troops have not yet arrived, take care that from Ustikolina downstream they do not bypass us and compromise such a good line of defence.

2) They may content themselves with the success achieved up to now and carry out forcible mobilization on the territory won. In this case Četnik warfare should prevent this.

3) They might attempt to cross over into East Bosnia — this is most probable, but this possibility requires further reflection.

It is necessary as soon as possible to transport peasant men and women to the other side and offer them good rewards to find out what is happening there, and inform us as soon as possible on all these matters.

It is urgently necessary to make fortifications along the banks and continue them all along the line. Care should be taken to defend the river itself.

To undertake the most active propaganda among the men, particularly emphasizing that the communists are connected with the Turks and that there are few Serbs among them, the rest being Turks and Ustašas. To point out their connection with the Germans.

On the first communication line form a new supply column with at least 150 pack-horses. Two groups of pack-horses could be organized at Ipsar and at the mouth of the Slatina river, so that unloading may be carried out and the horses changed. For this, very efficient and particularly energetic officers should be appointed, so that the supply service runs smoothly.



You said that you had two reserve brigades for the whole sector from Ustikolina to Šćepan Polje. Are there no more of them?

It is well that you ordered a resolute defence on the present positions. The morale should be high now.

If they appear on the cliffs, they should be strongly engaged by the 22 (Italians — Prosecutor's note) — yesterday they helped well.

The evacuation of the population, if it wants to be evacuated, should be carried out via Čajniče, Plevlje and further to Kolašin, and we can later take it over to Hercegovina.

You can remain there. Arrange everything that is necessary for the best defence and reconnaissance on the other side. Telegrams are just being received. As soon as we de-code them we shall send them to you.

28. III, at 9.10 hours. Greeting. Čika (Uncle) Đoka«.

In another letter dated 11. p. m., April 7, 1943, in Mihailović's handwriting, Mihailović told Major Ostojić in which position he should place an Italian company. Here is an extract from this letter:

»Dear Čika Branko,

Quiet down Voja and tell him who was in that »column«, but see to it at any rate that № 22 (Italians — Prosecutor's note) send as quickly as possible to the right bank of the Dragačevo river, at least one company, which should be placed above the saw-mills. It is not necessary to cross it for the moment. The terrain is suitable for the closing up of that line. During last night I noticed the fires lit by the refugees. Some of our forces should also be sent there. It would be best to find about 50 men and send Lazarević there.

Report what measures you have taken.

7. IV. 23 hours, Čika Đoka«.

Ostojić answered this letter from Mihailović, on April 8 at 0.5 a. m. Here is Ostojić's answer:

»Dear Čika Đoka,

I have already sent a report to Voja about the fugitives whom you noticed today and explained it to him.

№ 22 (Italians — Prosecutor's note) reports that a battalion was sent towards the Dragačevo river. He reports that at twilight this battalion went behind the patrols. During the night I shall send 50 men in the direction of the saw-mills.

Momčilović reports that the Bolsheviks again tried to cross the Ustikolina, but they were repelled and the crossing

Facsimile of the first part of the letter of Mihajlović to Colonel Boja Staničić during the Fourth offensive in which the Četniks fought jointly with the Germans, Italians and Ustašas against the Army of National Liberation. Mihajlović confirms that he personally directed the operations of the Četniks through Branka (Zaharije Ostojić) and that no order was issued without his permission.

Odbavljajući o stvari ~~je~~ ~~izjavljivanje~~ ~~svetih~~  
 da predomisliti se i predati, svrgnuti  
 ogorčavajući i da koristeći se. Pri tome  
 se rukovodimo sledećim načelima:  
 Mi radimo samo za sebe i nikog drugog,  
 samo nas se treba interesovati. Onda i  
 budućnost Hrvatske; za postizanje mira  
 koristimo jednog neprijatelja protiv  
 drugog, kao što su kao mi i da  
 nam neprijatelj bez razlike, paže,  
 postavićemo uvek na najmanje protiv, on  
 kojemu i najveće koristi, ako je to  
 potrebno za svoju stvar, savršeno  
 napad od strane neprijatelja i napada  
 na svoju. O stvari druge stvari se radimo  
 mislim da se i bi u stvari druge stvari  
 stvarno

Mladen Ban gubavski i pravski  
 protiv

PS Gornji Komarac i Gornji Komarac  
 učenik

Facsimile of the second part of the letter to Božo Stančić containing instructions that  
 he should utilize the invader in the struggle against the Army of National Liberation.  
 Mihailović signed the letter «čika Đoko»; this pseudonym is found in many of his  
 letters; he used it in order to hide his treacherous work.

As can be seen from the above telegrams, Mihailović's commanders did not collaborate with the Germans on their own. They received instructions and orders for such collaboration from Mihailović. In the investigation material there is a great number of telegrams which Mihailović sent to his commanders and in which he continuously repeats the same thing: our chief enemies are the communists (as he called all the members of the National Liberation Movement), we cannot fight simultaneously against all enemies; the Germans, the invaders and Nedić's Serbian State Guards should be utilized, we must only be careful to do it secretly as far as possible, because the people condemn open collaboration with the invader. »Try to get arms discreetly, use careful tactics, etc.«

In an undated letter Mihailović writes in his own hand to Dobrosav Jevdević:

*»Take full initiative in developing the organization and armed forces, but always keep in mind that the people will not stand any »legal« work. (Answer to Aera — Jevdević with signature »your 1001«, i. e., Draža).*

As can be seen from the above passage from Mihailović's letter, he himself draws Jevdević's attention to the fact that »legal«, i. e., public and open collaboration is harmful and compromising. He gained this experience in the course of his collaboration with the invader. Therefore, when he gives instructions for collaboration he tries to disguise them.

In a circular to all the commanders Mihailović gives the following instructions:

*»... It is necessary to do it in this way, as whoever attacks the Germans is directly helping the communists, and thus making the situation more difficult for our forces. Therefore, all armed action against the occupation forces should be discontinued until I give further orders. We must remember that we have a great number of enemies. We cannot fight against all of them simultaneously. Our chief enemies now are the communists...« (Mihailović's telegram № 708 to all his commanders dated May 7, 1944).*

Then there is Mihailović's telegram to Major Ostojić (№ 600 dated 1. V. 1944):

*»...Utilize No. 11 (Germans — Prosecutor's note) as much as possible in order to succeed more easily...«*

Then Mihailović's telegram to Jevdević № 611, dated May 2, 1944:

»... Utilize the German offensive in Gorski Kotar«.

In the material collected for the inquiry there are many similar telegrams from Mihailović. Such were his disguised instructions for collaboration with the invader against the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, which he sent to his commanders. And here are examples of the way in which Mihailović's commanders »utilized« the invader.

One of Mihailović's commanders reports to him:

»No. 786 from Ras-Ras (pseudonym of Kalabić — Prosecutor's note) No. 711, dated 16. I. 1944. On Javor at Kušić and Katić fighting continues between the communists on the one side, and Četniks, field guards, Germans and Bulgarians on the other. There are about 3.500 communists. They are encircled and should now be finally defeated.«

Here is another example. Mihailović's commander for Serbia, General Trifunović, reports to him:

»Telegrams 468 and 369 received. Details on the situation, from the intelligence service, received at 4 in the evening: communists are at Divčibare. They captured the village of Mionica on Subjel mountain. Communist attacks repelled in direction of Bukovo. Kalabić and Ajdačić fought at Bukovo. There was fighting on the front from Bukovo to Povlen and from Bukovo to Ražana. Also on Subjel and Prevlja. Disposition of forces: Field Guard at Mravinjci. Kalabić at Bukovo. From Bukovo to Ražana, Ajdačić. At Ražana one battalion of Germans and Kalabić's men. At Kosjerić our forces and one battalion of volunteers (Ljotić's — Prosecutors's note). At Seča Reka one brigade of Raković's and Germans. At Varda one battalion of Russian White Guards and one battalion of volunteers. At Dub, one battalion of Germans and one battalion of volunteers. In the area: Ražana—Subjel—Kosjerić several wounded Partisans captured. Ajdačić's losses: one wounded, one killed and 10 captured. Raković and Janković: one killed and one wounded each. In order to avoid confusion, I did not give any orders concerning this since you are giving instructions...« (telegram from Hans No. 648 and 649 of May 5, 1944). Neško Nedić reports to Mihailović:

»From Gar-Gara (Captain Neško Nedić) No. 85 dated May 5, 1944: Forces under my command took the defensive on the line Bačevci and Kosjerić, i. e., — Valjevo corps with some Germans hold the left bank of Grac in the heights of Lipa—Ravan. At this place all communist attacks were repulsed



yesterday. Ajdačić, with some Germans, is closing up Bukovik Ražana positions. In the Ražana—Kosjerić area there is a battalion of Germans. Njegovan's brigade, as reserve, holds Divčibare. Raković's corps is at Kosjerić to carry out offensive. №86. — Continuation. My idea is to create, with support of Germans, strong protection of Bačevci—Kosjerić line, until the forces are rallied, and conditions for an annihilating blow created, then to destroy the First, Second, and finally Third division. With this object in view, the front against the second division is today on the defensive, while a new division from the west is being attacked by a battalion of Germans, and by three battalions of Ljotić's men, and we are waiting for it. An attack with engagements is being launched today against the Fifth division.

Continuation, No. 98 of May 6: I am proceeding today towards the west with an offensive group, while our right wing still remains on the defensive at its position at Teskovice. A volunteer regiment with a battalion of Germans is pushing the Partisans from Mravinjci towards Radanovci. It seems that the Second and Fifth division must proceed to the south in the area of Tara, and perhaps even towards Bosnia, to be reinforced and to rest, for they are badly beaten and have little ammunition. Two German motorized battalions stand on the road to the north of Kosjerić ready to cross over to the area of Jelova Gora if the Partisans start penetrating towards the south. The Germans look upon us with suspicion and I am on the watch.»

In the beginning of 1945, when Mihailović found himself in a difficult situation, he openly demanded arms and ammunition from the Germans — just as, in the beginning of April 1943, he had asked for them from the Italians — obliging himself to participate with the Germans in the operations against the National liberation Army. Here is one of his telegrams sent to his officer, Colonel Borota:

»№ 645 dated 7. II. 1945, from General Headquarters; urgent and personal: Through Doder inform № 11 of the following: (№ 11 are Germans — Prosecutor's note) All promises concerning ammunition are not yet fulfilled. For this reason forces from Serbia cannot participate in the action against Tuzla and in general cannot take part in any action. The forces from Serbia have the impression that delivery is being intentionally held up, and that in this way № 11 is deliberately helping the communists. All successful work regarding the communists depends exclusively on ammunition which № 11 should give us.



*We should not like to spoil our relations. Inform us urgently of the results and the date of delivery. Consignment to be handed over to us at Rudanka railway station... — Čiča.*

From one of the telegrams it can be seen that Mihailović warmly received a diversionary-terrorist-espionage group, which the Gestapo sent from Vienna, after it had finished its training, with the task of crossing over into Serbia to carry out diversionary, terrorist and espionage acts. Mihailović reports to Colonel Borota:

*»№ 8 from General Headquarters, January 14, 1945: Call Colonel Pavlović (commander of all Mihailović's diversionary-espionage-terrorist groups called »commandos« Prosecutor's note) and with him establish contact with Gara (Gašparević — leader of the group sent by Vienna Gestapo — (Prosecutor's note), I repeat with Gara; inform Pavlović that I have nothing against receiving the men under the command of Gara at our headquarters. Colonel Pavlović should take special instructors from Gara in order to utilize their experience. Hold a meeting with Gara, but it would be useful if Colonel Pavlović were also present... — Čiča.*

These few excerpts are sufficient to prove the seriousness of the treason committed by Mihailović in the most critical days of war and occupation, when our peoples were carrying on a life and death struggle against the German-fascist invaders and their servants and helpers. And when, at the public trial, the whole of the investigation material is discussed, then the really treacherous character of one of the most perfidious traitors known in the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia will appear in its true light. It will then be clearly seen that Mihailović and the whole of his organization were nothing but a kind of »fifth column« of the German fascist invaders and that fundamentally there was no essential difference between Mihailović and the quislings Nedić and Pavelić.

All during the war and occupation, Mihailović, constantly inspired and helped by reactionary circles abroad, especially in England and America, fought exclusively with the aim of suppressing the liberation movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In this struggle he continuously collaborated with the quislings and the invaders.

Further, Mihailović is not only a wicked traitor to our peoples, but also an especially wicked war criminal. In the investigation material, attached to the indictment, there is a large file with numerous documents of horrible war crimes committed by Mihailović's military

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*Original  
na srpskom*

#### ДРАГИ ЧИКА ТОМО !

Од нашег последњег састанка, код нас су остало неке трагичне вешце. По Воји сам Вам послао опширан извештај. Јевђевић је коначно ослобођен испод полицијског надзора. Бирчанин са својим штабом отпутао за Сплит. Јевђевић путује у друштву са неким италијанским генералом који је дошао из Рима, по свему изгледа да је италијански обавештајни официр. Јевђевић ме је известио да овај италијански генерал тражи да се састане са мном ради преговора. Састанак сам одбио из простог разлога што све преговоре који се односе са Италијанима то може Јевђевић водити. Јевђевић ми је саопштио да му је овај исти генерал рекао да Павле Ђурић и ја намеравамо извршити револуцију у Црној Гори и Херцеговини. Италијани су лажали и хтели да у долинама УНУ у нашу организацију, зато је овај генерал обилаз свих наших трупа које су се налазиле у близини путева. Јевђевић Вам је опширно писао о Крстовом и Војводином случају као и то да Италијани хтели да разговарају са Вама. Ни у ком случају неби требало нико да разговара у име Ваше са Италијанима, сви други могу да разговарају и преговарају а не Ви. Сигурно сам написао Јевђевићу да оспоре и Војводи написао да нико Ваше име не разговара са Италијанима јер на то нема право. Ви знате да сте идеја нашег народа и то наш народ неби примио добро. Немојте мислити да је ово неки совет са моје стране, само знам расположење народа који жели да Ви и Ваши сарадници остану у слободним Српским планинама без икакве интимне бригаде са окупатором. Ова трећина који су се спустили близу ~~Каванима~~ Навесице турци су их приметили и неки хрвати који ту онако станују.

Чим примите овај мој извештај по овим питањима и траженима одмах ми известите путем курира. Преко капетана Ружића, капетана Пејовића поручника Поповића Гацко који ће бити обавештен где се ја налазим. Са капетаном Салатићем и капетаном Ковачевићем кродем на пут у обилазак орамова и чамца дотајног упутства.

С ВЕРОМ У БОГА ЗА КРАЉА И ОТАЧИНУ

3. августа 1942. године  
Слободна Српске планине.

*Михаиловић*

Report of Hivan (Petar Bočović) to Čika Đoka (Đozo Mihailović) concerning the cooperation of Erčanin and Jevđević with the Italians.

formations and terrorist bands, who acted according to instructions and orders issued by Mihailović.

In the course of the occupation, Mihailović created a system for the committing of war crimes, a system of militarized banditry, which differed from ordinary banditry only in the fact that the crimes were committed by organizations formed as military bodies which were linked and centralized, and subordinated to the will of the supreme leader, the supreme commander. We shall quote a few typical circulars, instructions and orders of Mihailović from numerous similar documents contained in the investigation material, from which it will be seen what a system of militarized banditry the accused Mihailović had created.

Mihailović gives instructions in a telegram to Majors Račić and Bačović:

»№ 276 dated August 18, 1942, to Đorđe (Račić — Prosecutor's note) and Ištvan (Bačović — Prosecutor's note):

*It is very important and absolutely necessary to defeat the communists so that no trace of them is left. They have undertaken a campaign against us, because they are furious at being almost completely wiped out in the country...«*

Further, Mihailović issues orders in a circular to all the commanders in Serbia:

»№ 921 dated March 2, 1943. Circular to everybody in Serbia.

*There are only few communists left in Serbia. In West Bosnia we are annihilating them daily. In bitter despair Comrade Tito calls upon the people to join the uprising, and for that reason individual small groups have re-appeared. I, therefore, most energetically demand and order that everybody on his own territory annihilates the very last remnants of the communists, and informs me about it by March 25. Let us prove to these blackguards that they have nobody among the people, and that their only weapon is their lying propaganda. I emphasize that there are areas where there is not a single communist, and where the commanders are worthy of their duty. For this annihilation use the Serbian State Guard to the utmost. For the execution of this task make contact with the neighbours.«*

In a telegram Mihailović sends an order to Pavle Đurišić (Đuzepe):

»№ 2033 dated May 9, 1943, to Đuzepe:

*Send your demand for Ružić through Radulović. My opinion is that the communists should be annihilated by attack-*

ing on all fronts. Bačović is advancing from Ravni towards Piva and through Sutjeska towards Šćepan Polje. He has captured Kalinovik, Major Keserović has taken over the whole area on the right bank of the Lim river and in a few days he will purge it from all sympathizers. We shall liquidate what is not good and shall do it at once.»

He further gives orders to his commander He-He:

»№ 171 dated 25. IX. 1943, for He-He:

Your number 966—969 link. Continue purging your areas of communists. Through propaganda win over the Toplica people to our cause. Purge the area of sympathizers by means of the Black Threes...»

And further, Mihailović in a telegram sends an order to his commander Emil:

»№ 511 dated Nov. 18, 1943, to Emil:— I received all your telegrams regarding the carrying out of actions against the communists (№ 193 to 205). I agree with the suspension of the commander of the second flying brigade, as the sole obstacle to a definite liquidation of the communists. I am very satisfied that you have broken through to Jastrebac and that you have established contact with Keserović. Very energetic work on purging the area not only of communists but also of their helpers is very necessary now...»

While reading these telegrams one should bear in mind firstly, that Mihailović always refers to all the members of the National Liberation Movement as »communists«, and especially the fighters of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia.

Secondly, from the telegrams quoted it can be seen that Mihailović explicitly orders the execution of sympathizers and helpers of communists, i. e. the civilian population, who followed with sympathy and helped as far as it could the heroic struggle of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments against the fascist invaders and their servants in the country.

And thirdly, it should not be forgotten that the investigating material contains hundreds of similar documents.

For the execution of such instructions Mihailović formed within his organization special instruments: the »Black Threes«, and the »Flying brigades«. The chief of the »Black Threes« in Yugoslavia was Mihailović himself. Here is what he says about the »Black Threes«.

»Threes for the application of the letter Z (first letter of the word »zaklati« — to cut the throat of — Prosecutor's

note) carry with them as an identification sign a clover leaf with four petals made of grey cardboard. Inform the neighbours. Čiča.

№ 640 dated Sept. 21, 1942, Draža's telegram:

...»Once a man is marked with the letter Z it is never removed... Greetings, Čiča«.

Draža's telegram № 646 dated Sept. 22, 1942:

»... Chief of the Threes in Yugoslavia warns the Threes that they are too bold and open in their approach and that they should, on the contrary, attack from the rear...« (Mihailović's telegram to the president of the Yugoslav government Slobodan Jovanović in which he explains what the »Black Threes« are. — № 116, 321 of July 27, 1942.).

There was not a single Četnik brigade which did not contain several »Black Threes« who worked exclusively according to orders given by commanders of brigades. According to the structure of his organization, Mihailović had brigades in almost all the districts of Serbia, Montenegro, Sandžak, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Lika, etc. In each district several »Black Threes« functioned. In many towns Mihailović's »Black Threes« also functioned with the full support of the quisling police and the condescending tolerance of the invader. The »Black Threes« were composed of specially chosen sadistic and blood-thirsty types. Thus Mihailović established a special mechanism for slaughtering all the adherents of the National Liberation Movement.

Mihailović's »Flying brigades« had the same tasks as the »Black Threes« and, in addition, they had to purge the terrain of small Partisan groups. Here is what Mihailović's telegrams say about this:

»... The task of the »Flying brigades« is to definitely purge their terrain of communists and their sympathizers and other elements destructive to our organization, in so far as this has not already been done. To avoid conflicts with the invader, brigades should live outside of inhabited places, in huts, and should frequently change their quarters«. (Mihailović's general instructions — telegrams № 2293 of May 29, 1943).

Mihailović's orders for the killing of »communists and their helpers« were executed not only by the »Black Threes« and »Flying brigades«, but also by all his corps, brigades, battalions and companies.

From beginning to end, having set up his organization as a Pan-Serbian organization — as an armed force of the Pan-Serbian reaction, Mihailović inspired his organization with chauvinistic hatred

## РЕФЕРАТ

НАЧЕЛНИКУ СТАЛА ВЕХОВНЕ КОМАНДЕ И МИНИСТРУ ВОЈСКЕ  
ВОЈНАРНИЦЕ И ВАЗДУХОПЛОТНА

У овим раније поштом Мићурски  
Глади за успостављање везе са Веном и  
Јосипом унутрашњом, по овоме, извесном  
лас у следећем:

Крајем Јануара 1944 год. (око  
28 Јануара) мајорски функционер преко  
кога Арсеп одржао везу, био је у Бу-  
диму Пенти позван од стране пуковника  
Ујасека који му је лично следеће:  
„Одмах по пријелу Веног извеш-  
таја с успостављању везе са ДМ извес-  
тно сам претседио на вези Келовина који  
се живо интересовао за ову везу“. Дало  
је пуковник Ујасека рекао да има чина  
позван од ДМ на да дође на везу,  
или који му ДМ знаје. Тон пријемник му  
је позвао ЈОЖУ ГОТОВОЋА ЗАСТАПЕ ВЕНА  
ДА СА ДМ УСПОСТАВИ ВЕЗУ И ДА МУ,  
У НАЈБЛИЖИ ГРАНИЦАМА ПОГУБНОСТИ, У СЕБИ  
ИЗДАЈЕ У СРБИЈИ, као и да покуша да у нај-  
користијим разговорама са ДМ (са ДМ)  
нађе предуслове за решање мајорско-српских  
односа после рата.

Овај функционер запознат је Арсе-  
па следеће: Потребу за изолуцијом дискре-  
цијом по целој овој ствари и молбу, да се  
оде што се односи на ову везу веома брзо  
и да, којем је пријемник открио бојазни да  
се ова веза не би могла брзо извршити.

Овакром на услове под којима се  
овај веза успоставља летишати је мисао  
да је ово за нас најпогоднији начин, који  
долази директно из Будим Пенти да Београд  
излази стараван, а тек од Београда се про-  
визије на ову везу. Веза на чинилаца  
и извршилаца личност Готовина или оти да-  
је мала да се овој вези да личност,  
нама се сматра да је ово погоднији начин  
од онога којег би та личност успоставила.

Нама Мајора све енергичније траже  
конкретан одговор, у име пуковника Ујасека,  
мајорског министра за извршање шта мо-  
гу одговорити на њихово питање:

„Какав конкретан одговор имате по  
предлогу који сам учинио по овоме пуков-  
нику Ујасека и што се још није искористио  
за успостављање везе.“

9. фебруара 1944 године.  
По-С-23.



ПОДСТАВНИК, ПОД  
П. З. Билић

*Милић*  
Писао ми је  
популарне да  
мије извршио да  
сада се се била  
опростио Милић  
По са са Који —  
Српско, ујасека

Report of the Vojvodina Cetnik Staff to Mihailović, and his note.

against the Croatian people and the Moslem population, and  
against the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Among the Serbian people,  
he and his helpers, both those in the country and those in emigration,  
especially the Pan-Serbian reactionaries in the emigrant government,



constantly instigated chauvinistic hatred against the Croats and Moslems, accusing the whole Croatian people and the Moslems of the horrible massacres of the Serbian population, which were really carried out by the fascist servants — Pavelić's Ustašas.

We quote only a few excerpts from the documents contained in the investigation material, in order to demonstrate how Mihailović's »Black Threes«, »Flying brigades«, corps, brigades, etc, executed his instructions.

Major Zaharije Ostojić reports to Mihailović:

*»Yesterday I completed the action as far as Ustikolina and Jahorina ridge. Ustašas well beaten. According to details obtained, about 500 dead and about 1000—2000 Moslems slaughtered. All the troops good fighters, but much better plunderers, except Pavle. The fall of Foča had a good effect, Moslems fleeing in masses to Sarajevo. Ordered troops to return home and am since yesterday at Kalinovik solving other questions with Ištvan and Jevđević. Now they are satisfied. 1002«.* (Telegram № 466 of August 23, 1942).

Baćović informs Mihailović.

*»I have returned from my trip through Hercegovina. Four of our battalions, about 900 men, set off on August 30 via Ljubuško, Imotsko, Podgora, and reached the sea at Makarska. 17 Ustaša villages burnt. 900 Ustašas killed. Several catholic priests skinned alive. For the first time after the downfall, our flag hoisted by the sea, and Draža Mihailović cheered. Our losses very small.«* (Telegram № 544 of September 4, 1942). Ješa Simić sends a telegram to Mihailović:

*»Ras' units in fights with the Reds had no losses, while they had four dead. Karađorđe in the village Banja slaughtered eighteen outstanding and hardened Reds. Purging still continues in the direction of Darosava. Dom is ill, he is receiving injections; units on terrain are energetically pursuing the Reds. Greetings. Drška«* — (Telegram № 804 of January 15, 1943).

Mihailović's commander Dal-Dal reports to him:

*»We caught fourteen alive and slaughtered them. Reinforcements reached our men later, 150 men from Grahovo and 200 from the Strmnica Brigade. The battle continued day and night in storm and snow. And while I am writing this to you, our men are driving the communists over Stožište and Grahovo towards the village of Tičevo in the direction of Glamoč. In this battle so far we have killed 93 communists,*

while 28 were caught alive and slaughtered.« — (Telegram № 12692 of Dec. 17, 1943).

And further:

»We lost there three fighters and 2 rifles, and captured 4 machine guns, 11 rifles and 140 communists, among whom were 7 Serbs and all the rest were Croats. Our fighters let 3 Serbs go home and all the rest they slaughtered and threw into a pit. Our fighters say that they are incorrigible and completely corrupt, and that they died unrepentant.« — (Telegram № 12627 of December 17, 1943).

Lieutenant-Colonel Radojević informs Mihailović:

»Since the Serbian outcasts helped the proletarian scum in certain villages, I ordered the liquidation of entire families, the burning of homes and whole villages in which the Partisans find shelter. This I have ordered because we have lost the best of our nationalists on account of the outcasts of our people«. — (Telegram № 13007 of December 28, 1943 from Georgije).

In his report marked strictly confidential, № 23 dated January 1, 1943, Mihailović's commander Pavle Đurišić informs him:

»To the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command — at the front. The action on the right bank of the Lim river in Bjelo Polje district is finished. It was executed exactly according to plan. The result of this battle is:

1) The following Moslem villages entirely destroyed: (Sector: Plevlje, Sjenica, Peć and Kolašin):

Voljavac, Gubavača, Radijelja, Usakovići, Presečenik, Baturići, Donji Vlah, (Plevlje region), Murovići, Šolja, Radojeva Glava, Pobratiči, Mediše, Donja Kostenica, Stublo, Vrh, Zmijčinac, Šipovice, Negobratina, Osmanbegovo Selo, Dupljaci, Jasen, Kostići, Kaševan, Ivanje, Godijevo, Žilica, Gornja Crnča, Gornji Radulići, Vrba, Crkalj, Kradenik, Sipanje, Ličani, (Sjenica — Peć sector). In all 33 villages.

2) Losses of Moslem fighters about 400, women and children about 1000.

The commander of the Kladanj Brigade, Second-Lieutenant Stevo Vojnović informs the commander of the Ozren military Četnik corps:

»... The battalions have been sent back to pursue the criminals and to catch them. We killed everyone we laid our hands on. In the place where the crime took place, killed about 10 persons and burned the villages. In the reprisals the Vlasenica Brigade took a particularly prominent part, especially

*Rajko Čelonja with his battalion. According to him and his men, about 150 were killed, both men and women, while on all sides the flames of the burned villages rose to the sky...»*  
 Pavle Đurišić in his report of February 13, 1943 informs Mihailović:

*»To the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command: The action in Plevlje, Čajniče and Foča districts against the Moslems has been carried out. The operations were executed exactly according to orders. The attack began at the appointed time.*



Mihailović's commander, Colonel Bajo Stanišić (left), Italian Governor of Montenegro, Pirzio Biroli, and Bishop Joanikije arriving at a ceremony.

*All the commanders and units carried out their tasks satisfactorily. On the night of the 7th of this month our detachments had already reached the Drina river, so that the battles were mostly finished on that day, and then followed the purging of the liberated territory. All Moslem villages in the three above mentioned districts are entirely burnt, so that not one of their houses has remained undamaged. All property has been destroyed except the cattle, wheat and hay. In certain places the collection of fodder and food has been ordered so that we can set up warehouses for reserve food for the units which*

*have remained on the terrain in order to purge it and to search the wooded areas, as well as to establish and strengthen the organization on the liberated territory. During operations, complete annihilation of the Moslem population was undertaken, regardless of sex and age.*

*Victims... among the Moslems, about 1200 fighters and up to 8 thousand other victims: women, old men and children...«*

Baćović informs Mihailović in a telegram:

*»I have burned entire villages, I have 170 prisoners. I am executing the people by shooting every day...«* (Telegram № 2960 from Ištvan for 570, №215, April 2, 1943).

Mihailović trained this savage band of robbers, who did not shrink from any crime. In addition to massacre, burning of villages and plundering, Mihailović's Četniks committed acts of violation. His commander Luj informs him:

*»It was daylight and my eyes are to be trusted, for my pride as a man and as an officer in the Guards does not permit me to fall so low in these difficult days. Miloš violated a communist girl and then killed her. I did not report him, because I considered it was not the time to make reports about such things and that this was no reason to remove him as detrimental. A detailed report follows«.* (Telegram № 10,460 of November 1943).

The following note was written by Mihailović's »legalized« corps commander Miloš Glišić:

*»Imprisoned communist women are used...«, and on the other side of the notebook is the phrase: »Communist women are used for sexual purposes...«* (This is Glišić's notebook for 1941).

Mihailović did not shrink from liquidating parachutists who were forced to land from damaged Allied planes. Nerre is an example. In telegram № 467 dated December 10, 1943, Mihailović issued an order to Hugo (Bora Mitranović):

*»In connection with your number 137, we inform you that both parachutists are spies of the worst kind... Court-martial them immediately. They came to work against us. This is the charge against them«.*

Following the line given by Mihailović, his commanders committed espionage for the benefit of the invader, collected details on the attitude and opinion of patriots and reported regularly to the quisling police or to the invader, and often asked the invader to shoot

a certain number of the followers of the National Liberation Movement. Here are several examples:

Capt. Vignjević (Azed) in telegram № 314, dated January 4, 1944, informs Mihailović:

*»Today I received from Diša Jovanović a list of communists in Požega, which was composed at your orders. I immediately forwarded it through the proper channels to the right quarters«.*

Capt. Raković (Frike) in telegram 2550. № 110 dated March 23, 1943 informs Mihailović:

*»... If a soldier of the invader should be killed in this area the houses are not all to be burned, but only those belonging to Partisans, who are listed, and only Partisans should be killed«.* (Raković concluded these terms with the German commander of Gornji Milanovac — Prosecutor's note).

Sava Vukadinović (Dra-Dra) in telegram № 9861 dated April 22, 1943 reports to Mihailović:

*»... For the murder of Bajo (Stanišić — Prosecutor's note) and Blažo (Đukanović — Prosecutor's note) I have asked our men in Podgorica to appeal to the Germans, through Arsa Petrović, to shoot 300 communists released from the prison at Bar, who were again arrested in Podgorica«.*

The Četniks in the Italian zone of occupation received considerable sums of money from the Italians for each Partisan killed. Here is an example:

*»The Headquarters of the Zeta Flying Detachment № 321, May 13, 1943, Danilo Grad. To the commander of the 4th Četnik battalion Capt. Špiro Stojanović — Danilo Grad. For the killed deserter and rebel, the communist Jagoš Kontić, the sum of 30.000 (thirty thousand) lire has been paid out as a reward by the treasurer of the »Ferrara« division.*

*As the killing of the above mentioned man on January 14, 1943, was carried out by the men of the 4th Četnik Battalion with gendarmes attached, and by some peasants- send me immediately a list of persons who participated in his capture and killing, including gendarmes and militiamen, in order that the allotted rewards may be distributed to them. Commander Col. Bajo Stanišić, signed«.*

From these various short excerpts, taken from the detailed investigation material regarding the war crimes committed by Draža Mihailović and his organization, it can be stated without exaggeration that, in view of the brutality and gravity of the crimes com-



mitted, and in view of the enormous number of victims, Mihailović may be classed among the most notorious criminals of this war; undoubtedly he is not far behind either the quisling Nedić or Pavelić.

As leader of the Četnik organization which committed these countless grave crimes, Mihailović bears criminal responsibility for each particular crime committed by each and every adherent of his organization, even if many of the perpetrators of these crimes who belonged to his organization, were unknown to him. This principle has also been adopted by the International Court in Nürnberg which is trying the German-fascist war criminals.



Photograph taken at Dvori, near Bjeljina, on September 26, 1944; 1) Mihailović, 2) Colonel McDowell of the American Army, 3) Mustafa Mulalić, and a group of Ustašas.

Mihailović is responsible for all these actual crimes, and for each individual crime, as an accessory, because they were committed by organizations which were subordinate to him (Black Threes, Flying brigades, etc.) and which only carried out his directions and orders. Therefore Mihailović in reality committed all these crimes indirectly through his organizations, through men who comprised those organizations. Between him and the perpetrators of the crimes there existed a relationship of the absolute subordination of the perpetrators of the crimes towards him, which relationship made possible the application of severe measures on the part of Draža Mihailović



against any member of his organization who dared to refuse to carry out an order issued by him. Of course, this does not mean that perpetrators of specific crimes are not criminally responsible, for only feeble-minded persons and children are not held responsible before the law. And the Četnik criminals do not belong to this category. On the contrary they were fully aware of the nature of the crimes they were committing, but they committed them nevertheless, for they were imbued with furious hatred against the adherents of the National Liberation Movement, with inflamed chauvinistic hatred against the Croats and Moslems, instilled in them by Mihailović and his helpers in directing the Četnik organization.

Moreover, Mihailović is criminally responsible as the creator of the criminal system of militarized banditry, which after the liberation of our country, became just common banditry. Mihailović is the direct perpetrator of this crime. It is graver than any specific crime, however serious, because all specific war crimes are only the result of the putting into practice and consistent application of militarized banditry.

Together with Mihailović his collaborators are also held responsible, both for treason and for war crimes, namely: the accused Stevan Moljević, Mladen Žujović and Živko Topalović, because, as leaders of Mihailović's so-called Central National Committee, they collaborated most closely with Mihailović in directing the Četnik organization. This can best be seen from excerpts taken from the evidence given by Mihailović to the examining magistrate. This read as follows:

*»Telegrams from abroad were typed in one copy, each of which we read together (this refers to Moljević, Dragiša Vasić, and Mladen Žujović — Prosecutor's note) and they also received copies of all telegrams from the interior. After studying the telegrams, they would return them to me for destruction. In this way, they were informed of the contents of all telegrams from the interior of the country and abroad, regardless of their military or political nature.*

*Written reports which were sent from the terrain were submitted to them for consideration if they were of a political character; they retained reports of a purely political nature, but if they contained any military matter they would return them to me.*

*I had no secrets from these three men, nor did I hide anything from them. We worked together on the telegrams, in the same room and as far as other written work was concerned, everyone worked according to his own branch in his*

own room. Before or after work, we would discuss matters together and all work was the result of our common effort.« (Page 131 and 137 Mihailović's record).

To the question asked by the examining magistrate as to whether Moljević and Žujović were kept informed of military operations, and whether he asked them for their approval on these questions also, Mihailović answered: —

»I have said that I never hid anything from them. As far as I know they never disagreed with me in military questions either«. (Page 132 Mihailović's record).

In answer to the question of the examining magistrate as to who decided general lines of the policy towards the Partisan Movement, Mihailović replied:

»Up to the time of the congress at Ba, this policy was laid down by Vasić, Moljević and Žujović«. (Page 133 — Mihailović's record).

In connection with the proclamations which were published in the press, Mihailović said: —

»They were the result of common efforts.«

Finally, speaking about relations of the Executive Committee of the so-called Central National Committee, and the Supreme Command, Mihailović says:

»These were two parallel institutions. The Executive Committee was the supreme political body, and the Supreme Command was the supreme military staff. Both institutions were united in my person. Both these institutions, under the conditions of war, coordinated in the fullest sense of the word, and such was the situation in my organization that the activities of the Supreme Command and of the Executive Committee supplemented and helped each other.

The Supreme Command could take action, for it had at its disposal military power, but, in this case the Supreme Command bore full responsibility, and the Executive Committee could threaten to resign, which exerted pressure on the Commander, so that he had to take into account the attitude of the Executive Committee.« (Page 135 Mihailović's record).

In answer to the question as to whether opposing viewpoints, in connection with military actions of the Četnik organizations, occurred between him and his supreme command and the Executive Committee of the Central National Committee, Mihailović replied:

»No. Unanimity existed in our work«. —

## Preuzvišenosti,

Preplavivši Srbiju i druge srpske pokrajine, komunistički val od nekoga vremena zapljuskuje i one pokrajine, koje nastanjuje hrvatski narod. On se sve više širi i, naročito poslednjih dana, preti da preplavi i te krajeve, onako isto kako je to bio slučaj u minuloj godini sa srpskim krajevima. Prilikom prve audijencije, kojom ste donosiocu ovoga pisma učinili čast, imao je on prilike da obavesti Vašu Preuzvišenost o svima nevoljama i patnjama, što ih je komunizam prouzrokovao srpskome narodu u toku nekoliko minulih meseci.

Osećajući u ovim časovima potrebu da, pored ostalih, i Vašoj Preuzvišenosti, kao duhovnome vodji hrvatskoga naroda, skrenem pažnju na sve strahote eventualnog komunističkog osvajanja hrvatskoga prostora, meni je čast da u prilogu dostavim Vašoj Preuzvišenosti je - dan memoar u kome su izložena moja gledišta na sadašnji vojni i politički položaj. Donosilac ovoga pisma biće Vašoj Ekselenciji na raspoloženju za eventualna dalja obaveštenja.

Bes obzira na sve one momente i okolnosti, koji su nas ili koji bi nas mogli deliti, ja smatram za svoju dužnost, da zamolim i Vašu Preuzvišenost, da uloži sav svoj uticaj i sve svoje napore u cilju aktiviranja svih nacionalnih snaga hrvatskoga naroda u borbi protiv boljševizma. Upućujući Vam ovu molbu, ja želim da verujem, da će Vaša Preuzvišenost, idući stopama svojih velikih prethodnika, odgovoriti svim onim istorijskim dužnostima i zadacima, koji se pred Vašu Preuzvišenost postavljaju u današnjim teškim vremenima. Jer, od pravilnoga shvatanja tih dužnosti i zadataka sa strane Vaše Preuzvišenosti zavisiće i mesto, što će ga istorija hrišćanstva, a napose hrvatskoga naroda, Vašoj Preuzvišenosti dodeliti.

U tom verovanju i nadi, ja preporučujem Vašoj blagonaklonoj pažnji donosioca ovoga pisma i molim Vašu Preuzvišenost, da i ovom prilikom primi izraze moga osobitoga poštovanja.

Vrhovna Komanda. 15 aprila 1945.

armijski general

*Dr. M. Mihailović*

Njegovoj Preuzvišenosti

d-ru ALOJZIJU ŠTEPINCU,  
nadbiskupu zagrebačkom i metro-  
politi hrvatskom

Z a g r e b

Facsimile of Mihailović's letter to Archbishop Štepinac concerning the question of cooperation against the forces of the National Liberation Movement.

In answer to the question put by the examining magistrate as to whether the members of the Executive Committee of the Central National Committee were acquainted with the work of Mihailović's commanders and his representatives in various staffs, Mihailović replied:

*»I have already declared that I hid nothing from them«.*

From these extracts, taken from Mihailović's testimony, it can best be seen that the accused Moljević and Žujović were Mihailović's closest collaborators in directing the Četnik organization in what was fundamental and essential, that is, in deciding the general line of policy of Mihailović's Četnik organization which is expounded in detail in the indictment, and which, in practical application, was essentially the policy of multilateral collaboration with the invader, both military and political, in the struggle against the National Liberation Movement. This is obvious, despite the efforts of the Četnik propaganda, at home and abroad, to cloak their treason with empty slogans.

Towards the end of 1943, the accused Živko Topalović entered the circle of Mihailović's closest associates in the administration of the Četnik organization. He made every effort, to a great extent successfully, to entice a certain number of prominent members from almost all the former political parties (Democrat, Radical, Yugoslav National Party and others) to collaborate with Mihailović. Topalović thought that he would save Mihailović — who was compromised as a collaborator with the enemy, both at home and abroad — by engaging politicians who considered that they still had a certain authority among the people and abroad, although they had not contributed anything to the National Liberation Struggle against the enemy.

After the congress of the representatives of the Četnik organization and a considerable number of leading figures from former political parties, held in the village of Ba at the end of January 1944, Topalović remained at Mihailović's Headquarters as a member of the »Committee of Three« chosen at the congress in Ba, and, like Moljević, he collaborated most intimately with Mihailović in leading the Četnik organization during the period of its open collaboration with the invader in the struggle against the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, up to his departure abroad.

After their departure abroad, Žujović and Topalović continued their collaboration with Mihailović, maintaining it throughout by means of radio communication. In agreement with Mihailović they formed the so-called Central National Committee abroad. This continued to collaborate with Mihailović and various Yugoslav emigrants on all

questions connected with the development of the political situation in Yugoslavia.

During the war and occupation the accused Slobodan Jovanović, Božidar Purić, Momčilo Ninčić, Petar Živković, Radoje Knežević, Milan Gavrilović and Živan Knežević, although abroad, also collaborated with Mihailović and his other intimate associates in the country in leading the Četnik organization. Most aspects of this collaboration are set down in the indictment.

It may be asked, why are only the above mentioned persons in the emigrant Government accused as collaborators of Mihailović in administering the Četnik organization, when the emigrant Government included other persons who held cabinet positions. To this question we can only answer that during the course of the present inquiry, documents were found which incriminate them, and which confirm that they collaborated with the enemy, through Mihailović.

Therefore they, together with Mihailović, must bear their share of legal responsibility for treason against our peoples during the war and occupation and for the grave war crimes committed by the Četnik organization, led by Mihailović, Slobodan Jovanović and other intimate associates of Mihailović in the leadership of the organization. Their criminal responsibility is that of abettors and accomplices in the act of collaboration with the enemy against the peoples of Yugoslavia, and in the war crimes committed by the Četnik organization and by Mihailović as Supreme Commander of this organization.

In the evidence, there is sufficient proof to establish that the accused Slobodan Jovanović and others, including Fotić, represented a close clique among the Yugoslav emigrants, and that this clique kept in contact with the accused Mihailović, and exercised such influence in official circles of the Yugoslav emigrants, that it dictated to them its general attitude in relation to the accused Mihailović and his activity in the occupied homeland. The attitude of this clique, according to the evidence at the disposal of the inquiry, coincided at all points with the attitude of the accused Mihailović: even more, this clique gave Mihailović instructions for his work on matters pertaining to his general line of activity, and various political, military and other matters.

Thanks to the influence of this clique, whose core was represented by the accused Slobodan Jovanović and others, including Fotić, the accused Mihailović was given the rank of Minister of War in the emigrant government at the beginning of 1943, when he had already entered into open collaboration with the invaders and other hire-



lings of the enemy, along the entire line. In June 1942, when Mihailović was already completely compromised through his collaboration with the Italians in the Third Offensive of the invaders against the Partisans, through the influence of this clique, Mihailović's staff was, by a decree of King Peter P. V. K. N. 662, dated June 10, 1942, transformed into the »Staff of the Supreme Command with all rights and duties according to the Law concerning the Composition of Army and Navy in War Time« and by decree V. K. N. 662 of June 10, 1942, Mihailović was appointed »Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command in the occupied fatherland«, »so that everything was now centered in him«. Thus relations of the closest collaboration were created between Mihailović and the official circles of the Yugoslav emigration, both regarding the activity of the Četnik organization in this country and the activity of the former official organs of the Yugoslav state abroad, relations which obliged Mihailović to follow the instructions and orders of the Yugoslav emigrant government.

This collaboration was in no way fictitious, despite the fact that Mihailović was in an occupied country and the Yugoslav emigrant government was abroad, the chief connection being between Mihailović and the accused Slobodan Jovanović, and others who maintained exclusive contact with Mihailović. This link was maintained by radio and by various other channels, through couriers. In this way Mihailović sent reports on his activity to the Yugoslav emigrant government and received instructions from it, primarily from the clique whose most influential members were the accused Slobodan Jovanović, Purić, Ninčić, Živković, Radoje Knežević, Gavrilović and Živan Knežević. This clique entirely approved of Mihailović's activity, commended him and did all it could to extend full help to him, although it knew that he was collaborating with the enemy and had committed serious war crimes against the peoples of Yugoslavia.

The general line of Mihailović's activity and that of his organization was the result of the common consultations and decisions of Mihailović and his supreme political organ at his Headquarters on the one hand, and the accused Slobodan Jovanović and his companions on the other. Here are several illustrations of this from the evidence:

Slobodan Jovanović in his letter, marked »strictly confidential« V. K. № 409, and dated May 7, 1942, writes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, *inter alia*:

*»... We are doing everything secretly and over the radio so that premature actions on a large scale should not be*



*undertaken because of the futile and disproportionate number of victims and horrible reprisals...«*

As can be seen it is the same policy that was advocated by Mihailović from the first days of the formation of the Četnik organization.

Further, Slobodan Jovanović in his letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, marked »strictly confidential« V. K. № 646, and dated July 14, 1942, writes:

*»... General Mihailović has been given instructions to begin an insurrection only in case of the landing of strong allied forces in Yugoslavia, or in the case of the collapse of Germany. In no other case and at no invitation of any radio station at all...«*

From this excerpt it can be seen that Mihailović's policy — »it is not yet time for the struggle against the invaders... a favourable moment should be awaited... it is not yet time... we shall start an uprising when the proper moment comes...« — was not determined by him alone, but was the result of the joint decision arrived at by Mihailović and the accused Slobodan Jovanović and others.

As can be seen from these excerpts, Mihailović did not decide alone upon his course of action, but in consultation with the deciding factors of the Yugoslav emigrant government. Against whom he was to fight, whether to struggle against the invader or wait for the »proper time«, or annihilate the Partisans — Mihailović decided all these questions in consultation with the accused Slobodan Jovanović and others.

The accused Slobodan Jovanović, Purić, Ninčić and others praised and fully approved of Mihailović's work, although they knew well that he was collaborating with the enemy. Thus, for instance, the accused Slobodan Jovanović, in a telegram D.K.V.B. № 75 dated August 6, 1942 says:

*»To General Mihailović... I approve of your work, as well as that of your collaborators, for the good of our people and the resurrection of our fatherland, and I commend you. Establish similar organizations in all regions of Yugoslavia. Supreme Commander Petar. — Jovanović«.*

And Mihailović informs his commander Đujić in a telegram № 194 dated January 16, 1943, to Bernard through Ištvan:

*»I am doing all in my power to prevent propaganda... for the Partisans. The president of the government, Slobodan Jovanović, is undertaking the most energetic*

*measures to prevent this. Rest assured of this. For this reason we should annihilate as soon as possible these hyenas among our people... Have confidence in Slobodan Jovanović and the Supreme Command. Čiča.*

However, the accused Slobodan Jovanović and the others did not satisfy themselves only with words of praise sent to Mihailović. They distributed the highest military order (the Karadorde Star) to Mihailović's commanders: Pavle Đurišić, Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, Jezdimir Dangić, Petar Bačović, Vojislav Lukačević, Major Ostojić, Nikola Kalabić, Predrag Raković, Zvonimir Vučković, Dobrosav Jevđević, Father Đujić, Rade Radić, Slavoljub Vranješević, Dragutin Keserović, Capt. Račić and others, who openly collaborated with the Germans, Italians, Ustašas, Nedić's and Ljotić's men, the Bulgarian invaders, the Russian »White Guards«, and other sworn enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In this way they helped them in all their measures and outrages aimed at suppressing the heroic National Liberation Struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, they discharged active officers of the former Yugoslav army, who, having entered the ranks of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, participated in the fierce fighting against the enemy and their hirelings, fighting for the liberation of their fatherland. Here is one such decree:

*»The Presidency of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia V. K. ... № 809, dated July 3, 1942, London.*

*At the proposal of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command № 231, dated June 9 and № 246, dated June 17, 1942; for having violated the military oath — for treason against King and country, according to item b, Article 120, paragraphs I and II of the Law concerning the Constitution of the Army and Navy, —*

*I order that the following persons be declared deserters and their rank suspended:*

*1. Infantry Col. Savo Orović; 2. Reserve Lt.-Col. Veljko Bulatović; 3. Major of Engineers Branko Poljanac; 4. Infantry Capt. first class Arsa Jovanović; 5. Infantry Capt. first class Velimir Terzić; 6. Infantry Capt. first class Petar Četković; 7. Infantry Capt. first class Rudolf P. Sremček; 8. Infantry Lieut. Mileta Đukić; 9. Infantry Lieut. Ratko Martinović; 10. Infantry Lieut. Nikola Šekularac; 11. Cavalry Col. Rade Avšić.*

*The President of the Ministerial Council and Assistant Minister for the Army, Navy and Air force, Slobodan Jovanović. — (signed). (The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. — Wartime edition № 9. — London, Sept. 6, 1942).*

In addition to this, as has been stated in the indictment, Slobodan Jovanović, Purić and the other accused sent Mihailović enormous sums of money from the state treasury for the needs of his organization. They also worked actively in supplying Mihailović with war material, in bribing foreign newspapers and radio stations to popularize him as a hero fighting against the German-fascist aggressors. They attacked the Partisans with lies and slander, as being »an international band of criminals«. In short, everything that has been said in the indictment concerning the accused Slobodan Jovanović, Purić and others is proved by a large number of documents.

As can be seen from all that has been so far revealed concerning the accused, they are all criminally responsible, together with Mihailović, as aiders and abettors of criminal acts of treason against their fatherland and of war crimes.

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The course of the trial will be followed with the greatest attention by the broad masses of the people throughout our country. The proceedings will be followed attentively by mothers and fathers whose sons and daughters have been killed by the invaders' hirelings in collaboration with the German-fascist criminals. The course of the trial will be followed attentively by the surviving fighters who shed their blood in the battles against the German-fascist invaders and armed bands organised and led by the renegade hirelings of the invader. It will be attentively followed by the surviving men and women, boys and girls who have passed through the torture chambers of the Special Police, through the Banjica prison camps and other places of torture throughout our country. It will also be attentively followed by the men of the plundered villages and towns, out of whose houses the invaders and their renegade hirelings took everything that could be carried away, leaving the owners and their families to starve.

And they will all expect the Court to mete out severe and just punishment to these traitors and criminals.

In conclusion, I propose that the Court, after a thorough examination of the accused and of all the evidence, should award to each of the accused the punishment he deserves according to the gravity of his criminal deeds, punishment severe and merciless for those who have committed merciless and cruel crimes. In proposing this I am only interpreting the thoughts and feelings of our peoples.

DEATH TO FASCISM — LIBERTY TO THE PEOPLE

A suivre...