1947: UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), Views of Yugoslavia's Simic

UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP): Views of Mr. V. Simic, representative of Yugoslavia (1947)
SOURCE: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-186346/ 
 
Document symbol: A/364 Add. 1
Download Document Files:  https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/a364add1.pdf 
Document Type: Addendum, Map, Report
Document Sources: Arab Higher Committee, General Assembly, Jewish Agency, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
Subject: Palestine question 
Publication Date: 03/09/1947
 
SEE ALSO: 
UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE – 13th Meeting – Press Release 14.10.1947.
 
 

Question of Palestine/Partition recommendation – UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) – Report Addendum 1 (Annexes, Appendix and Maps)

 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANNEXES

  

1.   Letter dated 2 April 1947 from the United Kingdom delegation to the Acting Secretary-General requesting a special session of the General Assembly on Palestine
2.   Requests from the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia for inclusion of an item in the agenda of the special session
3.   Provisional rules of procedure of the Special Committee 
4.   Itinerary of the Special Committee in Palestine   
5.   Transmission by the Secretary-General of a cable dated 13 June 1947 from the Arab Higher Committee to the Secretary-General concerning collaboration with the Special Committee
6.   Appeal for full co-operation broadcast by the Chairman of the Special Committee
7.   Letter dated 8 July 1947 from the Chair-man of the Special Committee to the Arab Higher Committee inviting full co-operation  
8.   Letter dated 10 July 1947 from the Arab Higher Committee confirming its decision concerning collaboration with the Special Committee
9.   List of principal documents and written statements submitted to the Special Committee 
10.   Letter dated 17 June 1947 from relatives of the men sentenced to death by the Jerusalem Military Court on 16 June 19471
11.   Amendment 7 to the Palestine Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 
12.   Letter dated 23 May 1947 from the United Kingdom representative to the Secretary-General concerning transit of illegal immigrants
13.   Resolution adopted by the Special Committee concerning death sentences pronounced by the Jerusalem Military Court 
14.   Letter dated 22 June 1947 from the Special Committee in reply to the letter from relatives of the men sentenced to death by the Jerusalem Military Court
15.   Letter dated 23 June 1947 from the Government of Palestine concerning the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1947
16.   Reply of the United Kingdom representative to the Special Committee resolution of 22 June 1947  
17.   Resolution adopted by the Special Committee concerning acts of violence
18.   Report of Sun-Committee 3 on its visit to certain assembly centres for Jewish refugees and displaced persons in Germany and Austria
                  Appendix I. Duppel Centre-IRO Census
                  Appendix II. Copy of verbal answers to questionnaire  
19.   Text of the Balfour Declaration  
20.   Text of the Mandate for Palestine
21.   Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
 
APPENDIX
 
Statement of Mr. J. D. L. Hood, representative of Australia, on his attitude to-wards proposals in Chapters VI and VII of the report
Reservations of Mr. J. Garcia Grrandos, representative of Guatemala, to Recommendation XII
Special note by Sir Abdur Rahman, representative of India
    (I) Independence of Palestine
    (II) The Mandate and Balfour Declaration in their historical setting 
    (III) Proposal for form of government
    (IV) Proposal for interim period
    (V) Conclusions
Reservations and observations of Mr. E. R. Fabregat, representative of Uruguay
Views of Mr. V. Simic, representative of Yugoslavia
 
MAPS 
1.   The Tours of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
2.   Palestine-Plan of Partition with Economic Union (Majority Proposal
3.   City of Jerusalem-Proposed Boundaries (Majority Proposal)
4.   Palestine-Federal State Plan (Minority Proposal)
 
 
[...]
 
 

V. VIEWS OF MR. V. SIMIC, REPRESENTATIVE OF YUGOSLAVIA

 
 
 
A. COVERING LETTER TO MR. JUSTICE E. SANDSTROM, CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE 
 
31 August 1947
 
When the procedure to be adopted for the writing of the Committee's report to the General Assembly of the United Nations was decided upon, it was resolved that a single report would be prepared and submitted. This decision was taken notwithstanding the fact that it had al-ready become obvious that two different points of view had taken shape, in the course of the discussion within the Committee, regarding the solution of the Palestine question. One point of view, which was that of the majority, favoured the partition of Palestine into two separate States-an Arab State and a Jewish State-with the establishment of an economic union. The second point of view, which was that of the minority, favoured the creation of an independent federal State of Palestine. 
There were two main reasons why such a decision was taken. Despite the difference of opinion regarding a settlement of the Palestine question, there were a number of recommendations which were contained in the proposals of both the majority and the minority. There was, secondly, the conception that the Committee members were under no obligation to subscribe to either of the two solutions, but that they could, if they so desired, sign the report as a whole, and thus recommend both proposals to the General Assembly for consideration and decision. 
This could not, however, lessen the substantial difference existing between the two proposals. As this difference had arisen from different appraisals of the historical, political, national and economic aspects of the problem under consideration, it was only natural that every member of the Committee could not be expected to accept all the views expressed in the various parts of the reports. Nor could the majority, on the other hand, permit these reports to lose those features whereby they had offered an explanation and a justification of the proposal the majority had put forth, It was for that reason that each Committee member was granted the right to make the reservations he deemed necessary in the course of the discussion of the different sections of the report, and to reserve for himself the right to submit his views in this respect, such views to be incorporated in an appendix to the joint report. 
In accordance with that decision I, being unable to agree with Chapters II, IV and VI, have reserved the right to submit separately my views on; 
1.   The main features of the historical back-ground of the Palestine question; 
2.   The appraisal of the Palestine Mandate and its functioning in the present situation; 
3.   The present situation in Palestine; and  
4.    Basic principles and premises for the solution of the problem. 
The latter document contains the principles which prompted me to place before the Committee, at an informal meeting held as far back as 7 August 1947, a memorandum proposing that a united independent Palestine should be given a federal form or organization. The contents of this memorandum were, besides, adopted by the working group favouring a federal solution as a basis for the proposal which this group was subsequently to work out in all the necessary detail. 
I am therefore submitting these views within the time limit set, I ask that, in accordance with the Committee's decision, these views be included together with this covering letter in the .appendix to the report. 
 
(Signed) Vladimir SIMIC
 Representative of the Federated
 Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia
 
 
 
B. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION 
 
1.  The independence movement of the Palestine Arabs 
 
Palestine is one of those countries of the Near East in which the Arab nationalist movement developed before and especially during the First World War. The aim of this movement was to put an end to Turkish rule and to establish independence. As such, the Palestine Arab movement was closely connected with the Arab movement in the neighbouring Arab countries.
Seeing that the war which was being waged by the Entente Powers against the Central Powers extended to them the possibility of smashing the rule of the Turkish Empire, the Arabs of Palestine together with the Arabs in neighbouring countries placed themselves on the side of the Entente. This was understandable because statements were made, by persons in responsible positions, by authorities representing the Entente Powers and especially by the British, in which the right of these peoples to independence was recognized and in which they were promised support toward that end. 
The fact that the Arabs were on the side of the Entente was of political and military help to the British and French in their operations In the Near East. 
 
2.   The British a determining factor in the Near East following World War 1 
 
The situation in the Near East changed with the occupation of Palestine and other Arab countries by the Entente military forces. The Ottoman authorities were replaced by French and British military and civil administrations which, on the one hand, were temporary both according to promises made by those Powers themselves and according to obligations under the Mandate but which, on the other hand, meant the creation of political and economic bases upon which these Powers could rely as well as the retention of their armed forces, o the territory of the Near Eastern countries.
By decision of the League of Nations Council set forth in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the right of these peoples to achieve independence is recognized in paragraph 4. This paragraph reads as follows: 
"Certain communities formerly belonging w the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as Independent nations can be provisionally recognized-; subject to the rendering of administrative advice; and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."
Countries coming under this Mandate, known: as a Class A mandate, were recognized as having the right to, and being capable of, independence in the greatest measure as compared with other countries coming under mandates other categories.
The further development of the neighbouring Arab countries is the history of a long ands stubborn battle for the attainment of complete independence as quickly as possible. From time to time, this battle sharpened into armed up risings, riots, demonstrations and strikes. The peoples of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, etc., succeeded in making great- strides toward the attainment of independence during the period between this; two world ware, and during as well as afte!4 the Second World War. Developments in Palestine, however, did not unfold in the same way,
 
3. The Jews in Palestine and the policy of creating a Jewish national home as the third  factor in Palestine's development
 
Small Jewish settlements have always existed: in Palestine. There were periods when the settlements received people from the outside for instance, in the sixteenth century when the Jews fled from Spanish persecution and came to Palestine, and in the seventeenth century when they fled from Eastern Europe. 

During the second half of the nineteen century, a significant number of Jews began to settle in Palestine. This time their settlement was somewhat different. Even though it was then, as it had been earlier, caused, the difficult position of Jews in certain European countries, a considerable number of them to Palestine feel leg as though they were returning to their homeland. Some of them intended to settle on the land as farmers. 

The number of Jews in Palestine rose from 12,000 in 1845 to 25,000 in 1881, and to 80,000 in 1914. In the year 1914, 12,000 Jews made their living on the land and were settled it forty-three settlements or "colonies." 
The Zionist movement, which had its beginnings at the Basle Congress of 1897, aimed to unite, strengthen, and broaden the above mentioned tendencies regarding the settlement of Palestine. To secure the success of their plain, the leaders of the Zionist movement turned to the British Government for help. As is well, known, the British Government at that time was showing a marked interest in the Near and Middle East, which led to the establishment of British control and domination over countries in that area.
It may be mentioned here that at that time, that is, up to the First World War, there were no conflicts between Arabs and Jews. 
By decision of the Governments representing the most important Entente Powers, certain ' provisions were included in the Palestine Man-date which gave it a specific character. These provisions represented the recognition of the desires and demands of the Zionists to settle in Palestine and to create there a Jewish National Home. 
The Palestine problem arose-apart from the provisions of the Mandate itself-from the following: 
(a)   From the newly created situation in the Near East, where Great Britain had become the dominant Power. This was the result of the carrying out of the Sykes-Picot agreement in which the British emphasized their interests in the countries of the Near East, and separately in Palestine, where they sought an outlet to the sea near Haifa. In countries which were under a British mandate or protectorate, Great Britain treated a strong base for the realization of her imperial, political and economic interests. 
(b)   From the policy carried out by Great Britain in the execution of the Palestine Man-date. This policy had two aspects: Great Britain as the mandatory did not endeavour to prepare Palestine for independence; Great Britain carried out its policy without the agreement of the interested Palestine parties, imposing this policy upon both Arabs and Jews. 
 
4. The Mandate and the population of Palestine 
 
The situation created by British occupation of Palestine, and later by the establishment of the mandatory authority as well as by the postponement of the proclamation of the independence of Palestine, was regarded by the Arab population of the country as detrimental to its interests in the greatest degree. The Arabs considered themselves deceived because earlier promises and obligations had not been fulfilled. This feeling was expressed at a 'series of conferences and congresses held in Palestine, Syria and Egypt. From the beginning, the population of Palestine was unfriendly to the mandatory authority, which it considered to be a continuation of military occupation as well as an instrument of British imperial policy. According to the Peel Commission, the Mandate was regarded by the Arabs as "merely a cynical device for promoting British imperialism under a mask of humane consideration for the Jews." This point of view regarding the authorities is justified by the fact that no self-governing democratic institutions were created either then or later. The embitterment of the Palestine Arab population, because of the denial of its rights to an immediate proclamation of independence and to the creation of democratic legislative and administrative organs, was expressed in many ways. These were as follows:  –
(a)   Refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Mandate; 
(b)   Armed uprisings, conflicts, attacks, strikes and massacres;
(c)   Appeal to the neighbouring Arab peoples for help, as well as appeal to world public opinion. 
The embitterment manifested by the Arab population of Palestine after the proclamation of the Mandate did not diminish in the years that followed. On the contrary, it turned into unceasing resistance to the mandatory authority. 
While the Arabs were openly unfriendly to the establishment of a Mandate over Palestine, the Zionist leaders not only agreed to its establishment but specifically requested, in a proposal submitted to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in February 1919, that Great Britain be the mandatory. "The selection of Great Britain as mandatory is urged on the ground that this is the wish of the Jews of the world..:" reads the proposal. In this way, the Zionist leaders took upon themselves a part of the responsibility for the establishment of the British Mandate and control over Palestine, thus strengthening the position of the British Empire in Palestine itself and in the Near East in general. 
This policy of the Zionist leaders was one of the main reasons why the Arabs, during the riots and demonstrations of 1921, attacked a certain number of Jews as well. 
The Peel Commission, enumerating the reasons for these riots, disorders and attacks, observes that, in the first place, the reason was the following: "The Arabs' disappointment at the non-fulfillment of the promises of independence which they believed to have been given them in the war." 
 
5. An attempt to solve the problem of Arab. Jewish relations by agreement
 
Under the very undemocratic conditions existing in the country, and because of them, the relations between the Arab and Jewish political leaders were marked by national exclusiveness. Both sides believed that they would achieve their aims if they could succeed in gaining the favour of the British Government. 
There were times when the leaders of both sides, Arab and Jewish, negotiated directly or indirectly. One such attempt took place in Cairo early in 1922. The Arab representatives announced their readiness to accept Jewish settlement in Palestine, to establish contact as befits related peoples, and to co-operate for the progress of Palestine. On his part, the Jewish representative accepted the Arab invitation to co-operate and emphasized the historical rights of the Jews in Palestine. In recognizing Jewish aspirations, the Arabs expressed the wish that the negotiations be carried on without regard to earlier agreements, declarations, etc. They ex-pressed this in the following announcement: “The Arabs and Jews today must discuss their problems as one nation to another. They must make mutual concessions and recognize each .other's rights.” 
These negotiations were discontinued by wish of the British Government, which requested of Weizmann that they be postponed "until the Mandate is ratified." (Information from the statement of Aharon Cohen, representative of the Leage for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-opearion) It is impossible to under-stand why such a postponement was necessary. The ratification of a Mandate which would be able to rely upon an Arab-Jewish agreement would only have increased the chances for the successful execution of the Mandate provisions. 
These negotiations were continued in Geneva in September of the same year. Further strides were made in the mutual recognition of Jewish and Arab rights. The Geneva negotiations, how-ever, were also broken off before discussion of practical details was reached. Mr. A. Safir, who was the Jewish representative for these negotiations, declared before the British Commission of 1937 that they were discontinued after Weizmann's visit to the British ambassador. 
 
6. The nature of certain Arab-Jewish conflicts 
 
The years 1929-1931 showed that British 'policy in executing the Mandate was bringing the situation in Palestine to a new dead end. On the one hand, new tendencies in the policy of the Arab leadership became evident in the disorders of 1929. Discouraged by the failure to create self-governing organs of government, Arab leaders sought a way to manifest their dissatisfaction to the world public and especially to the Moslem world, and to call attention to their difficult position. Among the Arab leaders at that time were men who called for open anti-Jewish action, as a way of exerting pressure on the Government and with the aim of stopping immigration and the sale of land to Jews. The increased immigration of Jews at that time and the implacable stand of the Jewish leaders served to give the Arab leadership a reason to call for battle against the Jews. 
In 1929, following several years of good and normal relations, the chauvinistic forces on both aides, taking advantage of certain disagreements in regard to the Holy Places, caused bloody conflicts in which many hundreds of Arabs and Jews lost their lives. In order to better under- stand the conditions under which the 1929 clashes took place, it is useful to note the follow- 6g: On the eve of 23 August 1929 and on the following day, when a multitude of Arabs began arriving in Jerusalem armed with heavy sticks, clubs, pistols and knives, and when the Jewish representatives asked that the Arabs be disarmed, the Government did not accede to this request. Kingsley-Heath, the police officer on the Jericho side of the city, realized the seriousness of the situation and undertook to disarm the Arabs, but discontinuance of the disarming was ordered by Major Allen Saunders, Inspector-General of the Palestine police. It is significant that the discontinuance of disarming was ordered despite the fact that two months of very bitter mutual campaigning by both sides in the Press and at public meetings had pre-ceded this clash, and despite the fact that no one could doubt the intentions of the armed groups gathering within the city. 
What is characteristic of these conflicts f8 that, after the first wave of killing and violence, the attacks ceased very quickly. The boycott of Jewish products quickly lost its effectiveness despite the chauvinistic incitement in the Press. In this respect, the conflict of 1929 differs from the conflicts of 1933 and 1936, when the Arabs rose against the mandatory and when-in spite of cruel and drastic methods of repression-the continual and individual attacks lasted long after the main force of the uprising had been put down. The policy of mutual attack, and the incitement to Arab and Jewish conflicts succeeded in mobilizing the Arab population to a much lesser degree and with much less intensity than the policy of rebellion against the mandatory. 
The establishment of the Shaw Commission and its report, as well as the Hope Simpson investigation, the White Paper of 1930 which followed these investigations, and finally Mao Donald's letter to Weizmann contributed to the deepening of the conflict between the Arab and Jewish leaders. Specifically, Shaw and Hope Simpson stated that there was not enough tillable land in Palestine to support the settlement of new Jewish immigrants, and emphasized that the immigration of new Jewish workers would result in an increase in Arab unemployment. Shaw and Hope Simpson emphasized that new immigrants could nevertheless settle on the land if extensive irrigation projects were carried out and if agricultural methods were improved, and that the number of unemployed would necessarily be decreased if the arrival of new Jewish labourers was accompanied by the import of capital and its investment in industry. In the White Paper, not enough attention was paid to these positive observations. It denied the possibility of absorption and therefore officially gave support to the Arabs in their stand against immigration. This was a hard blow to Zionist policy so that Weizmann and some of his associates resigned from the leadership of the Jewish Agency. Some months later, after the negotiations between the Agency and the British Government, MacDonald sent Weizmann a letter in which he presented an interpretation of the White Paper which more nearly coincided with Jewish demands. 
The Jews always quote the. White Paper of 1930 as proof of how mistaken was the estimate of Palestine's absorptive capacity, whereas Mac-Donald's letter is known as the "black letter" among the Arabs. Peel himself observed the following regarding the difference between the two: "This letter did not repudiate the policy laid down in the White Paper; it set out to explain or interpret it. But, on such important points as prospective availability of State land for Jewish settlers or the admission of Jewish labour maintained by Jewish capital, the interpretation was more favourable to Jewish claims than the uninterpreted White Paper had seemed to be.    
By such a vacillating policy, the British Government could only convince both sides that British policy toward the opposing side could be changed by pressure on and by agreement with that Government. 
The stand taken by the representatives of the Jewish Agency on the basis of the conclusions reached at the Lucerne Congress in 1935 regarding the creation of a legislative council greatly decreased the possibility of closer rapprochement with the Arab representatives. That stand was motivated by fear of a policy of 'majority rule on the part of the Arabs.
Some time later, with the knowledge and authorization of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Magnes carried on some preliminary negotiations with certain Arab representatives from Palestine and from outside Palestine. The Jewish Agency persistently refused to agree to permanent status as a minority, while Dr. Magnes and some other moderate elements were willing to agree to minority status for a period of ten years. These negotiations were without result because the Palestine Arab leadership felt that His Majesty’s Government was inclining more and more towards that point of view which was finally expressed in the White Paper of 1939. The possibility of agreement was also diminished due to the activities of the Revisionists, who gave much cause for the assertion that Jews do not favour equal co-operation with the Arabs but demand a Jewish State, that is, Jewish domination on both sides of the Jordan River. 
An attempt to which too little attention was paid at the time dates from the same period as the above-mentioned conflicts between the Arab and Jewish leadership. In 1930 a society called the Workers' Brotherhood was founded for the purpose of organizing Jewish and Arab workers in a common union. The initiative for the founding of this society came from the people themselves. This meant that consciousness of the need for unified action and close co-operation among Arabs and Jews had strengthened. This attempt was doomed to temporary failure. The authorities forbid the organization to continue its activities and prohibited the publication of its newspaper. 
In everyday life, in social and economic contacts, and in the attitude of the Arab peasant toward the Jewish settlers, the relations between the two peoples were good. It is necessary to emphasize these good relations in connexion with the fact that propaganda for the boycott of Jewish products continued and that the Press on both sides was filled with attacks and threats. 
The campaign carried on by the Arab Press in 1933 against the Jews grew "steadily more inflammatory," in the estimate of the Royal Commission. A new regulation regarding the Press was issued; it provided for the banning of newspapers whose contents threatened the public peace. Nevertheless, despite the most bitter chauvinistic agitation by one side or the other, not one newspaper was banned. 
 
7.  Arab uprisings against the mandatory
 
Attacks on government offices and government police, from 13 to 29 October 1988, indicated that the dissatisfaction of the Arab population had reached its peak. The uprising which began in 1936 and did not end until the beginning of the Second World War was basically the same as that of 1988. The riots began with incidents among certain groups of Arabs and Jews, but developed into a broad uprising against the mandatory Power. Whole detachments of rebels were organized with the support of the population. The British troops, which succeeded in again becoming masters of the situation only after long and cruel operations, imposed heavy losses in life and property upon the people and the rebels. The Peel Commission made the following observation regarding this uprising: "It has been pointed out that the outbreak of 1933 was not only, or even mainly, an attack on the Jews, but an attack on the Palestine Government. In 1936 this was still clearer. Jewish lives were taken and Jewish property destroyed; but the outbreak was chiefly and directly aimed at the Government. The word 'disturbances' gives a misleading impression of what happened. It was an open rebellion of the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by fellow-Arabs from other countries, against British mandatory rule." The uprising of 1936-1939 brought such broad masses of the people into the battle against the mandatory that it resulted in the creation of an unbridgeable gap between the Arab population and the Government. 
During the uprising itself, and especially during the Second World War, new forces came into being within the framework of the Arab nationalist movement. These new forces were represented in the "League for the National Liberation of Palestine," which carries on an uncompromising battle against the mandatory authority, supports the democratization of the Arab movement and favours rapprochement and co-operation with democratic Jewish forces. The Arab workers' movement co-operated with the Jewish labour movement in the political and economic fields. These new forces found expression also in the creation of a unified "Arab front," which gathered about itself those Arab politicians s4ho considered that close co-operation with the Jews was an important condition for the waging of a successful struggle for in-dependence. The Arab front had its centre out-side of the Arab Higher Committee, and op-posed that committee. Only upon the intervention of the Arab League, which appealed for "unity" in the Arab movement in Palestine, did some members of the front join the Arab Higher Committee. 
 
8.   Jewish immigration and the development of the Jewish community
 
The immigration of Jews into Palestine, from 1930 up to 1939, took place under significantly changed circumstances. As a consequence of the economic crises and unemployment, and primarily because of the growth of fascist forces and the subsequent persecutions of the Jews beginning in 1933 in Europe, the number of immigrants began to grow rapidly: from 4,075 in 1981 to 9,553 in 1932, then to 30,327 in 1983, and 42,859 in 1984 with a peak of 61,854 in 1985. Many of these immigrants were specialists and highly skilled workers. Investments in Jewish industry, which in 1930 amounted to 2,095,000 Palestine pounds, multiplied five times and reached the sum of 11,064,000 Palestine pounds in 1937. Thus, Jewish industry became a determining factor in the country's economy. 
The political and cultural life of the Jewish community took on a broader aspect, so that at the beginning of the Second World War the Jewish community in Palestine was no longer simply a small minority but rather a first-rate factor in the life of Palestine. The significance of this community grew, not only in relation to local conditions in Palestine and the Near East but also in relation to the difficult position of the Jews in those areas of Europe which little by little were falling victims to Hitler's invasion. There were, however, rather strong political forces at the end of thirty years which were against the exclusive stand of the Zionist Centre and Right wings, and which considered agreement and co-operation with the Arabs to be of first-rate importance. 
Hashomer I-Iatzair, Ihud, the Jewish Communists and the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement not only propagated the idea of co-operation with the Arabs but undertook concrete measures for the realization and the extension of such co-operation. 
 
9.  The White Paper
 
Through the White Paper, the British Government attempted to meet the situation which prevailed before the beginning of the war as a consequence of the Arab uprising and the strengthening of the Jewish community, and also as a consequence of the growing unfriendliness which the whole population of Palestine was manifesting towards the mandatory authority, The White Paper satisfied neither the Arabs nor the Jews, since the provisions for the establishment of a democratic Palestine government were never put into effect. It was a momentary concession to the political demands of the Arab leaders with regard to immigration and land laws, but practically speaking it did not solve the basic existing problems. The White Paper did not mean the beginning of a democratizing administration, the creation of local self-government, and elections. It did not solve the problem of Arab-Jewish relations on the basis of the equal rights of two sovereign and independent peoples. Finally, it did nothing to prevent the spreading of chauvinism, intolerance, and the like. 
 
10.  Palestine during the Second World War
 
The Arab uprising had subsided by the time the Second World War began in 1939. During the war, the new democratic forces among the Arabs grew quickly in strength and became a significant factor in public life, in the Press, in the cities and in the villages. The League for the National Liberation of Palestine, the worker movement and circles close to them stood firmly for co-operation as a necessary condition to the achievement of independence by both peoples. 
The fate of European Jewry under the heel of the fascist conquerors had a direct effect on, the Jewry of Palestine. The .main result of this was the broadening of the demand for increased immigration, mostly to solve the problem of those unfortunate Jews who are today in the various camps for displaced persons. 
The influence of progressive forces among the Jews was strengthened during the anti-fascist war. 
Another characteristic point is the rapid development of the Palestine economy. Due to transport difficulties and limited imports of industrial products during the war, Palestine industry, and especially Jewish industry, began to grow very rapidly. Palestine's economic ties with the other countries of the Near East multi. plied many times. 
Generally speaking, the situation in Palestine during the war developed in the direction of peaceful and improved political, economic and cultural relations between Arabs and Jews. It is necessary, however, to point out various developments which were not in keeping with this trend. A part of the Zionist leadership thought that the time had come, for the above-mentioned reasons, to make maximum demands again. Thus, we have the Biltmore programme which aimed at a solution-that of a Jewish State throughout the whole of Palestine-which, during the past two and a half decades, had shown itself to be incompatible with the situation in Palestine and with the rights of the Arab people. An analogous tendency was to be found among the Arabs as well. Those representatives of the Palestine Arabs who considered that the only possible solution to the Palestine problem was the creation of an Arab State began to organize once again. The politics of the great Western Powers were not completely absent from this scene, as is testified to by the distinguished member of the_ Anglo-American Committee of inquiry, Mr. Bartley Crum. 
Despite the demands of the chauvinistic leadership on both sides, and despite their economic boycott of each other and bitter attacks in the Press, the basic tendency proved to be a desire for the strengthening of peaceful relations between Jews and Arabs. This was shown by the growth of trade between the Arabs and Jews, and also by their successful co-operation in a number of institutions established for the furtherance of certain common interests. Among such institutions are the General Agricultural Council, the Citrus Control and Marketing Boards, the Joint Transport Advisory Board. The mixed municipality councils provide an-other example of successful co-operation. 
The awareness of the Arab and Jewish working classes that co-operation is necessary has found expression in the growing number of strikes held in common. In 1943, 515 Arab and Jewish workers participated jointly in strikes. In 1944, the number of workers participating in such common strikes rose to 1250, in 1945 to 2530, in 1946 to 30000 and thus far in 1947 to 40000.  These strikes are not merely of economic but of political significance as well. Demonstrations having as their slogan "Unity of Arab and Jewish workers means victory" accompanied the strikes. 
The growing conflict between the Jewish population and the mandatory, in addition to the already existing opposition between the Arabs and the mandatory, has seriously shaken the position of the Palestine Government. It was forced to increase considerably its military and police forces, to more than double expenditures for police, to proclaim martial law and to isolate itself behind thick rows of barbed wire and carefully guarded entrances. 
 
 
 
C. THE APPRAISAL OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE AND ITS FUNCTIONING IN THE PRESENT SITUATION
 
(I)   The Mandate is the international instrument by virtue of which Great Britain governs Palestine. It is the legal title whereunder Great Britain's jurisdiction over Palestine is exercised. Thus, Great Britain's position as regards Pales-tine was that of a trustee called upon to carry out an international mandate under specific conditions and for specific purposes. This means that Great Britain did not acquire sovereignty over Palestine; it was merely given certain powers which were deemed necessary to enable it to carry out the obligations it had assumed under the Mandate. These obligations were laid down in Article 22 (Annex 21) of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the text (Annex 20) of the Palestine Mandate of 24 July 1922. They can be taken to fall under three main headings: 
(a)   The general obligations defined in paragraph 1 of Article 22, which apply to all man-dated territories and which make it incumbent upon the mandatory to further the well-being and development of the mandated territories; 
(b)   The obligations relating to Class A mandates (paragraph 4 of Article 22), the general purpose of which is to prepare the mandated territories for an early independence. (These obligations are confirmed in articles 2 and 3 of the Palestine Mandate); 
(c)   The specific obligations of the Palestine Mandate involving the establishment of a Jewish National Home, the facilitation of Jewish immigration and the close settlement of the Jews on the land. 
 
(II)   The first set of obligations covers a very wide range of tasks which the mandatory was called upon to perform in order to create favourable general conditions for the pursuance of a positive policy designed to enable the man-dated territory eventually to "stand alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." It would transcend the scope of this report to examine in any detail the achievements recorded in this field by the mandatory in Palestine; We shall merely confine ourselves to some of the more general aspects of the matter, such as education, public health, the legal system, the land system, taxation, social legislation and general economic policy. 
As regards education and public health, we could not help but be struck by the extremely low percentage of budgetary expenditure under the above two items, This percentage, which amounted to 4.86 on education and 6,2 on public health in 1922-1923, decreased to 8.99 on education and 3.3 on public health in 1936-1987, and fell to 8.09 on education and 2.9 on public health in 1943-1944. The relevant figures for 1944-1945 were 2.9 and 2.7. 
The inadequacy of expenditure on education was noted by the Peel Commission in 1937: "It seems to us unfortunate that the administration has been unable to do more for education. Its share of the total expenditure is not only small but the percentage has been perceptibly falling since 1933." 
Significant in this respect is' a comparison with Iraq, a former mandated territory which has acquired its independence. Although suffering from greater initial disadvantages, and with ten times as many unsettled Bedouins as Palestine, and although handicapped by geographical conditions, Iraq found it possible to apportion a greater percentage of its expenditure to education. This percentage has, moreover, been displaying an upward trend: from 6.1 per cent in 1930-1931, allocations for education were in-creased to 12.9 per cent in 1940-1941. 
The legal system evolved in Palestine under the Mandate did not impress us as being of a nature to accelerate the general development of the country. It is based, on the one hand, on the obsolete Turkish Mejelle, which has now been abandoned both in Turkey itself and in the vast majority of countries where it had once been in force, and, on the other hand, on English Common Law and Law of Equity (article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922) which, whatever merits they may otherwise possess, are obviously a product of the particular historical development of the British Isles and are, therefore, wholly unsuited to the needs of a country like Palestine. 
In a country where the majority of the population live from the land, the raising of the level of the peasantry is an essential prerequisite for the general advance of the country. In this respect, we ale compelled to observe that little has been done under the mandatory regime to remedy the backwardness of the semi-feudal land system inherited from the Ottoman regime.
Mention must be movie, in this connexion, of the taxation system. More than 50 per cent of the revenue is obtained through indirect taxation, and these indirect taxes are on the increase, both relatively and absolutely. Capital taxation and death duties do not exist, while archaic taxes such as tithes and animal taxes are still in force. Income tax, which has been introduced only recently (1940-1941) , burdens particularly the small taxpayer, since inflation of prices has drawn a large number of workers and employees within the scope of income-tax payment; large incomes, on the other hand, are little affected in comparison. 
We are also obliged to note the absence of progressive social legislation. Such elementary rights of workers as the right to form trade unions, the recognition of trade unions, the right of assembly and strike, the limitation of working hours, minimum wages, compensation in case of discharge, payment for absence due to sickness, and annual leave, are not provided for in the labour legislation of Palestine. 
The disparity between the living standards of Jewish and Arab workers is frequently referred to as one of the main causes of friction between Arabs and Jews in general. Indicative of the absence of any positive policy on the part of the Government to remove this disparity is the fact that the Government has failed to eliminate it even among its own employees, of whom there are some 80,000 and among whom there is the additional glaring disparity between British employees on the one hand and Arab and Jewish employees on the other. (Of the hundred and twenty-one officials whose salaries amount to more than one thousand pounds a year, a hundred and thirteen are British; only four are Arabs and only three are Jews, while one official is listed under the heading, "others." Many similar instances might be cited.) 
In respect of the mandatory Government's general economic policy, some mention should be made here of the special concessions granted to the Palestine Potash Company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the Consolidated Refineries Limited. The first of these companies was granted, in 1930, a seventy-five year concession for the ex-traction of salts and minerals from the Dead Sea, while the concessions granted to the two oil companies include such extensive privileges as the right-free of royalties, taxes, import duties and other payments, charges or compensations-to lay pipelines through any part of Palestine, to expropriate land, etc. 
Characteristic in this respect is the question of the Huleh concession. Huleh is a swamp situated in the north-eastern part of Palestine. Not only is it a breeding ground for malaria-bearing mosquitoes, not only does it exclude from cultivation much good soil, but also it rep-resents a waste of water which could be used for irrigation purposes. Nothing, however, has been done to drain this swamp or reclaim the soil during the twenty-five years of the mandatory regime. The reasons adduced to explain this failure to take any effective action on this matter were either of a financial and administrative nature, or else they referred to the partition proposal of the Peel Commission which, it was alleged, made it uncertain to which of the two States envisaged the area would belong. 
These few examples go to show that little has been done in the course of the twenty-five years of the Mandatory regime to implement the general obligations deriving from Article 22 of the Covenant. This was bound to affect adversely the carrying out of the other, more specific obligations of the Palestine Mandate. Nor can this failure to abide by the basic terms of the Man, date be explained by the particular condition prevailing in Palestine, i.e. by the strained relations between Arabs and Jews. As far back as 1930, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations expressed the opinion that a more active policy of the mandatory Government in the field of social and economic development would probably have diminished antagonism between Arabs and Jews.
 
(III) As regards the development of self-governing institutions, the primary task of the Powers administering Class A mandates, we are obliged to note that no advance has been achieved in this respect under the mandatory regime. 
The fundamental law of Palestine is the Order-in-Council, 1922, issued under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. This Order-in-Council, as subsequently amended, and the other legislation enacted thereunder, applied to Palestine the system of government in force in the British possessions known as Crown Colonies. 
Executive authority is vested in the High Commissioner, who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He exercises the authority within the limit set by the aforesaid order, the provisions of which he may, under article 87, "vary, annul, add to" with the prior approval of the Secretary of State and with the assistance of the Executive Council, consisting of British officials.
Legislative authority is exercised either by the mandatory Power itself by means of Order-in-Council, or by the High Commissioner by means of ordinances (which he enacts after consultation with the Advisory Council, consisting of the heads of the different Government Departments and of the District Commissioners, i.e. exclusively of British, generally colonial, officials), and by means of rules, regulations and orders made under such ordinances. 
The judiciary is organized along similar lines. Practically all senior posts are a preserve for British subjects. The Chief Justice is British, while two out of the four puisne judges who assist him are of British nationality. Even as regards the power of inflicting punishment, a distinction is made between British and Palestinian judges: the former are empowered to impose upon any accused person double the maximum sentence or fine which the latter may impose. 
The absence of self-governing institutions in Palestine is thus complete. Nor has any visible effort to develop them been made by the mandatory. It has, it is true, made two attempts, one in 1922 and one in 1936, to set up a Legislative Council. The failure of these attempts was construed by the mandatory as proof of the impossibility of implementing the obligations under article 2 of the Mandate, and as proof of the necessity of maintaining the Crown Colony system of government. These attempts, therefore, require a somewhat closer investigation. 
In 1922 an Order-in-Council was issued providing for the creation of a Legislative Council to consist of the High Commissioner and twenty-two other members, ten official and twelve elected; of the elected members, eight were to be Moslems, two Christians and two Jews. This scheme was rejected by the Arabs on the grounds that "no constitution which would fall short of giving the people of Palestine full control of their own affairs could be acceptable." The mandatory Power felt unable to accept this demand of the Arabs, because it would, the Power said, have made it impossible for it to implement a "pledge, antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations," i. e. the Balfour Declaration. It will be seen that the mandatory bases itself upon the well-known theory of "dual obligations," which it was invariably to refer to whenever there was a question of justifying a failure to carry out an obligation enjoined by the Mandate. 
After the Arab refusal to co-operate, the mandatory, instead of making at least some endeavour to meet Arab demands by proposing the establishment of a more broadly democratic and representative body, while reserving for itself matters such as immigration, public order and others directly affecting the implementation of the Jewish National Home policy, hastily reverted to the system of a nominated Advisory Council, on a basis similar to that of the abortive Legislative Council. When this proposal, too, proved inacceptable to the Arabs, the mandatory made the quite irrelevant proposal to set up an "Arab Agency" as a counterpart of the Jewish Agency; this plan also, naturally enough, was rejected by the Arabs. The policy of the British Government on this question was summed up at the time by the Colonel Secretary, the Duke of Devonshire, in the following terms: "Towards all these proposals, Arabs have adopted the same attitude, viz. refusal to co-operate. His Majesty's Government has been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that further efforts on similar lines would be useless, and they have accordingly decided not to repeat the attempt." 
In fact, thirteen years-at least eight of which were acknowledged by the British Government itself in its recent pamphlet on The Political History of Palestine under British Administration to have been free from disturbance-were allowed to elapse before a further endeavour was made in this sphere. The next attempt occurred in 1986, significantly enough after disturbances which, as is noted in the same pamphlet, were "directed not against the Jews, but against the mandatory Government" had again started. The Legislative Council now proposed approximated even less than did its 1922 predecessor a genuinely democratic self-governing body. The majority of the members were to be either nominated or officials (sixteen as against twelve elected). Council powers were to be extremely circumscribed: It was precluded from introducing money-bills, or from proposing a vote for the expenditure of public money or the imposition of taxation, except by direction of the High Commissioner, or even from passing "any resolutions which, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, were likely to endanger public peace." That the limitations of this proposal were realized even within the British Houses of Parliament, is shown by a statement made at the time by Mr. Wedgewood, a Labour M. P., who explained "that the Labour Party oppose the legislative scheme because, far from being a step In the direction of democratic control, it would, under existing conditions, merely increase the power of the effendis over the illiterate masses and provide a source for the further embittering of Arab-Jewish relations." The proposal was finally abandoned because of Jewish opposition. 
These two lone attempts, made at an interval of thirteen years and when conditions in the country were particularly unsettled-attempts which were, moreover, obviously inadequate to meet either the requirements of the population or the provisions of the Mandate-can hardly be considered a token of the mandatory Government's determination to depart from its colonial system of administration or to implement its obligations under paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant and article 2 of the Mandate. 
The basic reasons why these attempts failed, and why the Palestine Government was becoming increasingly unpopular with the population, and becoming the target of criticism on its part, appear to be the following: 
(a)   The attempts were not preceded by the establishment of local self-governing bodies which would have made it possible for democratic forces to emerge and grow; 
(b)   Adequate political preparations were lacking, i.e. those Jewish and Arab leaders who had shown the least desire to co-operate, and who had become notorious for their extreme demands, were the ones who were called upon to state their views in connexion with these attempts. 
 
(IV) Nor were we able to note any real effort on the part of the mandatory to carry out its obligations as regards the "encouraging of local autonomy" (article 8 of the Mandate) . We were, on the contrary, obliged to observe that "tendency towards centralization," which had already struck both the Peel Commission and the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. It cannot be said, even now, that municipal and local council areas are governed democratically. The franchise is subject to various qualifications, including rate-paying requirements. (In the majority of municipal and council areas, the right to take part in the election of councillors is vested solely in the propertied classes. At the last Jerusalem elections in 1959 only some 7,000 out of 70,000 adults had the right to vote.) In Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, and in almost all the smaller towns and villages, women are disfranchised. 
The High Commissioner may appoint mayors and deputy-mayors among the councillors against the majority vote of the municipal council, as has been done in Tel Aviv. The High Commissioner is empowered to dismiss a mayor, a deputy-mayor, or a whole elected municipal council, a right he has actually availed himself of in Jerusalem as well as in nine other municipalities. Existing municipal, local and village councils possess very limited powers. They may not expend even the smallest amount without the written consent of the British District Commissioner. 
Elections to municipal councils have been postponed by the Government time and time again. In the majority of municipalities no elections have been held for the last twelve years. By the village administrative ordinance for 1944, council elections were abolished in rural Arab communities. 
A further measure designed to check the democratic development of the local and municipal councils is the encouragement given to the setting up of rural councils. The Government has approved the constitution of such a rural council in Chedera; this rural council is endowed with powers similar to those of the local council. The right of election to the rural councils is enjoyed only by land-owners whose landed property exceeds a certain minimum.
 
(V) All this goes to show that the entire structure of the governmental system established in Palestine both at local and central-government levels was calculated to impede rather than to promote the development of any form of self-government. And the general trend of the mandatory's policy seems to have been to move away from, rather than advance towards, the goal originally set by the Mandate. This trend was reflected, above all, in the fact that Pales-tine, particularly in recent years, has been acquiring more and more the features of what is generally known as a "police State," in the tendency to resort with increasing frequency to emergency regulations, to restrict, and in certain spheres even to abolish, elementary civil rights and liberties, to augment the number of police officials and to invest them with ever wider powers over the lives and property of citizens, to replace judicial proceedings with police action, etc.

This general tendency developed through several stages, from the "Collective Punishment Ordinance" of 1926, through the 1933 "Prevention of Crime Ordinance" (which provided police authorities with such extensive powers that judicial action through law courts was made to appear almost illusory), and through the 1937 regulations (which authorized the seizure and use of building and road transport, the imposition of curfews, censorship of the Press, the deportation of undesirables, and very far-reaching rights to search, arrest and impose collective fines) up to more recent emergency legislation under which orders of detention may be issued against any citizen on the authority of an area commander, these orders not being re-viewable in a court of law. While censorship for war purposes was abolished on 31 October 1945, compulsory censorship before publication of the local Pre has been retained, and a separate Press Censorship Office has been constituted in the Secretariat. Requests for habeas corpus have been rejected by the Palestine judiciary on the grounds "that the District Commissioner's powers under the regulations are absolute and that he is not obliged to give any reasons when acting thereunder." 

Budgetary expenditure on the maintenance of law and order has been increasing correspondingly. In the period between 1920 and 1945, this.: expenditure totalled £.P.43,352,000, (Palestine pounds) while expenditure on all other services amounted to £.P.96,268,000 including £.P.22,252,000 on special measures arising out of the war. The 1947-1948 budget estimate provides for a £,P.7,000,000 expenditure on police and prisons out of a total expenditure of £.P.24.5 millions, or 30 per cent of the total as compared with 25 per cent two years earlier. 
Despite all these stringent regulations, how. ever, despite the vast and ever-mounting expenditure on the maintenance of law and order, we were unable to note that any progress in this field had been achieved since the days when the Peel Commission remarked that "the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged." 
 
(VI) The failure to carry out obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the Mandate is usually explained by the mandatory by the fact that the Palestine Mandate possessed some specific features which distinguished it from other Class A mandates-i. e. the obligations relating to the setting up of a Jewish National Home in Palestine-and that these specific obligations made it impossible, in view of prevailing conditions in Palestine, to implement the other obligations, of a more general nature, deriving from the same Mandate. This is the well-known theory of "dual obligations" which, while having equal weight, are said to be mutually contradictory, to have resulted in the impossibility of fully carrying out both obligations at one and the – same time, and to have rendered the Mandate generally unworkable. Thus, the mandatory contended that, in endeavouring to implement its obligations regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home, it could not help but neglect somewhat the provisions of the Mandate which enjoined it to develop self-governing institutions (which in a country with an Arab majority, the mandatory alleged, would obviously have frustrated any attempt to put into effect the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration). Vice-versa, it has always been maintained that the obligations towards the Arabs precluded the possibility of fully abiding by the Jewish National Home policy. We shall quote two authoritative British Government policy statements by way of illustration. 
In 1922, in replying to Arab criticism of the Legislative-Council proposal, the British Colonial Office asserted that "His Majesty's Government … cannot allow a constitutional position to develop (i. e. grant genuine self-governing institutions) in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the Principal Allied Powers which may make it impracticable-to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies." 

About twenty five years later, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained his Government’s attitude to Jewish immigration in the following terms: "There is nothing in the Man-date which would warrant me or the British Government taking a step to deprive the, Arabs of their rights, or deprive them of their liberties, or deprive them of their land." 

Thus, according to the mandatory Power, the failure to implement the Mandate was due to the fact that the obligations it contained were irreconcilable; and they were rendered irreconcilable because of the state of relations between Arabs and Jews, because Arabs and Jews persisted in their hostility towards each other's aspirations and refused to co-operate. The Man-date thus became unworkable. 

We do not feel that either the terms of the Mandate or the history of its operation, lend substance to such an interpretation. 

Without entering into a detailed legal analysis of the terms of the Mandate in order to as-certain whether the different obligations are in fact of equal weight, or whether greater moment should be attached to some at the expense of others, we should merely like to call attention to some of the more fundamental aspects of the matter. In the first place the terms of the various mandates, including the Palestine Man-date, are or are presumed to be, merely an application of the general provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant (which is considered the fundamental, "organic" law of the mandate system) to the particular conditions of the various mandated territories. It is obvious, therefore, that an international instrument, the purpose of which is to implement another international instrument, antecedent thereto, shall not be in-consistent with or repugnant to, the latter. Otherwise, it would necessarily have to be deemed ultra vices and invalid. Such specific provisions as the Mandate may possess are, there-fore, to be viewed in the light of, and subordinated to, the basic purposes of the mandate system. This is confirmed by the authoritative opinion of the Chairman of the Permanent Man-dates Commission, Marquis Theodoli, who pointed out at the Commission's session in June 1980 that "in considering the two parts of the Mandate … it was necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle of all mandates. The purposes of the mandates, as described in Article 22 of the Covenant, was the development and welfare of the inhabitants of the mandated territory." As regards the theory that the two sets of obligations were "irreconcilable" we may refer to the pronouncement made by the Commission itself at the same session, to the effect that the two obligations imposed on the mandatory were in no sense irreconcilable.

Nor are we in a position to accept the poi en of view that it was the inimical attitude of Arabs and Jews towards each other which made it impossible to carry out the provisions of the Mandate. On the contrary, the entire history of the mandatory regime seems to corroborate the opinion, expressed in the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, that "the failure of the mandatory to develop self-governing institutions, a responsibility enjoined by the terms of the Mandate, had resulted in an even greater division between the Jews and the Arabs."

It was the non-implementation of the basic obligations deriving from the Mandate which made it impossible to carry into effect all the other, more specific obligations, in a satisfactory manner. It was the absence of self-governing institutions, the failure to develop the country along democratic lines, which prevented the creation of conditions in which the two peoples of Palestine might have come together and settled all outstanding questions, including those pertaining to the Jewish National Home. How can people be expected to co-operate when there is no responsible governing body for them to co-operate in? How can they be expected successfully to bridge the gulf which had been dividing them, when a third party is constantly stepping in between them in the role of an arbiter? How can genuinely democratic forces, the forces alone capable of achieving co-operation and progress, be expected to come to the fore, when the existing backward relationship of social and political forces is "frozen" under a Crown-Colony type of government? In the words of the recent statement of British policy known as the Bevin Plan: “The two peoples of Pales-tine could not live in harmony as long as Government was imposed from without.”

We therefore cannot but agree with Mr. Ben-Gurion when he says that: "The mandatory in Palestine failed not because Jews and Arabs did not co-operate, but because the mandatory refused to co-operate with the Mandate."

 

(VII) Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to why the Mandate has failed, opinion is practically unanimous that it has failed. This has been recognized by the mandatory itself. 

It is quite obvious, moreover, that the Man-date has become an insurmountable obstacle to the further peaceful development of Pales-tine, that its continuance would mean a constant and rapid deterioration of conditions in the country and would make any future settlement of the problem even more difficult than it is today. 

 

 
D. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PALESTINE
 
1. Since the Arab uprising against the mandatory in 1936-1989, relations between the Arabs and the mandatory have remained in a state of latent crisis. Certain symptoms to be discerned in the Arab Press, in speeches delivered at public meetings as well as in political life in general, indicate that this tension is threatening anew to flare up into an open conflict. According to the statements of prominent Arab politicians and those of spokesmen of the Palestine Government, there are signs that such a conflict is brewing. The High Commissioner himself pointed out in this connexion, in his address to the Special Committee, that arms traffic was going on and that it was impossible to control the frontiers and prevent such traffic. 

The political basis of the conflict between the Arabs and the mandatory Power is to be sought in the fact that the Palestine Arabs demand the abolition of the Mandate, the withdrawal of British troops and the proclamation of Pales-tine's independence, while the policy of the mandatory results in a continued delay in the fulfilment of these demands. 

 

2. There is, on the other hand, a profound antagonism between the Jewish population and the mandatory. The Jewish community in Palestine has grown into a powerful community possessing all the features of a developed national group and claiming statehood and independence; as such, it has come into conflict with the policy of the mandatory. This tension has, since the conclusion of the Second World War, been gradually acquiring the character of an armed conflict. The actions of Jewish under-ground groups, directed against the mandatory, are meeting with the approval of wide sections of the Jewish population precisely because they are directed against the mandatory, and regard-less of the motives which the underground leaders themselves ascribe to such actions and regardless of the subsequent. reprisals. According to the mandatory itself: 
"The Jewish community of Palestine still publicly refuses its help to the Administration in suppressing terrorism on the ground that the Administration's policy is opposed to Jewish interests." 
 
3. The measures which the mandatory is taking for its own protection are evidence of the relations existing between the Government and the population. 
Jerusalem itself has been divided into a number of security zones; it is intersected by long rows of barbed wire, studded with machine-gun nests; armoured cars circulate through the streets as do groups of soldiers with their weapons at the ready. 
Throughout the country, the buildings housing Administration offices or accommodating British officials are encircled with barbed wire and are guarded by soldiers. No guards have, on the other hand, been posted before the premises of either Jewish or Arab organizations, before the premises of Jewish and Arab politicians, or in front of Jewish and Arab firms. 
Alarms and curfews have become a part of the daily routine in Jerusalem and in the other large towns. While the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was holding its hearings In Jerusalem, there were days when the alarm was sounded two or three times. Columns of armoured cars and tanks cruise along the roads throughout Palestine. On some of the main roads, traffic has been restricted to certain hours of the day. Checquered with military camps, Palestine itself has been turned into one large armed camp. 
The frequent proclamations of martial law, the setting up of military courts and the wide powers which various ordinances have granted to the military commanders in the areas under their command have resulted in the last vestiges of individual and political liberties being abandoned to the arbitrary action of the various military commanders. The application of collective punishments, and even of such obsolete and shameful punishments as flogging, offer further evidence of the fact that what we have in Palestine is not merely "a severe military enforcement of order" but a conflict between the mandatory and the people. All the measures we have just mentioned are usually characteristic of the attitude a conqueror adopts in a conquered country. 
 
4.   Lacking both the confidence and the support of the Palestine population, the mandatory Power has been increasing its military and police force from year to year. In 1946 there was one policeman or soldier to every eighteen inhabitants. In 1947 their number has been further augmented, so that there is today one policeman or soldier to every thirteen inhabitants. 
 
5.   In connexion with these and similar meas. urea, an ever-growing part of Palestine's budgetary expenditure has been allocated by the mandatory for purposes defined as "maintaining peace and order," which means for the safe guarding of its own position in Palestine. In 1946-1947, £.P.6,520,000 or 27.5 per cent of the entire budget was spent on the maintenance of the police forces. In 1947-1948, the budget provides for an increase of expenditure under this heading to £.P.7,000,000 or B0 per cent of the total expenditure. 
 
6.   That both the political and the military struggle are being waged against the mandatory, that it is the latter which is most directly threatened, is manifested by the fact that, according to official figures, the number of casualties suffered by the mandatory has been greater than that sustained by either the Arabs or by the Jews. Despite the barbed wire, the curfews, the prohibited zones and other security measures, the mandatory sustained casualties of one hundred and sixty-four dead and three hundred and ninety-four wounded in the period from 1 August 1945 to 81 March 1947. 
 
7.   The strained relations between the mandatory Power and the population of Palestine are reflected in the absence of any form of democratically elected government, in the sphere of either central or local government; this applies to both the Jewish and the Arab sections of the population. The executive, legislative and judiciary authority, in fact all levels of authority. are concentrated in the hands of the mandatory, or, more precisely, of the High Commissioner. 
 
8.   Economic life in Palestine suffers greatly from existing conditions. One-third of budgetary expenditure is allocated to the maintenance of police forces, while not even a twentieth part goes to promote education, public health, or agriculture, etc. Trade has been greatly reduced owing to the disruption of the communications system caused by the cutting off of various towns and areas, as a consequence of restrictions imposed by martial law and of underground activities. Last year alone, over a million cases of citrus rotted in the ports because the situation prevented their being shipped. 

The crops from 15,000 dunums of citrus groves 'remained unpicked because military operations prevented farmers from going to their fields. The workers of Palestine were most directly affected by such a state of affairs because the cutting off of certain zones brought unemployment to tens of thousands of workers during certain periods, while thousands of others were obliged to go to and from their work at the risk of their lives. 

 

9.   There are reasons to believe that the maintenance, of such large armed forces is not prompted only by the difficult situation within the country. Toward the end of the negotiations conducted in London in September 1946 between ' the representatives of the States which are members of the Arab League and the British Government, the British representative asked whether the Governments of these countries were prepared to recognize British interests in the security of the Near East and whether the independent State of Palestine (when created) would conclude a military agreement with Great Britain. Some of the Arab representatives replied to this question in the affirmative. On the other hand, Dr. Nahum Goldman of the Jewish Agency said that Zionists would afford Great Britain full rights for military, naval and air bases in Pales-tine in return for an agreement establishing a viable Jewish State comprising the area of the Jewish State as recommended by the Royal Commission plus the Negeb. The presence of British troops has thus become an element in the policy of certain Arab and Jewish leaders who view the realization of their own plans in the light of concessions to the British imperial military scheme. In considering the liquidation of the Mandate, the mandatory is guided by the interests of its imperial military scheme which, in the forthcoming period, would find a new framework, that is, a military agreement made before the creation of an independent Palestine, before the peoples of Palestine have an opportunity freely to express their opinions in this regard. 

 

10.   The mandatory and the leaders of some of the interested parties attempt to explain the present situation in Palestine as resulting from the conflicting attitudes of the Arabs and the Jews. The hegemonistic designs of certain Arab and Jewish politicians are generalized and made to appear as proof of the irreconcilable hostility between the Arab and Jewish peoples in Palestine. The very policy of the mandatory, on the other hand, has shown itself to be connected in mote ways than one with the insistence of certain Arab and Jewish politicians upon their conflicting claims. As a result of this policy, the opposing claims of certain Jewish and Arab leaders have become and remain one of the outstanding features of political life in Palestine.

The wide scope allowed to chauvinistic agitation of both an anti-Jewish and an anti-Arab nature has formed the framework within which serious crimes are being perpetrated against Site common interests of both peoples and of co-operation between them. The attacks of the chauvinistic Arab Press are not directed only against individuals but against the Jewish people as a whole, their aspirations and their efforts in the economic and social fields, The Jewish reactionary is free to propagate the idea of absolute Jewish domination over the whole of Palestine without any regard for the fundamental interests of the Arab population. Chauvinistic occurrences of this kind take place frequently without resort by the mandatory to the measures with which it is invested for the purpose of maintaining law and order and for safeguarding the peace. 
Several crimes, the victims of which were per-sons who had endeavoured to bring the two peoples of Palestine together, have been committed. Among the victims were Fawzi el Husseini, a prominent Arab representative of the group which is working for Arab-Jewish rapprochement, who was murdered, and others. The criminals, however, have gone undiscovered and unpunished. 
Propaganda in favour of the economic boycott is conducted at public meetings and through the Press. Such propaganda, coupled not infrequently with threats from which the Palestine population does not feel that it is protected, has led to truly serious consequences. The Arab boycott was accompanied by counter-measures on the part of the Jews. Trade between Jews and Arabs, which after 1985 had reached a sum amounting to several million Palestine pounds (the Arabs bought goods worth £.P.850,000 in 1985 and worth £.P.8,000,000 in 1948; the Jews bought goods worth £P.2,500,000 in 1948, i.e. three times more than in 1985) has now dropped to less than half of what it had been.
 
11.  The instances mentioned above show that what is here involved is a deliberate and planned effort to deepen the gulf between the two peoples of Palestine. The fact that such drastic and pernicious measures are finding application in the settling of relations in Palestine has been rendered possible by the lack of democratic conditions for the settlement of Arab-Jewish relations. Both the Zionist and Arab leaders have failed to make the necessary efforts to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence in their relations. Owing to the absence of self- governing institutions, it has been possible for the hegemonistic leadership of both sides to put forth and persistently maintain quite conflicting claims without this leading to an immediate and complete breakdown in the economic and social life of the country and in the activities of the administration, and without having to bear adequate responsibility for the harm done to the public interests of the country. 
 
12.   The peaceful daily co-operation between the two peoples and the rapid strengthening of the parties and organizations which are working for a solution of the Palestine problem on a basis e" mutual respect between, and of equal rights for, the peoples of Palestine are the foundations for the equitable settlement of Arab-Jewish relations. On the Arab side there is the National Liberation League, the League of Intellectuals, the trade union movement; on the Jewish side there is the Hashomer Hatzair, Ihud, the Communist Party, and the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement, which are the leading forces represented in this trend. The efforts of these parties and their development are meeting with very considerable obstacles because of the policy of the mandatory, and especially because of the fact that there are no democratic and self-governing institutions in existence in Palestine today. These forces are obviously handicapped in the present situation since they are deprived of the possibility of influencing, through freely-elected self-governing institutions, the policy of the government and of contributing their share in accordance with their influence on, and prestige among, the population. The fact that these forces are gaining in strength daily, even under such unfavourable circumstances, shows that their strivings correspond to the interests and aspirations of the population, and that they are increasingly becoming one of the decisive factors in the development of Palestine.
 
 
 
E. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
 
1.   In analysing the various possible proposals regarding the future government of Palestine, I feel that, one should pay particular attention, in addition to the theoretical forms and the substance of such a future government, to the specific features of the problem we are dealing with. Above all, one must bear in mind the fact that the population of Palestine consists of ewe peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. 
 
2.   From this fact, which nobody denies, arises the most important task we have to face in settling the Palestine problem. 
The most important task confronting us is undoubtedly that of regulating relations between the Arab and the Jewish peoples in Palestine, where they are living together. 
 
3. This approach to the most important task involved in the settling of this problem which is itself a result of historical development-a task which is definitely based upon the terms of reference our Committee has been given by the General Assembly of the United Nations-clearly points to the limitation contained in the terms of reference, that is, to the fact that we are not dealing with a solution to the Jewish problem in general which exists, and in so far as it exists in the world. 
 
4. Bearing these facts in mind, regardless of our appraisal of international developments in the course of the First World War, the inter-war period, and the Second World War and its aftermath, we must give due consideration to another specific feature of the problem: 
(a) Present ethnical conditions in Palestine and the numerical relationship between the Arab and the Jewish population are largely a result of the immigration of individuals and families belonging to the Jewish people who hitherto had been living in other countries, as well as a result of the considerable population increase which is characteristic of the Arab people living in Palestine.
(b)   There exists among the Jewish people, no matter where they live, a great and deeply rooted striving for the, establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine; this striving is largely responsible for the achievement of their national and political unity within the Zionist organization and has been considerably strengthened by the terrible persecutions and the extermination to which the Jewish people have been subjected by aggressive and criminal nazism in the course of the last war and, to a certain extent, even since its conclusion. 
(c)   Some 800,000 individuals and families of Jewish people, whose place of origin is certain European countries, are living as displaced persons in concentration camps in Germany, Austria, Italy and Cyprus; although their conditions are, objectively, more or less difficult, more or less favourable, all these people are in a state of great moral, psychological and psychic depression. A very high percentage of these Jews (nearly one hundred per cent) wish to join the Jewish people in Palestine and to start a new life in the Jewish National Home already established in that country.
(d)   Under the White Paper of 1939, which is still in force, there is a legal immigration of 18,000 per annum into Palestine. One-half of this number come from concentration camps in Europe, and the other half are taken from the Cyprus concentration camp; to their number must be added those immigrants who enter the country on the basis of duly issued certificates. 
 
5.   These facts, as well as the limitations referred to in paragraph 3, make it imperative to establish an objective criterion upon which t base our considerations and conclusions regarding the question of the immigration of Jews into Palestine. 
The question of settling relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, a question which has acquired international significance, is the most important aspect of the Palestine problem as well as of the problem of the future fate of Jews in camps for displaced persons (which problem, together with that of persons of other nationalities possessing a similar status, has acquired international significance). These two problems have a certain measure of mutual interdependence, as is the case with all international questions in general. 
That is why the objective criterion just men• tinned is to be found in this degree of interdependence, on the understanding that the essential task remains the regulation of relations between the Arabs and Jews living in Palestine, which is their common country. 
 
6.   As the population of Palestine consists of two peoples, the preliminary question naturally arises as to the rights which are to be recognized as belonging to those peoples forming the population of Palestine. As regards this question, and on the basis of an analysis of historical facts, I fully accept the point of view that both these peoples, the Arabs and the Jews, have historical roots in Palestine, in other words, that Palestine is the homeland of both these peoples and that they both play an important part in the economic and cultural life of the country. In view of these facts and of existing conditions in Palestine and among its population, the surest means in achieving the fundamental goal-that is, the regulation of relations between the Arab and the Jewish peoples living in the country-is for these two peoples to reach an understanding. 

 

7.   In so far as there is no such understanding at the present time owing to conditions inside the country, to influences which have been and are being exerted, to the extreme attitudes of the national fronts which have appeared there and to the feelings which have either taken shape naturally or have deliberately been fanned, and if such an understanding is not to be expected under present conditions, we should all the more be guided by motives of a purely objective character in considering and solving the problem we have before us, by motives based on realities and on democratic principles which have been confirmed by history. For, this is the surest method of creating fundamentally changed conditions which will make it possible for the two peoples to reach an understanding regarding the proposed solution, and subsequently to coin to an agreement on all questions arising from their life together in their common State. This method is all the more essential if the proposed solution involves the moral and pa litical prestige of the United Nations. 

 
8.   The right of independence, freedom and self-government is a fundamental democratic right of every people. One of the basic elements of the proposals put forward for the solution of the Palestine problem must provide for the termination of conditions which have, against the will of the Palestine population, rendered it impossible for the peoples of the country to develop self-government and achieve the independence of their country. 
Therefore, in considering the different principles and premises on which the solution of the Palestine problem is to be based, I reject the point of view that self-government and independence for Palestine should be put into effect solely by means of international measures which are now being taken. I consider, on the con-wary, that these will have been achieved through the consciousness which the Arab people have displayed and the struggle they have waged through many decades, and of the consciousness and struggle of the Jewish people in more re-cent years; and I consider that the international action which is now in progress is only a means whereby these existing conditions are to be acknowledged and a solution found, if possible, by peaceful means. 
 
9.   In so far as it shall be necessary, for reasons of a technical nature, to establish a transitional regime in order to implement the decisions concerning the recognition of the independence of the peoples of Palestine, this regime should be limited to the shortest period possible and should be confined to the most indispensable co-operation required for putting the decisions into effect. 
Such a point of view precludes any possibility of the continuation of the Mandate in any form whatsoever or of the establishment of any kind of trusteeship. This point of view requires the General Assembly of the United Nations to set up, under the provisions of the Charter, an ad hoc body responsible to the United Nations which will be entrusted with the above task. 
 
10.   The granting of equal, individual rights-civil, political, religious and cultural-to all the inhabitants of Palestine will constitute a further step in the application of democratic principles under the proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem. 
 
11.   In view of the specific aspects of the problem, referred to in paragraph 1, what is here involved is not merely the equality of the in-habitants of Palestine in respect of individual rights, but also equal rights for the Arab and Jewish peoples in their common State. This is based on the acknowledgment of both historical and existing facts since both peoples have historical roots in the same country; there can be no question of majority rights or minority protection. 
Concepts such as sovereignty, the right of self-determination, the right to self-government, independence and freedom, are the fundamental democratic principles which should guide us in dealing with peoples and their territories. However, for the very reason that we are dealing with peoples and their territories, and in order correctly to apply these basic principles, it must be borne in mind how essential it is to ascertain whether only one people has its historical roots in this territory, or whether there is a second people which also has its historical roots in this territory and lives there. What we have here is the latter case. Thus, in this particular case, all the rights referred to are vested in both pea pies concurrently. The democratic principle of majority and minority is by no means affected here, because it will still find expression in the social and political life of the country; that principle cannot, however, nor should it be al-lowed to, become instrumental in whittling down or jeopardizing these fundamental demo static principles and rights, which belong to both peoples in their common territory and in their common country. 
The basic assumption for such a conclusion is the historical and dynamic development of every national community in the spheres of state, political, social and economic life. However, contrary to these assumptions, which do not require proving, should we be justified in expecting that something else, something exceptional, will occur in Palestine-that some sort of static conditions will prevail, that the future development will be marked by stagnation instead of the normal process of political differentiation in any form of economic progress then, such an exceptional case would be something sui generic, something wherein, contrary to human experience hereto, some kind of other factors are in operation. Such exceptional conditions would require an exceptional solution. 
Should the existence of such highly improbable and exceptional static conditions be ascertained after some time in the national, social, political and economic life of the country, then, as regards Palestine and the future of its people, we must resort to that democratic principle which may be considered the highest achievement of progressive human thought. I am referring to the right of secession. 
 
12. An essential premise on which our considerations of the problems and solutions should be based is the unquestionable fact that Palestine, within its present frontiers, constitutes an economic unit. 
 
13. The proposal put forward and the solution of the problem which may possibly be based on such a proposal should, both in general outline and in detail, be of a nature to promote; above all, peaceful life and development ins,; Palestine, and peace-both peace in the area of which Palestine is a part and world peace. 
 
14. In view of the historical fact that Pales tine as a whole constitutes, in the eyes of mil-lions throughout the world, a high spiritual '; value because it contains the Holy Places, some kind of corptu separatum with an international control consisting of representatives of the United , Nations and of all the religions concerned should,, be established. 
***
On the basis of such considerations, fundamental principles and premises, bearing in mind existing realities in Palestine, and prompted by a sincere desire to achieve a just and lasting solution of the problem and to settle correctly relations between Arabs and Jews in their common homeland, I have decided to propose a federal State, based on the equality of the Arab " and Jewish peoples in a free and independent Palestine, their common State.
 
 

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