>Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture
>Vol. 24, No. 12, December 2000, p. 5
>
>CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS: The Serbs
>By Srdja Trifkovic
>
>The Serbs, after a decade of being treated as the designated demons of
>Europe, were, in the first week of October, tranformed by Western media and
>politicians into a nation of Walesas and Havels. The ethnic cleansing and
>mass rape stories were gone, replaced by those of freedom, democracy and
>gallantry. As Matthew Parris remarked in The Times of London, "We love
>them/We love them not. If I was a brave Serb/beastly Serb, I'd be feeling
>confused this morning." The entire Serbian nation was humanized in about
>five minutes, which must be a record even for CNN's spin doctors.
>
>But most Serbs did not care what the rest of the world thought of them as
>they took to the streets to depose Slobodan Milosevic. That misshapen
>communist apparatchik - who had never been any kind of nationalist, let
>alone the "greater Serbian chauvinist" - was determined to maintain power
>for as long as he could feed on the ever-shrinking innards of Serbia. In
>spite of controlling the media and the money, Milosevic was beaten,
>convincingly and on the first round, by an unassuming lawyer of integrity
>and intellect, Vojislav Kostunica. Having lost the vote, he tried to steal
>the election by fraud.
>
>Until election day, even Milosevic's enemies had grudging respect for his
>creative deviousness. But when he found himself reduced to stealing wallets
>in broad daylight, he was doomed. The magic was gone. In the aftermath of
>the election, his subjects lost their respect him, and thus they no longer
>feared him.
>
>Kostunica and his opposition partners were prepared for the attempted
>theft. They immediately denounced the federal election commission's claim
>that Kostunica was one percentage point short of a simple majority and
>called for a general strike. "The Boss" obviously did not have an ace up
>his sleeve, and the initial trickle of desertions from his ranks turned
>into a flood. The deserters included some astute police generals whose
>pragmatism was coupled with insight into the mood in the streets. The fear
>that the military would violently suppress the protests - as it did in
>March 1991, when Milosevic ordered tanks to the streets of Belgrade -
>proved unfounded. Finally, on October 5, the police let hundreds of
>thousands of demonstrators take over the parliament building and the main
>TV station. Milosevic's reign had ended
>
>Milosevic's main problem in the crucial ten days after the election was
>that the prospect of deliverance from his 13-year rule had irrevocably
>gripped the imagination of millions of Serbs. They could see the end of the
>disastrous Milosevic era, and with it the end of sanctions and of the
>institutionalized paranoia that thrived on Washington's Serbophobic Balkans
>policy, and the vision proved contagious - even within Milosevic's
>establishment.
>
>At the time of this writing, with every Western worthy and his uncle
>packing bags for Belgrade, there is still some talk of an attempted
>comeback by Milosevic, but the danger is probably exaggerated. As Serbia's
>deposed ruling couple ponder their shrinking options in the isolation of
>their suburban villa, they are more likely belatedly attempting to come to
>terms with reality. Their fate may be humiliating, but it is still
>preferable to that of previous Balkan despots on a losing streak - as the
>ghosts of Nicolae and Elena Ceaucescu could testify.
>
>http://www.rockfordinstitute.org/
>
>Vol. 24, No. 12, December 2000, p. 5
>
>CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS: The Serbs
>By Srdja Trifkovic
>
>The Serbs, after a decade of being treated as the designated demons of
>Europe, were, in the first week of October, tranformed by Western media and
>politicians into a nation of Walesas and Havels. The ethnic cleansing and
>mass rape stories were gone, replaced by those of freedom, democracy and
>gallantry. As Matthew Parris remarked in The Times of London, "We love
>them/We love them not. If I was a brave Serb/beastly Serb, I'd be feeling
>confused this morning." The entire Serbian nation was humanized in about
>five minutes, which must be a record even for CNN's spin doctors.
>
>But most Serbs did not care what the rest of the world thought of them as
>they took to the streets to depose Slobodan Milosevic. That misshapen
>communist apparatchik - who had never been any kind of nationalist, let
>alone the "greater Serbian chauvinist" - was determined to maintain power
>for as long as he could feed on the ever-shrinking innards of Serbia. In
>spite of controlling the media and the money, Milosevic was beaten,
>convincingly and on the first round, by an unassuming lawyer of integrity
>and intellect, Vojislav Kostunica. Having lost the vote, he tried to steal
>the election by fraud.
>
>Until election day, even Milosevic's enemies had grudging respect for his
>creative deviousness. But when he found himself reduced to stealing wallets
>in broad daylight, he was doomed. The magic was gone. In the aftermath of
>the election, his subjects lost their respect him, and thus they no longer
>feared him.
>
>Kostunica and his opposition partners were prepared for the attempted
>theft. They immediately denounced the federal election commission's claim
>that Kostunica was one percentage point short of a simple majority and
>called for a general strike. "The Boss" obviously did not have an ace up
>his sleeve, and the initial trickle of desertions from his ranks turned
>into a flood. The deserters included some astute police generals whose
>pragmatism was coupled with insight into the mood in the streets. The fear
>that the military would violently suppress the protests - as it did in
>March 1991, when Milosevic ordered tanks to the streets of Belgrade -
>proved unfounded. Finally, on October 5, the police let hundreds of
>thousands of demonstrators take over the parliament building and the main
>TV station. Milosevic's reign had ended
>
>Milosevic's main problem in the crucial ten days after the election was
>that the prospect of deliverance from his 13-year rule had irrevocably
>gripped the imagination of millions of Serbs. They could see the end of the
>disastrous Milosevic era, and with it the end of sanctions and of the
>institutionalized paranoia that thrived on Washington's Serbophobic Balkans
>policy, and the vision proved contagious - even within Milosevic's
>establishment.
>
>At the time of this writing, with every Western worthy and his uncle
>packing bags for Belgrade, there is still some talk of an attempted
>comeback by Milosevic, but the danger is probably exaggerated. As Serbia's
>deposed ruling couple ponder their shrinking options in the isolation of
>their suburban villa, they are more likely belatedly attempting to come to
>terms with reality. Their fate may be humiliating, but it is still
>preferable to that of previous Balkan despots on a losing streak - as the
>ghosts of Nicolae and Elena Ceaucescu could testify.
>
>http://www.rockfordinstitute.org/
>