Jugoinfo

(english / deutsch.

Di seguito, in due lingue diverse, il primo articolo di una serie che l'ottimo portale di controinformazione tedesco German Foreign Policy dedica alle guerre fatte dalla Germania nell'ultimo ventennio. Si comincia con quella mirata a strappare la provincia del Kosovo alla Serbia e a cancellare la Federazione jugoslava dalle cartine geografiche: scatenata nella primavera del 1999 assieme ad altri paesi NATO, il suo bilancio può dirsi catastrofico viste le condizioni misere in cui quella provincia versa tutt'oggi, tra corruzione, povertà, criminalità internazionale, fondamentalismo islamico, disoccupazione, sciovinismo pan-albanese, desertificazione delle attività produttive, tensioni immutate con tutti i popoli confinanti, regime di apartheid interno, eccetera. La situazione è tale che decine di migliaia di persone ogni anno cercano di emigrare: si calcola che solo tra il 2014 e il 2015 ben il 2,56% dei residenti abbia chiesto asilo politico in Germania – in grande prevalenza albanofoni – dove però non può ottenerlo perché ufficialmente con la guerra del 1999 la NATO ha "liberato" e "democratizzato" la provincia. Vero e proprio "buco nero" che risucchia miliardi di euro di "aiuti" internazionali, il Kosovo è da 17 anni sotto il controllo militare delle truppe NATO comandate da generali italiani e tedeschi che si alternano, di nuovo come sotto il nazifascismo.)


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http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/59435

Deutschlands Kriegsbilanz (I)
 
07.09.2016
BERLIN/PRISTINA
 
(Eigener Bericht) - Rund 17 Jahre nach dem NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien und dem Beginn der Besetzung des Kosovo auch durch Deutschland bescheinigen Beobachter dem De-facto-Protektorat desolate politische, ökonomische und soziale Verhältnisse. Die Folgen des ersten Kriegs, in dem die Bundesrepublik eine wirklich bedeutende Rolle spielte, sind katastrophal: Unter faktischer Kontrolle der EU herrscht in Priština eine Elite, die enger Verflechtungen mit der Organisierten Kriminalität und schwerster Kriegsverbrechen bezichtigt wird und deren ausufernde Korruption in der Bevölkerung zunehmend frustrierte Resignation bewirkt. 34 Prozent der Bevölkerung leben in absoluter, zwölf Prozent in extremer Armut; die Gesundheitsversorgung ist miserabel, die Lebenserwartung liegt um fünf Jahre unter derjenigen der angrenzenden Staaten und um zehn Jahre unter dem Durchschnitt der EU. Blutige Racheaktionen mit Schusswaffen würden "beharrlich betrieben", heißt es darüber hinaus in einem Bericht, der vom Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge in Auftrag gegeben wurde und der auf die auch sonst erschütternde Lage in puncto Menschenrechte verweist. - (Teil 1 einer Serie, in der german-foreign-policy.com - aus Anlass der Ankündigung Berlins, in Zukunft stärker "global" intervenieren zu wollen, auch militärisch - die Folgen der deutschen Kriege aus den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten bilanziert.)
De-facto-Protektorat
Rund 17 Jahre nach dem NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien und der anschließenden Besetzung der südserbischen Provinz Kosovo auch durch die Bundeswehr wird das Kosovo von den Mächten der EU auch weiterhin faktisch als Protektorat geführt. Die EU ist in der Hauptstadt Priština mit einem Sonderbeauftragten präsent, der schon deswegen über massiven Einfluss verfügt, weil die EU die kosovarische Regierung mit hohen Zuschüssen funktionsfähig hält. Seit 1999 sollen zwischen fünf und sechs Milliarden Euro nach Priština geflossen sein, wenngleich ein mutmaßlich hoher Anteil daran in die Taschen korrupter Politiker oder Staatsangestellter geflossen ist. Die EU übt darüber hinaus mit ihrer "Rechtsstaatsmission" EULEX ("European Rule of Law in Kosovo") erheblichen Einfluss im Sezessionsgebiet aus, wobei ihr immer wieder vorgeworfen wird, selbst zutiefst in die kosovarische Korruption verstrickt zu sein.[1] Auch die NATO-Truppe KFOR (Kosovo Force) ist bis heute im Kosovo stationiert, um größere Aufstände oder auch soziale Konflikte bei Bedarf niederschlagen zu können. Sie wird seit Jahren abwechselnd von deutschen und italienischenen Generälen kommandiert. Der Anspruch der südserbischen Provinz auf Eigenstaatlichkeit wird bis heute nur von 109 der insgesamt 193 UN-Mitgliedstaaten anerkannt; sogar die EU ist gespalten, fünf EU-Staaten (Griechenland, Rumänien, Slowakei, Spanien, Zypern) verweigern ihr trotz massiven deutschen Drucks die Anerkennung - bis heute.
Kriegsverbrechen, Organisierte Kriminalität
Gegen die kosovarischen Eliten, die sich unter der Aufsicht insbesondere der EU in Priština an der Macht halten, werden ungebrochen schwere, ja schwerste Vorwürfe wegen Korruption und wegen Kriegsverbrechen erhoben. EULEX ist es, wie Beobachter kritisieren, seit dem Beginn ihrer Arbeit im Jahr 2008 nicht gelungen, auch nur einen einzigen führenden kosovarischen Politiker einer Verurteilung wegen Korruption zuzuführen. Als starker Mann des Sezessionsgebietes gilt seit 1999 Hashim Thaçi, der gegenwärtig als Präsident in Priština amtiert. Thaçi wird seit je als Anführer der kosovarischen Mafia eingestuft; gegen ihn sind mehrfach Vorwürfe erhoben worden, selbst oder über enge Mitarbeiter in den Mord an Serben, die Entnahme ihrer Organe und den Handel damit involviert gewesen zu sein (german-foreign-policy.com berichtete [2]). Ähnliches wird einer Reihe weiterer kosovarischer Spitzenpolitiker vorgeworfen, etwa Ramush Haradinaj.[3] Trotz massiver Obstruktion des kosovarischen Parlaments wird in Kürze ein Sondergericht erste Anklagen wegen kosovarischer Kriegsverbrechen erheben; sie könnten auch kosovarische Spitzenpolitiker treffen. Die Chance, dass es - 17 Jahre nach den Taten - zu Verurteilungen kommt, muss als nicht allzu günstig eingeschätzt werden: Zu dem langen zeitlichen Abstand kommt die Erfahrung hinzu, dass bereits bei den - wenigen - früheren Verfahren Zeugen entweder überraschend ums Leben kamen oder angesichts der sich häufenden Zahl derartiger Todesfälle ihre Bereitschaft zur Aussage gegen die neuen Machthaber in Priština zurückzogen. Die mutmaßlichen Täter kamen bislang straffrei davon.
Beschäftigungsquote: 28 Prozent
Die von der EU im Amt gehaltene korrupt-mafiöse Führung in Priština verantwortet nicht nur eine weitreichende politische Frustration in der Bevölkerung; die Wahlbeteilung sank im Jahr 2014 trotz der Wählermobilisierung interessierter Clans auf 42 Prozent. Auch Proteste drohen; im Januar 2015 etwa kam es kurz nach der Regierungsbildung zu den heftigsten Unruhen seit der Proklamation der Eigenstaatlichkeit im Jahr 2008. Die politische Kultur in Priština, die spürbar zur Resignation auf Seiten der kosovarischen Bevölkerung beiträgt, lässt sich nicht umfassend, aber doch in Ansätzen durch den Hinweis darauf beschreiben, dass Parlamentsdebatten in der Hauptstadt zuweilen mit Tränengas geführt werden, zuletzt am 9. August.[4] Zudem verantworten die kosovarischen Eliten die desolate wirtschaftliche und soziale Lage in dem Gebiet. Das Kosovo verzeichnet ein Pro-Kopf-Einkommen von durchschnittlich weniger als 2.800 Euro im Jahr und ist vollständig von Hilfen der EU und Rücküberweisungen im Ausland lebender Kosovo-Albaner abhängig. Echter ökonomischer Aufschwung ist nicht in Sicht. Die Arbeitslosigkeit ist exzessiv hoch; die Beschäftigungsquote liegt bei gerade einmal 28 Prozent.[5] 34 Prozent der Bevölkerung leben laut einem Bericht, der im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) erstellt wurde, mit einem täglichen Durchschnittseinkommen von weniger als 1,55 Euro in absoluter Armut, zwölf Prozent mit einem Durchschnittseinkommen von weniger als 1,02 Euro sogar in extremer Armut, wobei Minderheiten wie Roma dem Bericht zufolge "überproportional stark betroffen" sind. Das Sozialsystem ist laut dem BAMF-Bericht "nur rudimentär ausgebaut und bietet keine angemessene Versorgung"; das Gesundheitssystem stagniert ebenfalls "auf einfachem Niveau". "Der Gesundheitszustand der Bevölkerung ist entsprechend unbefriedigend", heißt es weiter in dem Dokument: "So liegt die Lebenserwartung um fünf Jahre niedriger als in den Nachbarstaaten und um zehn Jahre niedriger als in der EU." Die Kindersterblichkeit sei "die höchste in Europa".
Blutrache
Miserabel ist nicht zuletzt die menschenrechtliche Situation. So konstatiert der im Auftrag des BAMF erstellte Bericht, dass - 17 Jahre nach dem Einmarsch der NATO, die den Krieg gegen Jugoslawien 1999 im Namen der Menschenrechte vom Zaun brach - die kosovarischen Clans ganz ungehindert archaischen Normen huldigen. "Gerade bei der ländlichen Bevölkerung", heißt es höflich in dem Bericht, "sind althergebrachte Sitten, Tradition und Kultur noch sehr lebendig".[6] Unter "althergebrachten Sitten" ist demnach zum Beispiel zu verstehen, dass "nicht die staatlichen Institutionen und deren Sanktionsmöglichkeiten im Zentrum stehen, sondern die Familien oder Familienverbände (Clans)". Diese wiederum wendeten, heißt es, "ein Relikt aus dem albanischen Gewohnheitsrecht" an, nämlich "die Tradition der kosovo-albanischen Blutrache". Zwar sei "die reine Tradition der Blutrache" heute "nur noch vereinzelt anzutreffen"; davon zu unterscheiden seien allerdings allgemeine "Racheakte", bei denen "die Hemmschwelle, eine Schusswaffe zu benutzen, oft sehr niedrig" sei und die "beharrlich betrieben" würden.
Schüsse und Molotowcocktails
Entsprechend gestaltet sich die allgemeine Menschenrechtslage, die sich unter Protektoratsaufsicht der EU entwickelt hat. Ein Bericht der Vereinten Nationen verzeichnet für den Zeitraum vom 16. April bis zum 15. Juli insgesamt 86 gewalttätige "Zwischenfälle" - meist Angriffe auf Angehörige der serbischsprachigen Minderheit. Dazu zählten das Abfeuern von Schüssen auf das Haus eines serbischsprachigen Politikers und ein Molotowcocktailangriff auf eine von der Polizei geschützte Gruppe, die einen serbisch-orthodoxen Feiertag beging; nur aufgrund glücklicher Umstände kam niemand zu Schaden.[7] Wie Amnesty International berichtet, wurden im Jahr 2015 noch 1.650 Menschen vermisst, die während der bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen der Jahre 1998 und 1999 verschwanden; die EU-Mission EULEX zog es vor, in Fällen, die serbischsprachige Bewohner des Kosovo betrafen, nicht angemessen zu ermitteln.[8] Minderheiten wie Roma oder Aschkali leiden laut Amnesty "weiterhin unter institutionalisierter Diskriminierung"; "tätliche Angriffe auf Lesben, Schwule, Bisexuelle, Transgeschlechtliche und Intersexuelle sowie andere Hassverbrechen", heißt es weiter, seien von den Behörden gar nicht erst untersucht worden. Dass zahlreiche Journalisten beklagen, ihrer Arbeit wegen Bedrohungen oder tätlicher Angriffe nicht angemessen nachgehen zu können, entspricht dem allgemeinen Befund.
Kein Grund zur Flucht
Die Verhältnisse im deutsch-europäischen Protektorat Kosovo haben die Einwohner der Provinz zuletzt in Scharen auf die Flucht getrieben. Allein von November 2014 bis März 2015 verließen mehr als 50.000 Kosovo-Albaner ihr Land; bei einer Einwohnerzahl von insgesamt 1,8 Millionen entspricht dies einem Anteil an der Gesamtbevölkerung von 2,78 Prozent. Einen Asylantrag in Deutschland stellten laut Auskunft des Bundesinnenministeriums im Jahr 2014 insgesamt 8.923 Einwohner des Kosovo, im Jahr 2015 37.095; zusammengenommen sind das gut 2,56 Prozent der Gesamtbevölkerung. Chancen auf Asyl haben sie faktisch nicht: Schließlich wurde ihr Land 1999 von Deutschland und der NATO "befreit"; Fluchtgründe, die aus Sicht der deutschen Behörden nachvollziehbar und zulässig sind, liegen also nicht vor.

[1] Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Hg.): Kosovo. Länderreport Band 3. Aktuelle Lage, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechtslage. Mai 2015.
[2] S. dazu Teil des Westens geworden und Ein privilegierter Partner.
[3] S. dazu Politische Freundschaften und Heldenfigur.
[4] Adelheid Wölfl: Wieder Tränengaseinsatz im kosovarischen Parlament. derstandard.at 11.08.2016.
[5], [6] Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Hg.): Kosovo. Länderreport Band 3. Aktuelle Lage, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechtslage. Mai 2015.
[7] Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. UNSC S/2016/666, 29.07.2016.
[8] Amnesty Report 2016: Serbien (einschliesslich Kosovo). www.amnesty.de.


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Germany's War Record (I)
 
2016/09/07
BERLIN/PRIŠTINA
 
(Own report) - Around 17 years after NATO's war against Yugoslavia and the beginning of the occupation of Kosovo with German participation, observers note that the de-facto protectorate is in a desolate political, economic and social condition. The first war in which the Federal Republic of Germany played an important role has had catastrophic consequences. De facto under EU control, Priština's ruling elite is accused of having close ties to organized crime and having committed the most serious war crimes. Its rampant corruption is spreading frustrated resignation within the population. Thirty-four percent of the population is living in absolute - and twelve percent in extreme - poverty, healthcare is deplorable, life expectancy is five years less than that of its neighboring countries and ten years below the EU's average. A report commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), describes the horrifying human rights situation, which includes vendettas "constantly carried out" with firearms. (This is part 1 of a german-foreign-policy.com series, reporting on consequences of German military interventions over the past two decades, in light of the German government's announcement of plans to increase its "global" - including military - interventions.)
De-facto Protectorate
Around 17 years after NATO's war against Yugoslavia, and its subsequent occupation of the south Serbian Kosovo Province - with the participation of the German Bundeswehr - the EU is still treating Kosovo like a de-facto protectorate. The EU maintains a presence in the capital, Priština, with a special envoy, who has enormous influence simply because large EU subsidies guarantee the functioning of Kosovo's government. Since 1999, the EU is said to have transferred five to six billion Euros to Priština, although a large portion has allegedly filled the pockets of corrupt politicians and government employees. The EU, with its "European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo" (EULEX Kosovo), has massive influence in the secessionist province. EULEX, itself, has repeatedly been accused of being deeply involved in corruption.[1] NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) remains deployed in Kosovo to suppress, if necessary, larger rebellions or social upheavals. German and Italian generals alternately command KFOR. Until now, 109 of the UN's 193 member countries have recognized the southern Serbian province's claim to independent statehood. Even the EU is divided on the question: Despite massive German pressure, five EU members (Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Cyprus) refuse to recognize Kosovo's independence - still today.
War Crimes, Organized Crime
Serious allegations, and even grave accusations of corruption and war crimes have repeatedly been raised against Kosovo's elites, who can remain in power in Priština, particularly under the EU's supervision. Observers criticize the fact that since starting its engagement in 2008, EULEX has failed to obtain even a single conviction of a Kosovo politician for corruption. Since 1999, Hashim Thaçi, Priština's current president, has been considered the strongman in the secessionist province and the head of Kosovo's mafia. He has repeatedly been accused of having been involved - either personally or through close associates - in murdering Serbs, and removing and trafficking their organs. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[2]) Similar accusations have been leveled at other top politicians in Kosovo, such as Ramush Haradinaj.[3] Despite the Kosovo parliament's massive obstruction, a special court will soon hand down the first indictments for Kosovo war crimes, possibly also against leading politicians of Kosovo. The chances - 17 years after the crimes - of obtaining convictions are slim, not only because of the time lapse, but also because of experience. In earlier trials, witnesses died suddenly or became intimidated by the growing numbers of these deaths, and lost their will to testify against those in power in Priština. The alleged perpetrators got away with impunity.
Employment Rate: 28 Percent
The corrupt, mafia-like administration, maintained in office in Priština by the EU, is not only responsible for the widespread political frustration in the population - in 2014 electoral participation dropped to 42 percent - in spite of voter mobilization by certain clans. Protests are simmering. Since the 2008 proclamation of independence, the most virulent protests erupted shortly following the formation of the government in January 2015. Priština's political culture clearly contributes to increasing sense of resignation within Kosovo's population. The fact, for example, that teargas has repeatedly been used during parliamentary debates - most recently, on August 9 - can at least partially explain this resignation.[4] However, Kosovo's elite is also responsible for the region's desolate economic and social situation. Kosovo has an annual average per capita income of less than 2,800 Euros and is totally dependant upon EU aid and money transfers from relatives living abroad. A real economic upswing is nowhere in sight. Unemployment is excessively high. The employment rate is no more than 28 percent.[5] According to a report commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), 34 percent of the population, with a daily average income of less than €1.55, is languishing in absolute poverty. Twelve percent, with a daily average income of less than €1.02, is suffering extreme poverty. Minorities such as the Roma are being "disproportionately affected." The social system is "only rudimentary, and does not provide adequate service," the BAMF reports. The health system is stagnating "at a low level," therefore, "the public health situation is inadequate." "Life expectancy is five years less than that of its neighboring countries and ten years below the EU's average." The child mortality rate is "the highest in Europe."
Vendetta
Moreover, the human rights situation is deplorable. The BAMF-commissioned report notes that - 17 years after the NATO invasion, which set off the 1999 war against Yugoslavia in the name of human rights - Kosovo clans have a free hand in continuing to honor archaic standards. "Particularly among the rural population," the report politely notes, "archaic customs, traditions and culture are still very much alive."[6] "Archaic customs" refers, for example, to the fact that "the focus is not on official institutions and their means of penalization, but rather on families or extended families (clans)." They use "a relic of the Albanian customary law," namely "the tradition of the Kosovo Albanian vendetta." "The pure vendetta tradition, is only occasionally practiced" today. A differentiation must be made between a vendetta and general "acts of vengeance," which are "constantly carried out." "The threshold for use of a firearm is often very low."
Shots and Molotov Cocktails
An overall human rights situation has correspondingly developed under the EU's protectorate supervision. A United Nations report listed 86 violent "incidents" - mostly aimed at members of the Serb-speaking minority, between April 16 and July 15. These attacks included shots being fired at the house of a Serbian politician and a Molotov cocktail attack on a police-escorted convoy of persons celebrating a Serbian Orthodox holiday. There were luckily no injuries.[7] As Amnesty International reported, in 2015, 1,650 people, who had disappeared during armed conflicts in 1998 and 1999, were still missing. The EU's EULEX mission preferred not to properly investigate cases involving Serb-speaking inhabitants of Kosovo.[8] Amnesty reports that, minorities such as Roma or Ashkali are "still suffering under institutional discrimination," while "physical attacks against lesbians, homosexuals, bisexuals, transgender and intersexes as well as other hate crimes" are not even investigated by the authorities. The fact that numerous journalists complain of being hampered in their work through threats or physical attacks, concords with the overall findings.
No Need to Flee
The conditions in the German-EU protectorate of Kosovo have driven large numbers of its inhabitants to flee. Between November 2014 and March 2015 alone, more than 50,000 Kosovo Albanians left the country - 2,78 percent of a population of 1.8 million. In 2014, according to the German Interior Ministry, 8,923 refugees from Kosovo have requested asylum in Germany and 37.095 in 2015 - altogether 2.56 percent of the Kosovo population. De-facto, they will have no chance of obtaining asylum in Germany. After all, Germany and NATO "liberated" their country in 1999. From the German administration's perspective, they have no acceptable reason to flee.

[1] Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Hg.): Kosovo. Länderreport Band 3. Aktuelle Lage, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechtslage. Mai 2015.
[2] See Became Part of the West and Ein privilegierter Partner.
[3] See Political Friendships and Heldenfigur.
[4] Adelheid Wölfl: Wieder Tränengaseinsatz im kosovarischen Parlament. derstandard.at 11.08.2016.
[5], [6] Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Hg.): Kosovo. Länderreport Band 3. Aktuelle Lage, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechtslage. Mai 2015.
[7] Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. UNSC S/2016/666, 29.07.2016.
[8] Amnesty Report 2016: Serbien (einschliesslich Kosovo). www.amnesty.de.





Auf Deutsch: Die Regelung der Reparationsfrage (Griechenland fordert Reparationen für die NS-Aggression – GFP 19.08.2016)
ATHEN/BERLIN (Eigener Bericht) - Der griechische Ministerpräsident Alexis Tsipras stellt eine neue Initiative zur Erzwingung deutscher Reparations- und Entschädigungszahlungen an Griechenland in Aussicht. Wie Tsipras am Dienstag während der Gedenkfeier für die Opfer eines Wehrmachts-Massakers in dem westgriechischen Dorf Kommeno ankündigte, wird Athen "auf diplomatischer und falls nötig auf gerichtlicher Ebene" gegen Berlin vorgehen, sollte die Bundesregierung sich weiterhin weigern, in Reparationsverhandlungen einzutreten. Anfang September soll das griechische Parlament über einen kürzlich fertiggestellten Bericht diskutieren, der die deutsche Reparationsschuld auf 269 Milliarden Euro beziffert. Behauptungen der Bundesregierung, die Reparationsfrage sei "erledigt", treffen nicht zu: Tatsächlich ist die Zahlung einer 1946 verbindlich anerkannten Reparationssumme mit dem Londoner Schuldenabkommen vom Februar 1953 zwar gestundet, aber nicht aufgehoben worden; nur ein Bruchteil von ihr wurde beglichen. Wie Horst Teltschik, ein ehemaliger Berater von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl, bestätigt, hat Bonn sich der Reparationspflicht zu entziehen versucht, indem es den Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag explizit nicht als "Friedensvertrag" einstufte. Man habe befürchtet, mit einem Friedensvertrag plötzlich "Reparationsforderungen von über 50 Staaten auf dem Tisch" zu haben, erklärt Teltschik...
http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/59422



Resolution of the Reparations Issue
 
2016/08/19

ATHENS/BERLIN
 
(Own report) - The Prime Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras has announced a new initiative to force Germany to pay reparations and compensations to Greece. During a memorial service for the victims of a massacre committed by the German Wehrmacht in the western Greek village of Kommeno, on Tuesday, Tsipras declared that, should the Germany government persist in refusing to pay reparations, Athens will seek "through diplomatic channels - and if necessary at the judicial level - " to take action against Berlin. In early September, the Greek parliament is scheduled to discuss a recently completed report quantifying the German reparations debt at 269 billion Euros. German government assertions that the reparations issue has been "closed" are unfounded. In fact, payment of the binding 1946 reparations sum, recognized by the London Debt Agreement of February 1953, had been deferred, but not annulled. Only a fraction of it has been paid. As confirmed by Horst Teltschik, former advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Bonn had sought to evade its reparations obligations by explicitly not qualifying the 2 + 4 Treaty a "Peace Treaty." It had been feared that, with a peace treaty, suddenly "reparations demands from over 50 countries would land on the table," Teltschik explained.
If Necessary, at the Judicial Level
The Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, has announced a new initiative to force German reparations and compensations payments to Greece for crimes committed during the World War II German occupation of that country. Tsipras reiterated that his government would do "everything necessary" to impose reparations - "at the diplomatic, and, if necessary, at the judicial level."[1] He made this announcement in the course of a memorial service for the victims of a massacre committed by the German Wehrmacht on August 16, 1943 in the western Greek village of Kommeno. Within a few hours, 317 defenseless civilians aged from one year old to 90, where abruptly awakened and murdered by the German occupiers. Referring to the Greek parliamentary committee's final report, completed in late July, the Prime Minister explained that this represents the first time that a "national strategy" for dealing with the issue of reparations and compensation payments exists, and is scheduled to be debated officially in parliament at the beginning of September.
269 Billion Euros
The committee's final report has listed the reparations and compensation claims still pending. According to the list, Athens can raise claims for "reparations for material war damages and confiscated property," along with the restitution of the forced loan, the German occupiers extorted from Greece. In addition, reparations are demanded for the victims and their families of German war crimes, and not least of all, the demand for the return of hundreds of stolen archeological artifacts.[2] It is reported that private individuals' claims for reparations is already calculated "at more than 107 billion Euros - before interests." Germany also still owes Greece 9.2 billion Euros in World War I reparations. The forced loan to the Nazi government is usually valued in today's currency at more than 10.3 billion Euros. Altogether, the parliamentary committee arrives at a total of 269 billion Euros in reparations and compensation payments.
To The Hague and the UN
The final report also proposes measures the Greek government could take. According to the authors, a Greek parliamentary delegation should inform parliamentarians of the German Bundestag and the parliaments of other nations of the claims. In a note verbale, the government in Athens should call on Berlin to enter negotiations, they write, and the European Parliament should be called upon to intervene. The conflict could be taken to the United Nations.[3] Should the German government remain intransigent, the case must then be taken before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Athens must also consider the possibility of executing the rulings already handed down by Greek courts and confiscate German property in Greece. Greek courts, in principle, have awarded surviving victims of German war crimes in Distomo, Egio and Rethymno reparations, however, cannot impose the execution of the ruling. The only possibility would be to nationalize the Goethe Institute's Athens' subsidiary and compensate the victims from those proceeds. Under massive German political pressure, the Greek government, so far, has not taken this step.
Berlin's Double Strategy
Since some time, Berlin has been responding to Athens' demands for reparations with a sort of double strategy. On the one hand, Germany claims that there is no legal basis for reparations. The case is "closed." On the other, Berlin offers cheap concessions, from its cultural policies abroad reserves, destined to strangle any further reparations demands. Thus for example, the German government is officially promoting the German-Greek Future Fund - which began functioning September 12, 2014, during a visit of Greek President Karolos Papoulias - as "serving reconciliation and historical analysis between Germany and Greece."[4] This project does not cost 269 billion Euros, but rather annually a million, only the smallest fraction of which actually reaches the victims and their descendents. However, selected historical projects are supposed to give the impression that finally Germany's historical crimes will be comprehensively dealt with. Projects, such as these, are usually administered in the context of cultural policy abroad, not only for the purpose of promoting the image of an alleged "reflective" Germany, but primarily to stave off reparations demands - at the expense of the victims of the Nazis.
Confirmed, then Postponed
Berlin is particularly interested in subduing reparations demands because, contrary to the official German standpoints, these demands remain applicable under international law. The fundamental necessity of reparations payments was confirmed in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference. The first general guidelines were laid down in the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945. November 9, 1945, negotiations began in Paris on their concretization, during which, Greek reparations claims valued at US $7.1 billion - based on the 1938 buying power - were confirmed. Today, this is worth a multiple of that value, even without interests. Experts estimate the value - in 2010 currency - at around US $106.5 billion.[5] In the January 14, 1946 Reparations Agreement of Paris, Greece had been allocated a certain percentage of Germany's available reparations reserves. In fact, Athens received non-cash benefits with an estimated value of only US $25 million.[6] Since signing the London Debt Agreement on February 27, 1953, Bonn has refused to pay any reparations at all. That agreement made an indefinite deferment of reparations for the Federal Republic of Germany. However, it explicitly also provided for a future "final ... settlement of the reparations issue."
Demands from 50 Countries
Throughout the cold war period, the Federal Republic of Germany had turned down demands for the payment of reparations, using the London Debt Agreement as reference, and declaring that reparations claims can only be negotiated after the "reunification" with the German Democratic Republic and the ensuing finalization of a peace treaty. However, Bonn has deliberately qualified the 2 + 4 Treaty, signed September 12, 1990, not as a peace treaty, "not least of all, because of the risk of reparation demands," as former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's advisor Horst Teltschik explained in March 2015. "Not only Greece" could be demanding reparations. "As is known, the Nazi regime was at war with over 50 countries around the world. ... Just imagine, in the context of a peace treaty, we would have had reparations demands from over 50 countries on the table."[7] That is what had to be avoided. However thereby, the "final ... settlement of the reparations issue," stipulated in the London Debt Agreement, which for decades the Federal German government made conditional on a formal peace treaty, was simply postponed further into the future. Should the Greek government carry out Prime Minister Tsipras' announcement, it would now be placed on the agenda.

More on this topic see: Legacy without a Future.
[1] Tsipras zu Reparationen: Werden "alles Notwendige" tun. www.neues-deutschland.de 17.08.2016.
[2], [3] Giorgos Christides: Wie Griechenland von Deutschland 269 Milliarden Euro einklagen könnte. www.spiegel.de 10.08.2016.
[4] "Deutsch-Griechischer Zukunftsfonds" nimmt Arbeit auf. www.auswaertiges-amt.de 12.09.2016.
[5] Karl Heinz Roth: Griechenland am Abgrund. Die deutsche Reparationsschuld. Zweite Auflage. Hamburg 2015.
[6] Hagen Fleischer, Despina Konstantinakou: Ad calendas graecas? Griechenland und die deutsche Wiedergutmachung. In: Hans Günter Hockerts, Claudia Moisel, Tobias Winstel: Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945-2000. Göttingen 2006. S. 375-457.
[7] "Alle Forderungen erledigt". www.deutschlandfunk.de 14.03.2015.





What the Karadzic Trial Didn’t Prove


The Karadzic trial does not purport to show that the Serbian war effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina was unjustified, or that Bosnian-Muslims and Croats were innocent of crimes committed against Serbs during the 1992-95 war.

www.slobodan-milosevic.org - September 1, 2016
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson

Last week, ICTY chief prosecutor Serge Brammertz wrote an article for Al-Jazeeraattempting to downplay the fact that that the Radovan Karadzic trial chamber had exonerated Slobodan Milosevic for crimes committed during the 1992-95 Bosnia War.

Brammertz argued that:

Some government officials throughout the region regularly misrepresent and disregard the judicial and historical record. [...]

Last week marked a new low. To widespread surprise, a thin pretext was seized in an attempt to publicly absolve former President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, of responsibility for the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Some, including the Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, contend that earlier this year the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) exonerated Milosevic in its trial verdict convicting former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

The arguments are not only misguided, but wrong. The only person on trial in Karadzic’s case was Karadzic himself. 

Mr. Brammertz’s assertion that “The only person on trial in Karadzic’s case was Karadzic himself” is somewhat disingenuous. The charges against Milosevic and Karadzic are inexorably linked. Because of the way Mr. Brammertz and his prosecutors structured their indictments one can’t separate the two, and being the ICTY chief prosecutor, Mr. Brammertz ought to know that. 

Milosevic’s culpability was an issue before the Karadzic trial chamber because Mr. Brammertz and his staff made it an issue. The Karadzic indictment accuses Slobodan Milosevic of co-perpetrating a “joint criminal enterprise” together with Radovan Karadzic. That’s why the Karadzic chamber made findings regarding Milosevic’s participation in the alleged “joint criminal enterprise” in first place. If Milosevic’s culpability wasn’t a relevant issue before the Karadzic trial chamber, then the judges wouldn’t have made any findings about him at all.

Mr. Brammertz and the prosecutors working under him charged Milosevic and Karadzic with undertaking the same conspiracy or “joint criminal enterprise” to permanently remove Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from Bosnian Serb territory through the commission of various crimes. Radovan Karadzic’s indictment lists Slobodan Milosevic as his co-conspirator, and Slobodan Milosevic’s indictment lists Radovan Karadzic as his co-conspirator. Milosevic and Karadzic were accused of co-perpetrating exactly the same joint criminal enterprise in Bosnia together.

Paragraph 9 of the indictment against Karadzic says: “Radovan KARADZIC participated in an overarching joint criminal enterprise to permanently remove Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the territories of BiH claimed as Bosnian Serb territory by means which included the commission of [crimes].” And in Paragraph 11 the indictment asserts that “Radovan KARADZIC acted in concert with other members of this criminal enterprise including [...] Slobodan MILOSEVIC”.

Conversely, paragraph 6 of the indictment against Milosevic says: “Slobodan MILOSEVIC participated in the joint criminal enterprise [...] The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the commission of crimes.” And in Paragraph 7, “The individuals participating in this joint criminal enterprise included Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Radovan KARADZIC, [...]”.

The Karadzic chamber’s determination that the evidence against Milosevic was not only “insufficient” to show that he was part of the joint criminal enterprise, but also that there was exculpatory evidence showing that he had limited influence over the Bosnian Serbs, opposed ethnic cleansing, and wanted to find a peace settlement that was fair to the Muslims and the Croats undermines the allegations against him in a very direct and obvious way. 

The presiding judge in the Karadzic case (O-Gon Kwon of South Korea) was one of the three judges who sat on the bench throughout the Milosevic trial. He was certainly aware of the evidence, or more accurately, the lack of evidence against Milosevic. 

Ms. Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff was one of the senior prosecutors in both the Milosevic case and in the Karadzic case. She too would have been aware of evidence against Milosevic, and she had ample opportunity to advise her colleagues or present whatever evidence she had to the chamber during the nearly 8 years that Radovan Karadzic was on trial. 

Moreover, the Karadzic chamber had access to recently disclosed documents that the Milosevic chamber did not. Specifically, they had access to Ratko Mladic’s diaries and they had access to the transcripts of the Supreme Defence Council, both of which they made reference to in their findings pertaining to Milosevic.

It should also be noted that the chamber based its findings mainly on the evidence tendered by prosecutors working for Mr. Brammertz himself. Karadzic had no obligation to defend Milosevic, but the prosecution was certainly obliged to present its evidence against Milosevic because they made allegations against him in the Karadzic indictment -- allegations that the judges rejected. 

The ICTY’s Findings Can Be Questioned

If a senior ICTY official like chief prosecutor Brammertz, and outspoken ICTY apologists like RFE/RL Balkan Service Director Gordana Knezevic, can dispute the Karadzic chamber’s findings regarding Slobodan Milosevic, then others are free to question findings made by ICTY trial chambers. By denying, disputing, or trying to downplay the significance of these findings they have forfeited their right to accuse the Tribunal’s critics of “genocide denial” and “revisionism” for questioning other findings made by the Tribunal. 

If the only findings that the Karadzic chamber was competent to make were the findings related to his acts and conduct alone, and not the acts and conduct of other people (e.g. Slobodan Milosevic), then we can disregard the vast majority of their findings. We can disregard all of the trial chamber’s findings related to the scheduled incidents listed in the indictment because Radovan Karadzic is not alleged to have personally killed or mistreated anyone.

The argument that Brammertz and Knezevic are advancing is a double-edged sword. If the Karadzic chamber is not competent to determine whether Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic participated in a joint criminal enterprise in Bosnia together because Slobodan Milosevic wasn’t officially charged in the Karadzic case, then they’re certainly not competent to determine what Bosnian-Serb military and police personnel, who also weren’t officially charged with crimes in the Karadzic case, did at Srebrenica or in prison camps where Radovan Karadzic was not present. Nor can they credibly determine whether a shell or a bullet came from the Serbian or the Muslim side of the confrontation line in Sarajevo where the alleged shooters were not officially charged in the Karadzic proceedings.

Of course the ICTY’s findings have always been questionable, and that certainly includes some very questionable findings contained in the Karadzic judgment itself. Slobodan Milosevic isn’t innocent because of anything in the Karadzic judgment, and the tribunal doesn’t deserve a gold medal for exonerating him ten years after they killed him in their jail. Slobodan Milosevic is innocent because that’s what the evidence has always shown.  

Mr. Brammertz made one excellent suggestion in his article. He said that “while Milosevic did not face final judgment in the courtroom, the facts and evidence remain. Today, any member of the public - and any government official - can access the ICTY’s judicial records and read the evidence. Vital information can also be found in Serbia’s state archives.”

Anyone who takes Mr. Brammertz suggestion on board and goes through that evidence will very likely come to the conclusion that Mr. Brammertz is wrong when he claims that “Milosevic played a central role in fostering ethnic cleansing campaigns throughout the former Yugoslavia.” That wasn’t the determination of the Karadzic trial chamber when they looked at the evidence, and if our so-called “experts” and “journalists” ever bothered to take a detailed look at the evidence for themselves, they’d find that there wasn’t any substance to the allegations against Milosevic either.

What the Karadzic Verdict Does Not Prove

As long as we’re on the subject of what the Karadzic trial proceedings prove or don’t prove, there are a couple of noteworthy issues that the trial process specifically did not purport to prove: (1) that the Bosnian-Serb war effort was unjustified, and (2) that Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat forces were innocent of crimes against Bosnian-Serb civilians.

There are two important principles in international law, one of which concerns the Karadzic trial and one of which does not: jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

Jus ad bellum (Latin for “right to war”) is the branch of international law that determines whether entering into an armed conflict is permissible or justified. Jus in bello (Latin for “right in war”), regulates the conduct of the belligerents engaged in an armed conflict regardless of whether they’re fighting an offensive war or a defensive war.

The Karadzic trial process openly disregarded jus ad bellum, and was only concerned with jus in bello. During the trial process Alan Tieger, the lead prosecutor in the Karadzic case, explained that “As this Trial Chamber has repeatedly pointed out to Dr. Karadzic, this case is not about who started the war, jus ad bellum.”[1]

The government of Germany made the same observation when it refused to hand over documents related to weapons shipments destined for Bosnian-Muslim soldiers based in the Srebrenica “safe area”. They noted that “The indictment specifically does not charge the Accused with violating the rules of jus ad bellum, but rather with disregarding jus in bello.”[2]

In its written submissions the prosecution argued that “International humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all parties in an armed conflict irrespective of the lawfulness of the other party’s resort to force, a violation of IHL can never be excused as a valid reprisal to an alleged violation of jus ad bellum.”[3]

Mr. Tieger made the same observation in court citing a U.S. military manual to argue that “the side that is acting in self-defence against illegal aggression does not because of that fact gain any right to violate the law of armed conflict.”[4]

When the Trial chamber refused to subpoena documents sought by the Karadzic defense from the United States government they did so on the basis that “the issue of who was responsible for starting the war is not relevant to the Accused’s defence case.”[5]

In court, Judge Kwon admonished Karadzic for spending too much time on the issue of whether Bosnian-Serb combat activities were offensive or defensive. He said, “Who started the attack is not relevant for the purpose of this case at all. So I was concerned very much about delving into whether the nature of certain combat activities was defensive or offensive. It’s all related jus ad bellum as I indicated yesterday. In the future, the Chamber will keep a closer look as to the relevance of the Defence witnesses’ evidence and, if necessary, it may consider not allowing the evidence at all.”[6]

Crimes against Serbs

Evidence of crimes committed against Bosnian-Serb civilians by Bosnian-Muslim and Croatian forces was also deemed “irrelevant” and suppressed by the prosecutors working for Mr. Brammertz, and by the trial chamber itself.

When a protected Bosnian-Muslim witness, under questioning from Dr. Karadzic, began testifying about Serbs who had been beheaded by Nasir Oric’s fighters in Srebrenica, prosecutor Melissa Pack intervened to stop the testimony. She said, “I can see that we are going down the road of this witness testifying about crimes allegedly committed by the ABiH against Serbs. This is the second answer which purports to describe those sorts of events, and I just want to at this point caution Dr. Karadzic and raise this as a potential issue. In my submission, evidence of crimes against Serbs is not relevant.”[7]

On many occasions prosecutors objected to the admission of documents on the grounds that “they consist of detailed evidence of crimes against Serbs and don’t satisfy the standard of relevance”.[8]

The judges openly sided with the prosecutors and forced the witnesses testifying in the trial to redact their statements in order to prevent evidence of crimes against Serbs from going on the record.

Witness Goran Sikiras had his statement redacted by the chamber on the grounds that “about half of Sikiras’s statement is concerned with crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs in Vogosca and as such are not relevant to the charges in the indictment. I refer here to page 4, parts of page 5, as well as pages 6 and 7. The Chamber reminds the accused once again that it will not admit detailed tu quoque evidence under the guise of relevance to this trial.”[9]

Witness Branislav Dukic’s statement was rejected in its entirety on the grounds that “Dukic’s proposed 92 ter statement is concerned, almost entirely, with detailed descriptions of crimes committed against the Serbs and against Dukic in particular. It also contains some references to previous meetings between Dukic and the Prosecution. As such, the Chamber considers that Dukic’s evidence is not relevant to the charges in the indictment. While his statement does contain some remote references to the positions and military activity of the ABiH and the Bosnian Croat forces in and around Sarajevo, these are not only minimal but also general in nature and thus are not sufficient in and of themselves to warrant admitting parts of his statement. Accordingly, the Chamber decides, proprio motu, to exclude the evidence of Branislav Dukic in its entirety.”[10]

The statement of witness Vidomir Banduka was redacted because “the Chamber finds paragraphs 59, 60, 62, 63, 72 to 75, 77, and 78 are not relevant in that they either refer to the detention facilities established by Bosnian Muslim authorities or to crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs. So these paragraphs should be redacted and will not admit associated exhibits referred to therein.”[11]

The statement of witness Nenad Kecmanovic was redacted because, “paragraphs 45 and 46 of Mr. Kecmanovic’s statement contain a detailed information about mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs, including the existence of detention centres. The Chamber is of the view that this level of detail is not relevant to the charges against the accused, and accordingly orders the redaction of these paragraphs.”[12]

When they ordered the redaction of witness Milovan Bjelica’s witness statement the judges explained that “the Chamber had an opportunity to skim through the statement. Para 44, the Chamber -- we will keep the first and last sentence, but the other part should be redacted, as well as paragraph 45, 47, and paragraph 49 to 51. They do contain too much detailed evidence, including names, ages of victims on crimes against Bosnian Serbs that are not relevant or necessary.”[13]

The judges were so keen to suppress evidence of crimes against Serbs that they would redact even a single sentence if the witness dared to mention that crimes had been committed against Serbs. When they ordered the redaction of Tomislav Savkic’s witness statement the judge explained that “the Chamber finds that the last sentence of paragraph 62 and the document referred to therein and the last sentence of paragraph 81 contain excessive detail about specific crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs which is not relevant to the charges against the accused in the indictment and orders that they be redacted.”[14]

When the trial chamber ordered redactions to Srdjan Sehovac’s witness statement they did so on the basis that “the statement, which the Prosecution seeks to exclude, falls within the category of detailed evidence pertaining to crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs which the Chamber has consistently excluded on the grounds that it is irrelevant tu quoque evidence.”[15]

When Radojka Pandurevic, a Serbian woman who was imprisoned in a camp run by the Bosnian-Muslims where she and other Serbian prisoners were subjected to beatings and sexual violence, took the witness stand the judges demanded that large swaths of her witness statement be redacted because “her statement is comprised of tu quoque or otherwise irrelevant evidence and will therefore not be admitted.”[16]

When she took the witness stand she objected to the redactions saying, “I read the statement, but it doesn’t reflect accurately everything I said, as I can see that some portions are marked which were unacceptable and redacted. Those paragraphs have to do with my stay in the Silos camp, which in turn would mean that I cannot convey the suffering I had undergone in the Silos camp.”[17]

The judges made no secret of what they were doing during the trial. They said it clearly, they said it openly, and they said it literally: “We didn’t allow the accused to expand on the issue of crimes committed against the Serbs.”[18]

In his editorial for Al-Jazeera, Mr. Brammertz argues that, “Progress and reconciliation require acceptance of clear, historical facts, no matter how uncomfortable those facts may be.” Unfortunately, the Karadzic trial purported to establish no such historical facts.

The Radovan Karadzic trial was not an objective exercise in truth seeking, nor did it purport to be one. The judges clearly told Radovan Karadzic that “It is you, not the Serbian army or Serb people or anybody else, that was indicted in this case.”[19]They said, “We are not trying to publish a white book on the history of the BiH. This is a criminal trial which deals with the charges against you.”[20] The judges were explicit. They said, “The purpose of this trial is to judge whether you are guilty of charges as alleged in the indictment. And this is not an opportunity for you to produce a white book of all the events that took place at the time.”[21] They were very clear about the fact that “We are not pursuing to produce a white book in history or to correct the history.”[22]

The Karadzic trial did nothing to promote progress and reconciliation in the Balkans, in fact it served exactly the opposite purpose. Publicizing crimes committed by Serbs, while shamelessly suppressing evidence of crimes committed against them, and suppressing evidence that they were defending themselves from illegal aggression can only serve to engender resentment and hard feelings. The Serbian people will never accept the Tribunal’s condemnation of Radovan Karadzic under these circumstances, nor should they. 

Suppressing evidence of crimes against Serbs, and suppressing evidence of whether the Serbs were fighting an offensive or a defensive war, directly undermines the Karadzic trial chamber's conviction of Radovan Karadzic. It's entirely possible that Serbian forces who did perpetrate crimes were motivated to do so in retaliation for crimes and aggression against Serbs by Muslims and Croats, and not because Radovan Karadzic was the evil mastermind of a “joint criminal enterprise”. The way in which this trial was conducted leaves ample room for resonable doubt.

Serge Brammertz does not speak from a position of credibility either. Thanks to Wikileaks, we know how he got his job as ICTY chief prosecutor, and it’s an interesting story.

According to a classified U.S. State Dept. cable dating from 2007, “France is backing Serge Brammertz to succeed Carla Del Ponte as ICTY Chief Prosecutor from a belief that Brammertz will otherwise refuse to extend his mandate at the UN International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), an outcome the French characterize as disastrous.”[23]

According to the cable, a more qualified prosecutor was passed over in favor of Brammertz despite doubts about his competence. The cable says, “With Del Ponte set to retire in September, current Deputy Prosecutor Tolbert would manage the transition until Brammertz’s arrival.  [MFA UN/Middle East Action Officer Salina Grenet] acknowledged that the outcome was not positive for Tolbert, an [American citizen], whom she called an excellent candidate in his own right to succeed Del Ponte. She volunteered moreover that the UK had raised doubts about whether Brammertz possessed the right profile and competence for the ICTY position.”[24]

Brammertz got the job of ICTY chief prosecutor, despite the fact that the ICC wouldn’t even give him his old job back. The cable says, “Grenet conceded that Brammertz, on leave as Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), should technically be able to resume his prior function; however, she claimed that ICC Prosecutor Ocampo, whose personal relationship with Brammertz has continued to deteriorate, has effectively shut the door on that possibility.”[25]

Why should anyone take the ICTY seriously when its chief prosecutor got his job for blatantly political reasons in spite of doubts about his competence?


[1] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 47592-47593

[2] Answer to the request for motion for a binding order to be issued to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the production of documents pursuant to Rule 54bis

[3] Prosecution’s Submission Re. Notice of Special Defence as to Count 11: Reprisals

[4] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 47690

[5] ICTY Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused’s Fifth Motion for Binding Order (United States of America), 22 August 2012

[6] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30365

[7] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 12743

[8] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 8347

[9] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30687-30688

[10] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30518-30519

[11] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 33424-33425

[12] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 7083-7084

[13] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 4386-4387

[14] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 1716

[15] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 32652-32653

[16] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30519

[17] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30649

[18] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 46536

[19] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 30365

[20] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 4867

[21] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 764

[22] Radovan Karadzic trial transcript, pg. 6130

[23] Classified U.S. State Dept. Cable #07PARIS1882_a; Para 1

[24] Ibid., Para 3

[25] Ibid., Para 4



(srpskohrvatski / italiano)

La Jugoslavia alle Olimpiadi 2016

1) Il medagliere olimpico
2) Due immagini significative
3) Illegittima partecipazione del "Kosovo" e provocazioni pan-albanesi / Evo kako su Albanci provocirali...
4) Hrvatska atletičarka Sandra Perković: Žao mi je što se Juga raspala, bili bismo najveća sila ["Mi dispiace che la Jugoslavia sia smembrata, saremmo stati i più forti"]


Come ogni quattro anni, cioè per ciascuna Olimpiade svoltasi dallo smembramento della Jugoslavia in poi, riportiamo qui il medagliere delle Repubbliche ex-federate a confronto con il passato. 
In totale gli atleti jugoslavi hanno raccolto 9 ori, 9 argenti e 5 bronzi, classificandosi complessivamente all'ottavo posto e battendo, per un oro, anche l'Italia. Croazia e Serbia in particolare hanno conseguito ottimi risultati. Nella pallanuoto addirittura su 4 semifinaliste, 3 erano nazionali di paesi sorti dalla dissoluzione jugoslava. 


Sullo stesso argomento segnaliamo anche:

Le repubbliche jugoslave nel medagliere olimpico

Ex-Ju: passato e presente olimpico (di Natalia Kawana – OBC 04/08/2016)
La Jugoslavia partecipò a molte Olimpiadi, vincendo un record di 18 medaglie nel 1984. Ora gli stati successori hanno tutti speranze di medaglie, nonostante la loro giovane storia di partecipazione all'evento come stati indipendenti... [N.B. Nell'articolo i risultati conseguiti dalla Jugoslavia nei 70 anni di unità vengono saltati a pié pari]
http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Bosnia-Erzegovina/Ex-Ju-passato-e-presente-olimpico-173401/

Il basket e la sfida infinita. Croazia-Serbia, ci risiamo (di Gianni Riotta, 17.8.2016)
Dalla guerra allo sport, stanotte nei quarti un match mai banale [N.B. Un articolo grondante imprecisioni e luoghi comuni: Mate Boban, coinvolto nella rissa al fianco dei suoi hooligans nazionalisti e violenti, viene rappresentato come una vittima, mentre Vlade Divac che calpesta la bandiera del nazismo ustascia (nel 1990 la bandiera della Repubblica Socialista di Croazia era con la stella rossa e la parte inferiore di colore blu!) fa la parte del cattivone]


=== 1: Il medagliere ===

paese classifica oro argento bronzo totale

SLOVENIA (45) 1 2 1 4
CROAZIA (17) 5 3 2 10
BOSNIA-ERZEGOVINA (--) 0 0 0 0
FYROM (--) 0 0 0 0
SERBIA (32) 2 4 2 8
MONTENEGRO (--) 0 0 0 0
KOSOVO (54) 1 0 0 1


=== 2: Due immagini significative ===


NAJLJEPŠA SCENA FINALA U VATERPOLU: Zagrljaj srpskog i hrvatskog selektora za istoriju!

Piše: Buka / Objavljeno: 21.08.2016.
Lekcija iz viteštva srpskog i hrvatskog selektora – Prizor zagrljaja Dejana Savića, trenera Srbije i hrvatskog selektora Ivice Tucka je možda i najdirljivija scena finala i najveća pobjeda sporta. Tako treba. Uvijek i u svakoj prilici, na svim sportskim borilištima kada se sastanu Hrvati i Srbi ili bilo koja druga kombinacija sa naših nesretnih vremena


---


SLIKA KOJA POKAZUJE BESMISAO RATA I MRŽNJE NA BALKANU

Piše: 24sata.rs / Objavljeno: 18.08.2016. u 13:04h
Rano jutros na terenu u Riju našla su se dva Bogdanovića, ali na suprotnim stranama - i obojica su bili najbolji u svojim timovima. Slika ove dvojice košarkaša odmah je počela da se širi društvenim mrežama kao najbolji podsetnik na besmisao ratova i mržnje na Balkanu.

Reprezentacije Srbije i Hrvatske nadmetale su se za prolazak u polufinale olimpijskog turnira i Srbija je izašla kao pobednika sa rezultatom 86:83. Lepa pobeda, velika i jako značajna - ali ipak obojena nacionalističkim
Ubrzo su krenuli da se vode pravi mini-ratovi u sekcijama komentara na portalima i društvenim mrežama. Puni "municije" u vidu mržnje, uvreda, psovki i ostalih primitivizama, najgori predstavnici obe stranem postarali su se da se njihov glas čuje. I delovalo je kao da je najglasniji. komentarima sa obe strane. U očima mnogih Srba ova pobeda je dvostruko veća jer je baš protiv naših suseda, dok se po hrvatskim društvenim mrežama i medijima šire komentari da poraz boli mnogo više jer je baš od Srbije.
Kakva glupost!
Koliko su tačno ovakvi statovi besmisleni možda je najbolje objasnio australijski komentator sinoć.
"Svi imaju ista imena... Ali nemojte to ni slučajno da im kažete", rekao je on kroz šalu, misleći baš na Bogdanovića i Bogdanovića. I nije bio jedini koji je bio zbunjen.
Dva bratska naroda, sa istim prezimenima, istim bojama, gotovo identičnim jezikom, geografski susedi - nikome ko nije upućen u komlikovanu istoriju Jugoslavije nije jasno zašto bi tu postojala mržnja. Zapravo, ni onima koji ne samo da su upućeni, nego su bili svedoci ratova, nije jasno kakve veze politika ima sa sportom i zašto bismo mrzeli narod zbog šačice političara.
Bogdan Bogdanović je juče bio najbolji u reprezentaciji Srbije i doneo nam je 18 poena. Bojan Bogdanović je bio najbolji u reprezentaciji Hrvatske i doneo im je 28 poena. A zajedno su ova dva Bogdanovića donela najlepšu poruku nakon utakmice.
Slika je već osvojila društvene mreže, pa šalje jasnu poruku da onaj glas mržnje o kom smo pričali možda ipak nije najglasniji. Sve dok mu mi to ne dozvolimo.



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Serbia ai suoi atleti: “Se c’è il Kosovo non salite sul podio”

Pubblicato il 8 agosto 2016 

di Silvio De Santis

La Serbia ai suoi olimpionici: “Non salite sul podio se ci sono atleti del Kosovo”. “Abbandonare le cerimonie di premiazione nel caso ci siano sul podio anche atleti del Kosovo”: è questo l’invito che il governo della Serbia ha voluto dare ai propri atleti nel caso si trovassero a condividere il podio delle olimpiadi di Rio 2016 con atleti provenienti dal Kosovo.
Il ministro dello sport, Vanja Udovicic (un ex campione di pallanuoto, ha solo 34 anni), ha chiarito che la decisione finale spetta solo ai singoli componenti del Team, mentre il governo ha sottolineato come non ci sia un obbligo “ma solo una raccomandazione”, perché la vicenda è “complessa”.
Il Kosovo è stato ufficialmente riconosciuto dal comitato olimpico internazionale nel 2014, e a Rio sono presenti otto atleti, alcuni dei quali avevano partecipato a Londra 2012 con l’Albania. “Non vogliamo certo minacciare i nostri atleti – ha aggiunto il ministro Udovicic – ma non possiamo ascoltare l’inno del Kosovo né vedere la loro bandiera“.
Qualcuno penserà che con 8 atleti la probabilità che il Kosovo vada sul podio è molto scarsa, e che quindi la Serbia stia solo cogliendo l’occasione per ribadire la propria ostilità al Kosovo anche in sede olimpica. Ma il Kosovo ha già vinto una medaglia, per di più d’oro, e contro l’Italia.
È stata la due volte iridata Majlinda Kelmendi, portabandiera del Kosovo alle olimpiadi di Rio, a vincere la medaglia d’oro di judo. Nella cerimonia organizzata a Pristina, prima della partenza per Rio, la Kelmendi aveva detto: “Voglio mostrare al mondo che il Kosovo non è solo un piccolo Paese con una storia di guerra. Voglio mostrare nostro lato buono del nostro Paese, dove i giovani fanno sport, spettacolo e possono anche vincere”.

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Odio incredibile: Ecco come gli albanesi hanno provocavano il campione olimpico Davor Stefanek

http://www.kurir.rs/sport/rio-2016/nevidena-mrznja-evo-kako-su-albanci-provocirali-olimpijskog-sampiona-stefaneka-clanak-2401351

NEVIĐENA MRŽNJA: Evo kako su Albanci provocirali olimpijskog šampiona Štefaneka

16.08.2016. – Grupa navijača provocirala je albanskom zastavom olimpijskog šampiona Davora Štefaneka tokom intoniranja himni u Rio de Žaneiru.
Srpski rvač Davor Štefanek osvojio je zlatnu medalju u Riju pošto je u finalu u kategoriji do 66 kilograma grčko-rimskim stilom pobedio Migrana Artjunjana iz Jermenije.
Prilikom podizanja zastave i intoniranja himne Srbije grupa albanskih navijača koja je provocirala olimpijskog šampiona. Međutim, Štefanek na to uopšte nije reagovao.


=== 4 ===


Hrvatska atletičarka Sandra Perković: Žao mi je što se Juga raspala, bili bismo najveća sila

Navijaću za Ivanu Španović kao i uvek, ne vidim nikakav razlog zašto ne bih. Moje je srce veliko kad ona pobeđuje kao što je i njeno kada to činim ja, poručila je Perkovićeva
Datum: 15/08/2016

Olimpijska pobednica u bacanju diska iz Londona Hrvatica Sandra Perković u obranu titiule krenuće u utorak u 1.30 časova, ali to ipak nije najbitnija vest u Hrvatskoj. Njeno drugarstvo sa Ivanom Španović i jugonostalgija netipična za hrvatske sportiste, koji čak i ako veruju u Jugu, to drže za sebe, zapalila je društvene mreže.

Osim što se sprema za lov na novu medalju, Sandra Perković za Novosti je poručila da će pružiti i podršku ostalim sportistima iz bivše Jugoslavije, i da bi volela da isto učine i svi navijači bez obzira na to iz koje države dolaze.

"Mi se tu svi držimo zajedno. Već smo ranije komentirali kako Bosanci dolaze kod nas na terapije, ja odem kod Slovenaca, a ti Slovenci kod Srba. Bitno je da se držimo zajedno, tako smo puno jači i sve ima jedan pozitivan duh. Puno je lepše biti u društvu našeg čoveka. Žao mi je što smo se raspali jer mislim da bismo bili najjača sila, jači od Nemaca, Rusa i Amerikanaca", rekla je Perkovićeva za Novosti.

Ona je kratko prokomentarisala i svoj odnos sa najboljom srpskom atletičarkom Ivanom Španović.

"Baš smo se čule pre nego što je stigla ovde. Srećemo se na većim mitinzima i jedva čekam da ju ponovno vidim. Navijaću za nju kao i uvek, ne vidim nikakav razlog zašto ne bih. Moje je srce veliko kad ona pobeđuje kao što je i njeno kada to činim ja", poručila je hrvatska atletičarka.