Jugoinfo

(seconda parte)

Military intervention may be justified "when a
self-determination claim triggers an armed conflict that
becomes a humanitarian crisis", wrote Scheffer and
Halperin.

The much-praised non-violent movement of Ibrahim Rugova
could not meet this criterion. It failed precisely
because it was not a movement for political equality but
a movement for secession. A non-violent movement for
political equality can find many active ways to
illustrate its exclusion and press its demands for
inclusion. But the goals of the Albanian movement were
not inclusion but complete independence from the existing
State. To show their rejection of Serbia, Kosovo
Albanians in the Rugova period refused to use the
democratic rights they had, boycotted elections, refused
to pay taxes, and even set up their own parallel schools
and public health service. The odd thing is that this
movement of passive resistance was met for the most part
by passive resistance on the part of the Serbian State,
which allowed Dr Rugova to go about his business
(obviously in defiance of Serbian laws) as "President of
the Republic of Kosova", let people get away with not
paying taxes and did not force children to attend Serbian
schools. Certainly, there were numerous instances of
police brutality, although their extent is hard to judge,
inasmuch as Kosovar Albanian Human Rights Groups
notoriously exaggerated such incidents in order to claim
that their people were being brutally oppressed -- a
claim which was not accepted by the German government
(21), incidentally, despite its support to the separatist
movement. But in reality, internal separatism was too
easy. The two communities grew ever farther apart, but
peacefully. There was an impasse.

That impasse was broken by the U?K/KLA, acting with the
backing of the United States. The strategy was summed up
by Richard Cohen (22):

The KLA had a simple but effective plan. It would kill
Serbian policemen. The Serbs would retaliate, Balkan
style, with widespread reprisals and the occasional
massacre. The West would get more and more appalled,
until finally it would, as it did in Bosnia, take action.
In effect, the United States and much of Europe would go
to war on the side of the KLA.

It worked.

This version perhaps gives the KLA/U?K a little too much
credit. The United States has been watching Kosovo
closely for years, and there are strong indications that
it both passively and actively assisted the armed rebels
in their humanitarian sting operation. The KLA did indeed
kill Serbian policemen, as well as a number of civilians,
including ethnic Albanians who failed to boycott the
Serbian state. But in between these killings and the Serb
retaliation, "Balkan style", there was a very significant
encouragement from Richard Gelbard, acting as U.S.
proconsul for former Yugoslavia. Normally, Gelbard's
visits to Belgrade were marked by utterances berating
Serbian authorities for not doing Washington's bidding in
one respect or another. But on February 23, 1998, Gelbard
visited Pristina and declared publicly that the KLA/U?K
was indeed "unquestionably a terrorist organization".

To the Serbs, this simply seemed to be recognition of
what to them was an obvious fact. Naively believing that
the United States was, as it continued to declare,
sincerely opposed to "international terrorism", Serbian
authorities took this remark as a green light to do what
any government normally does in such circumstances: send
in armed police to repress the terrorists. After all,
they were not hard to find. Unlike guerrillas in most
conflicts, they made no effort to conceal their
whereabouts but openly proclaimed that they were hanging
out in a number of villages in the Drenica hill region.
Far from heading for the hills when the police
approached, the U?K let civilians who didn't want to get
shot head for the hills while they themselves hunkered
down at home, sometimes with a few remaining family
members, and shot it out with police. This suicidal
tactic may have stemmed from the fact that Albanian homes
often double as fortresses in the traditional blood
feuds, but could not withstand Serbian government fire
power. In any case, the results were enough dead
Albanians in their villages to enable Madeleine Albright
and her chorus of media commentators to cry "ethnic
cleansing". It was not "ethnic cleansing", it was a
classic anti-insurgency operation. But that was enough
for the trap to start closing.

It is easy to imagine how the same scenario could enfold
again in some remote area of the "Eurasian Balkans",
where folk customs are not frightfully different from
those of the Albanians.

How to Get the Job of U.N. Secretary General

The Abramowitz-Albright policy for Yugoslavia has been
used as the event, the fait accompli, to complete a major
institutional shift of power. Institutions based on the
principle of decision-making equality between nations
(the United Nations, its agencies, and the OSCE) have
been drastically weakened. Others, effectively under U.S.
control (NATO, the International Criminal Tribunal), have
enlarged their scope, under the heading of a vague new
entity, the "international community".

The first target of this shift has of course been the
United Nations. Already weakened by the successful U.S.
undermining of U.N. agencies such as UNESCO and UNCTAD
which threatened to promote alternative and more
egalitarian concepts of "globalization", the United
Nations has been reduced by the conflict in Yugoslavia to
a rubber stamp to be used or ignored by the United States
as it chooses.

Certainly, responsibility for weakening the United
Nations is widely shared among world powers, but the
United States' role in this demolition enterprise has
nevertheless been outstanding. Far from trying to help
the United Nations seek an even-handed solution to the
Yugoslav crisis, the Clinton administration used its
influence to secure decisions of benefit to its own
chosen clients, the Bosnian Muslims and the Albanian
secessionists. In Bosnia, United Nations forces were
given impossible missions: hanging around deceptively
declared -- deceptively because never demilitarized --
"safe areas", as fighting continued. Their inevitable,
not to say programmed, failure could be, and has been,
trumpeted as "proof" that only NATO can carry out a
proper peace-keeping mission.

A significant high point in the United States' reduction
of the United Nations to a pliant tool came on August 30,
1995, when the United Nations momentarily relinquished
its control over Bosnian peace-keeping to NATO, aka the
Pentagon, in order to let the United States bomb the
Bosnian Serbs.

For Washington, the primary significance of this bombing
had less to do with the people of Bosnia than with U.S.
power. According to Richard Holbrooke, this was correctly
grasped by columnist William Pfaff who wrote the next
day: "The United States today is again Europe's leader;
there is no other."

In his memoir To End a War, Richard Holbrooke recounted
this proud achievement and lavishly praised the United
Nations official who made it possible: the Ghanaian
diplomat Kofi Annan, then in charge of peacekeeping
operations.

Madeleine Albright, at the time the U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations, was carrying on a "vigorous campaign"
in favour of bombing the Serbs. Luck smiled:
"fortunately, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was
unreachable [...], so she dealt instead with his best
deputy, Kofi Annan, who was in charge of peacekeeping
operations. At 11:45 a.m., New York time, came a big
break: Annan informed Talbott and Albright that he had
instructed the U.N.'s civilian officials and military
commanders to relinquish for a limited period of time
their authority to veto air strikes in Bosnia. For the
first time in the war, the decision on the air strikes
was solely in the hands of NATO -- primarily two American
officers [...]"

"Annan's gutsy performance in those twenty-four hours was
to play a central role in Washington's strong support for
him a year later as the successor to Boutros
Boutros-Ghali as Secretary General of the United Nations.
Indeed, in a sense Annan won the job on that day"(23).

Bosnia was the main reason for getting rid of
Boutros-Ghali. "More than any other issue, it was his
performance on Bosnia that made us feel he did not
deserve a second term -- just as Kofi Annan's strength on
the bombing in August had already made him the private
favorite of many American officials", Holbrooke
explained. "Although the American campaign against
Boutros-Ghali, in which all our key allies opposed us,
was long and difficult [...] the decision was correct,
and may well have saved America's role in the United
Nations."

How to Sabotage the OSCE

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was widely
favoured to succeed both the dismantled Warsaw Pact and
NATO as an all-inclusive institution to ensure security,
resolve conflicts and defend human rights in Europe. This
naturally encountered opposition from all those who
wanted to preserve and expand NATO, and with it, the
leading U.S. role in Europe -- that is, from many
important officials in many NATO countries, especially
Britain and the Netherlands, as well as the United States
itself.

On the eve of the Kosovo war, the tandem of Richard
Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright once again moved to
cripple a rival to NATO and clear the way for NATO
bombing.

On October 13, 1998, under threat of NATO bombing, U.S.
envoy Richard Holbrooke got Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic to sign a unilateral deal to end security
operations against armed rebels. The agreement was to be
monitored by 2,000 foreign "verifiers" provided under the
auspices of the OSCE. From the start, opinions in Europe
were divided as to whether this Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM) marked an advance for the OSCE or a kiss of
death, designed to prove the organization's impotence and
leave NATO as the uncontested arbiter of conflicts in
Europe.

The mission's fate was sealed in favour of the second
alternative when the European majority in the OSCE was
somehow persuaded to accept U.S. diplomat William Walker
to head the KVM. Walker was a veteran of Central American
"banana republic" management, who had collaborated with
Oliver North in illegally arming the "Contras" and had
covered up murderous state security operations in El
Salvador as U.S. ambassador there during the Reagan
administration.

Walker brought in 150 professional mercenaries from the
Arlington, Virginia-based DynCorp which had already
worked in Bosnia, drove around in a vehicle flying the
American flag, and did everything to confirm what his
French deputy, Ambassador Gabriel Keller, described as
the "wide-spread conviction in Serbian public opinion
that the OSCE was working under cover for NATO, [...]
that we acted with a hidden agenda" (24).

That impression was shared by many members of the KVM. A
number of Italians, whose comments were published
anonymously in the geostrategic review LiMes, accused the
Americans of "sabotaging the OSCE mission". Said one:
"The mission in my view had two primary aims. One was to
infiltrate personnel into the theatre with intelligence
tasks and for special forces activities (preparatory work
for a predetermined war). The other was to give the world
the impression that everything had been tried and thus
create grounds for public consent to the aggression we
perpetrated"(25).

According to Swiss verifier Pascal Neuffer: "We
understood from the start that the information gathered
by OSCE patrols during our mission were destined to
complete the information that NATO had gathered by
satellite. We had the very sharp impression of doing
espionage work for the Atlantic Alliance"(26).

KVM members have criticized Walker and his British chief
of operations, Karol (John) Drewienkiewicz, for rejecting
any cooperation with Serb authorities, for blocking
diplomatic means to ensure human rights, for controlling
the mission's information flow, and most serious of all,
for using the mission to make contact with U?K rebels and
train them to guide NATO to targets in the subsequent
bombing (27). Since the Serbs were quite aware of this
activity, as soon as the bombing began on March 24, Serb
security forces set out to root out all suspected U?K
indicators. These operations are very probably at the
heart of what NATO has described as ethnic cleansing.

However, prior to the bombing, KVM members testify to a
low level of violence, as well as a pattern of U?K
provocations. According to Keller, "every pullback by the
Yugoslav army or the Serbian police was followed by a
movement forward by [U?K] forces [...] OSCE's presence
compelled Serbian government forces to a certain
restraint [...] and U?K took advantage of this to
consolidate its positions everywhere, continuing to
smuggle arms from Albania, abducting and killing both
civilians and military personnel, Albanians and Serbs
alike."

By the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, an
increasingly audible split was taking place within the
KVM between Walker and most of the Europeans. Every
incident was an occasion for Walker and the U.S. State
Department to denounce the Serbs for breaking the truce,
and to accuse Milosevic of violating his commitment. The
Europeans saw things differently: the Albanian rebels,
with U.S. encouragement, were systematically provoking
Serb attacks in order to justify NATO coming in on their
side of the conflict.

In mid-January, Walker settled the score with his
European critics by bringing the world media over to his
side. This was the political significance of the famous
"Racak massacre". On January 15, Serb police had carried
out a pre-announced operation, accompanied by observers
and television cameras, against U?K killers believed to
be hiding out in the village of Racak. As the Serbs swept
into the village, the U?K gunmen took refuge on
surrounding high ground and began to fire on the police,
as TV footage showed. But the Serbs had sent forces
around behind them, and many U?K fighters were trapped
and shot. After the Serb forces withdrew that afternoon,
the U?K again took control of the village, and it was
they who led Walker into the village the next day to see
what they described as victims of a massacre. It may be,
as Serb authorities claimed and many Europeans tended to
believe, that the victims were in fact killed in the
shootout reported by the police, and then aligned to give
the appearance of a mass execution, or "massacre".

In any case, the extremely emotional public reaction by
the high-profile head of the KVM, condemning the Serbs
for "a crime against humanity", "an unspeakable atrocity"
committed by Serbs "with no value for human life", ended
any possible pretense of neutrality of the OSCE mission.

Walker's accusations were quickly taken up by NATO
politicians and editorialists. A complex conflict was
reduced to a simple opposition between Serbian
perpetrators of massacres and innocent Albanian civilian
victims. The U?K and its provocative murders of policemen
and civilians were to all intents and purposes invisible.
Presented as a gratuitous atrocity, "Racak" became the
immediate justification for NATO war against Yugoslavia.

In Kosovo itself, KVM members have testified, after Racak
the Serbs were totally convinced that the OSCE was
working for NATO and began to prepare for war, while the
U?K became still more aggressive. KVM members have also
complained of the fact that Walker evacuated the mission
to Macedonia on March 20, five days before the bombing
began. This way, no outside observers were there to see
exactly what did happen when the bombing began, much less
try to prevent it. Walker's leadership had effectively
removed all pressure or incentive for either side to show
restraint.

"In the history of international missions it would be
hard to find such a chaotic and tragically ambiguous
enterprise", concluded an Italian participant.

How to Obtain Justice

The importance of crimes in this new world order was
highlighted by the establishment in May 1993 of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). This tribunal was established by Security Council
resolution 827 under its Article 29 which allows it to
set up "subsidiary bodies" necessary to fulfill its
peacekeeping tasks. It is more than doubtful that the
framers of the United Nations statutes had a criminal
tribunal in mind, and many jurists consider resolution
827 to be an usurpation of legislative and judicial
powers by the Security Council. In fact, this act went
contrary to over forty years of study, within the
framework of the United Nations, of the possibilities for
setting up an international penal tribunal, whose
jurisdiction would be established by international treaty
allowing States to transfer part of their sovereign
rights to the tribunal. The Security Council's ICTY went
over the heads of the States concerned and simply imposed
its authority on them, without their consent.

Last April 5, as NATO was bombing Yugoslavia, the ICTY's
presiding judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (a former U.S.
federal judge in Texas) told the Supreme Court that the
Tribunal "benefited from the strong support of concerned
governments and dedicated individuals such as Secretary
Albright. As the permanent representative to the United
Nations, she had worked with unceasing resolve to
establish the Tribunal. Indeed, we often refer to her as
the `mother of the Tribunal'".

Because it is also located in The Hague, very many
well-informed people confuse the Tribunal with the
International Court of Justice, or at least believe that,
like the ICJ, the ICT is a truly independent and
impartial judicial body. Its many supporters in the media
say so, and so do its statutes. Article 32 of its
governing statute says the Tribunal's expenses shall be
borne by the regular budget of the United Nations, but
this has been persistently violated. As Toronto lawyer
Christopher Black points out, "the tribunal has received
substantial funds from individual States, private
foundations and corporations". The United States has
provided personnel (23 officials lent by the Departments
of State, Defense and Justice as of May 1996), equipment
and cash contributions. More money has been granted the
Tribunal by financier George Soros' Open Society
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the United
States Institute for Peace, set up in 1984 under the
Reagan administration and funded by Congressional
appropriations, with its board of directors appointed by
the U.S. President.

The Tribunal is vigorously supported by the Coalition for
International Justice (CIJ), based in Washington and The
Hague, founded and funded by George Soros' Open Society
Foundation and a semi-official U.S. lawyers' group called
CEELI, the Central and East European Law Institute, set
up to promote the replacement of socialist legal systems
with free market ones, according to Christopher Black.

Last May 12, ICTY president Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, in a
speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that:
"The U.S. government has very generously agreed to
provide $500,000 and to help to encourage other States to
contribute. However, the moral imperative to end the
violence in the region is shared by all, including the
corporate sector. I am pleased, therefore, that a major
corporation has recently donated computer equipment worth
three million dollars, which will substantially enhance
our operating capacity."

Moreover, during the bombing, Clinton obtained a special
$27 million appropriation to help the Tribunal,
especially in collecting anti-Serb testimony from
Albanian refugees along the borders of Kosovo. Finally,
Clinton has offered a bounty of $5 million for the arrest
of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.

Ethnic Divisions, Unified Empires

An extremely significant feature of the humanitarian
intervention policy is its emphasis on collective in
contrast to individual rights.

"In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet empire,"
runs the summary of Self-Determination in the New World
Order, "new nations are emerging rapidly, and more and
more ethnic groups are pushing for independence or
autonomy." So the question is "how the United States
should respond". The authors "propose criteria for
decision makers who are weighing whether to support
groups seeking self-determination, to offer political
recognition, or to intervene with force."

This approach has practically nothing to do with
democracy, and everything to do with empire construction.
Although the words "democracy" and "democratic" are still
used, they tend increasingly to be without meaning other
than to designate favoured client leaders or groups in
countries of interest to the United States. Certainly,
Hashim Thaqi, the U?K leader who counts Madeleine
Albright's spokesman James Rubin (husband of CNN's
Christiane Amanpour) among his fans (28), is scarcely
more "democratic" than Milan Milutinovic, elected
President of Serbia, indicted with Milosevic by
Albright's "International War Crimes Tribunal". In fact,
the selection of particular groups, ethnic or social, as
clients, is the traditional way in which a conquering
empire can reshape social structures and replace former
elites with its own.

The imperial project is becoming increasingly open.
Protectorates are being established in Bosnia and Kosovo,
President Clinton is vigorously calling for the illegal
overthrow of the legally elected Yugoslav president.

Totally disregarding the feelings and wishes of the real,
live people who live there, Robert Kaplan announced (29)
that "there are two choices in the Balkans -- imperialism
or anarchy. To stop the violence, we essentially have to
act in the way the great powers in the region have always
acted: as pacifying conquerors." Like the Romans and the
Austrian Habsburgs, "motivated by territorial
aggrandizement for their own economic enrichment,
strategic positions and glory."

Merely to suggest that the United States might "intervene
with force" on behalf of an ethnic group seeking
self-determination is to cause trouble. There are
potentially hundreds of such groups not only in the
former Soviet Republics but throughout Africa and Asia.
The prospect of U.S. military intervention will, on the
one hand, encourage potential secessionist leaders to
push their claims to the point of "humanitarian crisis",
in order to bring in the Superpower on their side. By the
same token, it will encourage existing states to suppress
such movements brutally and decisively in order to
prevent precisely that intervention. A vicious cycle will
be created, enabling the single Superpower to fish
selectively in troubled waters.

The concept of "ethnic group" rests on the notion of
"identity". If individual identity is problematic, group
identity is even more so. That is, just as individuals
may have multiple or changing "identities", groups may
have changing compositions as people come and go from one
"identity" group to another. Especially in the modern
mobile world, ethnic identity is therefore a highly
questionable basis for claim to political recognition in
the form of an independent State. The forceful
affirmation of "ethnic identity" tends to strengthen
traditional patriarchal structures in places such as
Kosovo, at the expense of individual liberation. Stress
on ethnic identity enforces stereotypes, mafioso
structures and leadership by "godfathers".

Foreign policy based on ethnic identity has notorious
antecedents: it was precisely the policy employed by
Adolf Hitler to justify his conquest of the same Eastern
European territories that Brzezinski now watches so
attentively. Both the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the
invasion of Poland were officially justified by the need
to protect allegedly oppressed German minorities from the
cruel Czechs and Poles. The British government's
understanding for Herr Hitler's concern about Germans in
Czechoslovakia is the real "Munich". Before invading
Poland, Hitler had the SS manufacture an "incident" in
which wicked Poles stormed an innocent German-language
radio station in order to desecrate it with their
barbarous Slav language. The dead body left on the scene
to authenticate the incident was in fact a prison convict
in costume.

In Yugoslavia, Hitler "liberated" not only Germans but
also and especially Croats and (in conjunction with
fascist Italy) Albanians, long selected as the proper
Randv?lker to receive German protection, the better to
crush the main historic adversary, the Serbs, the people
who more than any other had fought for independence from
Empires. (The Serbs themselves as they became "Yugoslavs"
were less and less unified around Serbian identity, even
if they have continued to pay for it.)

Making policy by distinguishing between "friend" and
"enemy" peoples is pure Hitlerism, and this is what the
Anglo-American NATO leaders are now doing, while
ironically pretending to reject "Munich".

History As Melodrama

The media that recount Balkan ghost stories to the
"children" (30) back in NATOland rarely go into detail
about the peculiarities of these various customs and
situations. Popular culture has prepared audiences for a
simpler version. The pattern is the same as in disaster
movies, outer space movies, etc: there is always the trio
of classic melodrama: wicked villain, helpless victim
(maiden in distress) and heroic rescuer. Same plot. Over
and over. Only in the Abramowitz humanitarian war plan,
the trio is composed of ethnic entities or nationalities.
There is the "good" ethnic group, all victims, like the
Kosovar Albanians. Then there is the "bad" ethnic group,
all racist hatred, ethnic cleansing and even "genocide".
And finally, of course, there is Globocop to the rescue:
NATO with its stealth bombers, cruise missiles and
cluster blade bombs, its depleted uranium and graphite
power-plan busters. A bit of fireworks, like the car
chase at the end of the movie.

The whole concept of ethnic war as pretext for U.S.
military intervention implies this division of humanity
between "good" and "bad" nationalities, between
"oppressor" and "victim" peoples. Since this is rarely
the case, the story is told by analogy with the famous
exceptional cases where the categories fit: Hitler and
the Jews being the obvious favourite. Every new villain
is a "Hitler", every new ethnic secessionist group to be
used as pretext for new NATO bases is the victim of a
potential "Holocaust". At this rate, the two terms will
cease to be proper nouns and become general terms for the
new global Guignol.

Starting with the pretense of militant anti-racism,
"humanitarian intervention" finishes with a new racism.
To merit all those bombs, the "bad" people must be
tarnished with collective guilt. At the G8 summit in
Cologne in June, Tony Blair clearly adopted the doctrine
of collective guilt when he declared that there could be
no humanitarian aid for the Serbs because of the dreadful
way they had treated the Kosovar Albanians. With their
incomparable self-righteousness, the Anglo-American
commanders are leading this new humanitarian crusade to
extremes of inhumanity.

Footnotes

(1) Jim Hoagland, "Developing a Doctrine of Humanitarian
Warfare", International Herald Tribune, June 28, 1999.

(2) A former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Abramowitz
served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research in the Reagan administration. In January
1986, he took part in an interesting mission to Beijing
alongside top CIA officials with the purpose of
persuading China to support supplying Stinger missiles to
Islamic Afghan rebels in order to keep up pressure on the
Soviet Union, even as Gorbachev was trying to end the
Cold War. In the mid-1990s, he was part of a blue ribbon
panel sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations which
advised the Clinton Administration to loosen restrictions
on CIA covert operations such as dealing with criminals,
disguising agents as journalists, and targeting
unfriendly heads of State.

(3) John B. Roberts, "Roots of Allied Farce", The
American Spectator, June 1999.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer with Patricia
L. Small, Self-Determination In the New World Order,
Carnegie Endowment, Washington,D.C., 1992; page 80.

(6) Ibid, p.105.

(7) Ibid, p.107.

(8) Ibid, p.110.

(9) Charles Trueheart, "Serbs and Kosovars Get Nudge From
Their Hosts To Speed Up Peace Talks", International
Herald Tribune/Washington Post, February 9, 1999: "On
Monday, the Kosovo Albanians won a small tactical victory
when their American advisers, initially barred by
conference hosts, were allowed to visit them at the
chateau. They included two former U.S. diplomats, Morton
Abramowitz and Paul Williams."

(10) John B.Roberts, op.cit.

(11) Steven Erlanger, "Winning Friends for Foreign
Policy: Albright's First 100 Days", The New York Times,
14 May 1997.

(12) "Il n'y a pas de paradoxe. J'ai mis au point cette
doctrine en accord avec le pr?sident Carter, car c'?tait
la meilleure fa?on de d?stabiliser l'Urss. ?a a march?."
L'Ev?nement du jeudi, 14 January 1998.

(13) Le Nouvel observateur, 14 January 1998, reported by
AFP.

(14) Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard,
BasicBooks, New York, 1997, p.78.

(15) Kaplan's 1993 book Balkan Ghosts was notoriously
read by President Clinton, who, however, had to be chided
later by the author for having drawn the wrong
conclusion. That is, Clinton's initial conclusion was to
stay out of the Balkans, whereas Kaplan has, he
explained, always been an interventionist.

(16) New York Times/International Herald Tribune, 23
February 1999.

(17) Robert D.Kaplan, "Why the Balkans Demand Amorality",
The Washington Post, 28 February 1999.

(18) Steve Niva, "Between Clash and Co-Optation: US
Foreign Policy and the Specter of Islam", Middle East
Report, Fall 1998.

(19) The Washington Post, 28 February 1999.

(20) Stern, 4 March 1999.

(21) In mid-April, 1999, the International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) obtained and
distributed to news media official documents from the
German foreign office showing that in the months leading
up to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the foreign office
had repeatedly informed administrative courts of the
various German L?nder that there was no persecution of
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo or the rest of Serbia.
Example: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office,
January 12, 1999, to the administrative Court of Trier,
"Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked
to Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of
Kosovo is still not involved in armed conflict. Public
life in cities like Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc.
has, in the entire conflict period, continued on a
relatively normal basis." The "actions of the security
forces [were] not directed against the Kosovo-Albanians
as an ethnically defined group, but against the military
opponent and its actual or alleged supporters." These
reports were published in the German daily junge welt on
24 April 1999.

(22) Richard Cohen, "The Winner in the Balkans Is the
KLA", Washington Post/International Herald Tribune, 18
June 1999.

(23) Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, Random House, New
York, 1998, p.103.

(24) "The OSCE KVM: autopsy of a mission", statement
delivered by Ambassador Gabriel Keller, principal deputy
head of mission, to the watch group on May 25, 1999.

(25) Italian military participant "Romanus", in LiMes
2/99, cited by il manifesto, 19 June 1999.

(26) La Libert?, Gen?ve, 22 April 1999, and Balkan-Infos
No.33, Paris, May 1999.

(27) Ulisse, "Come gli Americani hanno sabotato la
missione dell'Osce", LiMes, supplemento al n.1/99, p.113,
L'Espresso, Rome, 1999.

(28) "Throughout the Kosovo crisis, Mr.Rubin personally
wooed Hashim Thaci, the ambitious leader of the Kosovo
Liberation Army", the Wall Street Journal reported on
June 29, 1999, even going so far as to "jokingly promise
that he would speak to Hollywood friends about getting
Mr.Thaci a movie role."

(29) Robert D.Kaplan, "Why the Balkans Demand Amorality",
The Washington Post, 28 February 1999.

(30) Peter Gowan, in "The Twisted Road to Kosovo", Labour
Focus on Eastern Europe, Number 62, Spring 1999, explains
(p.76) that the foreign policy elite discuss the sordid
realities of power politics in a closed arena, and "not
in front of the children", that is, the citizenry of the
NATOland countries, who are regaled with versions that
appeal to their values and ideals.

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UN GIUBILEO ETNICAMENTE PULITO


I devoti che quest'anno giungono a Roma nella speranza di lavare la
propria coscienza da tutte le colpe commesse potranno notare che, nella
lista delle lingue in cui confessarsi, o seguire le visite guidate,
appare la "lingua croata" e mai il croatoserbo, o serbocroato. La
operazione di revisionismo e "repulisti culturale" da parte di Santa
Romana Chiesa, impegnata a sostenere la divisione dei Balcani e delle
genti che ci vivono, continua dunque e si evidenzia in ogni occasione.

Visitando la Chiesa di San Marcello al Corso si potra' scoprire una
lapide, apposta nel 1996, dedicata a tale Giorgio Baglivi nato nel 1668
a Dubrovnik/Ragusa in... Croazia (quando la Croazia non esisteva, e dal
punto di vista geografico Dubrovnik era definita al massimo "citta'
dalmata" o "illirica"), a cura dell'Accademia delle Scienze e delle Arti
della Croazia. La suddetta Accademia ha collaborato certamente anche a
preparare la mostra di Arte Sacra Croata dal titolo "Croati, arte, fede
e cultura", aperta nel periodo dell'inaugurazione dell'Anno Santo del
2000, nella quale opere di artisti di lingua e cultura latina e
istro-veneta (Francesco da Milano, Nicola da Fiorentino, Lorenzo Lotto,
Tintoretto, Giovanni Lanfranco, e persino cimeli paleocristiani
precedenti all'arrivo degli Slavi su quelle terre) vengono spacciate
come tesori della cultura "croata".

Assolutamente da non perdere, per il turista come per i fedeli -
ustascia o meno - e' comunque la visita della Chiesa di San Girolamo
degli Illiri, all'inizio di via Tomacelli, all'interno del complesso
(edificato durante il fascismo) che ospita la Confraternita di San
Girolamo. Dal punto di vista artistico la chiesa di per se non offre
moltissimo, ma all'interno c'e' sempre qualche curiosita' che vale la
pena notare (ad esempio i santini con l'effigie del beato Alojzije
Stepinac). Essa poi da l'occasione di fermarsi un attimo a riflettere e
raccogliersi spiritualmente volgendo il pensiero, ad esempio, ai giorni
in cui il criminale nazista Ante Pavelic veniva ospitato tra quelle
mura, durante la sua permanenza a Roma in clandestinita' mentre fuggiva
dalla Jugoslavia (Croazia?) ancora grondante di sangue, verso
l'Argentina di Peron (si veda ad es. il libro "Ratlines" della Newton
Compton), grazie ai buoni uffici di Pio XII.


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
** NO COPYRIGHT ! **
------------------------------------------------------------
* Meglio ladri che rossi?
* Risultati delle elezioni in Russia (Solidaire)
* Putin, la spia innamorata dell'Occidente (Jef Bossuyt)


---

RUSSIA: MEGLIO LADRI CHE ROSSI

"La gran parte della campagna elettorale e’ stata spesa a bombardare la
Cecenia; un’altra a svillaneggiare i nemici di Eltsin [il sindaco di
Mosca Luzhkov (centro-sinistra) è stato accusato in diretta di omicidio;
al segretario del partito di maggioranza relativa, il comunista
Zjuganov, e' stato impedito di apparire in televisione sia prima che
dopo il voto] sulle televisioni pubbliche e private controllate dagli
amici di Eltsin [meglio: dai suoi padroni, come il
superbanchiere-supermafioso Berezovskij]. La famiglia’ - la figlia, i
generi, i grand commis e i nuovi ricchi ingrassati all’ombra del
presidente - ha finalmente trovato il candidato che garantirà il suo
futuro (...): Vladimir Putin"
Cosi’ scriveva Ugo TRAMBALLI sul “Sole 24 Ore” del 21\XII sui risultati
delle elezioni-farsa in Russia. Un improvviso scatto etico da parte del
quotidiano della Confindustria, a dispetto del fatto che per Vittorio
TORREMBINI, presidente dell’Associazione imprenditori in Russia (stessa
pagina), "queste elezioni siano un segno di vitalità democratica
positivo per coloro che vogliono lavorare e investire" ?

Niente paura! Continua Tramballi: "Non dobbiamo stupirci che il Paese
sia guidato da ex spie. Dove i servizi non sono deviati, esservi
appartenuti e’ un attestato di patriottismo. Ne’ deve indignare l’uso
elettorale di una guerra e di un popolo (i Ceceni), dei canali
televisivi e dei legami di famiglia. La Russia oggi e’ una cleptocrazia
[in greco: un ‘dominio di ladri’], il che e’ sempre un po’ meglio di
quando era una dittatura ideologica con la pretesa di esportare nel
mondo un modello politico..."

Tutto a posto, dunque. Ladri, fascisti, mafiosi, massacratori - si';
comunisti - no! Il ‘modello politico’ lo abbiamo esportato noi a loro:
il
‘dominio dei ladri’, appunto. [G.C.]

---

Roger ROMAIN
a/conseiller communal
B6180 COURCELLES

sites web : http://www1.brutele.be/users/r.romain
http://www1.brutele.be/users/r.romain/enbref.html


Elections en Russie

Beaucoup d?argent pour faire gagner Poutine

Les élections russes, organisées juste avant la Noël, ont conforté la
position des forces de droite à la Douma
(parlement). Quelques mois auparavant, le groupe entourant le président
Eltsine fondait le parti de l?Unité. Une
campagne médiatique sans précédent allait permettre à ce parti
d?engranger presque un quart des suffrages. A
gauche, les partis de Viktor Tioulkine et de Viktor Anpilov
recueillaient un total de 1,8 million de voix.

Jef Bossuyt

En juillet, les sondages étaient particulièrement catastrophiques pour
le Kremlin. 35% des salaires étaient inférieurs au
minimum vital de 872 roubles (1.308 FB). Les bombardements de l?Otan en
Yougoslavie avaient profondément humilié
la Russie, le Premier ministre Stepachine avait été forcé d?aller
mendier à New York un nouveau prêt du Fonds Monétaire
International. Tous ces éléments contribuaient à indisposer les Russes
vis-à-vis de l?équipe en place au Kremlin.
Le 2 juillet, cette équipe décidait d?inverser la vapeur en mettant sur
pied un état-major électoral. Dans la foulée, Serghei
Siojgou, ministre des Urgences, devenait le patron du tout nouveau parti
de l?Unité. Depuis lors, c?est tous les jours
qu?on allait le voir, grimé en pompier, éteindre des incendies, sauver
des blessés, distribuer repas chauds, couvertures et
matelas. Une image facile, car le Kremlin contrôle une bonne part de la
presse. Boris Berezovski, le banquier attaché au
Kremlin, était déjà actionnaire de la chaîne de TV ORT. Désormais, il
détient également 15% des parts du journal le plus
important, le Kommersant Daily. Le sponsor de la chaîne NTV, qui a
poussé celle-ci à soutenir les candidats de
l?opposition Loutchkov et Primakov, a eu maille à partir avec
l?inspection des impôts et les banques.
Autre point fort de la campagne électorale, la nomination de Poutine au
poste de Premier ministre. Sur-le-champ,
celui-ci lançait une campagne militaire destinée à traquer les
terroristes tchétchènes. Le groupe Eltsine profitait de
l?occasion pour le présenter comme un homme décidé, peu enclin à faire
des concessions aux séparatistes tchétchènes et à
l?ingérence étrangère. Sa popularité a donc grimpé en flèche. Dans un
même temps, on filmait Loutchkov, candidat de
l?opposition, en compagnie d?un homme d?affaire tchétchène, en suggérant
qu?il conspirait avec les terroristes de Grozny.
Alors que la guerre en Tchétchénie s?intègre dans la stratégie des
Etats-Unis pour démanteler la Russie, le régime Eltsine
a détourné la colère populaire contre les Tchétchènes, préservant ses
amis de Washington.

Outre le bassinage médiatique, il y a eu la pression administrative. Les
listes de candidats du parti de l?Unité étaient
truffées de fonctionnaires, de chefs d?entreprises, de pique-assiettes
du Kremlin, chargés tous de faire voter leurs ouailles
pour le parti de l?Unité. Résultat des courses, le nouveau parti a
récolté 23% des voix.
Ce faisant, le score total des partis de droite ralliés au gouvernement
(Unité, Patrie, Forces de Droite; Jirinovski,
Yabloko) atteignait 56% et leur accordait environ 70% des sièges de la
Douma. Dans les élections bourgeoises, où les
facteurs déterminants sont l?argent et la manipulation médiatique, le
peuple choisit lui-même ses exploiteurs. Pas un
seul travailleur ne siégera à la nouvelle Douma.

___________________

1,8 million de voix pour les révolutionnaires russes

103 millions de Russes pouvaient se rendre aux urnes. 61 millions
d?entre eux l?ont fait effectivement.

Le Parti Communiste Russe des Travailleurs (PCRT) de Viktor Tioulkine a
obtenu 1.427.447 voix. Le Bloc Stalinien
pour l?Union Soviétique de Viktor Anpilov en a reçu 327.364. Soit au
total 1.816.619 pour la gauche. Certains candidats
du PCRT ont obtenu des scores particulièrement élevés. Ainsi, Anatoli
Ouchakov, 51.000 voix (20,5%) parmi les
travailleurs du pétrole de Tchoumen. A Leningrad, Vladimir Grigoriev a
récolté 22.600 voix (10,7%).

La haute responsable syndicale Tamara Bedernikova, du secteur
Quadrichromie de Leningrad, était candidate du PCRT.
Elle raconte: 'Notre imprimerie compte 500 personnes. Une firme privée
voulait nous reprendre, mais avec 200
travailleurs seulement. Nous nous sommes battus en Justice. Notre usine
était propriété fédérale de l?Etat, le ministère
devait donc autoriser la privatisation et cela n?a pas eu lieu. Nous
savons bien qui se trouve derrière: Piatnik, une boîte
autrichienne. Elle veut nous reprendre, puis nous liquider, car nous
sommes ses principaux concurrents. Nous
fabriquons les plus belles cartes à jouer au monde. Malgré tous les
bâtons dans les roues, notre entreprise poursuit ses
activités.

Lorsque je me suis présentée comme candidate PCRT, certains travailleurs
ont dit: ?Ouais, imagine que tu sois élue. Tu
vas déménager à Moscou, et puis au revoir!? Mais je continue à habiter
ici. Jamais auparavant je n?ai fait de politique,
mais il faut bien que quelqu?un les représente. Mes parents
travaillaient dans cet atelier, et mon grand-père aussi. Mon
père a participé à la libération de Berlin avec l?armée rouge. Il a reçu
une sale blessure par balle et est revenu
quasiment sourd. Après la guerre, il a été responsable politique à
l?usine. Manifestement, il faut que je poursuive la
tradition, non?' (J.B.)

___________________

Les résultats des élections

1. Parti Communiste. Parti réformiste, n?est communiste que de nom.
Dirigeant: Ziouganov. 24,3% des voix.

2. Parti de l?Unité. Parti du président Eltsine sous direction de
Sioygou. 23,2%.

3. Patrie. Parti social-démocrate de Loutchkov et Primakov. 13,1%.

4. Forces de Droite. Libéraux de droite sous la direction de Kyrienko.
8,6%.

5. Bloc Jirinovski. Parti nationaliste de droite, soutien à Eltsine.
6,1%.

6. Yabloko. Parti pro-américain et ouvertement procapitaliste sous la
direction de Yavlinski. 6,0 %.

7. Parti Communiste Russe des Travailleurs (PCRT). Parti
marxiste-léniniste sous la direction de Viktor Tioulkine.
2,23%.

14. Bloc Stalinien pour l?Union Soviétique. Parti marxiste-léniniste
sous la direction de Viktor Anpilov. 0,61%.

Lu dans
SOLIDAIRE du 5 janvier 2000

---

>
> Poutine, l?espion qu?aimait l?Occident
>
> Vladimir Poutine, le nouveau président russe, est-il un faucon? Un
> officier KGB menant une guerre acharnée en Tchétchénie? Un homme que
> les Occidentaux doivent prendre avec des pincettes? Une enquête sur sa
> carrière balaie vite fait cette image façonnée par nos médias: la race
> Poutine est aussi servile pour l?Occident que la race Eltsine.
>
> Jef Bossuyt
>
> De 1982 à 1986, Poutine est espion du KGB en Allemagne de l?Est. A
> partir de 1985, son équipe a comme tâche d?y imposer la perestroïka,
> la nouvelle politique de Gorbatchev. Concrètement, cela signifie que
> les troupes soviétiques doivent quitter ce qui est toujours la RDA et
> que ce pays doit engager des réformes économiques d?inspiration
> libérale.
>
> Mais le chef de fil des communistes est-allemands, Erich Honecker, y
> est opposé. Les espions russes recrutent alors des opposants en vue
> d?un putsch1. Deux mois plus tard, le Mur de Berlin tombe?
>
> Début des années 90, Poutine devient assistant de Sobtsiak, maire de
> Léningrad. Il mène les privatisations, vend bâtiments et entreprises
> de la ville au capital national et étranger. Dans les crémeries de
> Léningrad, on trouve désormais du yaourt Früchtegut en provenance de
> Bavière. Les kolkhozes (coopératives) ne doivent plus fournir de lait:
> elles dépérissent. Thane Gustafson, directeur du Cambridge Eurasia
> Energy Program (EU), décrit Poutine comme un homme 'habitué à traiter
> avec des sociétés occidentales'2.
>
> Tombeur de Mur et expert ès privatisations
>
> Mi-1999, le président Eltsine devient un danger pour la stabilité du
> régime pro-occidental de Russie. 35% des salaires sont passés sous le
> minimum vital. Et les bombardements de l?Otan en Yougoslavie ont
> profondément humilié la Russie. Il devient urgent de trouver la relève
> du chef du Kremlin. 'Le remplacement d?Eltsine par Poutine était déjà
> préparé six mois d?avance', confiera Gleb Pavlovski, conseiller
> privilégié d?Eltsine et de Poutine.3
>
> La décision est en effet prise en juillet 1999, lors du forum
> économique d?été à Salzbourg (Autriche)4. Le cénacle se compose
> d?investisseurs étrangers, de chefs d?Etat de l?Europe de l?Est, de
> hauts dignitaires autrichiens et de la crème des politiciens russes
> les plus pro-occidentaux: Tchoubaïs, Kirienko et Rijkov.
>
> En août 1999, Poutine devient Premier ministre et passe à
> l?avant-scène. Il déclare mener une guerre chirurgicales contre les
> rebelles tchétchènes. Les victimes civiles ne sont pas montrées. En
> décembre, son parti d?unité nouvellement constitué gagne les élections
> parlementaires. On décide alors de le lancer comme président
> intérimaire jusqu?aux élections présidentielles anticipées de mars
> 2000. Le délai maximum durant lequel on peut maintenir sa popularité?
>
> La meilleure manière de perdre la guerre
>
> Juste après l?abdication d?Eltsine, un journal américain écrit: 'Il y
> a quelques années, la démission d?Eltsine aurait choqué et alarmé
> Washington. Aujourd?hui, l?ambiance est plutôt au soulagement.'5 Dans
> le secteur de l?énergie, les investisseurs américains sont même
> enthousiastes: 'C?est une bonne nouvelle pour les investisseurs car
> ils sont favorables à ce Poutine pragmatique. Cela met un terme à
> notre incertitude. Le marché des actions a fait un bond de 25 % quand
> il a gagné les élections parlementaires, et c?est un deuxième bond en
> avant.'6 Madeleine Allbright, secrétaire d?Etat américaine aux
> Affaires étrangères, définit elle Poutine comme 'une personne pouvant
> réaliser quelque chose'7.
>
> Clinton et Allbright protestent bien contre la guerre en Tchétchénie,
> mais ils sont conscients que leurs intérêts au Kremlin ne peuvent être
> mieux servis que par Poutine. La manière dont celui-ci mène la guerre
> est en effet la meilleure pour la perdre. Il admet des observateurs en
> Tchétchénie qui préparent le terrain pour des interventions depuis
> l?Occident. Il se garde bien de s?en prendre aux mercenaires en chef,
> Basaev et Chatab. Mais n?hésite pas à bombarder la population des
> villages.
>
> Le président de l?Ingouchie, région voisine de la Tchétchénie, a la
> formule suivante: 'S?il y a des terroristes dans une maison, pourquoi
> détruis-tu alors toute la maison? Lorsque les réfugiés tchétchènes
> reviendront, ils ne le pardonneront jamais. Combien de temps encore
> l?armée russe pourra-t-elle payer une telle campagne? C?est la voie
> directe pour perdre tout le Caucase'.8
>
> 1 Berliner Zeitung, cité dans Le Soir, 11 janvier 2000. ? 2
> Cambridge, Massachussets, 31 décembre 1999. ? 3 De Standaard, 3
> janvier 2000. ? 4 Newsline, 2 juillet 1999 et ORT-tv-nouvelles, 3
> juillet 1999. ? 5 Los Angeles Times, 1 janvier 2000. ? 6
> Cambridge, Massachussets, 31 décembre 1999. ? 7 AP, Washington,
> 31 décembre 1999. ? 8 Pratislava?s Pravda, 28 décembre 1999.


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
** NO COPYRIGHT ! **
------------------------------------------------------------
* IL MITO DEL TIBET (analisi sulle manovre statunitensi per la
secessione
del Tibet dalla Repubblica Popolare Cinese; "Il Manifesto")
* LE VITTIME DELLA NATO CHIEDONO GIUSTIZIA (Il "Quotidiano del Popolo"
di Pechino sulla guerra "umanitaria" della NATO contro la RF di
Jugoslavia)
* CONSIDERAZIONI SULLA SETTA FALUN GONG (Dirk Nimmegeers)


---

"Il Manifesto" del 9 Gennaio 2000:

CINA UNA CRISI ALLA FRONTIERA DI UNA NUOVA GUERRA FREDDA

Il mito del Tibet

Dall'Impero a Mao, un popolo in gioco tra "modernizzazioni" di Pechino e
interessi occidentali in Asia. La fuga del "giovane Buddha" dalla storia
all'immaginario

- ENRICA COLLOTTI PISCHEL -

La notizia della fuga dalla Cina del giovanissimo Lama Ugyen Trinley
Dorje, terza autorità nella gerarchia delle reincarnazioni del buddhismo
tibetano stata ritenuta molto ghiotta dai giornali italiani e viene
considerata un grave scacco per il governo cinese che non sarebbe
riuscito
a impedirla, nonostante il proprio apparato militare.
Quest'interpretazione
ignora che i cinesi non hanno mai fatto nulla per fermare la fuga dei
rappresentanti politici e religiosi tibetani dalla Cina: nel 1959
l'intera
classe dirigente tibetana, con alla testa il Dalai Lama si allontanò da
Lhasa con una lunga fuga a piedi, nonostante il pattugliamento degli
aerei
da combattimento cinesi. Fa parte della politica delle autorità cinesi
il
pensare che gli avversari è sempre meglio tenerli fuori del paese che
dentro, meglio lontani dai loro adepti che vicini. Se poi le circostanze
equivoche di quest'ultimo episodio - cioè la mancata condanna di Pechino
-
possano far pensare a ipotesi di contatti con il Dalai Lama e di
trattative
di conciliazione, è difficile dirlo ora. Certamente il fatto che la
grande
organizzazione propagandistica che negli Stati Uniti (ma anche in Europa
e
nello stesso nostro scafato e realistico paese) sostiene la causa
dell'indipendenza tibetana si sia buttata sull'episodio, non rende certo
facile un'intesa: i cinesi sanno fare molto bene i compromessi e sono
disposti a concluderli quando siano convenienti. Ma ritengono che
debbano
essere cercati e raggiunti con la massima discrezione e comunque al di
fuori di pressioni che li possano far apparire come una resa a pressioni
straniere.

E non dimentichiamo mai che "straniero" per l'intera Asia orientale
nell'ultimo secolo e mezzo ha significato umiliazione e asservimento: di
essa fece parte anche il tentativo pi volte condotto di staccare il
Tibet
dalla Cina.

Il più povero

Molte cose dovrebbero essere dette a proposito del mito del Tibet che ha
preso piede, anche nei ranghi della sinistra. Dal cinematografico
"Shangri-la", al di fuori del tempo, dello spazio e del clima, alle
ovvie
seduzioni di turismo "estremo", dalle tendenze a vedere esempi validi in
civiltà rimaste primitive e tagliate fuori dal processo della storia,
alla
sistematica disinformazione diffusa da potenti mezzi mediatici
statunitensi
e al fascino che sugli occidentali delusi esercitano le religioni e le
ideologie esotiche ed esoteriche, tutto confluito in un'affabulazione
della
quale sono stati vittime in primo luogo proprio i tibetani.

Certamente sono uno dei popoli più poveri del mondo, esposti a
molteplici
forme di oppressione: tra esse quella cinese è stata con ogni
probabilità
meno gravosa di quella esercitata dai monaci e dagli aristocratici, dei
quali i pastori e i contadini erano fino al 1959 "schiavi", nel senso
letterale del termine, in quanto sottoposti al diritto di vita e di
morte
dei loro padroni. Che poi tutti, ma con ben diverso vantaggio,
trovassero
conforto nel ricorso ad una delle forme più degradate di buddhismo (il
buddhismo tantrico tibetano popolato di fantasmi e di incantesimi ha ben
poco a che vedere con la meditazione intellettuale e la creatività
artistica dello Zen), si può anche comprenderlo.

Per fare un minimo di chiarezza è necessario comunque precisare alcune
cose. Il Tibet non stato "conquistato dalla Cina comunista nel 1950":
dopo
precedenti più discontinui rapporti, fu conquistato dall'impero cinese,
nella prima metà del secolo XVIII e da allora stato considerato parte
dello
stato cinese da tutti i governi della Cina, anche dal Guomindang. La
Cina
(in cinese "Stato del Centro") è stato ed è uno stato multietnico nel
quale
è in corso da millenni un processo di trasferimenti di gruppi etnici e
soprattutto di fusione dei gruppi periferici entro quello più importante
che rappresenta nove decimi dei cinesi ed è sempre stato capace di
offrire
ai suoi membri una maggiore prosperità e i benefici di una cultura più
concreta. Mettere in discussione la natura multietnica della civiltà e
dello stato cinesi significherebbe mettere in moto la più spaventosa
catastrofe degli ultimi secoli. Quella praticata dalla Cina non è mai
stata
una politica di "pulizia etnica" bensì di fusione entro un insieme non
etnico ma contraddistinto da una comune cultura e da comuni pratiche
produttive: più che sterminarle, i cinesi hanno comprato le minoranze.
E'
vero che i tibetani per ragioni geografiche sono, entro lo "Stato del
Centro" il gruppo più lontano dalla comune cultura, però da 250 anni
sono
stati sempre governati da funzionari cinesi nominati dal governo
centrale:
giuridicamente e istituzionalmente ciò ha un senso. Gli inglesi
all'apice
del loro potere sull'India all'inizio del secolo XX intrapresero,
tuttavia,
una serie di manovre per staccare il Tibet dalla Cina e porlo sotto la
loro
influenza giungendo, nel 1913 a convocare una conferenza a Simla nella
quale le autorità tibetane cedettero vasti territori all'India
britannica.
Nessun governo cinese ha mai accettato la validità di quella conferenza.
Nel periodo precedente il 1949 il governo del Guomindang considerava il
Tibet a pieno diritto, parte del proprio territorio, tanto che durante
la
Seconda guerra mondiale concedeva il diritto di sorvolo agli aerei
alleati.

Il ruolo della Cia

Non ha quindi alcun senso dire che la Cina conquistò il Tibet nel 1950;
nel
1950 le forze di Mao completarono in Tibet il controllo sul territorio
cinese; nel 1951 fu raggiunto un accordo con il Dalai Lama per la
concessione di un regime di autonomia. Verso il 1957, nel pieno
dell'assedio statunitense alla Cina, i servizi segreti inglesi e
americani
fomentarono una rivolta dei gruppi di tibetani arroccati sulle montagne
delle regioni cinesi del Sichuan e dello Yunnan, lungo la strada che
dalla
Cina porta al Tibet; i cinesi repressero certamente la rivolta con pugno
di
ferro: nelle circostanze internazionali nelle quali si trovavano e nel
loro
contesto etnico non era razionale pensare che si comportassero
diversamente. Alla fine del 1958 i servizi segreti inglesi annunciarono,
che all'inizio del 1959 essa si sarebbe trasferita a Lhasa e avrebbe
cercato l'appoggio del Dalai Lama. Ed infatti ciò che avvenne: sullo
sfondo
della rivolta, il Dalai Lama dichiarò decaduto l'accordo per il regime
autonomo e fuggì con la maggioranza della classe dirigente tibetana in
India, dove costituì un proprio governo in esilio e il proprio centro di
propaganda. Nessun governo al mondo ha riconosciuto questa compagine.
Recentemente la Cia (i servizi segreti americani sono infatti obbligati
a
rendicontare prima o poi le loro spese di fronte ai contribuenti) ha
ammesso di aver finanziato tutta l'operazione della rivolta tibetana.

Pechino: autonomia no

Dopo il 1959 il governo cinese spossessò monasteri e aristocratici e
"liberò gli schiavi", iniziando una politica di modernizzazione forzosa
(vaccinazioni, costruzione di opere pubbliche) e di formazione di una
classe dirigente locale, figlia di schiavi, sottoposta a un
bombardamento
educativo razionalista e anti-religioso. Furono questi giovani che
durante
la rivoluzione culturale distrussero templi e monasteri, infliggendo
gravi
danni a un patrimonio culturale unico e a un'identità certo non
abbandonata
dalle masse.

Dopo la morte di Mao, i governanti cinesi hanno cercato di ristabilire i
rapporti con i tibetani, migliorando le sorti economiche dell'altipiano
ma
importando anche gran numero di cinesi, non solo militari. Hanno anche
trattato indirettamente con il Dalai Lama, che - politico asiatico molto
scaltro - non chiede l'indipendenza, ma una più o meno larga autonomia:
Pechino non ha mai tuttavia voluto concedere un reale autogoverno, che
aprirebbe rischi di secessione e metterebbe in discussione tutti i
rapporti
etnici del vasto paese. Alle spalle del Dalai Lama si è sviluppato,
intanto, un vasto insieme di interessi della classe dirigente tibetana
che
ormai è nata all'estero e vi ha ricevuto una formazione culturale
moderna:
è questa che chiede un'indipendenza che potrebbe essere ottenuta solo
con
una guerra spietata alla Cina e potrebbe essere innestata dal
reclutamento
di giovani guerriglieri in India - segnali "terroristici" in questo
senso
ci sono già stati. Erano proprio dissennati i governanti cinesi che
ritenevano che l'attacco alla Serbia motivato dalla difesa dei "diritti
umani" in Kosovo fosse in effetti la prova generale di un attacco alla
Cina?

---

STOP NATO: ¡NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG

http://web4.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200001/11/eng20000111F103.html

Peoples Daily (Cn), January 11, 2000
A Demand for International Justice from the Victimized

Soon after fireworks were let off at the advent of 2000 there has been
filed the second time by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a lawsuit at
the International Court decrying NATO's war atrocities against the
Yugoslav people in violation of principles and norms governing
international relations between countries.
Yugoslavia is obviously not a country that has suffered from amnesia nor
has it chosen terrorism to avenge itself on sufferings from "organized
terrorist crimes" of NATO headed by the US. It lodges likewise its
second complaint at the international court in pointing to its full
respect for international laws and its responsible principled demand for
justice from the international community.
Contrarily, the US and its ally NATO brag unblushingly about their war
atrocities committed against Yugoslavia as those "in complete accord
with international laws". But by international laws no interference in
the internal affairs of other countries or encroachments on their
sovereignty should be allowed. NATO and the US have conveyed their full
blatancy by denying the illegality of their aggression and atrocities
committed against a small country like Yugoslavia. A thing to be noted
is that by "just and mild" legal principles of the International Court,
just as things stand with the present panel of the court, Yugoslavia as
the victimized part can in the least be favored by decisions to be made
irrespective of its complaint placed. But this does not deny the
significance of Yugoslavia's complaint lodged at the International Court
against NATO and the US. Though Yugoslavia may fail in such a suit of
"war" against "organized terrorist crimes" by NATO and the US yet it
represents still the righteous demand of a nation for international
justice.
At a time as is now when NATO has by its Kosovo war brought an accursed
stain on the new bright 21st century the world people should be alerted
to the fact that dark clouds have already been thrown up by Western
power politics over world peace. It is by no means pointless for
Yugoslavia to renew its lawsuit and demand for justice from the
international community and a brand-new world order by lodging at the
International Court its accusations against crimes NATO and US
committed.
A variety of game rules have been produced by the US and its ally NATO
in regard to the sovereignty of other nations during the few years from
Gulf war to the Kosovo war. Back in 1990, when Iraq made inroads into
Kuwait the US and Britain directly unsheathed their sword on the pretext
of defending "principles on sovereignty". But by 1999, from US-led
NATO's Kosovo war there was suddenly produced such a pseudo theory as
"protecting human rights" at the expense of "principles on sovereignty"
originally they much flaunted. A saying by a handful of Americans is
that since the world has been engulfed in a tidal wave of globalization
the "principles on sovereignty" have become an outmoded concept in
defining the territorial rights of different states and their national
interest. But following the American logic, they themselves should be
excepted for they have still to be comforted by their own type of
"American interests". This is to say when the US has not been self
bestowed with the right to brag about various types of world interests
simply theirs it will find it hard to give a satisfactory explanation of
what it has asserted about the like fallacies as "human rights
transcending sovereignty". We should say international rules must be
worked out by a coordinated effort of the peoples of the whole world.
This is where the right sort of "human rights" and genuine democracy can
be produced and enjoyed by the peoples of the whole world.
In international politics, it is by no means a rare phenomenon for the
big to bully the small and strong to browbeat the weak. In spite of the
fact that though against Western power politics not a strong rival force
has yet risen in today's world since NATO launched its barbarous Kosovo
war in Yugoslavia people should in no way give up their hope and demand
for justice from the international community. High credit should
therefore be given to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since it has
lodged at the International Court its accusation against the US and its
ally NATO and the support given by the Italian Reconstructed Communist
Party to the Yugoslav people in their fight against Western power
politics.
A French writer has put it rightly. He said a people's foreign policy
can be bought but not the dreams or memories of such a nation. In the
brand-new 2000, instead of forgetting yesterday's sufferings the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia clings all the same to its hope and demand for
justice from a responsive international community tomorrow.

---

La Chine arrête les dirigeants de Falun Gong

Une secte qui tue

Le gouvernement chinois a mis sous les verrous de gros bonzes de la
secte Falun Gong, hors-la-loi,sans doute
responsable de 1.400 morts: des victimes crédules qui ne consultaient
plus le médecin mais espéraient que la
guérison viendrait de Falun Gong.

Dirk Nimmegeers*

Le 25 avril 1999, la secte Falun Gong rameute dix mille manifestants:
pendant 13 heures, ils occupent le quartier de
Zhongnanhai, où les hauts dirigeants et cadres supérieurs du parti ont
leurs bureaux et logements. Le 22 juillet, la secte
est interdite. Répression contre la liberté de culte? Muselage de la
libre expression? Voyons plutôt ce qui a provoqué ces
mesures.

Un an avant l?interdiction de la secte Falun Gong, Li Hongzhi, son
fondateur, émigre vers les Etats-Unis. A l?origine, il
pratique le qigong, une combinaison d?arts martiaux, de méditation et de
technique de respiration. En 1992, Li inaugure
son propre dogme, une concoction de qigong et d?idées bouddhistes et
taoïstes isolées de leur contexte: Falun Gong est né.

N?allez pas chez le médecin...

Li et ses assistants commencent à dispenser thérapies, formations et à
vendre toutes sortes de produits. Cela rapporte une
fortune. Ils déclarent suspectes toutes formes de médecines et superflus
les médecins, car 'avec Falun Gong, toutes les
douleurs physiques s?en vont et on atteint sa propre paix intérieure.'1

A partir de 1992, Li fondera 39 centres en Chine, dont dépendent 1.900
écoles et 28.000 salles d?exercices. Falun Gong
revendique cent millions de membres, les autorités chinoises estiment
qu?ils sont deux millions tout au plus.

Mais il y a des morts. Des adeptes croient que la maladie est imputable
à de mauvaises actions commises dans une vie
antérieure et que seuls les exercices de Falun Gong peuvent les guérir.
Ils laissent tomber médecin et médication. Certains
deviennent dépressifs ou sont obsédés par la prévision de la fin du
monde. De la sorte, la secte cause 1.400 décès et des
centaines de cas de maladies mentales.

A chaque critique des médias, Falun Gong fomente des bagarres. En août
1996, des membres de la secte entourent les
bureaux du Journal de Guangming. Occupations et sièges en règle de
journaux, de stations tv et radio se succèdent.
L?agence de presse Xinhua compte 78 manifestations non autorisées
impliquant chaque fois plus de 300 personnes. Les
revues médicales qui invitent les gens à refaire confiance en la
médecine reçoivent des visites menaçantes.

Début 1998, un nombre surprenant de rixes éclatent à Chongqing, dans le
Sud-Ouest. Le service de la sûreté publique
constate que toutes les actions sont dirigées par un solide réseau dont
le quartier général n?est autre que le principal siège
de Falun Gong à Pékin.2

La secte infiltre le Parti communiste et les ministères

Bientôt, il apparaît que le mouvement a infiltré certaines sections du
Parti communiste et des instances
gouvernementales. Deux des quatre dirigeants nationaux de Falun Gong qui
comparaîtront sont d?anciens fonctionnaires
de ministères importants. Il s?agit de Wang Zhiwen et de Li Chang. Ce
dernier travaillait encore il y a peu au ministère de
la Sûreté publique.3

En avril 1999, le professeur He Zuoxiu, de l?Académie chinoise des
Sciences, critique l?influence du qigong sur les jeunes.
Falun Gong saute sur l?occasion pour organiser ce qui sera, selon les
médias, ?la plus importante manif depuis Tien An
Men?.

Le gouvernement décide d?interdire la secte et sa propagande. La Chine
lance un mandat d?arrêt international contre Li
Hongzhi. Un avertissement est également adressé aux voyants
extralucides, vendeurs de perlimpimpin et autres semeurs
de superstitions. Le 30 octobre, le Congrès National du Peuple,
l?assemblée populaire suprême de la Chine, promulgue
une loi contre les sectes nuisibles.

Li Baoku, porte-parole gouvernemental, déclare: 'Celui qui veut suivre
le dogme de Falun Gong ne sera pas poursuivi à
condition qu?il rompe tous liens avec l?organisation, déclarée
hors-la-loi. L?interdiction ne vaut pas pour les groupes
de qigong qui s?en tiennent à l?observance des lois. Il y a une grande
différence entre la masse des simples adhérents, qui
ont été abusés, et la petite bande des dirigeants de la secte, qui les
ont trompés ou manipulés.'4

Et l?officielle agence de presse Xinhua indique: 'Le problème Falun Gong
a un contexte social et international
profondément enraciné. C?est une lutte politique entre le Parti
communiste et certaines forces intérieures et étrangères.
L?enjeu est de savoir qui va attirer à soi les masses. (...)' L?agence
de presse appelle la classe ouvrière à se détourner de
Falun Gong et de son influence.5

Deux cents dirigeants sont arrêtés mais la plupart sont remis en
liberté. A l?issue de manifestations, la police retient
brièvement quelques personnes. Pékin s?efforce de faire savoir aux
nombreux adeptes du taï-chi et du qigong qu?ils ne
sont en rien visés. Dans les parc, on voit toujours de nombreuses
personnes se livrer à leur gymnastique matinale.6

Claudio Cervini, un Italien qui travaille à Pékin depuis 1991, écrit:
'Ceux qui veulent maintenir la secte en place
s?opposent au gouvernement et ne sont pas conséquents car ils prétendent
toujours ne pas faire de politique et ne vouloir
que méditer et se développer. Les gens qui veulent s?adonner à la
méditation et à la quiétude spirituelle peuvent le faire
en d?innombrables endroits de Pékin. Je suis écoeuré de lire des
articles occidentaux accusant les autorités de
poursuivre des innocents. Tout étranger vivant ici peut se rendre compte
que ce n?est pas vrai.'

* Dirk Nimmegeers collabore à La Chine aujourd?hui, périodique de
l?Association Belgique-Chine. Pour plus d?infos
sur Falun Gong, consultez le site www.china.org.cn.

1. Conférencier de Falun Gong pour le Benelux, NRC, 27 novembre 1999 ?
2. Ibidem ? 3. Le Monde, 3 novembre 1999 ? 4.
China Daily, 24 juillet 1999 ? 5. Xinhua, 2 août 1999 ? 6. Michael
Kramer, correspondant de Reuters sur le website Asia
on line, 24 août 1999.


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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