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[Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Can Democracy be Constructed Based on Terror &
Fraud? -
The BHHRG Report on the Kosovo 'Elections,' 17
November 2001
[This report was prepared by Dr. David Chandler. It is Posted with the
kind permission of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 28 November
2001. For some quite interesting Further Reading, go to end of page.]
=======================================
Faking Democracy and Progress in Kosovo
1. Background
"This was an extraordinary election."[i] The pronouncement of US
Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Mission chief, running the elections was
very apt. These elections were truly extraordinary in many respects.
One extraordinary aspect is that they were held in a legal vacuum.
Kosovo is neither an independent state nor any longer under the
government of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The question
of statehood is to be postponed to the indefinite future while the
United Nations assumes the responsibility for governing the province,
through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR) the former Danish
foreign minister, Hans Haekkerup.
The provincial government elected on 17 November reflects this lack of
international legal framework. The new post-election arrangements are
outlined in a document titled `A Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo'.[ii] This is not a constitution
but a `framework' for a constitution and not self-government but
`provisional' self-government. The ill-defined legal and political
status of the former Yugoslav province, reflects Western powers'
diminished respect for state sovereignty and the crumbling formal
framework of international legal and political equality. (1)
Kosovo is an `extraordinary' political experiment because the system of
`dual power' of an international governing administration alongside a
subordinate, domestically-elected administration, which developed in an
ad hoc manner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is here for the first time
officially institutionalised. The new framework for a `constitution' of
Kosovo, is the first modern political constitution to explicitly rule
out democracy. The preamble states that the `will of the people' is to
be relegated to just one of many `relevant factors' to be taken into
account by the international policy-makers.[iii]
The executive and legislative powers of the UN Special Representative
remain unaffected by the new constitutional framework. Chapter 8 of the
framework lists the powers and responsibilities reserved for the
international appointee, which include the final authority over finance,
the budget and monetary policy, customs, the judiciary, law enforcement,
policing, external relations, public property, communications and
transport, housing, municipal administration, and the appointment of
regulatory boards and commissions. And, of course, the power to dissolve
the elected assembly if Kosovo's representatives do not show sufficient
`maturity' to agree with his edicts.[iv]
2. Sham Elections
Many international plenipotentiaries, including US President George
Bush, Nato Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged the Kosovo public to turn out to
vote, particularly the Kosovo Serbs. When it emerged that around 60% of
the Albanian and 50% of the Serb voters had taken part, the elections
were loudly hailed by the international organisers and observers to be a
`glorious day in the history of Kosovo' and as a `huge success'.[v] The
question of why the international community chose to spend millions of
dollars holding elections for a provincial administration with token
office-holders with highly circumscribed powers was, unfortunately,
rarely asked.
These elections were extraordinary in the importance attached to them,
not just because of the lack of power awarded to the victors, but also
the fact that the results were largely irrelevant once the electoral
`engineering' of the OSCE and UNMIK was taken into account. The largest
party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova,
which won 46% of the votes, would not have been able to form the
government even if they had won a land-slide victory. This was because
the seats in the seven-member presidency and positions in the new
ministries were already divided in a fixed ratio in advance. For
example, the largest party and second largest party, the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hashim Thaci, with 25% of the votes, were to
have two seats in the presidency with the third party holding one seat,
the two remaining seats were reserved for Serb and other minorities.
This system of dividing the seats before the elections made the
international pressure on Belgrade to encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote, in
order that they might have more of a say in the future of the province,
rather bizarre. The Serb community was already guaranteed 10 reserved
seats in the 120 seat assembly, a seat on the presidency and at least
one of the nine ministries, regardless of whether any Serbs voted at
all.
I was monitoring the Kosovo elections on behalf of the British Helsinki
Human Rights Group with the official international observation mission
of the Council of Europe. It did not take long to see why the
extravagant hype had taken over from the mundane reality of the
elections. At the start of the Council of Europe observer training, Lord
Russell Johnstone, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, put the elections in the broader context of international
intervention today. `The international community needs to prove that
intervention was benign [in Kosovo and East Timor] and will create
better conditions. These elections are a proving exercise.' Lord
Johnstone is probably correct to see the November elections as little
more than a `proving exercise' for the international institutions
involved in the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty and the promotion of
`military humanitarianism' in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This would seem
to be confirmed in the stated concern of the OSCE organisers to achieve
an election that made the international mission appear `legitimate and
credible'.[vi]
Bearing in mind the international importance of the `success' of the
Kosovo elections, the `independent' observation mission of the Council
of Europe claims that the provincial elections were `free and fair'
should not necessarily be taken at face value.[vii] It is highly
doubtful that these elections would have been passed as `free and fair'
had they taken place outside the international supervision of the OSCE.
The election conditions, in which there was a complete absence of
freedom of movement for minority communities, and many of the OSCE
election regulations covering the media and political parties, failed to
meet basic internationally accepted standards, such as those laid out in
the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Declaration on Democracy and Political
Pluralism.[viii] The following sections compare the claims of the OSCE
against the reality of Kosovo in more depth.
3. Creating Multi-Ethnic Society?
Without visiting the region it is difficult for outside observers to
imagine the depth of fear and insecurity which pervades the province
despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission. (2) There has been a
highly restricted number of Serb and minority returns to Kosovo, and the
UNHCR estimates that since the UNMIK administration took over more
minorities may have left the province than returned.[ix] One reason for
this is that Serb and other ethnic minorities still have no freedom of
movement in Kosovo. The lack of movement could be seen when we visited
the allegedly multi-ethnic `zone of confidence' in Mitrovica, which has
no Serb minority and is basically a Bosnian Muslim settlement policed by
a 24-hour UNMIK armed guard. Or when we walked further along the Ibar to
the uninhabited ruins of the Roma `Malhalla', formally the largest Roma
settlement in the Balkans, destroyed after the war. It is not yet
possible for any of the 7,000 former residents to return in safety.
The ethnic-apartheid ruled over by UNMIK (3) also had a direct impact
on the election campaign and election monitoring. The Council of Europe
election observation teams were told not to enter minority Serb or
Albanian areas within their allocated municipalities because it would be
too dangerous for their drivers and interpreters. Apart from indicating
the complete separation of the Serb and Albanian communities, this
instruction also meant that the `independent' observers had a highly
restricted view of the elections. One further impact of the lack of
security for ethnic minorities was the fact that the voters' list, the
basic tool to guide election campaigning, was considered to be sensitive
information. The voters' list was not available to be used by political
parties and could only be consulted if no notes or photographs were
taken, making full transparency impossible.[x]
Far from admitting to the failures of the Nato intervention or the
subsequent `peace-building' programmes of the UNMIK administration, and
the ethnic-apartheid, which is in place, the OSCE had boasted that the
elections were overcoming ethnic divisions. One reason for this
statement was that there were allegedly minority members on the polling
station committees.I was observing in the north of the Mitrovica area,
in Leposavic, a moderate-dominated Serb area, I saw no minority
committee members and asked an OSCE polling station supervisor if the
policy had been dropped. He replied that the polling station committee
were all minority community members as they were all Serbs. Classifying
mono-ethnic polling station committees as minority ones makes the OSCE
election organisation look artificially multi-ethnic. This artificial
`engineering' to create multi-ethnic institutions on paper is also
promoted as an important outcome of the elections themselves. Every
level of government, including the Presidency, the Ministries and the
Assembly will have reserved places for minority community members. These
minority members will be bussed in to meetings from minority enclaves
under heavy military guard. Multi-ethnic government will be created by
edict, but this will not reflect the divided society, nor help to break
down inter-ethnic barriers. The insecurities of minority and majority
communities are not caused by ignorance or irrational prejudice but by
rational concerns that the artificial and temporary nature of the
current settlement imposed by UNMIK can not be sustainable.
The lack of refugee return and poor treatment of non-Albanian minority
communities, was one reason for the low turn-out in some minority areas
of Kosovo, particularly in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar river
which divides the town of Mitrovica. At some polling stations turn-out
was under 10%.[xi] In Leposavic around a third of the 6,500 population
were refugees. I visited the refugee centres for Roma and Serbs
displaced from southern Kosovo. I spoke to Gushanig Skandir the head of
the Roma camp, who showed us around the overcrowded and poorly funded
site, where large families were forced to share single rooms and use
outside toilet and washing facilities despite the winter cold.He told me
that after waiting three years their centre had received a new roof 20
days ago, he believed this international aid was because he encouraged
the adults in the camp to register to vote and to encourage the Roma
refugees to vote on election day. He was sceptical about the elections
but felt the Roma might receive more aid from the international
community if they voted. The following day I saw him at the polling
station in the local school. Gushanig may have made the pragmatic choice
to vote but many other refugees and displaced people in similar
situations told us that voting could make no difference especially as
the leading Serb representatives would have seats in the Assembly
anyway.
In an attempt to portray the low turn-outs as unconnected to the lack
of freedom of movement and alienation of minority communities, Daan
Everts declared: `The only thing which marred what was a glorious day in
Kosovo's history was that some Serbs in the north of Kosovo were too
intimidated by other people in their own community to come out and
vote'.[xii] This claim was repeated on BBC World television, in
international press headlines and in the post-election International
Crisis Group report, which stated that `the intimidation of would-be
Serb voters marred the election in Serb-controlled region north of the
Ibar river'.[xiii] The intimidation claims were news to the independent
observers in the region. I attended the Mitrovica area debriefing for
the Council of Europe observers after the elections and intimidation was
not mentioned, the observation team for the north Mitrovica municipality
received not one report of intimidation. At a post election party for
internationals the mystery was clarified when I spoke to the OSCE
regional trainer for the Mitrovica area who told me that his boss's
claims of intimidation were based on highly dubious allegations `of
people staring outside polling stations and looking inside them'.
4. Political Pluralism, Free Press and Civil Society?
The OSCE and UNMIK regard the Kosovo political parties as a hindrance
rather than a help in addressing the problems of the province. They are
seen to be lacking maturity and in need of `continuous support from the
OSCE Democratization Department to enhance their organisational capacity
and to increase their political and social possibilities to advocate for
democratic changes'.[xiv] Daan Everts argued that the political parties
were so out of touch that the international community was, in effect,
more democratic and more representative of popular opinion. He stated
that the OSCE needed to inform the political parties of the concerns of
the people and to encourage them to respond to the demands of the
electorate.[xv]
As part of the process of making political parties more `accountable'
there are a host of restrictive regulations of the political sphere.
These include the fining of newspapers if they favour a major political
party. Epoka e Re was fined DEM 1,000 for `a clear bias in favour of the
PDK in its election political reporting' while Bota Sot was fined DEM
2,750 for coverage which was favourable to the LDK.[xvi] I asked Lucia
Scotton, the Council of Europe's Mission in Kosovo's media monitoring
officer, how these fines squared with the OSCE's claim to be encouraging
a free and independent media. Her view was that although it was an
international norm for a free press to take a political position
favouring a particular party in election campaigns, the fines were
`reasonable' because the press in Kosovo was not professional or mature
enough to act freely and independently yet.[xvii]
The OSCE Code of Conduct for political parties also breaches
internationally accepted democratic norms by holding political parties
responsible for the actions of their supporters.[xviii] I asked Adrian
Stoop, the Chief Commissioner of the OSCE Election Complaints and
Appeals Commission about whether this regulation complied with
international standards.[xix] He replied that `In Holland this law would
be unthinkable.' He explained that the internationally-appointed
Commissioners supported regulations which they would not accept in their
own countries because the international administrators found it hard `to
get a grip on what is happening' and `didn't speak the language'. In
order to give the international regulators greater control, the rules
had to be more pragmatic and flexible to try to influence the political
parties and the political climate.
The OSCE election `engineers' also sought to limit the influence of the
political parties once they got into power. Daan Everts stated at a
training session for Council of Europe observers that `these elections
force a certain degree of power-sharing', undermining the power of the
larger parties by restricting their positions and influence in the new
institutions.[xx]He added that the OSCE had learnt from the municipal
elections last year `to impose a bit more'. The flexible `framework' for
a `constitution' allows the line between international and domestic
responsibility to be easily blurred. Firstly, UNMIK has established
`international advisors' for the President, Prime Minister and ministers
and each ministry will also be overseen by an international `Principal
Advisor'. Secondly, the functions reserved for the UN's Special
Representative are so vaguely defined that they cover much of the
responsibilities `devolved' to the nine ministries. However, in the true
spirit of transparency and accountability the UNMIK spokesperson says
that at this stage `it is hard to describe' what powers will be needed
to carry out these reserved functions.[xxi]
While the political parties were being restricted at least it appeared
that one area of political life was booming, civil society. The growing
strength of civil society was indicated by the fact that this year there
was more than twice the number of domestic observers as last year,
representing 1% of the electorate. Daan Everts described the elections
as the `best monitored elections this century'.[xxii] In fact, according
to the OSCE, there `could be the highest proportion of election
observers to voters in the world'.[xxiii] One does not have to be a
hardened cynic to wonder why 1% of the population would be so keen to
observe the elections. I thought it would be interesting to find out.
When I asked the NGO observers more about how they got involved I was
surprised to find out that many did not know what `their' NGO did or
what its' initials stood for, and had got involved through being invited
by a friend. This was particularly true for those observing on behalf of
one of the best represented domestic NGOs, the KMDLNJ (Council for the
Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms) based in Pristina. The reason the
KMDLNJ had so many observers was probably because they were paying
people DEM 80 to take part. CeSID a Serbian-based NGO with close links
to the OTPOR student movement was paying people DEM 25 to observe. The
other NGO observers were paid somewhere between the two.
The dynamism of civil society, like every other aspect of these
elections was a fake. In the regional de-briefing back in Pristina, all
the observers noted that the domestic observers were rather
disinterested in the proceedings. It seems likely that the OSCE and its
international sponsors' actions of buying-in civil society NGOs will
have little positive impact in the longer run. It hardly encourages
people to take communal responsibility for democracy if people are paid
half-a-month's wages to `volunteer' to be part of the democratic
process. The statistics for domestic observers may have looked good on
paper but the OSCE's approach of artificially `engineering' the effect
it wanted may only set back any genuine attempt to involve the Kosovo
public in the political process. If civic NGO involvement is promoted as
an election-related job, like interpreting and driving for the
internationals, then this undermines, rather than promotes, the idea of
voluntary civic engagement.
5. Conclusion
The November 17 elections in Kosovo were phoney in every major respect.
They were phoney in that under the fiction of multi-ethnic government
they helped legitimise a society that provides no normal existence for
ethnic minorities, merely imprisonment in ethnic enclaves and military
escorts to visit family cemeteries or former homes and villages. They
were phoney in that through the fiction of `staring' Serbs the
responsibility for the low turn-out in some regions was seen to be the
fault of minorities themselves, rather than the ethnic segregation
overseen by the international community. They were phoney because under
the guise of promoting media freedom and independence, freedom of
expression and political debate were further restricted. They were
phoney because under the guise of promoting political pluralism,
majority rule was replaced by a consensus imposed by the UN's Special
Representative. They were phoney because under the fiction of a vibrant
civil society the OSCE and its partners corrupted the process of
encouraging civic engagement. Most importantly, they were phoney because
under the fiction of democratic autonomy for the people of Kosovo, they
legitimised a constitution that openly replaced the `popular will' with
the unaccountable power of an international protectorate.
The OSCE and UNMIK are celebrating the elections as a major
international success. They may have secured some international
legitimacy for their tin-pot protectorate and won kudos for their
`success' in encouraging `democracy' and `peace' in Kosovo. However,
phoney elections can only create phoney consultation bodies. The reduced
election turn-out among the Albanian voters and the low turn-out for the
Kosovo Serbs suggests that the domestic legitimacy of the international
protectorate may be the real sticking point for the future.
This report was compiled by Dr David Chandler, Policy Research
Institute, Leeds Metropolitan University. He is the author of Bosnia
Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000) and From Kosovo
to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press,
March 2002). He can be contacted at D.Chandler@....
[i] `First Official Results in Kosovo Election Announced', OSCE Mission
in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 19 November 2001.
[ii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001.
[iii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001, p.4.
[iv] For further background information on the framework for
provisional self-government, read: Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo:
State-Building and "Substantial Autonomy", International Peace Academy,
August 2001. Available from: <http://www.ipacademy.org/>; Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow-Up: Why Conditional
Independence? September 2001. Available from:
<http://www.kosovocommission.org/>; International Crisis Group, Kosovo
Landmark Election, November 2001. Available from:
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
[v] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[vi] International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans
Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.1.
[vii] `Kosovo Assembly Elections Bring Democracy Forward and Strengthen
regional Stability', Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in
Kosovo Press Release, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[viii] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the OSCE. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/docs>.
[ix] Interview with Leonard Zulu, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR,
Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[x] Information provided by Peter Urban, Director of Elections, OSCE,
Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina 13 November 2001.
[xi] Information provided by OSCE Spokesperson Claire Trevena, 21
November 2001.
[xii] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[xiii] Nicholas Wood, `Serbs "Face Threats at Polls"', Observer, 18
November 2001; International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election,
Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.i.
[xiv] Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xv] Daan Everts, `Foreword', Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices
(Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xvi] `Fines Given for Political Violence and Reporting Bias', OSCE
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 10 November 2001;
`Newspaper Sanctioned for Photo', OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press
Release, Pristina, 16 November 2001.
[xvii] Interview, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[xviii] `The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions,
Citizens' Initiatives, Independent Candidates, Their Supporters and
Candidates', Electoral Rule No.1 1/2001, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Central
Election Commission. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
[xix] At the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xx] Speech at the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xxi] UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR Press Briefing, 22 November 2001. UNMIK
Unofficial Transcript.
[xxii] `Calls for Kosova's Serbs to Vote', RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.5,
No.214, Part II, 9 November 2001.
[xxiii] `Plea to Election Observers: Be Patient', OSCE Mission in
Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 9 November 2001.
**********************************************
COMMENTS & FURTHER READING:
**********************************************
Prepared by John Flaherty and Jared Israel, Emperor's Clothes
1) UN Resolution 1244 guarantees that Kosovo will remain part of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) campaigned for the exact opposite during an earlier
provincial quasi-election. See "Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo
'Independence'" by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
* (Return to Report, above)
2) In his informative report on the Kosovo elections, posted above, Dr.
Chandler writes that Serbs have been subjected to a reign of terror in
Kosovo "despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission."
We in the NATO countries have been taught that our leaders are
basically decent, but make mistakes. We are told that if bad things
happen in countries undergoing NATO 'nation-building' it is in spite of,
not because of, NATO leaders.
But in Kosovo, the evidence on the ground is overwhelming. Kosovo has
suffered an unprecedented reign of terror by Albanian secessionists
because of - not in spite of - NATO and UN control.
Many articles on Emperor's Clothes document this with abundant
references from the mainstream media and from highly credible observers.
The following is a small but important sample:
* "TERRORISM AGAINST SERBIA IS NO CRIME" Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff
show how NATO and the UN have gone 100% against the promise, made
in UN Resolution 1244, to prevent Albanian secessionist terrorism in
Kosovo. Instead this terror has been encouraged. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
* 'What NATO Occupation Would Mean for Macedonia'. NATO's
nightmarish control of Kosovo is documented in interviews with three
women from the town of Orahovac. They describe NATO's lofty
promises prior to taking over the province; NATO's actual entrance,
alongside the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army; the transformation of
Orahovac into a death camp for Serbs and 'Gypsies' under NATO
management. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/savethe.htm
* 'Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel'. In this interview, three
Serbian women refute a Dutch Colonel's surreal description of life in
the brave new Kosovo town of Orahovac. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm
* 'Driven from Kosovo: Jewish Leader Blames NATO - Interview with
Cedda Prlincevic'. Mr. Prlincevic was President of the Jewish community
in Kosovo in the summer of 1999 when NATO - and the terrorist KLA -
took over. Mr. Prlincevic, at the time the chief archivist of Kosovo,
describes how he and thousands of others were driven from their homes
by the Albanian terrorists with NATO's approval.
* For those of us in the West, who tend to give our leaders the benefit
of the doubt, it is amazing to consider the career of the Kosovo
Protection Corps. Formed by top leaders of NATO and the UN in the fall
of 1999, from the outset it was comprised of members of a terrorist
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The terrorist nature of the UN-sanctioned Kosovo Protection Corps is
documented in "How Will You Plead at your Trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
The use of the terrorist Kosovo Protection Corps to invade Macedonia is
documented in 'SORRY, VIRGINIA, BUT THEY ARE NATO TROOPS, NOT 'REBELS'"
* (Return to Report, above)
3) Dr. Chandler argues that the West has introduced apartheid-like
conditions in Kosovo. This is discussed in the "Statement of President
Slobodan Milosevic on The Illegitimacy of The Hague 'Tribunal,'" which
the kidnapped and imprisoned Yugoslav leader tried to deliver when he
appeared before The Hague 'Tribunal' on 30 August 2001. We have all been
told that Milosevic is a demagogue whose speeches advocate religious and
ethnic hatreds, but how many have read his words? Whenever he tries to
speak at The Hague, they turn off his microphone. He can be read at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/aug30.htm
Speaking of Milosevic, the media campaign portraying him as a monster
began with a speech he gave in Kosovo in 1989. It is described as
inciting race war. Read it. He argues that Serbia's strength is its
ethnic diversity. 'What Milosevic Really Said at Kosovo Field (1989)'
can be read at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/milosaid.html
* (Return to Report, above)
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[Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Can Democracy be Constructed Based on Terror &
Fraud? -
The BHHRG Report on the Kosovo 'Elections,' 17
November 2001
[This report was prepared by Dr. David Chandler. It is Posted with the
kind permission of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 28 November
2001. For some quite interesting Further Reading, go to end of page.]
=======================================
Faking Democracy and Progress in Kosovo
1. Background
"This was an extraordinary election."[i] The pronouncement of US
Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Mission chief, running the elections was
very apt. These elections were truly extraordinary in many respects.
One extraordinary aspect is that they were held in a legal vacuum.
Kosovo is neither an independent state nor any longer under the
government of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The question
of statehood is to be postponed to the indefinite future while the
United Nations assumes the responsibility for governing the province,
through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR) the former Danish
foreign minister, Hans Haekkerup.
The provincial government elected on 17 November reflects this lack of
international legal framework. The new post-election arrangements are
outlined in a document titled `A Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo'.[ii] This is not a constitution
but a `framework' for a constitution and not self-government but
`provisional' self-government. The ill-defined legal and political
status of the former Yugoslav province, reflects Western powers'
diminished respect for state sovereignty and the crumbling formal
framework of international legal and political equality. (1)
Kosovo is an `extraordinary' political experiment because the system of
`dual power' of an international governing administration alongside a
subordinate, domestically-elected administration, which developed in an
ad hoc manner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is here for the first time
officially institutionalised. The new framework for a `constitution' of
Kosovo, is the first modern political constitution to explicitly rule
out democracy. The preamble states that the `will of the people' is to
be relegated to just one of many `relevant factors' to be taken into
account by the international policy-makers.[iii]
The executive and legislative powers of the UN Special Representative
remain unaffected by the new constitutional framework. Chapter 8 of the
framework lists the powers and responsibilities reserved for the
international appointee, which include the final authority over finance,
the budget and monetary policy, customs, the judiciary, law enforcement,
policing, external relations, public property, communications and
transport, housing, municipal administration, and the appointment of
regulatory boards and commissions. And, of course, the power to dissolve
the elected assembly if Kosovo's representatives do not show sufficient
`maturity' to agree with his edicts.[iv]
2. Sham Elections
Many international plenipotentiaries, including US President George
Bush, Nato Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged the Kosovo public to turn out to
vote, particularly the Kosovo Serbs. When it emerged that around 60% of
the Albanian and 50% of the Serb voters had taken part, the elections
were loudly hailed by the international organisers and observers to be a
`glorious day in the history of Kosovo' and as a `huge success'.[v] The
question of why the international community chose to spend millions of
dollars holding elections for a provincial administration with token
office-holders with highly circumscribed powers was, unfortunately,
rarely asked.
These elections were extraordinary in the importance attached to them,
not just because of the lack of power awarded to the victors, but also
the fact that the results were largely irrelevant once the electoral
`engineering' of the OSCE and UNMIK was taken into account. The largest
party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova,
which won 46% of the votes, would not have been able to form the
government even if they had won a land-slide victory. This was because
the seats in the seven-member presidency and positions in the new
ministries were already divided in a fixed ratio in advance. For
example, the largest party and second largest party, the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hashim Thaci, with 25% of the votes, were to
have two seats in the presidency with the third party holding one seat,
the two remaining seats were reserved for Serb and other minorities.
This system of dividing the seats before the elections made the
international pressure on Belgrade to encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote, in
order that they might have more of a say in the future of the province,
rather bizarre. The Serb community was already guaranteed 10 reserved
seats in the 120 seat assembly, a seat on the presidency and at least
one of the nine ministries, regardless of whether any Serbs voted at
all.
I was monitoring the Kosovo elections on behalf of the British Helsinki
Human Rights Group with the official international observation mission
of the Council of Europe. It did not take long to see why the
extravagant hype had taken over from the mundane reality of the
elections. At the start of the Council of Europe observer training, Lord
Russell Johnstone, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, put the elections in the broader context of international
intervention today. `The international community needs to prove that
intervention was benign [in Kosovo and East Timor] and will create
better conditions. These elections are a proving exercise.' Lord
Johnstone is probably correct to see the November elections as little
more than a `proving exercise' for the international institutions
involved in the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty and the promotion of
`military humanitarianism' in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This would seem
to be confirmed in the stated concern of the OSCE organisers to achieve
an election that made the international mission appear `legitimate and
credible'.[vi]
Bearing in mind the international importance of the `success' of the
Kosovo elections, the `independent' observation mission of the Council
of Europe claims that the provincial elections were `free and fair'
should not necessarily be taken at face value.[vii] It is highly
doubtful that these elections would have been passed as `free and fair'
had they taken place outside the international supervision of the OSCE.
The election conditions, in which there was a complete absence of
freedom of movement for minority communities, and many of the OSCE
election regulations covering the media and political parties, failed to
meet basic internationally accepted standards, such as those laid out in
the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Declaration on Democracy and Political
Pluralism.[viii] The following sections compare the claims of the OSCE
against the reality of Kosovo in more depth.
3. Creating Multi-Ethnic Society?
Without visiting the region it is difficult for outside observers to
imagine the depth of fear and insecurity which pervades the province
despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission. (2) There has been a
highly restricted number of Serb and minority returns to Kosovo, and the
UNHCR estimates that since the UNMIK administration took over more
minorities may have left the province than returned.[ix] One reason for
this is that Serb and other ethnic minorities still have no freedom of
movement in Kosovo. The lack of movement could be seen when we visited
the allegedly multi-ethnic `zone of confidence' in Mitrovica, which has
no Serb minority and is basically a Bosnian Muslim settlement policed by
a 24-hour UNMIK armed guard. Or when we walked further along the Ibar to
the uninhabited ruins of the Roma `Malhalla', formally the largest Roma
settlement in the Balkans, destroyed after the war. It is not yet
possible for any of the 7,000 former residents to return in safety.
The ethnic-apartheid ruled over by UNMIK (3) also had a direct impact
on the election campaign and election monitoring. The Council of Europe
election observation teams were told not to enter minority Serb or
Albanian areas within their allocated municipalities because it would be
too dangerous for their drivers and interpreters. Apart from indicating
the complete separation of the Serb and Albanian communities, this
instruction also meant that the `independent' observers had a highly
restricted view of the elections. One further impact of the lack of
security for ethnic minorities was the fact that the voters' list, the
basic tool to guide election campaigning, was considered to be sensitive
information. The voters' list was not available to be used by political
parties and could only be consulted if no notes or photographs were
taken, making full transparency impossible.[x]
Far from admitting to the failures of the Nato intervention or the
subsequent `peace-building' programmes of the UNMIK administration, and
the ethnic-apartheid, which is in place, the OSCE had boasted that the
elections were overcoming ethnic divisions. One reason for this
statement was that there were allegedly minority members on the polling
station committees.I was observing in the north of the Mitrovica area,
in Leposavic, a moderate-dominated Serb area, I saw no minority
committee members and asked an OSCE polling station supervisor if the
policy had been dropped. He replied that the polling station committee
were all minority community members as they were all Serbs. Classifying
mono-ethnic polling station committees as minority ones makes the OSCE
election organisation look artificially multi-ethnic. This artificial
`engineering' to create multi-ethnic institutions on paper is also
promoted as an important outcome of the elections themselves. Every
level of government, including the Presidency, the Ministries and the
Assembly will have reserved places for minority community members. These
minority members will be bussed in to meetings from minority enclaves
under heavy military guard. Multi-ethnic government will be created by
edict, but this will not reflect the divided society, nor help to break
down inter-ethnic barriers. The insecurities of minority and majority
communities are not caused by ignorance or irrational prejudice but by
rational concerns that the artificial and temporary nature of the
current settlement imposed by UNMIK can not be sustainable.
The lack of refugee return and poor treatment of non-Albanian minority
communities, was one reason for the low turn-out in some minority areas
of Kosovo, particularly in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar river
which divides the town of Mitrovica. At some polling stations turn-out
was under 10%.[xi] In Leposavic around a third of the 6,500 population
were refugees. I visited the refugee centres for Roma and Serbs
displaced from southern Kosovo. I spoke to Gushanig Skandir the head of
the Roma camp, who showed us around the overcrowded and poorly funded
site, where large families were forced to share single rooms and use
outside toilet and washing facilities despite the winter cold.He told me
that after waiting three years their centre had received a new roof 20
days ago, he believed this international aid was because he encouraged
the adults in the camp to register to vote and to encourage the Roma
refugees to vote on election day. He was sceptical about the elections
but felt the Roma might receive more aid from the international
community if they voted. The following day I saw him at the polling
station in the local school. Gushanig may have made the pragmatic choice
to vote but many other refugees and displaced people in similar
situations told us that voting could make no difference especially as
the leading Serb representatives would have seats in the Assembly
anyway.
In an attempt to portray the low turn-outs as unconnected to the lack
of freedom of movement and alienation of minority communities, Daan
Everts declared: `The only thing which marred what was a glorious day in
Kosovo's history was that some Serbs in the north of Kosovo were too
intimidated by other people in their own community to come out and
vote'.[xii] This claim was repeated on BBC World television, in
international press headlines and in the post-election International
Crisis Group report, which stated that `the intimidation of would-be
Serb voters marred the election in Serb-controlled region north of the
Ibar river'.[xiii] The intimidation claims were news to the independent
observers in the region. I attended the Mitrovica area debriefing for
the Council of Europe observers after the elections and intimidation was
not mentioned, the observation team for the north Mitrovica municipality
received not one report of intimidation. At a post election party for
internationals the mystery was clarified when I spoke to the OSCE
regional trainer for the Mitrovica area who told me that his boss's
claims of intimidation were based on highly dubious allegations `of
people staring outside polling stations and looking inside them'.
4. Political Pluralism, Free Press and Civil Society?
The OSCE and UNMIK regard the Kosovo political parties as a hindrance
rather than a help in addressing the problems of the province. They are
seen to be lacking maturity and in need of `continuous support from the
OSCE Democratization Department to enhance their organisational capacity
and to increase their political and social possibilities to advocate for
democratic changes'.[xiv] Daan Everts argued that the political parties
were so out of touch that the international community was, in effect,
more democratic and more representative of popular opinion. He stated
that the OSCE needed to inform the political parties of the concerns of
the people and to encourage them to respond to the demands of the
electorate.[xv]
As part of the process of making political parties more `accountable'
there are a host of restrictive regulations of the political sphere.
These include the fining of newspapers if they favour a major political
party. Epoka e Re was fined DEM 1,000 for `a clear bias in favour of the
PDK in its election political reporting' while Bota Sot was fined DEM
2,750 for coverage which was favourable to the LDK.[xvi] I asked Lucia
Scotton, the Council of Europe's Mission in Kosovo's media monitoring
officer, how these fines squared with the OSCE's claim to be encouraging
a free and independent media. Her view was that although it was an
international norm for a free press to take a political position
favouring a particular party in election campaigns, the fines were
`reasonable' because the press in Kosovo was not professional or mature
enough to act freely and independently yet.[xvii]
The OSCE Code of Conduct for political parties also breaches
internationally accepted democratic norms by holding political parties
responsible for the actions of their supporters.[xviii] I asked Adrian
Stoop, the Chief Commissioner of the OSCE Election Complaints and
Appeals Commission about whether this regulation complied with
international standards.[xix] He replied that `In Holland this law would
be unthinkable.' He explained that the internationally-appointed
Commissioners supported regulations which they would not accept in their
own countries because the international administrators found it hard `to
get a grip on what is happening' and `didn't speak the language'. In
order to give the international regulators greater control, the rules
had to be more pragmatic and flexible to try to influence the political
parties and the political climate.
The OSCE election `engineers' also sought to limit the influence of the
political parties once they got into power. Daan Everts stated at a
training session for Council of Europe observers that `these elections
force a certain degree of power-sharing', undermining the power of the
larger parties by restricting their positions and influence in the new
institutions.[xx]He added that the OSCE had learnt from the municipal
elections last year `to impose a bit more'. The flexible `framework' for
a `constitution' allows the line between international and domestic
responsibility to be easily blurred. Firstly, UNMIK has established
`international advisors' for the President, Prime Minister and ministers
and each ministry will also be overseen by an international `Principal
Advisor'. Secondly, the functions reserved for the UN's Special
Representative are so vaguely defined that they cover much of the
responsibilities `devolved' to the nine ministries. However, in the true
spirit of transparency and accountability the UNMIK spokesperson says
that at this stage `it is hard to describe' what powers will be needed
to carry out these reserved functions.[xxi]
While the political parties were being restricted at least it appeared
that one area of political life was booming, civil society. The growing
strength of civil society was indicated by the fact that this year there
was more than twice the number of domestic observers as last year,
representing 1% of the electorate. Daan Everts described the elections
as the `best monitored elections this century'.[xxii] In fact, according
to the OSCE, there `could be the highest proportion of election
observers to voters in the world'.[xxiii] One does not have to be a
hardened cynic to wonder why 1% of the population would be so keen to
observe the elections. I thought it would be interesting to find out.
When I asked the NGO observers more about how they got involved I was
surprised to find out that many did not know what `their' NGO did or
what its' initials stood for, and had got involved through being invited
by a friend. This was particularly true for those observing on behalf of
one of the best represented domestic NGOs, the KMDLNJ (Council for the
Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms) based in Pristina. The reason the
KMDLNJ had so many observers was probably because they were paying
people DEM 80 to take part. CeSID a Serbian-based NGO with close links
to the OTPOR student movement was paying people DEM 25 to observe. The
other NGO observers were paid somewhere between the two.
The dynamism of civil society, like every other aspect of these
elections was a fake. In the regional de-briefing back in Pristina, all
the observers noted that the domestic observers were rather
disinterested in the proceedings. It seems likely that the OSCE and its
international sponsors' actions of buying-in civil society NGOs will
have little positive impact in the longer run. It hardly encourages
people to take communal responsibility for democracy if people are paid
half-a-month's wages to `volunteer' to be part of the democratic
process. The statistics for domestic observers may have looked good on
paper but the OSCE's approach of artificially `engineering' the effect
it wanted may only set back any genuine attempt to involve the Kosovo
public in the political process. If civic NGO involvement is promoted as
an election-related job, like interpreting and driving for the
internationals, then this undermines, rather than promotes, the idea of
voluntary civic engagement.
5. Conclusion
The November 17 elections in Kosovo were phoney in every major respect.
They were phoney in that under the fiction of multi-ethnic government
they helped legitimise a society that provides no normal existence for
ethnic minorities, merely imprisonment in ethnic enclaves and military
escorts to visit family cemeteries or former homes and villages. They
were phoney in that through the fiction of `staring' Serbs the
responsibility for the low turn-out in some regions was seen to be the
fault of minorities themselves, rather than the ethnic segregation
overseen by the international community. They were phoney because under
the guise of promoting media freedom and independence, freedom of
expression and political debate were further restricted. They were
phoney because under the guise of promoting political pluralism,
majority rule was replaced by a consensus imposed by the UN's Special
Representative. They were phoney because under the fiction of a vibrant
civil society the OSCE and its partners corrupted the process of
encouraging civic engagement. Most importantly, they were phoney because
under the fiction of democratic autonomy for the people of Kosovo, they
legitimised a constitution that openly replaced the `popular will' with
the unaccountable power of an international protectorate.
The OSCE and UNMIK are celebrating the elections as a major
international success. They may have secured some international
legitimacy for their tin-pot protectorate and won kudos for their
`success' in encouraging `democracy' and `peace' in Kosovo. However,
phoney elections can only create phoney consultation bodies. The reduced
election turn-out among the Albanian voters and the low turn-out for the
Kosovo Serbs suggests that the domestic legitimacy of the international
protectorate may be the real sticking point for the future.
This report was compiled by Dr David Chandler, Policy Research
Institute, Leeds Metropolitan University. He is the author of Bosnia
Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000) and From Kosovo
to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press,
March 2002). He can be contacted at D.Chandler@....
[i] `First Official Results in Kosovo Election Announced', OSCE Mission
in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 19 November 2001.
[ii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001.
[iii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001, p.4.
[iv] For further background information on the framework for
provisional self-government, read: Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo:
State-Building and "Substantial Autonomy", International Peace Academy,
August 2001. Available from: <http://www.ipacademy.org/>; Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow-Up: Why Conditional
Independence? September 2001. Available from:
<http://www.kosovocommission.org/>; International Crisis Group, Kosovo
Landmark Election, November 2001. Available from:
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
[v] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[vi] International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans
Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.1.
[vii] `Kosovo Assembly Elections Bring Democracy Forward and Strengthen
regional Stability', Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in
Kosovo Press Release, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[viii] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the OSCE. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/docs>.
[ix] Interview with Leonard Zulu, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR,
Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[x] Information provided by Peter Urban, Director of Elections, OSCE,
Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina 13 November 2001.
[xi] Information provided by OSCE Spokesperson Claire Trevena, 21
November 2001.
[xii] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[xiii] Nicholas Wood, `Serbs "Face Threats at Polls"', Observer, 18
November 2001; International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election,
Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.i.
[xiv] Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xv] Daan Everts, `Foreword', Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices
(Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xvi] `Fines Given for Political Violence and Reporting Bias', OSCE
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 10 November 2001;
`Newspaper Sanctioned for Photo', OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press
Release, Pristina, 16 November 2001.
[xvii] Interview, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[xviii] `The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions,
Citizens' Initiatives, Independent Candidates, Their Supporters and
Candidates', Electoral Rule No.1 1/2001, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Central
Election Commission. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
[xix] At the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xx] Speech at the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xxi] UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR Press Briefing, 22 November 2001. UNMIK
Unofficial Transcript.
[xxii] `Calls for Kosova's Serbs to Vote', RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.5,
No.214, Part II, 9 November 2001.
[xxiii] `Plea to Election Observers: Be Patient', OSCE Mission in
Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 9 November 2001.
**********************************************
COMMENTS & FURTHER READING:
**********************************************
Prepared by John Flaherty and Jared Israel, Emperor's Clothes
1) UN Resolution 1244 guarantees that Kosovo will remain part of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) campaigned for the exact opposite during an earlier
provincial quasi-election. See "Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo
'Independence'" by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
* (Return to Report, above)
2) In his informative report on the Kosovo elections, posted above, Dr.
Chandler writes that Serbs have been subjected to a reign of terror in
Kosovo "despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission."
We in the NATO countries have been taught that our leaders are
basically decent, but make mistakes. We are told that if bad things
happen in countries undergoing NATO 'nation-building' it is in spite of,
not because of, NATO leaders.
But in Kosovo, the evidence on the ground is overwhelming. Kosovo has
suffered an unprecedented reign of terror by Albanian secessionists
because of - not in spite of - NATO and UN control.
Many articles on Emperor's Clothes document this with abundant
references from the mainstream media and from highly credible observers.
The following is a small but important sample:
* "TERRORISM AGAINST SERBIA IS NO CRIME" Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff
show how NATO and the UN have gone 100% against the promise, made
in UN Resolution 1244, to prevent Albanian secessionist terrorism in
Kosovo. Instead this terror has been encouraged. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
* 'What NATO Occupation Would Mean for Macedonia'. NATO's
nightmarish control of Kosovo is documented in interviews with three
women from the town of Orahovac. They describe NATO's lofty
promises prior to taking over the province; NATO's actual entrance,
alongside the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army; the transformation of
Orahovac into a death camp for Serbs and 'Gypsies' under NATO
management. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/savethe.htm
* 'Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel'. In this interview, three
Serbian women refute a Dutch Colonel's surreal description of life in
the brave new Kosovo town of Orahovac. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm
* 'Driven from Kosovo: Jewish Leader Blames NATO - Interview with
Cedda Prlincevic'. Mr. Prlincevic was President of the Jewish community
in Kosovo in the summer of 1999 when NATO - and the terrorist KLA -
took over. Mr. Prlincevic, at the time the chief archivist of Kosovo,
describes how he and thousands of others were driven from their homes
by the Albanian terrorists with NATO's approval.
* For those of us in the West, who tend to give our leaders the benefit
of the doubt, it is amazing to consider the career of the Kosovo
Protection Corps. Formed by top leaders of NATO and the UN in the fall
of 1999, from the outset it was comprised of members of a terrorist
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The terrorist nature of the UN-sanctioned Kosovo Protection Corps is
documented in "How Will You Plead at your Trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
The use of the terrorist Kosovo Protection Corps to invade Macedonia is
documented in 'SORRY, VIRGINIA, BUT THEY ARE NATO TROOPS, NOT 'REBELS'"
* (Return to Report, above)
3) Dr. Chandler argues that the West has introduced apartheid-like
conditions in Kosovo. This is discussed in the "Statement of President
Slobodan Milosevic on The Illegitimacy of The Hague 'Tribunal,'" which
the kidnapped and imprisoned Yugoslav leader tried to deliver when he
appeared before The Hague 'Tribunal' on 30 August 2001. We have all been
told that Milosevic is a demagogue whose speeches advocate religious and
ethnic hatreds, but how many have read his words? Whenever he tries to
speak at The Hague, they turn off his microphone. He can be read at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/aug30.htm
Speaking of Milosevic, the media campaign portraying him as a monster
began with a speech he gave in Kosovo in 1989. It is described as
inciting race war. Read it. He argues that Serbia's strength is its
ethnic diversity. 'What Milosevic Really Said at Kosovo Field (1989)'
can be read at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/milosaid.html
* (Return to Report, above)
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