Jugoinfo
Pierre Henri Bunel, alto ufficiale dell'esercito francese,
ha passato seri guai con la giustizia del suo paese in
seguito ad accuse relative alla sua posizione "filoserba".
In particolare, nel 1997 in Francia scoppiava uno scandalo per
l'aiuto prestato da settori militari francesi a Karadzic, affinche'
non fosse catturato e consegnato al Tribunale dell'Aia. Una vicenda
per la quale il comandante Bunel nel 1998 fu prima arrestato,
poi rilasciato. Su questa strana storia e' forse ancora possibile
trovare documentazione ad esempio sul sito di "Le Monde":
http://archives.lemonde.fr/
Bunel e' un uomo dell'establishment militare; per questo,
alcuni suoi giudizi non sono accettabili dal punto di vista
degli internazionalisti e degli antimperialisti. Tuttavia,
i suoi scritti gettano luce sulle contraddizioni interne al
fronte della NATO. (I. Slavo)
---
Su Bunel si vedano anche:
1. LIBRO
Pierre-Henri Bunel, "Crimes de guerre à l'OTAN",
Paris, Editions 1, 110 FF, parution juin 2000.
Una presentazione in francese su:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/308
2. INTERVISTA
pubblicata dalla rivista marxista tedesca KONKRET n.8/2000.
In italiano alla URL:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/377
3. ALTRI DOCUMENTI
sulle dichiarazioni di Bunel, sempre su:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/377
---
DEUX ARTICLES POUR LA YOUGOSLAVIE
Auteur: Pierre Henri Bunel*
1. Les Europeens se sont trompes d'ennemi**
Apres les attentats du 11 septembre, les Americains se
sont lances dans une nouvelle guerre de conquete
pour le controle d'une region strategique pour leurs
interets petroliers. Apres avoir soutenu les positions de
membre des plus extremistes de l'Organisation de la
conference islamique, ils ont ete victimes de ceux
qu'ils pensaient etre leurs allies.
Et pourtant, ils en avaient deja fait l'experience
pendant la campagne de l'IFOR en Bosnie-Herzegovine,
comme je l'ecris dans mon livre "Crimes de guerre a
l'Otan ".
Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, on "decouvre" ce que
tous les specialistes du renseignement des pays
europeens savaient tres bien: la plupart des ONG
islamiques operant dans le monde en general et dans
les Balkans en particulier disposent d'une branche
connectee au monde terroriste.
Dans un autre ouvrage que je viens de publier en
France, "Menaces islamistes" je raconte comment
l'Organisation de la conference islamique avait peu a
peu pris le controle du mouvement des non alignes
dont les pays fondateurs avaient ete la Yougoslavie et
l'Indonesie. Ayant pris le controle de ce mouvement si
important pour les relations internationales, les
elements les plus nefastes de l'OCI ont tente de
prendre aussi le controle de l'ONU.
L'offensive generalisee du terrorisme ne date pas du 11
septembre 2001. Ce jour-la, la violence et les crimes
que nous, Europeens, connaissons depuis des
decennies a des degres divers est entree dans le
cocon egoiste du peuple americain.
Les " occidentaux " devaient bien ouvrir les yeux.
Mais il ne faut pas jeter la pierre a tous les Americains.
Il faut surtout accuser les vrais coupables: des
financiers apatrides qui ont colonise les leviers
politiques des grands pays, y compris des Etats-Unis.
Je connais nombre d'Americains qui ne sont pas en
accord avec les politiques interieures et etrangere de
leurs administrations successives. Un exemple: lors
des emeutes anti-mondialisation de Seattle, la police
americaine a arrete 600 manifestants, essentiellement
des agriculteurs? americains!
Jeter l'anatheme sur tous les Americains serait donc
aussi injuste que les accusations que porte la
propagande contre tous les Serbes. Au contraire, la
reunion des efforts des hommes de bonne volonte doit
pouvoir nous permettre de nous debarrasser de la lepre
de l'argent sale.
Les criminels de l'UCK sont rarement des
Yougoslaves de culture albanaise.
Apres la sanglante aventure du printemps 1999,
l'autosatisfaction de nos politiciens du "repli" de
Milosevic devant la "communaute internationale" a
cede la place aux soucis quotidiens de la vie au
Kosovo. Les Francais implantes a Mitrovica ont du
essuyer la reprobation des Americains et des Allemands
qui leur reprochaient d'etre trop clements envers les
Serbes. La remarquable action des contingents
francais qui se succedaient ne trouvait pas grace a
leurs yeux. Jusqu'au moment ou, dans des conditions
qui restent encore a elucider, des Americains et des
Allemands ont eux-memes ete pris a partie dans cette
ville symbole et ont pu mesurer que la haine des
Albano-Kosovars separatistes n'a rien a envier a celle
qu'on attribue trop souvent aux Serbes.
Les Yougoslaves de culture albanaise qui vivaient au
Kosovo sont en fait assez rares parmi les aventuriers
qui ont rejoint l'UCK. La majorite des membres des
bandes de Agem Ceku, a l'instar de leur chef, vient de
l'exterieur de la province yougoslave. Mais les «cols
blancs» de la politique internationale qui jouaient aux
dames a Paris ou a Bruxelles - pour jouer aux echecs il
faut etre plus intelligent - ne se sont pas attaches a
ce detail. Il avait suffit de quelques images
soigneusement "bidonnees" presentees aux journaux
televises des differentes chaines pour faire croire aux
"opinions publiques" que tous les Albanais du Kosovo
etaient de pauvres misereux meritant toute notre
sollicitude.
La verite est tout autre. Nombre de ces acharnes de
"l'epuration ethnique", dirigee contre tout ce qui
n'est pas independantiste au Kosovo, viennent en fait
d'Albanie, d'Europe ou meme des Etats-Unis, et non de
la province yougoslave du Kosovo. Une chaine de la
television francaise diffusa un documentaire sur
l'action de M. Kouchner au Kosovo en tant que
representant special du secretaire general des Nations
Unies. On l'y voyait notamment se demener pour faire
face a l'irredentisme des factions, et en particulier des
Albanais qui se presentaient comme des Yougoslaves
de culture albanaise. Les hommes de Hacim Thaci et
Agem Ceku, finirent par accepter de se laisser
desarmer, mais pour constituer des depots d'armes
secrets dont la KFOR decouvrit et saisit certains. Les
mafias se developperent, sans qu'aucun des
intervenants exterieurs ne voulut vraiment venir a
bout. Comme d'habitude, des interets occultes, sur
lesquels on commence a avoir quelque visibilite,
s'opposaient a l'action efficace qu'auraient souhaite
conduire les acteurs du terrain.
L'administration americaine soutient l'UCK
Les Etats-Unis, quant a eux, se sont impliques aux
cotes de l'UCK comme ils l'avaient fait aux cotes des
Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzegovine. Et avec eux les
Allemands puisqu'on a pu voir fleurir dans les mains des
guerilleros de l'armement allemand et americain. Leur
soutien partisan lors des negociations de Rambouillet
n'est plus un secret pour personne depuis que le
journal francais l'Humanite a revele les dessous des
clauses que Mme Albright a fait rajouter au texte initial
pour le rendre inacceptable par Belgrade.
Preoccupe d'affermir ses contacts avec les
communautes musulmanes des Balkans, Washington
est soucieux de ne pas troubler les affaires, memes
occultes, des familles musulmanes les plus influentes
de la "grande Albanie" que les gens de l'UCk
souhaitent mettre sur pied.
Monsieur Kouchner ne voyait pas arriver les forces de
police et les magistrats qu'on s'etait engage a lui
fournir, selon ce qu'il avait confie a la presse et aux
televisions. Pourtant, a force d'energie et d'efforts de
persuasion, il finit par mettre sur pied une sorte
d'administration judiciaire, en tentant de faire
participer des Serbes et des Albanais.
Et il faut bien dire que les Serbes si decries etaient
bien moins reticents que les retors Albano-Kosovars
qui, ici aussi, se sentaient soutenus par plus fort que
l'ONU et l'Otan. Ils tiraient de ce soutien occulte une
insolence redoutable. Apres avoir decrit les Serbes
comme la peste, l'ONU devait en fait faire face au
cholera des sbires d'Agem Ceku.
Les stocks d'armes de l'UCK
Avant meme que l'Otan soit entree en Yougoslavie
pour occuper le Kosovo, les sbires de Agem Ceku
avaient commence a mettre au point leur
approvisionnement en armes et munitions. Certes, ils
disposaient deja de materiel venant d'Allemagne ou des
Etats-Unis comme le montraient clairement les prises
de vues de television abondamment diffusees, mais
encore ils avaient mis sur pied des filieres compliquees
passant par la Suisse et l'Afrique. Trop confiants, sans
doute, les trafiquants ont ete demasques a cause des
changements de la legislation suisse qui interdit non
seulement le trafic d'armes mais aussi le transit des
sommes qui en decoulent. C'est ainsi que les policiers
suisses ont arrete en juillet 2000 un Francais et un
Kosovar qui avaient achete a la Bulgarie, pour les
forces de l'UCK plusieurs milliers de grenades et
plusieurs centaines de lance-roquettes. Selon les
informations parvenues a la presse, la quantite d'armes
devait etre importante puisque le montant des
transactions etait d'environ 3 millions d'euro. Les
marchandises ont quitte la Bulgarie en juillet 1999 pour
un pays d'accueil africain complaisant et sont ensuite
reparties vers l'Albanie ou elles sont arrivees apres le
deploiement de la KFOR au Kosovo.
On pouvait se demander quelle utilite l'UCK allait
trouver a ces armes offensives et plutot lourdes alors
que la mission d'imposition de la paix des Occidentaux
avait deja commence.
L'evolution de la situation en Macedoine est une partie
de la reponse a la question. Car il n'y aucune surprise
dans l'evolution actuelle de la guerre des Balkans.
Apres avoir seme le trouble dans la province
yougoslave du Kosovo, les terroristes albanais tentent
depuis plusieurs mois de destabiliser la frontiere sud de
la Serbie et maintenant s'attaquent a la Macedoine.
Le cancer islamiste porte par l'UCK s'attaque a la
Macedoine
Cette evolution etait prevue depuis longtemps. Les
strateges militaires - les seuls qui ne soient pas
infeodes a des elections et qui se moquent de l'opinion
que manipulent les tenants du politiquement correct -
ont envisage depuis 1991 le risque de retour a une
situation dans les Balkans analogue a celle du debut du
siecle. Ils ont prevu une vague de crises qui, apres la
Slovenie et la Croatie glisserait vers la
Bosnie-Herzegovine, puis la Macedoine en passant par
le Sandjak et le Kosovo. On a meme envisage des
difficultes avec la region de Voivodine, au nord de la
Yougoslavie, ou vivent de nombreux Magyars. La
destabilisation de la Macedoine etait si evidemment
previsible que les Etats-Unis y avaient deploye, des la
declaration d'independance du pays, deux bataillons
sous le beret bleu de l'ONU.
Les specialistes militaires avaient tire le signal
d'alarme, mais evidemment, les politiciens se sont
trouves dans l'incapacite de reagir. Gouverner, c'est
prevoir. Ils prefererent laisser pourrir la plaie
albanaise.
Depuis longtemps les mafias albanaises vivaient de
trafics divers - drogue, armes, femmes, voitures
volees, etc. -. L'intervention d'une force europeenne
en 1997 a l'occasion de l'operation Alba incita les
mafieux les plus impliques dans le gangsterisme, les
Musulmans du nord du pays, a emigrer vers le Kosovo
ou ils importerent une partie des armes qui n'avaient
pas rejoint les casernes lors de l'intervention
franco-italienne.
On sait quelle part ont pris ces "faux Kosovars",
soutenus par l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis, dans
l'insurrection contre la Yougoslavie, et quelle politique
d'epuration ethnique ils ont conduite sous la ferme
autorite de Agem Ceku, chef militaire de l'uCk. nous
connaissons ses "exploits" en matiere de droits de
l'homme en Croatie et au Kosovo.
Le demantelement de l'uCk, plus apparent que reel, a
laisse le champ libre aux actions de l'uCpbm, qui se mit
a destabiliser la zone tampon imposee en Serbie par
l'administration de l'ONU, interdite aux forces
yougoslaves. La vallee de Prechevo etait en fait livree
aux exactions des terroristes de Hacim Thaci et de
Agem Ceku.
Maintenant, c'est le tour de la Macedoine. Et
l'implication americaine dans cette ancienne republique
yougoslave met le Departement d'Etat dans une
position difficile: ou l'administration americaine
continue de soutenir les terroristes albanais, et ils
destabilisent le pays, ou les forces americaines de la
KFOR, responsables de la zone ou operent les bandits
de Hacim Thaci et Agem Ceku se desolidarisent de ces
criminels qu'elles ont soutenus jusqu'a present.
Les Serbes sont le seul recours
Apres avoir soutenu l'uCk avec la derniere energie,
en allant jusqu'au crime de guerre, et vilipende
Belgrade, les autorites politiques de l'Otan s'appuient
maintenant sur la Yougoslavie pour participer aux
operations de remise en ordre de la region. Les
evenements actuels exposent clairement que
prendre parti pour l'uCk etait une faute politique, faire
la guerre pour le compte des Albanais etait une faute
militaire qui a conduit aux crimes de guerre que nos
dirigeants politiques ont commis en utilisant les
forces de l'Otan dans les conditions ou ils les ont
utilisees.
Et maintenant, l'Otan n'a plus d'autre ressource que
de s'appuyer sur Belgrade pour retablir l'ordre dans
la vallee de Prechevo. Et comme M. Kostunica est un
patriote, ce que d'aucuns appellent "nationaliste",
on peut s'attendre a des passes politiques
interessantes. D'autant que pendant les quelques
mois durant lesquels la region de Prechevo a ete
livree par l'incurie des planificateurs de l'Otan aux
exactions de l'UCPMB, les gens de bonne foi ont pu
toucher du doigt la realite du comportement des
partisans de la "Grande Albanie" et prendre
conscience de ce qu'il risquait de se produire en
Macedoine. Cela n'a pas manque.
Les extremistes albanais veulent realiser une grande
Albanie qui ne serait en fait qu'une sorte de
Kurdistan europeen. On a connu la meme quadrature
de cercle entre l'Allemagne et la France pendant des
siecles. On n'a aplani les differends entre l'Allemagne
et la France e propos de l'Alsace et de la Moselle
qu'en assurant la libre circulation des personnes et
des biens entre les deux pays. Si un Mosellan ou un
Alsacien, ne en France se sent plus allemand que
francais, rien ne l'empeche de travailler en
Allemagne. Comme les conditions de vie sont
somme toute confortables au plan materiel, il n'y a
plus de probleme entre les peuples : "Lorsqu'il y a du
foin au ratelier les chevaux ne se battent plus", dit un
proverbe francais.
Il en est de meme avec les gens de culture albanaise
dans les Balkans: ce ne sont pas tout a fait les
Kurdes d'Europe, puisqu'il existe une Albanie, mais il
faut reconnaitre que les Albanais sont presents dans
quatre pays: l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie, la Macedoine
et quelques elements en Grece. Le fantasme de la
Grande Albanie est plus ancre chez les terroristes de
l'uCk qu'en Albanie meme. Compte tenu des
contacts que j'ai eus avec des Albanais, il me
semble meme que les Albanais considerent leurs
"cousins" du Kosovo avec le meme recul que les
gens de la republique d'Irlande considerent les
Irlandais de l'Ulster.
Quel dirigeant politique prendra la decision de faire
poursuivre les dirigeants de l'uCk pour crimes en
ex-Yougoslavie, histoire de faire bonne mesure? Il
serait plus que temps, parce que le soutien a ces
terroristes, comme aux Tchetchenes, vient de la
branche dure de la conference islamique.
2. Le transfert de Slobodan Milosevic a La Haye
Toujours pris par leurs fantasmes, les Americains ont
achete a Belgrade la livraison de Slobodan Milosevic
au TPI de La Haye. Il semble que les administrations
americaines successives n'aient rien compris: la
question Milosevic est parfaitement accessoire
devant l'evolution de la guerre civile balkanique vers
le sud. L'Otan a deja perdu une guerre contre la
Yougoslavie, meme si la diplomatie europeenne a
rattrape les choses apres. Car ne nous cachons pas
que c'est la diplomatie et les elections qui ont fait
partir Milosevic du pouvoir, et non les bombes de
l'Otan. Donc la guerre de 1999 est bien un echec.
Quoiqu'il en soit, Slobodan Milosevic est donc parti
pour La Haye. "Enfin" diront deux types
d'observateurs. Parmi ceux qui se rejouiront, on
trouvera evidemment les gens peu au fait des
dessous des cartes auxquels on fait avaler n'importe
quoi par les medias "alignes". On trouvera aussi les
valets de l'argent roi. Pourtant un examen plus
equitable des choses met en evidence une realite
plus dramatique.
En outre, il semble bien que l'action a laquelle s'est
prete le Premier ministre Djindjic releve plus de
l'enlevement que de l'extradition et que cette action
soit meme en dehors de la loi yougoslave.
Ne nous y trompons pas. J'ai ete satisfait de
l'arrestation de Slobodan Milosevic que je
considerais deja comme un criminel de guerre alors
qu'il n'etait pas encore question de le critiquer a
l'Otan. En effet, lorsque j'etais officier de
renseignement de l'Otan en Bosnie-Herzegovine, il
etait hors de question de critiquer le principal allie
des occidentaux dans la signature par les Serbes de
Bosnie de l'accord de Dayton. Son arrestation par
les Yougoslaves me paraissait dans le cours normal
des choses, mais seulement parce que c'etait la
justice yougoslave qui s'etait saisie du dossier.
(Je precise cette position personnelle ne releve que
de mon jugement sur ce que me semble etre l'action
de l'ancien president avant la guerre civile. Je crois
qu'il a conduit la Yougoslavie dans le piege dont se
sont ensuite servis les Allemands d'abord, et les
Americains ensuite. Mais il y a d'autres coupables
des malheurs des Balkans: les politiciens europeens
qui n'ont pas ete capables de faire taire les
Allemands et de prier les Americains de se meler de
leurs affaires. Toutefois, il s'agit de l'opinion d'un
observateur exterieur qui n'a pas vecu le debut de la
guerre civile).
Le TPI, un tribunal sans foi ni loi
En revanche, l'evolution, helas previsible, des choses
est loin de me satisfaire, parce que je ne reconnais
aucune legalite ni legitimite au TPI.
Si je souscris entierement a la creation d'un tel
tribunal qui peut etre utile dans le cadre de
l'harmonisation du monde, il me semble qu'en
l'espece on a une fois de plus "mis la charrue avant
les b?ufs".
Un tribunal est fait pour faire appliquer les lois. Or il
n'existe pas de loi internationale mais des traites.
Aucun traite ne peut, en l'etat actuel des choses, faire
office de code penal ou de code de procedure
penale. En outre, le mode de selection des
magistrats, qui doivent rester independants des
pouvoirs politiques, ne fait l'objet d'aucun processus
legalement determine.
Avant de le faire fonctionner, il me semble donc
indispensable de faire promulguer des lois penales
internationales qui semblent plus urgentes que les
arrangements que savent prendre les etats en
matiere economique et commerciale.
Ce TPI s'est juge incompetent pour donner suite e la
plainte d'Amnesty International contre l'Otan pour
crimes de guerre lors des bombardements de
l'ex-Yougoslavie.
Si le procureur du TPI, Mme Carla Del Ponte a
deboute Amnesty International, c'est peut-etre sur
ordre, mais le simple fait de refuser d'engager une
procedure d'enquete avec appel a temoins est bien
un deni de justice. Et pourtant j'aurais temoigne bien
volontiers dans un tel proces.
C'est pourquoi je considere que ce tribunal, tel qu'il
agit actuellement, est non seulement sans loi mais
encore sans foi.
Monsieur Milosevic n'etait pas un dictateur
On va donc juger devant un tribunal discutable un
homme que la presse "alignee" a commence par
qualifier "d'ancien dictateur de Belgrade". Que c'est
beau!, lorsque l'inspirateur de cette pensee unique
est un pays dont le president a ete elu? par des
juges, contre la majorite des votes de sa population!
Pourtant, M. Milosevic, lui, apres avoir ete elu par les
Yougoslaves, a bien ete oblige de se retirer lorsqu'il
a ete battu aux elections. Je ne connais pas de
dictateur qui ait quitte le pouvoir sans revolution. M.
Milosevic n'etait donc pas un dictateur, il serait bon
de le rappeler.
En revanche, je suis beaucoup plus inquiet du rele de
l'argent dans cette election, et surtout dans
l'expulsion par un pays independant de l'un de ses
nationaux. Car, ne nous y trompons pas, la non plus,
le financement de la campagne electorale, et surtout
le chantage conduit aupres des candidats etait bien
le suivant: on vous aide financierement, et on
financera le relevement de la Yougoslavie, si vous
nous aidez en faisant battre Milosevic aux elections.
Si M. Djindjic a finalement decide de livrer l'ancien
president sans attendre la decision de la justice
yougoslave, c'est evidemment du a l'action des
Americains. Le fait que l'avion qui a conduit l'accuse
a La Haye soit parti de Tuzla, base americaine en
Bosnie-Herzegovine, est significatif. Le Premier
ministre Djindjic a-t-il agi de son propre chef ou avec
l'aval discret de Vojislav Kostunica? C'est difficile a
dire pour un observateur exterieur. Mais ce qui est
sur c'est qu'il l'a fait en pensant a l'argent dont la
Yougoslavie a tant besoin pour se relever des
devastations que lui a causees l'Otan en 1999.
Encore la CIA?
Cette decision risque fort de provoquer des troubles
graves en Yougoslavie. En Serbie, les partisans de
M. Milosevic pourraient bien se lancer dans des
manifestations degenerant en emeutes. Et surtout, le
Montenegro pourrait bien profiter de ce qu'il faut bien
appeler un affaiblissement dramatique du president
Kostunica pour tenter l'aventure separatiste.
Et si la CIA avait fait des propositions de soutien?
Djindjic, au cas ou le remplacement de l'actuel
president viendrait a l'ordre du jour? Et qui sait si la
CIA n'est en train de tout faire pour que ce
remplacement vienne effectivement immediatement
a l'ordre du jour?
Ce serait une bonne affaire pour Washington de voir
succeder a Kostunica, patriote et assez oppose aux
Americains, un valet qui vient de leur donner des
preuves evidentes de sa servilite.
Incapables de venir a bout de Saddam Hussein,
ridiculises par les Chinois a propos de leur avion
espion, les Americains emportent enfin une
"victoire" internationale sur un petit pays ravage par
cette politique de la canonniere qu'ils ont tant
denoncee lorsqu'ils etaient encore des nains
politiques.
Mais qu'ils se souviennent de - ou qu'ils se
renseignent sur - ce qu'est une «victoire a la
Pyrrhus». Quant a la politique europeenne, que
devient-elle dans tout cela? Elle ne cesse de ramper
parce que les bombardements de la Yougoslavie ont
desequilibre l'Euro, accroissant la charge
d'investissements dans les anciens pays de l'Est et
surtout dans les Balkans.
Apres avoir devaste la Yougoslavie les Americains
sont retournes se cacher derriere leurs valets
On n'entend pas beaucoup Washington a propos de
la Macedoine, et pourtant, c'est bien la Maison
Blanche qui avait entretenu des bataillons de
stabilisation americains sous beret de l'Onu a
l'epoque de la guerre civile en Bosnie-Herzegovine.
Maintenant, les Americains vont engranger les
dividendes de la guerre, pendant que les Europeens
vont avoir le souci d'organiser la paix? sans avoir
les hommes d'etat capables de le faire, ceux qui
seraient suffisamment integres pour ne rien devoir
aux grands groupes economiques multinationaux.
L'Homme et sa culture
Le proces de M. Milosevic ne pourra donc etre
qu'une forfaiture de plus, perpétree par les agents de
gouvernements qui n'ont pas de lecon de morale a
donner a quiconque.
Avec cette affaire, nous avons une preuve de plus du
fait que les Americains ne savent pas prendre en
compte une donnee essentielle des relations
humaines: chaque peuple europeen a une culture et
une civilisation multimillenaire, alors qu'eux sont
ignorants de toutes ces subtilités.
Ils ont commis la meme faute en Asie, la continuent
en Afrique, s'y sont adonnes en Yougoslavie, et sont
en train de s'y enfoncer en Afghanistan: dans toutes
ces calamites pour les peuples broyes, les
responsables sont toujours les memes, les grands
capitalistes qui ont oublie que l'economie doit etre au
service de l'Homme, et non le contraire.
Ce que nous, Europeens de l'Atlantique a l'Oural,
nous savons tous.
Les guerres qui nous ont opposes ou reunis n'ont pu
se regler que par les compromis culturels. C'est vrai
dans les Balkans, mais la question de l'Alsace et la
Moselle relevait de la meme problematique. C'est
pourquoi elle peut etre un message d'espoir.
Apres la derniere guerre mondiale, devant l'inutilite
de la force pour regler cette question, la disparition
du barrage que representaient les anciennes
frontieres a rendu caduc tout recours a la force. Les
Mosellans ou les Alsaciens qui se sentent plus
francais passent leur temps de detente en France,
ceux qui se sentent plus allemands vont se distraire
en Allemagne? et souvent, comme je le faisais
lorsque j'habitais Strasbourg, vont d'un cote a l'autre
de la frontiere suivant les circonstances?
Mais pour proteger notre avenir, il faut savoir
proteger nos cultures, diverses et complementaires,
et pour cela refuser l'uniformisation decretee par des
financiers et des economistes qui manipulent les
gouvernements pour le plus grand malheur des
peuples.
La culture est le plus grand ennemi des dictateurs,
meme financiers. Parce qu'elle est l'outil qui permet
de refuser une societe de consommation qui n'est
qu'une incivilisation du gaspillage, promotrice de
l'abetissement et de l'asservissement.
* Pierre Henri Bunel, officier francais, accuse d'etre
l'espion yougoslave dans le Haut Commandement de
l'OTAN a Bruxelles.
** Extraits du livre "Crimes de guerre a l'OTAN"
ha passato seri guai con la giustizia del suo paese in
seguito ad accuse relative alla sua posizione "filoserba".
In particolare, nel 1997 in Francia scoppiava uno scandalo per
l'aiuto prestato da settori militari francesi a Karadzic, affinche'
non fosse catturato e consegnato al Tribunale dell'Aia. Una vicenda
per la quale il comandante Bunel nel 1998 fu prima arrestato,
poi rilasciato. Su questa strana storia e' forse ancora possibile
trovare documentazione ad esempio sul sito di "Le Monde":
http://archives.lemonde.fr/
Bunel e' un uomo dell'establishment militare; per questo,
alcuni suoi giudizi non sono accettabili dal punto di vista
degli internazionalisti e degli antimperialisti. Tuttavia,
i suoi scritti gettano luce sulle contraddizioni interne al
fronte della NATO. (I. Slavo)
---
Su Bunel si vedano anche:
1. LIBRO
Pierre-Henri Bunel, "Crimes de guerre à l'OTAN",
Paris, Editions 1, 110 FF, parution juin 2000.
Una presentazione in francese su:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/308
2. INTERVISTA
pubblicata dalla rivista marxista tedesca KONKRET n.8/2000.
In italiano alla URL:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/377
3. ALTRI DOCUMENTI
sulle dichiarazioni di Bunel, sempre su:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/377
---
DEUX ARTICLES POUR LA YOUGOSLAVIE
Auteur: Pierre Henri Bunel*
1. Les Europeens se sont trompes d'ennemi**
Apres les attentats du 11 septembre, les Americains se
sont lances dans une nouvelle guerre de conquete
pour le controle d'une region strategique pour leurs
interets petroliers. Apres avoir soutenu les positions de
membre des plus extremistes de l'Organisation de la
conference islamique, ils ont ete victimes de ceux
qu'ils pensaient etre leurs allies.
Et pourtant, ils en avaient deja fait l'experience
pendant la campagne de l'IFOR en Bosnie-Herzegovine,
comme je l'ecris dans mon livre "Crimes de guerre a
l'Otan ".
Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, on "decouvre" ce que
tous les specialistes du renseignement des pays
europeens savaient tres bien: la plupart des ONG
islamiques operant dans le monde en general et dans
les Balkans en particulier disposent d'une branche
connectee au monde terroriste.
Dans un autre ouvrage que je viens de publier en
France, "Menaces islamistes" je raconte comment
l'Organisation de la conference islamique avait peu a
peu pris le controle du mouvement des non alignes
dont les pays fondateurs avaient ete la Yougoslavie et
l'Indonesie. Ayant pris le controle de ce mouvement si
important pour les relations internationales, les
elements les plus nefastes de l'OCI ont tente de
prendre aussi le controle de l'ONU.
L'offensive generalisee du terrorisme ne date pas du 11
septembre 2001. Ce jour-la, la violence et les crimes
que nous, Europeens, connaissons depuis des
decennies a des degres divers est entree dans le
cocon egoiste du peuple americain.
Les " occidentaux " devaient bien ouvrir les yeux.
Mais il ne faut pas jeter la pierre a tous les Americains.
Il faut surtout accuser les vrais coupables: des
financiers apatrides qui ont colonise les leviers
politiques des grands pays, y compris des Etats-Unis.
Je connais nombre d'Americains qui ne sont pas en
accord avec les politiques interieures et etrangere de
leurs administrations successives. Un exemple: lors
des emeutes anti-mondialisation de Seattle, la police
americaine a arrete 600 manifestants, essentiellement
des agriculteurs? americains!
Jeter l'anatheme sur tous les Americains serait donc
aussi injuste que les accusations que porte la
propagande contre tous les Serbes. Au contraire, la
reunion des efforts des hommes de bonne volonte doit
pouvoir nous permettre de nous debarrasser de la lepre
de l'argent sale.
Les criminels de l'UCK sont rarement des
Yougoslaves de culture albanaise.
Apres la sanglante aventure du printemps 1999,
l'autosatisfaction de nos politiciens du "repli" de
Milosevic devant la "communaute internationale" a
cede la place aux soucis quotidiens de la vie au
Kosovo. Les Francais implantes a Mitrovica ont du
essuyer la reprobation des Americains et des Allemands
qui leur reprochaient d'etre trop clements envers les
Serbes. La remarquable action des contingents
francais qui se succedaient ne trouvait pas grace a
leurs yeux. Jusqu'au moment ou, dans des conditions
qui restent encore a elucider, des Americains et des
Allemands ont eux-memes ete pris a partie dans cette
ville symbole et ont pu mesurer que la haine des
Albano-Kosovars separatistes n'a rien a envier a celle
qu'on attribue trop souvent aux Serbes.
Les Yougoslaves de culture albanaise qui vivaient au
Kosovo sont en fait assez rares parmi les aventuriers
qui ont rejoint l'UCK. La majorite des membres des
bandes de Agem Ceku, a l'instar de leur chef, vient de
l'exterieur de la province yougoslave. Mais les «cols
blancs» de la politique internationale qui jouaient aux
dames a Paris ou a Bruxelles - pour jouer aux echecs il
faut etre plus intelligent - ne se sont pas attaches a
ce detail. Il avait suffit de quelques images
soigneusement "bidonnees" presentees aux journaux
televises des differentes chaines pour faire croire aux
"opinions publiques" que tous les Albanais du Kosovo
etaient de pauvres misereux meritant toute notre
sollicitude.
La verite est tout autre. Nombre de ces acharnes de
"l'epuration ethnique", dirigee contre tout ce qui
n'est pas independantiste au Kosovo, viennent en fait
d'Albanie, d'Europe ou meme des Etats-Unis, et non de
la province yougoslave du Kosovo. Une chaine de la
television francaise diffusa un documentaire sur
l'action de M. Kouchner au Kosovo en tant que
representant special du secretaire general des Nations
Unies. On l'y voyait notamment se demener pour faire
face a l'irredentisme des factions, et en particulier des
Albanais qui se presentaient comme des Yougoslaves
de culture albanaise. Les hommes de Hacim Thaci et
Agem Ceku, finirent par accepter de se laisser
desarmer, mais pour constituer des depots d'armes
secrets dont la KFOR decouvrit et saisit certains. Les
mafias se developperent, sans qu'aucun des
intervenants exterieurs ne voulut vraiment venir a
bout. Comme d'habitude, des interets occultes, sur
lesquels on commence a avoir quelque visibilite,
s'opposaient a l'action efficace qu'auraient souhaite
conduire les acteurs du terrain.
L'administration americaine soutient l'UCK
Les Etats-Unis, quant a eux, se sont impliques aux
cotes de l'UCK comme ils l'avaient fait aux cotes des
Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzegovine. Et avec eux les
Allemands puisqu'on a pu voir fleurir dans les mains des
guerilleros de l'armement allemand et americain. Leur
soutien partisan lors des negociations de Rambouillet
n'est plus un secret pour personne depuis que le
journal francais l'Humanite a revele les dessous des
clauses que Mme Albright a fait rajouter au texte initial
pour le rendre inacceptable par Belgrade.
Preoccupe d'affermir ses contacts avec les
communautes musulmanes des Balkans, Washington
est soucieux de ne pas troubler les affaires, memes
occultes, des familles musulmanes les plus influentes
de la "grande Albanie" que les gens de l'UCk
souhaitent mettre sur pied.
Monsieur Kouchner ne voyait pas arriver les forces de
police et les magistrats qu'on s'etait engage a lui
fournir, selon ce qu'il avait confie a la presse et aux
televisions. Pourtant, a force d'energie et d'efforts de
persuasion, il finit par mettre sur pied une sorte
d'administration judiciaire, en tentant de faire
participer des Serbes et des Albanais.
Et il faut bien dire que les Serbes si decries etaient
bien moins reticents que les retors Albano-Kosovars
qui, ici aussi, se sentaient soutenus par plus fort que
l'ONU et l'Otan. Ils tiraient de ce soutien occulte une
insolence redoutable. Apres avoir decrit les Serbes
comme la peste, l'ONU devait en fait faire face au
cholera des sbires d'Agem Ceku.
Les stocks d'armes de l'UCK
Avant meme que l'Otan soit entree en Yougoslavie
pour occuper le Kosovo, les sbires de Agem Ceku
avaient commence a mettre au point leur
approvisionnement en armes et munitions. Certes, ils
disposaient deja de materiel venant d'Allemagne ou des
Etats-Unis comme le montraient clairement les prises
de vues de television abondamment diffusees, mais
encore ils avaient mis sur pied des filieres compliquees
passant par la Suisse et l'Afrique. Trop confiants, sans
doute, les trafiquants ont ete demasques a cause des
changements de la legislation suisse qui interdit non
seulement le trafic d'armes mais aussi le transit des
sommes qui en decoulent. C'est ainsi que les policiers
suisses ont arrete en juillet 2000 un Francais et un
Kosovar qui avaient achete a la Bulgarie, pour les
forces de l'UCK plusieurs milliers de grenades et
plusieurs centaines de lance-roquettes. Selon les
informations parvenues a la presse, la quantite d'armes
devait etre importante puisque le montant des
transactions etait d'environ 3 millions d'euro. Les
marchandises ont quitte la Bulgarie en juillet 1999 pour
un pays d'accueil africain complaisant et sont ensuite
reparties vers l'Albanie ou elles sont arrivees apres le
deploiement de la KFOR au Kosovo.
On pouvait se demander quelle utilite l'UCK allait
trouver a ces armes offensives et plutot lourdes alors
que la mission d'imposition de la paix des Occidentaux
avait deja commence.
L'evolution de la situation en Macedoine est une partie
de la reponse a la question. Car il n'y aucune surprise
dans l'evolution actuelle de la guerre des Balkans.
Apres avoir seme le trouble dans la province
yougoslave du Kosovo, les terroristes albanais tentent
depuis plusieurs mois de destabiliser la frontiere sud de
la Serbie et maintenant s'attaquent a la Macedoine.
Le cancer islamiste porte par l'UCK s'attaque a la
Macedoine
Cette evolution etait prevue depuis longtemps. Les
strateges militaires - les seuls qui ne soient pas
infeodes a des elections et qui se moquent de l'opinion
que manipulent les tenants du politiquement correct -
ont envisage depuis 1991 le risque de retour a une
situation dans les Balkans analogue a celle du debut du
siecle. Ils ont prevu une vague de crises qui, apres la
Slovenie et la Croatie glisserait vers la
Bosnie-Herzegovine, puis la Macedoine en passant par
le Sandjak et le Kosovo. On a meme envisage des
difficultes avec la region de Voivodine, au nord de la
Yougoslavie, ou vivent de nombreux Magyars. La
destabilisation de la Macedoine etait si evidemment
previsible que les Etats-Unis y avaient deploye, des la
declaration d'independance du pays, deux bataillons
sous le beret bleu de l'ONU.
Les specialistes militaires avaient tire le signal
d'alarme, mais evidemment, les politiciens se sont
trouves dans l'incapacite de reagir. Gouverner, c'est
prevoir. Ils prefererent laisser pourrir la plaie
albanaise.
Depuis longtemps les mafias albanaises vivaient de
trafics divers - drogue, armes, femmes, voitures
volees, etc. -. L'intervention d'une force europeenne
en 1997 a l'occasion de l'operation Alba incita les
mafieux les plus impliques dans le gangsterisme, les
Musulmans du nord du pays, a emigrer vers le Kosovo
ou ils importerent une partie des armes qui n'avaient
pas rejoint les casernes lors de l'intervention
franco-italienne.
On sait quelle part ont pris ces "faux Kosovars",
soutenus par l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis, dans
l'insurrection contre la Yougoslavie, et quelle politique
d'epuration ethnique ils ont conduite sous la ferme
autorite de Agem Ceku, chef militaire de l'uCk. nous
connaissons ses "exploits" en matiere de droits de
l'homme en Croatie et au Kosovo.
Le demantelement de l'uCk, plus apparent que reel, a
laisse le champ libre aux actions de l'uCpbm, qui se mit
a destabiliser la zone tampon imposee en Serbie par
l'administration de l'ONU, interdite aux forces
yougoslaves. La vallee de Prechevo etait en fait livree
aux exactions des terroristes de Hacim Thaci et de
Agem Ceku.
Maintenant, c'est le tour de la Macedoine. Et
l'implication americaine dans cette ancienne republique
yougoslave met le Departement d'Etat dans une
position difficile: ou l'administration americaine
continue de soutenir les terroristes albanais, et ils
destabilisent le pays, ou les forces americaines de la
KFOR, responsables de la zone ou operent les bandits
de Hacim Thaci et Agem Ceku se desolidarisent de ces
criminels qu'elles ont soutenus jusqu'a present.
Les Serbes sont le seul recours
Apres avoir soutenu l'uCk avec la derniere energie,
en allant jusqu'au crime de guerre, et vilipende
Belgrade, les autorites politiques de l'Otan s'appuient
maintenant sur la Yougoslavie pour participer aux
operations de remise en ordre de la region. Les
evenements actuels exposent clairement que
prendre parti pour l'uCk etait une faute politique, faire
la guerre pour le compte des Albanais etait une faute
militaire qui a conduit aux crimes de guerre que nos
dirigeants politiques ont commis en utilisant les
forces de l'Otan dans les conditions ou ils les ont
utilisees.
Et maintenant, l'Otan n'a plus d'autre ressource que
de s'appuyer sur Belgrade pour retablir l'ordre dans
la vallee de Prechevo. Et comme M. Kostunica est un
patriote, ce que d'aucuns appellent "nationaliste",
on peut s'attendre a des passes politiques
interessantes. D'autant que pendant les quelques
mois durant lesquels la region de Prechevo a ete
livree par l'incurie des planificateurs de l'Otan aux
exactions de l'UCPMB, les gens de bonne foi ont pu
toucher du doigt la realite du comportement des
partisans de la "Grande Albanie" et prendre
conscience de ce qu'il risquait de se produire en
Macedoine. Cela n'a pas manque.
Les extremistes albanais veulent realiser une grande
Albanie qui ne serait en fait qu'une sorte de
Kurdistan europeen. On a connu la meme quadrature
de cercle entre l'Allemagne et la France pendant des
siecles. On n'a aplani les differends entre l'Allemagne
et la France e propos de l'Alsace et de la Moselle
qu'en assurant la libre circulation des personnes et
des biens entre les deux pays. Si un Mosellan ou un
Alsacien, ne en France se sent plus allemand que
francais, rien ne l'empeche de travailler en
Allemagne. Comme les conditions de vie sont
somme toute confortables au plan materiel, il n'y a
plus de probleme entre les peuples : "Lorsqu'il y a du
foin au ratelier les chevaux ne se battent plus", dit un
proverbe francais.
Il en est de meme avec les gens de culture albanaise
dans les Balkans: ce ne sont pas tout a fait les
Kurdes d'Europe, puisqu'il existe une Albanie, mais il
faut reconnaitre que les Albanais sont presents dans
quatre pays: l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie, la Macedoine
et quelques elements en Grece. Le fantasme de la
Grande Albanie est plus ancre chez les terroristes de
l'uCk qu'en Albanie meme. Compte tenu des
contacts que j'ai eus avec des Albanais, il me
semble meme que les Albanais considerent leurs
"cousins" du Kosovo avec le meme recul que les
gens de la republique d'Irlande considerent les
Irlandais de l'Ulster.
Quel dirigeant politique prendra la decision de faire
poursuivre les dirigeants de l'uCk pour crimes en
ex-Yougoslavie, histoire de faire bonne mesure? Il
serait plus que temps, parce que le soutien a ces
terroristes, comme aux Tchetchenes, vient de la
branche dure de la conference islamique.
2. Le transfert de Slobodan Milosevic a La Haye
Toujours pris par leurs fantasmes, les Americains ont
achete a Belgrade la livraison de Slobodan Milosevic
au TPI de La Haye. Il semble que les administrations
americaines successives n'aient rien compris: la
question Milosevic est parfaitement accessoire
devant l'evolution de la guerre civile balkanique vers
le sud. L'Otan a deja perdu une guerre contre la
Yougoslavie, meme si la diplomatie europeenne a
rattrape les choses apres. Car ne nous cachons pas
que c'est la diplomatie et les elections qui ont fait
partir Milosevic du pouvoir, et non les bombes de
l'Otan. Donc la guerre de 1999 est bien un echec.
Quoiqu'il en soit, Slobodan Milosevic est donc parti
pour La Haye. "Enfin" diront deux types
d'observateurs. Parmi ceux qui se rejouiront, on
trouvera evidemment les gens peu au fait des
dessous des cartes auxquels on fait avaler n'importe
quoi par les medias "alignes". On trouvera aussi les
valets de l'argent roi. Pourtant un examen plus
equitable des choses met en evidence une realite
plus dramatique.
En outre, il semble bien que l'action a laquelle s'est
prete le Premier ministre Djindjic releve plus de
l'enlevement que de l'extradition et que cette action
soit meme en dehors de la loi yougoslave.
Ne nous y trompons pas. J'ai ete satisfait de
l'arrestation de Slobodan Milosevic que je
considerais deja comme un criminel de guerre alors
qu'il n'etait pas encore question de le critiquer a
l'Otan. En effet, lorsque j'etais officier de
renseignement de l'Otan en Bosnie-Herzegovine, il
etait hors de question de critiquer le principal allie
des occidentaux dans la signature par les Serbes de
Bosnie de l'accord de Dayton. Son arrestation par
les Yougoslaves me paraissait dans le cours normal
des choses, mais seulement parce que c'etait la
justice yougoslave qui s'etait saisie du dossier.
(Je precise cette position personnelle ne releve que
de mon jugement sur ce que me semble etre l'action
de l'ancien president avant la guerre civile. Je crois
qu'il a conduit la Yougoslavie dans le piege dont se
sont ensuite servis les Allemands d'abord, et les
Americains ensuite. Mais il y a d'autres coupables
des malheurs des Balkans: les politiciens europeens
qui n'ont pas ete capables de faire taire les
Allemands et de prier les Americains de se meler de
leurs affaires. Toutefois, il s'agit de l'opinion d'un
observateur exterieur qui n'a pas vecu le debut de la
guerre civile).
Le TPI, un tribunal sans foi ni loi
En revanche, l'evolution, helas previsible, des choses
est loin de me satisfaire, parce que je ne reconnais
aucune legalite ni legitimite au TPI.
Si je souscris entierement a la creation d'un tel
tribunal qui peut etre utile dans le cadre de
l'harmonisation du monde, il me semble qu'en
l'espece on a une fois de plus "mis la charrue avant
les b?ufs".
Un tribunal est fait pour faire appliquer les lois. Or il
n'existe pas de loi internationale mais des traites.
Aucun traite ne peut, en l'etat actuel des choses, faire
office de code penal ou de code de procedure
penale. En outre, le mode de selection des
magistrats, qui doivent rester independants des
pouvoirs politiques, ne fait l'objet d'aucun processus
legalement determine.
Avant de le faire fonctionner, il me semble donc
indispensable de faire promulguer des lois penales
internationales qui semblent plus urgentes que les
arrangements que savent prendre les etats en
matiere economique et commerciale.
Ce TPI s'est juge incompetent pour donner suite e la
plainte d'Amnesty International contre l'Otan pour
crimes de guerre lors des bombardements de
l'ex-Yougoslavie.
Si le procureur du TPI, Mme Carla Del Ponte a
deboute Amnesty International, c'est peut-etre sur
ordre, mais le simple fait de refuser d'engager une
procedure d'enquete avec appel a temoins est bien
un deni de justice. Et pourtant j'aurais temoigne bien
volontiers dans un tel proces.
C'est pourquoi je considere que ce tribunal, tel qu'il
agit actuellement, est non seulement sans loi mais
encore sans foi.
Monsieur Milosevic n'etait pas un dictateur
On va donc juger devant un tribunal discutable un
homme que la presse "alignee" a commence par
qualifier "d'ancien dictateur de Belgrade". Que c'est
beau!, lorsque l'inspirateur de cette pensee unique
est un pays dont le president a ete elu? par des
juges, contre la majorite des votes de sa population!
Pourtant, M. Milosevic, lui, apres avoir ete elu par les
Yougoslaves, a bien ete oblige de se retirer lorsqu'il
a ete battu aux elections. Je ne connais pas de
dictateur qui ait quitte le pouvoir sans revolution. M.
Milosevic n'etait donc pas un dictateur, il serait bon
de le rappeler.
En revanche, je suis beaucoup plus inquiet du rele de
l'argent dans cette election, et surtout dans
l'expulsion par un pays independant de l'un de ses
nationaux. Car, ne nous y trompons pas, la non plus,
le financement de la campagne electorale, et surtout
le chantage conduit aupres des candidats etait bien
le suivant: on vous aide financierement, et on
financera le relevement de la Yougoslavie, si vous
nous aidez en faisant battre Milosevic aux elections.
Si M. Djindjic a finalement decide de livrer l'ancien
president sans attendre la decision de la justice
yougoslave, c'est evidemment du a l'action des
Americains. Le fait que l'avion qui a conduit l'accuse
a La Haye soit parti de Tuzla, base americaine en
Bosnie-Herzegovine, est significatif. Le Premier
ministre Djindjic a-t-il agi de son propre chef ou avec
l'aval discret de Vojislav Kostunica? C'est difficile a
dire pour un observateur exterieur. Mais ce qui est
sur c'est qu'il l'a fait en pensant a l'argent dont la
Yougoslavie a tant besoin pour se relever des
devastations que lui a causees l'Otan en 1999.
Encore la CIA?
Cette decision risque fort de provoquer des troubles
graves en Yougoslavie. En Serbie, les partisans de
M. Milosevic pourraient bien se lancer dans des
manifestations degenerant en emeutes. Et surtout, le
Montenegro pourrait bien profiter de ce qu'il faut bien
appeler un affaiblissement dramatique du president
Kostunica pour tenter l'aventure separatiste.
Et si la CIA avait fait des propositions de soutien?
Djindjic, au cas ou le remplacement de l'actuel
president viendrait a l'ordre du jour? Et qui sait si la
CIA n'est en train de tout faire pour que ce
remplacement vienne effectivement immediatement
a l'ordre du jour?
Ce serait une bonne affaire pour Washington de voir
succeder a Kostunica, patriote et assez oppose aux
Americains, un valet qui vient de leur donner des
preuves evidentes de sa servilite.
Incapables de venir a bout de Saddam Hussein,
ridiculises par les Chinois a propos de leur avion
espion, les Americains emportent enfin une
"victoire" internationale sur un petit pays ravage par
cette politique de la canonniere qu'ils ont tant
denoncee lorsqu'ils etaient encore des nains
politiques.
Mais qu'ils se souviennent de - ou qu'ils se
renseignent sur - ce qu'est une «victoire a la
Pyrrhus». Quant a la politique europeenne, que
devient-elle dans tout cela? Elle ne cesse de ramper
parce que les bombardements de la Yougoslavie ont
desequilibre l'Euro, accroissant la charge
d'investissements dans les anciens pays de l'Est et
surtout dans les Balkans.
Apres avoir devaste la Yougoslavie les Americains
sont retournes se cacher derriere leurs valets
On n'entend pas beaucoup Washington a propos de
la Macedoine, et pourtant, c'est bien la Maison
Blanche qui avait entretenu des bataillons de
stabilisation americains sous beret de l'Onu a
l'epoque de la guerre civile en Bosnie-Herzegovine.
Maintenant, les Americains vont engranger les
dividendes de la guerre, pendant que les Europeens
vont avoir le souci d'organiser la paix? sans avoir
les hommes d'etat capables de le faire, ceux qui
seraient suffisamment integres pour ne rien devoir
aux grands groupes economiques multinationaux.
L'Homme et sa culture
Le proces de M. Milosevic ne pourra donc etre
qu'une forfaiture de plus, perpétree par les agents de
gouvernements qui n'ont pas de lecon de morale a
donner a quiconque.
Avec cette affaire, nous avons une preuve de plus du
fait que les Americains ne savent pas prendre en
compte une donnee essentielle des relations
humaines: chaque peuple europeen a une culture et
une civilisation multimillenaire, alors qu'eux sont
ignorants de toutes ces subtilités.
Ils ont commis la meme faute en Asie, la continuent
en Afrique, s'y sont adonnes en Yougoslavie, et sont
en train de s'y enfoncer en Afghanistan: dans toutes
ces calamites pour les peuples broyes, les
responsables sont toujours les memes, les grands
capitalistes qui ont oublie que l'economie doit etre au
service de l'Homme, et non le contraire.
Ce que nous, Europeens de l'Atlantique a l'Oural,
nous savons tous.
Les guerres qui nous ont opposes ou reunis n'ont pu
se regler que par les compromis culturels. C'est vrai
dans les Balkans, mais la question de l'Alsace et la
Moselle relevait de la meme problematique. C'est
pourquoi elle peut etre un message d'espoir.
Apres la derniere guerre mondiale, devant l'inutilite
de la force pour regler cette question, la disparition
du barrage que representaient les anciennes
frontieres a rendu caduc tout recours a la force. Les
Mosellans ou les Alsaciens qui se sentent plus
francais passent leur temps de detente en France,
ceux qui se sentent plus allemands vont se distraire
en Allemagne? et souvent, comme je le faisais
lorsque j'habitais Strasbourg, vont d'un cote a l'autre
de la frontiere suivant les circonstances?
Mais pour proteger notre avenir, il faut savoir
proteger nos cultures, diverses et complementaires,
et pour cela refuser l'uniformisation decretee par des
financiers et des economistes qui manipulent les
gouvernements pour le plus grand malheur des
peuples.
La culture est le plus grand ennemi des dictateurs,
meme financiers. Parce qu'elle est l'outil qui permet
de refuser une societe de consommation qui n'est
qu'une incivilisation du gaspillage, promotrice de
l'abetissement et de l'asservissement.
* Pierre Henri Bunel, officier francais, accuse d'etre
l'espion yougoslave dans le Haut Commandement de
l'OTAN a Bruxelles.
** Extraits du livre "Crimes de guerre a l'OTAN"
Gentile Redazione di Limes,
leggiamo sul vostro sito internet
(http://www.limesonline.com/doc/navigation/LettereDirettore/#)
che Lucio Caracciolo risponde ogni settimana ai lettori. Alleghiamo
pertanto il testo, un po' abbreviato, di una lettera gia' recapitata
nei giorni scorsi alla vostra sede:
---
Al Dott. Lucio Caracciolo
Direttore di "LIMES", Roma
In seguito alle ultime dichiarazioni di Ibrahim Rugova dopo le
elezioni "libere" nel Kosovo e Metohija, commentate anche
dall’ambasciatore Miodrag Lekic alla Radio Tre, nelle quali Rugova
ribadisce di lavorare per la secessione della regione, ho pensato di
scrivere a Lei che e’ stato tante volte presente a dibattiti con
Rugova. L’ambasciatore Lekic ha dato una risposta diplomatica, io
invece dico senza mezzi termini che Rugova e’ uno dei responsabili
dello sfascio della Jugoslavia unitaria, un secessionista, separatista-
etnico, quindi razzista, che ha usato, strumentalizzato la nonviolenza
per mettere i popoli della regione gli uni contro gli altri. E’ stata
soltanto una grande furbizia da parte di Rugova, vezzeggiato
dall’Occidente, e del suo partito, di mostrarsi meno estremista degli
altri... E questo estremismo non inizia oggi, ma con il fascismo.
Vuole rispolverare un po’ la storia italiana neanche tanto remota,
Dott. Caracciolo, e la politica di guerra verso l’Albania ed il Kosovo
dal 1941-1945?
Numerosi sono stati i crimini compiuti dal terrorismo schipetaro,
soprattutto a partire dal 1980, anno della morte di Tito: si
andava dalla minaccia di dover vendere le case, agli incendi ed alle
rapine del raccolto. Le ricordo soltanto due crimini compiuti contro
persone: lo stupro di un insegnante serbo del Kosmet, rimasto invalido
e morto due anni fa a Belgrado, effettuato con una bottiglia di birra
rotta; e la strage alla caserma di Paracin, nel 1987, compiuta da Aziz
Keljmendi che sparo’ ed uccise nel sonno quattro reclute, ferendone
altre cinque. I crimini venivano compiuti contro i serbi, come ha
ammesso lo stesso Rugova all’ambasciatore Zimmermann.
Gli atti di terrorismo sono aumentati con l’arrivo della KFOR e
dell’UNMIK. I dati rivelano: dal 1991 al 1999 circa 1200-1300 crimini,
mentre sotto l’ombrello delle forze internazionali i crimini sono stati
circa 5300.
Il pallino di Rugova e' stata sempre la secessione e la Grande Albania,
come dimostrano i suoi interventi su questo argomento, pubblicati sui
riviste croate, tedesche, e cosi’ via, da noi tradotti e pubblicati su
"Nuova Unita’" nel 1997. Le dichiarazioni sono diventate sempre piu’
frequenti, ed in esse si agognava la presenza internazionale e
l’intervento della NATO - fino alle parole rilasciate in occasione di
queste ultime elezioni-farsa.
In tutti gli anni passati Rugova e’ stato appoggiato all’estero, ed ha
naturalmente avuto la benedizione del papa. Non e’ un mistero chi pago’
la "Ruder & Finn Public Global Affairs" di Washington per la propaganda
a favore della parte albanese-kosovara, e neanche il fatto che Rugova
prendeva soldi dall’estero.
Le allego anche copia del volantino della "Lega Democratica del Kosovo"
di Rugova, diffuso durante l’ultima conferenza FAO a Roma pochi anni
fa, nel quale la regione indicata "Repubblica Kossova" (sic!) e’
rappresentata come parte integrante della Grande Albania.
Anche le mura sanno che la pulizia etnica nel Kosmet non c’e’ stata,
prima dei bombardamenti della NATO. E questo accanimento contro
Milosevic dimostra soltanto che si vogliono coprire le barbarie
commesse contro uno stato sovrano e contro tutta la sua popolazione...
Ma le mura non parlano, ed io credo che anche Lei, da intellettuale,
dica solo "mezze verita’".
Con osservanza
Ivan Pavicevac
Roma 29 novembre 2001
(anniversario della mia Repubblica)
leggiamo sul vostro sito internet
(http://www.limesonline.com/doc/navigation/LettereDirettore/#)
che Lucio Caracciolo risponde ogni settimana ai lettori. Alleghiamo
pertanto il testo, un po' abbreviato, di una lettera gia' recapitata
nei giorni scorsi alla vostra sede:
---
Al Dott. Lucio Caracciolo
Direttore di "LIMES", Roma
In seguito alle ultime dichiarazioni di Ibrahim Rugova dopo le
elezioni "libere" nel Kosovo e Metohija, commentate anche
dall’ambasciatore Miodrag Lekic alla Radio Tre, nelle quali Rugova
ribadisce di lavorare per la secessione della regione, ho pensato di
scrivere a Lei che e’ stato tante volte presente a dibattiti con
Rugova. L’ambasciatore Lekic ha dato una risposta diplomatica, io
invece dico senza mezzi termini che Rugova e’ uno dei responsabili
dello sfascio della Jugoslavia unitaria, un secessionista, separatista-
etnico, quindi razzista, che ha usato, strumentalizzato la nonviolenza
per mettere i popoli della regione gli uni contro gli altri. E’ stata
soltanto una grande furbizia da parte di Rugova, vezzeggiato
dall’Occidente, e del suo partito, di mostrarsi meno estremista degli
altri... E questo estremismo non inizia oggi, ma con il fascismo.
Vuole rispolverare un po’ la storia italiana neanche tanto remota,
Dott. Caracciolo, e la politica di guerra verso l’Albania ed il Kosovo
dal 1941-1945?
Numerosi sono stati i crimini compiuti dal terrorismo schipetaro,
soprattutto a partire dal 1980, anno della morte di Tito: si
andava dalla minaccia di dover vendere le case, agli incendi ed alle
rapine del raccolto. Le ricordo soltanto due crimini compiuti contro
persone: lo stupro di un insegnante serbo del Kosmet, rimasto invalido
e morto due anni fa a Belgrado, effettuato con una bottiglia di birra
rotta; e la strage alla caserma di Paracin, nel 1987, compiuta da Aziz
Keljmendi che sparo’ ed uccise nel sonno quattro reclute, ferendone
altre cinque. I crimini venivano compiuti contro i serbi, come ha
ammesso lo stesso Rugova all’ambasciatore Zimmermann.
Gli atti di terrorismo sono aumentati con l’arrivo della KFOR e
dell’UNMIK. I dati rivelano: dal 1991 al 1999 circa 1200-1300 crimini,
mentre sotto l’ombrello delle forze internazionali i crimini sono stati
circa 5300.
Il pallino di Rugova e' stata sempre la secessione e la Grande Albania,
come dimostrano i suoi interventi su questo argomento, pubblicati sui
riviste croate, tedesche, e cosi’ via, da noi tradotti e pubblicati su
"Nuova Unita’" nel 1997. Le dichiarazioni sono diventate sempre piu’
frequenti, ed in esse si agognava la presenza internazionale e
l’intervento della NATO - fino alle parole rilasciate in occasione di
queste ultime elezioni-farsa.
In tutti gli anni passati Rugova e’ stato appoggiato all’estero, ed ha
naturalmente avuto la benedizione del papa. Non e’ un mistero chi pago’
la "Ruder & Finn Public Global Affairs" di Washington per la propaganda
a favore della parte albanese-kosovara, e neanche il fatto che Rugova
prendeva soldi dall’estero.
Le allego anche copia del volantino della "Lega Democratica del Kosovo"
di Rugova, diffuso durante l’ultima conferenza FAO a Roma pochi anni
fa, nel quale la regione indicata "Repubblica Kossova" (sic!) e’
rappresentata come parte integrante della Grande Albania.
Anche le mura sanno che la pulizia etnica nel Kosmet non c’e’ stata,
prima dei bombardamenti della NATO. E questo accanimento contro
Milosevic dimostra soltanto che si vogliono coprire le barbarie
commesse contro uno stato sovrano e contro tutta la sua popolazione...
Ma le mura non parlano, ed io credo che anche Lei, da intellettuale,
dica solo "mezze verita’".
Con osservanza
Ivan Pavicevac
Roma 29 novembre 2001
(anniversario della mia Repubblica)
Nota: nell'invio precedente era contenuto un errore di traduzione nella
parte intitolata "Le disavventure d'un analfabeta mondano". Abbiamo
inoltre aggiunto la traduzione degli stralci dall'intervista a P. Handke
---
(na talijanskom i na srpskohrvatskom)
=============
PRIMA PUNTATA: BERNARD APPOGGIA I CONTRAS
=============
Nella prefazione a "Della guerra come politica estera degli Stati
Uniti", una semplice raccolta di 6 articoli di N. Chomsky alla ricerca
dell'ingrato lettore francese, Jean Bricmont parla del "piccolo mondo
dei grandi media", per spiegare come "la buona parte degli
intellettuali francesi fosse politicamente sempre piu' passiva, piu'
che altrove in Europa, prima durante la lotta contro gli euro-missili,
poi durante la guerra del Golfo ed il genocidio in Ruanda, per finire
decisamente bellicista durante gli interventi in Bosnia e Kosovo".
A questo punto troviamo la seguente nota dell'editore: "Sebbene la
passività fosse la tendenza generale, i filosofi mediatici non hanno
tardato a sostenere - molto attivamente - la politica estera di
Reagan; cosicche' i vari Bernard-Henri Levi e André Glucksman insieme
a quel Jean-François Revel firmarono una petizione d'appoggio ai
contras in Nicaragua, indirizzata al Congresso USA."
(Per chi fosse interessato alla prefazione di Jean B. segnaliamo che è
stata riportata da "Le Monde diplomatique" e si puo' trovare nel
supplemento di febbraio de "Il Manifesto". E' interessante
principalmente in quanto analisi del mancato successo francese di
Chomsky.
Titolo: Noam Chomsky: De la guerre comme politique étrangére des Etats
Unis, préface de J. Bricmont, Agone éditeur, 2001)
SRPSKO-HRVATSKI
Naslov knjige: "Noam Comski, O ratu kao spoljnij politici SAD",
predgovor Zan Brikmo, u izdanju Agon, februar 2001 U predgovoru Z.
Brikmona za 6 clanaka N. Comskog sabranih pod gornjim naslovom, u
delu gde Zan govori o "polusvetu medijskih intelektualaca da bi
objasnio da su francuski intelektualci mahom bivali sve pasivniji i
pasivniji, mnogo vise nego drugde u Evropi, prvo za vreme borbe protiv
euro-raketa, zatim tokom rata u Zalivu i genocida u Ruandi, da bi
konacno, za vreme intervencije u Bosni i Kosovu postali odlucne
pristalice rata", nalazimo sledecu fus-notu urednika izdanja:"mada je
sklonost ka ravnodusnosti bila opsta pojava, medijska inteligencija je
podrzala vrlo brzo - i vrlo aktivno- Reganovu spoljnu politiku, tako
da su takvi kao B. H. Levi i A. Gluksman zajedno sa nekakvim Z. F.
Revelom potpisali peticiju u znak podrske kontrasima u Nikaragvi. Ta
je peticija glasila na americki Kongres."
===============
SECONDA PUNTATA: DIFENSORE DELLA LIBERTA'
===============
Estratto da "PLPL - Pour Lire Pas Lu" (Per leggere non letto) "il
giornale che non mente e che prende di mira il potere, la sinistra
molle e i padroni", N° 0, giugno 2000 - sito internet www.plpl.org
IL LACCIO D'ORO
La lotta è accanita, pero'
PLPL sempre equanime,
il laccio d'oro
consegnera'
alla penna del piu' servile.
Editorialista associato di "le Monde", direttore di una collana di
libri presso Grasset (gruppo Matra-Hachette) e cronista di "le Point"
(il padrone di questo giornale è François Pinault), Bernard-Henri Lévy
è anche un caro amico di Jean-Luc Lagardère (il padrone di
Matra-Hachette e mercante d'armi).
Nel testo che segue ("le Point", 5 maggio 2000) il grande filosofo
delle libertà, prende le difese di un industriale perseguitato dalla
giustizia: "Quando ci capita di vedere un capitano dell'industria come
Jean-Luc Lagardére sbattuto davanti ai giudici, anche se a quanto pare
non abbia fatto niente per impedire l'arricchimento nè della propria
impresa ne della collettività, non ci restano che due possibili
reazioni ..."
Tuttavia piu' in là BHL precisa: "Jean-Luc è un amico. Quello che
apprezzo in lui e' questo suo stile da grande condottiero, da Cirano
che sa il fatto suo."
E vero, "l'amico" Lagardère ha finanziato con F. Pinault l'ultimo film
di BHL, "Il Giorno e la Notte", un pessimo film fallimentare.
PLPL si felicita con BHL: leccare è un affare delicato quando le
ghiandole salivari sono compresse dal laccio d'oro.
SRPSKO-HRVATSKI
Preuzeto bez pitanja iz PLPL, Pour Lire Pa Lu, (Sta Stampa ne Stampa)
"novina koje ne lazu" a izlaze kao dvomesecnik u Parizu. "Na meti PLPL
su vlastodrsci, levi mekusci i gazde" Jun 2000. br. 0
(www.plpl.org)
ZLATNA UZICA
I u najzescoj konkurenciji,
PLPL nepristrasno
nagradu dodeljuje
samo najvecoj ulizici.
Spoljni saradnik "Le Mond-a", direktor izdanja kod Grase (Grasset u
sastavu Marta-Hachette) hronicar u listu "Point", BERNAR-ANRI LEVI je
takodje i prijatelj ZAN-LUK LAGARDERA koji je ne samo gazda preduzeca
Matra-Hachette vec i trgovac oruzjem. U tekstu sto sledi ("Le Point",
5.maja 2000.) veliki filozof i ljubitelj slobode zauzima se za
industrijalca koga sud progoni:
"Kad covek vidi kapetana industrije kakav je Zan-Luk Lagarder kako se
povlaci po sudovima, a da nije, a kazu da nije, onemogucio bogacenje,
ni svom preduzecu, ni zajednici, moze da bira izmedju dve moguce
reakcije ...."
Malo dalje u istom tekstu BHL pojasnjava : "Zan-Luk je moj prijatelj.
Volim kod njega tu zicu velikog vojskovodje, Sirana koji tera po
svom."
Tacno je da su prijatelji, Lagarder je sa F. Pinoom finansirao
najnoviji film Bernara-Anrija, "Dan i Noc", pravo djubre od filma koje
je progutalo ogromne pare.
PLPL cestita Bernar-Anriju : Ulizivanje je vrlo slozen napor kada
zlatna uzica steze pluvacne zlezde.
=============
TERZA PUNTATA: BERNARD COSMOPOLITA TUTTOLOGO
=============
PLPL n° 1 ottobre 2000
Le disavventure d'un analfabeta mondano
Editorialista associato di "Le Monde" BHL è anche un grande cronista.
Ha esordito con l'Algeria offrendoci un'analisi approfondita sulla
situazione (quattro pagine, 8-9/01/1998), ha minuziosamente descritto
una giornata qualunque di un combattente in Afganistan (due pagine
13/10/98), dall'Austria ha riportato i suoi commenti filosofici (2
pagine 2/03/00), ha ricordato che in Germania vivono i tedeschi
(quattro pagine 5-6/02/99).
Cambio di lettera dell'alfabeto il 14 ottobre: toccava alla Bosnia (due
pagine).
Albania, Angola e Argentina hanno subito espresso il proprio sollievo
mentre Belgio, Brasile e Botswana stanno per chiudere le frontiere.
PLPL n°1 oktobar 2000
Potucanja belosvetskog nepismenjakovica
Spoljni saradnik "Le Monda", BH Levi je takodje i veliki reporter.
Poceo je istancanom analizom dogadjaja u Alziru (4 strane 8-9/01/98).
Do tancina je opisao dan jednog ratnika u Avganistanu (dve strane,
13/10/98). Svoja filosofska zapazanja preneo je iz Austrije (2 str.
2/03/00) i podsetio da Nemacku nastanjuju Nemci (4 str. 5-6/02/99).
A onda je promenio slovo 14 oktobra ove godine. Dosla je na red Bosna
(dve str.).
Albanija, Angola i Argentina su tom prilikom sa olaksanjem odahnule,
a Belgija, Brazil i Bocvana se spremaju da zatvore granice.
==============
QUARTA PUNTATA: SQUADRISTI A PARIGI
==============
Prenosimo deo intervjua Martina Letmajera sa Peterom Handkeom.
Ovaj intervju sa cuvenim pozorisnim i knjizevnim stvaraocem
novinar nemacke Tv vodio je januara 1997.
Na engleskom jeziku nalazi se na adresi :
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1417
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1418
Pitanje: Jasno, usledio je napad gospode Levi i Finkelkraut ...
HANDKE: Tako je. Samo sto ta dvojica nisu knjizevnici. Obojica su
"novi filozofi". Ne bih vam znao reci ni zasto "novi" , ni zasto pak
"filozofi". S pocetka rata, ja sam im u jednom trenutku bio potreban,
kao neko ko nije filozof, vec knjizevnik i to dokazan i, za razliku od
njih dvojice, neko ko ima barem nekakvu predstavu o Jugoslaviji. Vec
posle par susreta sa njima bese mi jasno da zele da me iskoriste i nista
vise. Samo sto sam poceo da branim Srbiju, a vec su digli su ruke od
mene. Zaista su zatvoreni tipovi, ta dvojica. To vam je Cetvrti Rajh.
Novac i moc.
U Francuskoj oni i njima bliski potpuno kontrolisu izdavastvo i
elektronske medije. Od njih dvojice ne moze nista da prodre do javnosti,
gotovo da u potpunosti dominiraju na televiziji i na stranicama novina.
Poneko sa njima i segu tera, medjutim, uprkos svim neprimerenim i
nesuvislim pisanijama o ratu u Bosni , niko Levija vise i ne napada,
toliko je uzeo maha. Ne moze se vise procitati ni rec kritike na njegov
racun.
Sve se to uzima kao vrsna knjizevnost. A bilo bi dovoljno uzeti Roberov
recnik i proveriti nekoliko izraza i pojmova, staviti pod gramaticku
lupu, pa da sve sto kaze bude opovrgnuto.Naizgled neverovatno, a ipak
niko nista ne cini u tom pravcu.
U pitanju su finansijski interesi i moc. Shvatio sam to odmah i odlucio
da nista ne potpisujem i da se sa "novim filozofima" vise ne sastajem.
Oni ce to iskoristiti protiv mene, no ipak je to manje zlo.
Pitanje: Ta gospoda Finkielkraut i Levi, nalazim da su zanimljivi. Mogli
bi pare da mlate na necem drugom a ne na hvalospevima Tudjmanu, sto je
slucaj Bernara-Anrija, ili na prici da Evropa pocinje u Sarajevu, sto je
slucaj onog drugog.
Ko je uzeo pod najam tu dvojicu?
HANDKE: U danasnje vreme, intelektualci, a pod tim ne podrazumevam nista
lose, ne oskudevaju u novcu. Dakle, nije novac njihov motiv, vec pre
moc. To uostalom, ide jedno sa drugim.
Bernar-Anri je po prirodi cutljiv, zajedljiv i lazljiv. Kao i njegov
Bosanski dnevnik, on je izvestacen, umisljen. On prikazuje dimenziju
vladavine moralnih vrednosti, uporedo sa vladavinom politickih faktora,
kakav je Sirakova vlada i druge, medjutim, to on umislja. Problem sa
njim je u tome sto je on sa stanovista etosa, morala, obicni punjeni
curan.
Gledao sam onomad scenu koju je snimila, rekao bih, nemacka televizija
gde Levi sa grupom svojih pristalica pred Jugoslovenskim Kulturnim
Centrom u Parizu grubo i nasilnicki otima kljuc iz ruku zeni koja
uzaludno pokusava da zgradu zakljuca i tako spreci uljeze da u nju
prodru. Ona se brani recima : "Ne, ne zelim vam dati kljuc, sta vi ovde
trazite? To nije vase pravo!"
U svom crnom koznom mantilu, Levi je hladnokrvno posmatrao kao kakav
komunisticki komesar iz petparackog filma. Trebalo bi da sve Tv stanice
sirom sveta prikazu ovu triminutnu scenu da se vidi kako se samozvani
branilac Sarajeva i Bosne ophodi prema ljudima. Voleo bih kada bi svi
mogli to da vide.
Pitanje: Da li mislite da je moguce ispraviti sve ovo sto danas neki
rade?
HANDKE: Ne. bilo bi odvec lako. Tragicna je istorija Jugoslavije i
Evrope u ovom veku.
Odvijanje i pisanje istorije su spojeni. To je zajednicko i istoriji
Jevrejskog naroda, koja je takodje tragicna.
Verovatno nece biti ispravljene nepravde. Takva vrsta ljudi se ne
menja. Po meni, neosnovano je misliti da ce jednog dana biti moguce
drugacije posmatrati stvari. Svojim laznim recima i laznim slikama
pocinili su toliko mnogo zlocina protiv Jugoslavije, strasnih zlocina. A
neki su zlocini nepovratni, trajni.
Stralci dall'intervista a Peter Handke effettuata dal giornalista
televisivo tedesco Martin Lettmayer nel gennaio 1997 e riportata in
inglese sul sito del Congresso dell'Unità Serba:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1417
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1418
DOMANDA: Il sig. Levy e il sig. Finkielkraut, naturalmente l'hanno
attaccata...
HANDKE: Esatto. Ma loro non sono scrittori. Loro sono "I nuovi
filosofi". Non so perché siano stati chiamati "nuovi" o "filosofi".
C'è stata un'epoca all'inizio della guerra in cui loro hanno avuto
bisogno di me. Avevano bisogno di qualcuno che non fosse un filosofo,
ma un autore, un autore riconosciuto che, al contrario di loro, avesse
una qualche conoscenza della Jugoslavia. Dopo alcuni incontri con
Finkielkraut e Bernard Henri Levy, mi fu chiaro che loro volessero
soltanto usarmi. Ma appena presi le difese della Serbia, non mi
vollero più vedere. Questo è un gruppo veramente poco comunicativo. E
appartiene al Quarto Reich. Ci sono un sacco di soldi in ballo. E
potere. In Francia i libri e i mezzi elettronici sono completamente
controllati da una catena di gente come questa. Non si riesce più a
far arrivare nessuna notizia. La stampa francese e la TV sono
pressoché totalmente sotto il controllo di Bernard Henri Levy, così
come di Finkielkraut. Alcune persone lo ridicolizzano, ma in virtù di
tutti quegli indecenti, decorati, pessimi diari che lui [Levy]
pubblica sulla guerra in Bosnia, nessuno lo attacca più. Non un
singolo attacco. Prendono tutto come una buona letteratura. Tutto
quello che basta fare è prendere un paio di frasi nel dizionario
Robert's dei luoghi comuni. Il suo lavoro è sbagliato nei suoi punti
di vista, e pieno di errori di grammatica. Da non credere. Ma nessuno
fa niente. C'è in giro un sacco di denaro, e di potere. Tutto questo
mi fu chiaro dopo che mi incontrai un paio di volte con i "nuovi
filosofi". Decisi di non firmare nulla. E non sarei più andato ai loro
incontri. Hanno usato questo fatto contro di me, ma è meglio così.
DOMANDA: Questi signori Finkielkraut e Levy pero' mi interessano.
Potrebbero guadagnare soldi scrivendo altro, invece il primo elogia la
democrazia di Tudjman, l'altro dice che l'Europa inizia a Sarajevo.
Chi li ha ingaggiati?
HANDKE: Gli intellettuali (non intendendo niente di negativo) non sono
a corto di denaro, oggigiorno. Perciò non è il denaro che li spinge.
E' il potere, il potere più del denaro. Certamente denaro e potere
sono strettamente connessi. Bernard Henri Levy, credo, non ha una
spiegazione per la sua demonologia. E' taciturno, ma ingannevole.
Taciturno e ingannevole, malizioso. E' una meraviglia speculare come
il suo diario di Bosnia ci mostri una quadro in cui esiste un secondo
potere, oltre a quello del governo, di Chirac, etc., un potere etico e
morale. Questo è quello che lui immagina. Ma questa è la difficoltà,
poiché moralmente ed eticamente, lui è una papera morta. (Come noi
diciamo in un proverbio austriaco, "sotto il cane").
Una volta vidi una scena girata, penso, dalla TV tedesca, in cui Levy
va al Centro Culturale Jugoslavo a Parigi, con un gruppo di suoi
seguaci. A questo punto la donna che dirige il centro desidera
chiudere l'edificio. Lei rifiuta di passare la chiave agli intrusi.
Levy e il suo assistente, prendono la chiave alla donna con la forza.
Per due o tre minuti questa donna, abbastanza anziana, urla, grida:
"No, non voglio darvi la chiave, non vi appartiene. Non potete entrare
qui."
Levy rimane li, proprio come il commissario comunista dei film di
seconda categoria con il suo soprabito di pelle nero, e, sorridendo,
osserva il suo amico mentre rigira e strappa la chiave dalle mani
della donna. Questa immagine dovrebbe essere trasmessa dai notiziari
della sera, per tutti i tre minuti, su ogni emittente TV del mondo per
far vedere come questo autoproclamato difensore di Sarajevo e della
Bosnia, si comporta con la gente di tutti i giorni. Mi piacerebbe che
tutto il mondo lo guardasse.
DOMANDA: E' convinto che tutte queste persone che oggi fanno queste
cose, potranno correggersi?
HANDKE: No, sarebbe troppo facile. E' tragica, la storia della
Jugoslavia, la storia dell'Europa in questo secolo. Come la storia
avviene e come la storia viene scritta, sono due cose unite insieme.
Questa storia va insieme con la storia del popolo ebreo. Queste sono
le due storie tragiche. E probabilmente non saranno corrette. Pensare
in questo modo, che un giorno le cose potranno essere viste
differentemente, penso, sarebbe un falso ottimismo. Questa gente non
cambia. Con il loro linguaggio e le loro immagini hanno commesso così
tanti crimini, crimini veri, contro la Jugoslavia. Ci sono crimini che
possono solo essere perpetuati. Non c'è via di ritorno.
(zajednicki priredili : Olga iz Pariza, i Andrea iz Rima)
(a cura di Olga, da Parigi, e di Andrea, da Roma)
parte intitolata "Le disavventure d'un analfabeta mondano". Abbiamo
inoltre aggiunto la traduzione degli stralci dall'intervista a P. Handke
---
(na talijanskom i na srpskohrvatskom)
=============
PRIMA PUNTATA: BERNARD APPOGGIA I CONTRAS
=============
Nella prefazione a "Della guerra come politica estera degli Stati
Uniti", una semplice raccolta di 6 articoli di N. Chomsky alla ricerca
dell'ingrato lettore francese, Jean Bricmont parla del "piccolo mondo
dei grandi media", per spiegare come "la buona parte degli
intellettuali francesi fosse politicamente sempre piu' passiva, piu'
che altrove in Europa, prima durante la lotta contro gli euro-missili,
poi durante la guerra del Golfo ed il genocidio in Ruanda, per finire
decisamente bellicista durante gli interventi in Bosnia e Kosovo".
A questo punto troviamo la seguente nota dell'editore: "Sebbene la
passività fosse la tendenza generale, i filosofi mediatici non hanno
tardato a sostenere - molto attivamente - la politica estera di
Reagan; cosicche' i vari Bernard-Henri Levi e André Glucksman insieme
a quel Jean-François Revel firmarono una petizione d'appoggio ai
contras in Nicaragua, indirizzata al Congresso USA."
(Per chi fosse interessato alla prefazione di Jean B. segnaliamo che è
stata riportata da "Le Monde diplomatique" e si puo' trovare nel
supplemento di febbraio de "Il Manifesto". E' interessante
principalmente in quanto analisi del mancato successo francese di
Chomsky.
Titolo: Noam Chomsky: De la guerre comme politique étrangére des Etats
Unis, préface de J. Bricmont, Agone éditeur, 2001)
SRPSKO-HRVATSKI
Naslov knjige: "Noam Comski, O ratu kao spoljnij politici SAD",
predgovor Zan Brikmo, u izdanju Agon, februar 2001 U predgovoru Z.
Brikmona za 6 clanaka N. Comskog sabranih pod gornjim naslovom, u
delu gde Zan govori o "polusvetu medijskih intelektualaca da bi
objasnio da su francuski intelektualci mahom bivali sve pasivniji i
pasivniji, mnogo vise nego drugde u Evropi, prvo za vreme borbe protiv
euro-raketa, zatim tokom rata u Zalivu i genocida u Ruandi, da bi
konacno, za vreme intervencije u Bosni i Kosovu postali odlucne
pristalice rata", nalazimo sledecu fus-notu urednika izdanja:"mada je
sklonost ka ravnodusnosti bila opsta pojava, medijska inteligencija je
podrzala vrlo brzo - i vrlo aktivno- Reganovu spoljnu politiku, tako
da su takvi kao B. H. Levi i A. Gluksman zajedno sa nekakvim Z. F.
Revelom potpisali peticiju u znak podrske kontrasima u Nikaragvi. Ta
je peticija glasila na americki Kongres."
===============
SECONDA PUNTATA: DIFENSORE DELLA LIBERTA'
===============
Estratto da "PLPL - Pour Lire Pas Lu" (Per leggere non letto) "il
giornale che non mente e che prende di mira il potere, la sinistra
molle e i padroni", N° 0, giugno 2000 - sito internet www.plpl.org
IL LACCIO D'ORO
La lotta è accanita, pero'
PLPL sempre equanime,
il laccio d'oro
consegnera'
alla penna del piu' servile.
Editorialista associato di "le Monde", direttore di una collana di
libri presso Grasset (gruppo Matra-Hachette) e cronista di "le Point"
(il padrone di questo giornale è François Pinault), Bernard-Henri Lévy
è anche un caro amico di Jean-Luc Lagardère (il padrone di
Matra-Hachette e mercante d'armi).
Nel testo che segue ("le Point", 5 maggio 2000) il grande filosofo
delle libertà, prende le difese di un industriale perseguitato dalla
giustizia: "Quando ci capita di vedere un capitano dell'industria come
Jean-Luc Lagardére sbattuto davanti ai giudici, anche se a quanto pare
non abbia fatto niente per impedire l'arricchimento nè della propria
impresa ne della collettività, non ci restano che due possibili
reazioni ..."
Tuttavia piu' in là BHL precisa: "Jean-Luc è un amico. Quello che
apprezzo in lui e' questo suo stile da grande condottiero, da Cirano
che sa il fatto suo."
E vero, "l'amico" Lagardère ha finanziato con F. Pinault l'ultimo film
di BHL, "Il Giorno e la Notte", un pessimo film fallimentare.
PLPL si felicita con BHL: leccare è un affare delicato quando le
ghiandole salivari sono compresse dal laccio d'oro.
SRPSKO-HRVATSKI
Preuzeto bez pitanja iz PLPL, Pour Lire Pa Lu, (Sta Stampa ne Stampa)
"novina koje ne lazu" a izlaze kao dvomesecnik u Parizu. "Na meti PLPL
su vlastodrsci, levi mekusci i gazde" Jun 2000. br. 0
(www.plpl.org)
ZLATNA UZICA
I u najzescoj konkurenciji,
PLPL nepristrasno
nagradu dodeljuje
samo najvecoj ulizici.
Spoljni saradnik "Le Mond-a", direktor izdanja kod Grase (Grasset u
sastavu Marta-Hachette) hronicar u listu "Point", BERNAR-ANRI LEVI je
takodje i prijatelj ZAN-LUK LAGARDERA koji je ne samo gazda preduzeca
Matra-Hachette vec i trgovac oruzjem. U tekstu sto sledi ("Le Point",
5.maja 2000.) veliki filozof i ljubitelj slobode zauzima se za
industrijalca koga sud progoni:
"Kad covek vidi kapetana industrije kakav je Zan-Luk Lagarder kako se
povlaci po sudovima, a da nije, a kazu da nije, onemogucio bogacenje,
ni svom preduzecu, ni zajednici, moze da bira izmedju dve moguce
reakcije ...."
Malo dalje u istom tekstu BHL pojasnjava : "Zan-Luk je moj prijatelj.
Volim kod njega tu zicu velikog vojskovodje, Sirana koji tera po
svom."
Tacno je da su prijatelji, Lagarder je sa F. Pinoom finansirao
najnoviji film Bernara-Anrija, "Dan i Noc", pravo djubre od filma koje
je progutalo ogromne pare.
PLPL cestita Bernar-Anriju : Ulizivanje je vrlo slozen napor kada
zlatna uzica steze pluvacne zlezde.
=============
TERZA PUNTATA: BERNARD COSMOPOLITA TUTTOLOGO
=============
PLPL n° 1 ottobre 2000
Le disavventure d'un analfabeta mondano
Editorialista associato di "Le Monde" BHL è anche un grande cronista.
Ha esordito con l'Algeria offrendoci un'analisi approfondita sulla
situazione (quattro pagine, 8-9/01/1998), ha minuziosamente descritto
una giornata qualunque di un combattente in Afganistan (due pagine
13/10/98), dall'Austria ha riportato i suoi commenti filosofici (2
pagine 2/03/00), ha ricordato che in Germania vivono i tedeschi
(quattro pagine 5-6/02/99).
Cambio di lettera dell'alfabeto il 14 ottobre: toccava alla Bosnia (due
pagine).
Albania, Angola e Argentina hanno subito espresso il proprio sollievo
mentre Belgio, Brasile e Botswana stanno per chiudere le frontiere.
PLPL n°1 oktobar 2000
Potucanja belosvetskog nepismenjakovica
Spoljni saradnik "Le Monda", BH Levi je takodje i veliki reporter.
Poceo je istancanom analizom dogadjaja u Alziru (4 strane 8-9/01/98).
Do tancina je opisao dan jednog ratnika u Avganistanu (dve strane,
13/10/98). Svoja filosofska zapazanja preneo je iz Austrije (2 str.
2/03/00) i podsetio da Nemacku nastanjuju Nemci (4 str. 5-6/02/99).
A onda je promenio slovo 14 oktobra ove godine. Dosla je na red Bosna
(dve str.).
Albanija, Angola i Argentina su tom prilikom sa olaksanjem odahnule,
a Belgija, Brazil i Bocvana se spremaju da zatvore granice.
==============
QUARTA PUNTATA: SQUADRISTI A PARIGI
==============
Prenosimo deo intervjua Martina Letmajera sa Peterom Handkeom.
Ovaj intervju sa cuvenim pozorisnim i knjizevnim stvaraocem
novinar nemacke Tv vodio je januara 1997.
Na engleskom jeziku nalazi se na adresi :
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1417
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1418
Pitanje: Jasno, usledio je napad gospode Levi i Finkelkraut ...
HANDKE: Tako je. Samo sto ta dvojica nisu knjizevnici. Obojica su
"novi filozofi". Ne bih vam znao reci ni zasto "novi" , ni zasto pak
"filozofi". S pocetka rata, ja sam im u jednom trenutku bio potreban,
kao neko ko nije filozof, vec knjizevnik i to dokazan i, za razliku od
njih dvojice, neko ko ima barem nekakvu predstavu o Jugoslaviji. Vec
posle par susreta sa njima bese mi jasno da zele da me iskoriste i nista
vise. Samo sto sam poceo da branim Srbiju, a vec su digli su ruke od
mene. Zaista su zatvoreni tipovi, ta dvojica. To vam je Cetvrti Rajh.
Novac i moc.
U Francuskoj oni i njima bliski potpuno kontrolisu izdavastvo i
elektronske medije. Od njih dvojice ne moze nista da prodre do javnosti,
gotovo da u potpunosti dominiraju na televiziji i na stranicama novina.
Poneko sa njima i segu tera, medjutim, uprkos svim neprimerenim i
nesuvislim pisanijama o ratu u Bosni , niko Levija vise i ne napada,
toliko je uzeo maha. Ne moze se vise procitati ni rec kritike na njegov
racun.
Sve se to uzima kao vrsna knjizevnost. A bilo bi dovoljno uzeti Roberov
recnik i proveriti nekoliko izraza i pojmova, staviti pod gramaticku
lupu, pa da sve sto kaze bude opovrgnuto.Naizgled neverovatno, a ipak
niko nista ne cini u tom pravcu.
U pitanju su finansijski interesi i moc. Shvatio sam to odmah i odlucio
da nista ne potpisujem i da se sa "novim filozofima" vise ne sastajem.
Oni ce to iskoristiti protiv mene, no ipak je to manje zlo.
Pitanje: Ta gospoda Finkielkraut i Levi, nalazim da su zanimljivi. Mogli
bi pare da mlate na necem drugom a ne na hvalospevima Tudjmanu, sto je
slucaj Bernara-Anrija, ili na prici da Evropa pocinje u Sarajevu, sto je
slucaj onog drugog.
Ko je uzeo pod najam tu dvojicu?
HANDKE: U danasnje vreme, intelektualci, a pod tim ne podrazumevam nista
lose, ne oskudevaju u novcu. Dakle, nije novac njihov motiv, vec pre
moc. To uostalom, ide jedno sa drugim.
Bernar-Anri je po prirodi cutljiv, zajedljiv i lazljiv. Kao i njegov
Bosanski dnevnik, on je izvestacen, umisljen. On prikazuje dimenziju
vladavine moralnih vrednosti, uporedo sa vladavinom politickih faktora,
kakav je Sirakova vlada i druge, medjutim, to on umislja. Problem sa
njim je u tome sto je on sa stanovista etosa, morala, obicni punjeni
curan.
Gledao sam onomad scenu koju je snimila, rekao bih, nemacka televizija
gde Levi sa grupom svojih pristalica pred Jugoslovenskim Kulturnim
Centrom u Parizu grubo i nasilnicki otima kljuc iz ruku zeni koja
uzaludno pokusava da zgradu zakljuca i tako spreci uljeze da u nju
prodru. Ona se brani recima : "Ne, ne zelim vam dati kljuc, sta vi ovde
trazite? To nije vase pravo!"
U svom crnom koznom mantilu, Levi je hladnokrvno posmatrao kao kakav
komunisticki komesar iz petparackog filma. Trebalo bi da sve Tv stanice
sirom sveta prikazu ovu triminutnu scenu da se vidi kako se samozvani
branilac Sarajeva i Bosne ophodi prema ljudima. Voleo bih kada bi svi
mogli to da vide.
Pitanje: Da li mislite da je moguce ispraviti sve ovo sto danas neki
rade?
HANDKE: Ne. bilo bi odvec lako. Tragicna je istorija Jugoslavije i
Evrope u ovom veku.
Odvijanje i pisanje istorije su spojeni. To je zajednicko i istoriji
Jevrejskog naroda, koja je takodje tragicna.
Verovatno nece biti ispravljene nepravde. Takva vrsta ljudi se ne
menja. Po meni, neosnovano je misliti da ce jednog dana biti moguce
drugacije posmatrati stvari. Svojim laznim recima i laznim slikama
pocinili su toliko mnogo zlocina protiv Jugoslavije, strasnih zlocina. A
neki su zlocini nepovratni, trajni.
Stralci dall'intervista a Peter Handke effettuata dal giornalista
televisivo tedesco Martin Lettmayer nel gennaio 1997 e riportata in
inglese sul sito del Congresso dell'Unità Serba:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1417
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1418
DOMANDA: Il sig. Levy e il sig. Finkielkraut, naturalmente l'hanno
attaccata...
HANDKE: Esatto. Ma loro non sono scrittori. Loro sono "I nuovi
filosofi". Non so perché siano stati chiamati "nuovi" o "filosofi".
C'è stata un'epoca all'inizio della guerra in cui loro hanno avuto
bisogno di me. Avevano bisogno di qualcuno che non fosse un filosofo,
ma un autore, un autore riconosciuto che, al contrario di loro, avesse
una qualche conoscenza della Jugoslavia. Dopo alcuni incontri con
Finkielkraut e Bernard Henri Levy, mi fu chiaro che loro volessero
soltanto usarmi. Ma appena presi le difese della Serbia, non mi
vollero più vedere. Questo è un gruppo veramente poco comunicativo. E
appartiene al Quarto Reich. Ci sono un sacco di soldi in ballo. E
potere. In Francia i libri e i mezzi elettronici sono completamente
controllati da una catena di gente come questa. Non si riesce più a
far arrivare nessuna notizia. La stampa francese e la TV sono
pressoché totalmente sotto il controllo di Bernard Henri Levy, così
come di Finkielkraut. Alcune persone lo ridicolizzano, ma in virtù di
tutti quegli indecenti, decorati, pessimi diari che lui [Levy]
pubblica sulla guerra in Bosnia, nessuno lo attacca più. Non un
singolo attacco. Prendono tutto come una buona letteratura. Tutto
quello che basta fare è prendere un paio di frasi nel dizionario
Robert's dei luoghi comuni. Il suo lavoro è sbagliato nei suoi punti
di vista, e pieno di errori di grammatica. Da non credere. Ma nessuno
fa niente. C'è in giro un sacco di denaro, e di potere. Tutto questo
mi fu chiaro dopo che mi incontrai un paio di volte con i "nuovi
filosofi". Decisi di non firmare nulla. E non sarei più andato ai loro
incontri. Hanno usato questo fatto contro di me, ma è meglio così.
DOMANDA: Questi signori Finkielkraut e Levy pero' mi interessano.
Potrebbero guadagnare soldi scrivendo altro, invece il primo elogia la
democrazia di Tudjman, l'altro dice che l'Europa inizia a Sarajevo.
Chi li ha ingaggiati?
HANDKE: Gli intellettuali (non intendendo niente di negativo) non sono
a corto di denaro, oggigiorno. Perciò non è il denaro che li spinge.
E' il potere, il potere più del denaro. Certamente denaro e potere
sono strettamente connessi. Bernard Henri Levy, credo, non ha una
spiegazione per la sua demonologia. E' taciturno, ma ingannevole.
Taciturno e ingannevole, malizioso. E' una meraviglia speculare come
il suo diario di Bosnia ci mostri una quadro in cui esiste un secondo
potere, oltre a quello del governo, di Chirac, etc., un potere etico e
morale. Questo è quello che lui immagina. Ma questa è la difficoltà,
poiché moralmente ed eticamente, lui è una papera morta. (Come noi
diciamo in un proverbio austriaco, "sotto il cane").
Una volta vidi una scena girata, penso, dalla TV tedesca, in cui Levy
va al Centro Culturale Jugoslavo a Parigi, con un gruppo di suoi
seguaci. A questo punto la donna che dirige il centro desidera
chiudere l'edificio. Lei rifiuta di passare la chiave agli intrusi.
Levy e il suo assistente, prendono la chiave alla donna con la forza.
Per due o tre minuti questa donna, abbastanza anziana, urla, grida:
"No, non voglio darvi la chiave, non vi appartiene. Non potete entrare
qui."
Levy rimane li, proprio come il commissario comunista dei film di
seconda categoria con il suo soprabito di pelle nero, e, sorridendo,
osserva il suo amico mentre rigira e strappa la chiave dalle mani
della donna. Questa immagine dovrebbe essere trasmessa dai notiziari
della sera, per tutti i tre minuti, su ogni emittente TV del mondo per
far vedere come questo autoproclamato difensore di Sarajevo e della
Bosnia, si comporta con la gente di tutti i giorni. Mi piacerebbe che
tutto il mondo lo guardasse.
DOMANDA: E' convinto che tutte queste persone che oggi fanno queste
cose, potranno correggersi?
HANDKE: No, sarebbe troppo facile. E' tragica, la storia della
Jugoslavia, la storia dell'Europa in questo secolo. Come la storia
avviene e come la storia viene scritta, sono due cose unite insieme.
Questa storia va insieme con la storia del popolo ebreo. Queste sono
le due storie tragiche. E probabilmente non saranno corrette. Pensare
in questo modo, che un giorno le cose potranno essere viste
differentemente, penso, sarebbe un falso ottimismo. Questa gente non
cambia. Con il loro linguaggio e le loro immagini hanno commesso così
tanti crimini, crimini veri, contro la Jugoslavia. Ci sono crimini che
possono solo essere perpetuati. Non c'è via di ritorno.
(zajednicki priredili : Olga iz Pariza, i Andrea iz Rima)
(a cura di Olga, da Parigi, e di Andrea, da Roma)
URL for this article: http://emperors-clothes.com/news/demockery.htm
www.tenc.net
[Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Can Democracy be Constructed Based on Terror &
Fraud? -
The BHHRG Report on the Kosovo 'Elections,' 17
November 2001
[This report was prepared by Dr. David Chandler. It is Posted with the
kind permission of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 28 November
2001. For some quite interesting Further Reading, go to end of page.]
=======================================
Faking Democracy and Progress in Kosovo
1. Background
"This was an extraordinary election."[i] The pronouncement of US
Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Mission chief, running the elections was
very apt. These elections were truly extraordinary in many respects.
One extraordinary aspect is that they were held in a legal vacuum.
Kosovo is neither an independent state nor any longer under the
government of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The question
of statehood is to be postponed to the indefinite future while the
United Nations assumes the responsibility for governing the province,
through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR) the former Danish
foreign minister, Hans Haekkerup.
The provincial government elected on 17 November reflects this lack of
international legal framework. The new post-election arrangements are
outlined in a document titled `A Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo'.[ii] This is not a constitution
but a `framework' for a constitution and not self-government but
`provisional' self-government. The ill-defined legal and political
status of the former Yugoslav province, reflects Western powers'
diminished respect for state sovereignty and the crumbling formal
framework of international legal and political equality. (1)
Kosovo is an `extraordinary' political experiment because the system of
`dual power' of an international governing administration alongside a
subordinate, domestically-elected administration, which developed in an
ad hoc manner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is here for the first time
officially institutionalised. The new framework for a `constitution' of
Kosovo, is the first modern political constitution to explicitly rule
out democracy. The preamble states that the `will of the people' is to
be relegated to just one of many `relevant factors' to be taken into
account by the international policy-makers.[iii]
The executive and legislative powers of the UN Special Representative
remain unaffected by the new constitutional framework. Chapter 8 of the
framework lists the powers and responsibilities reserved for the
international appointee, which include the final authority over finance,
the budget and monetary policy, customs, the judiciary, law enforcement,
policing, external relations, public property, communications and
transport, housing, municipal administration, and the appointment of
regulatory boards and commissions. And, of course, the power to dissolve
the elected assembly if Kosovo's representatives do not show sufficient
`maturity' to agree with his edicts.[iv]
2. Sham Elections
Many international plenipotentiaries, including US President George
Bush, Nato Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged the Kosovo public to turn out to
vote, particularly the Kosovo Serbs. When it emerged that around 60% of
the Albanian and 50% of the Serb voters had taken part, the elections
were loudly hailed by the international organisers and observers to be a
`glorious day in the history of Kosovo' and as a `huge success'.[v] The
question of why the international community chose to spend millions of
dollars holding elections for a provincial administration with token
office-holders with highly circumscribed powers was, unfortunately,
rarely asked.
These elections were extraordinary in the importance attached to them,
not just because of the lack of power awarded to the victors, but also
the fact that the results were largely irrelevant once the electoral
`engineering' of the OSCE and UNMIK was taken into account. The largest
party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova,
which won 46% of the votes, would not have been able to form the
government even if they had won a land-slide victory. This was because
the seats in the seven-member presidency and positions in the new
ministries were already divided in a fixed ratio in advance. For
example, the largest party and second largest party, the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hashim Thaci, with 25% of the votes, were to
have two seats in the presidency with the third party holding one seat,
the two remaining seats were reserved for Serb and other minorities.
This system of dividing the seats before the elections made the
international pressure on Belgrade to encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote, in
order that they might have more of a say in the future of the province,
rather bizarre. The Serb community was already guaranteed 10 reserved
seats in the 120 seat assembly, a seat on the presidency and at least
one of the nine ministries, regardless of whether any Serbs voted at
all.
I was monitoring the Kosovo elections on behalf of the British Helsinki
Human Rights Group with the official international observation mission
of the Council of Europe. It did not take long to see why the
extravagant hype had taken over from the mundane reality of the
elections. At the start of the Council of Europe observer training, Lord
Russell Johnstone, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, put the elections in the broader context of international
intervention today. `The international community needs to prove that
intervention was benign [in Kosovo and East Timor] and will create
better conditions. These elections are a proving exercise.' Lord
Johnstone is probably correct to see the November elections as little
more than a `proving exercise' for the international institutions
involved in the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty and the promotion of
`military humanitarianism' in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This would seem
to be confirmed in the stated concern of the OSCE organisers to achieve
an election that made the international mission appear `legitimate and
credible'.[vi]
Bearing in mind the international importance of the `success' of the
Kosovo elections, the `independent' observation mission of the Council
of Europe claims that the provincial elections were `free and fair'
should not necessarily be taken at face value.[vii] It is highly
doubtful that these elections would have been passed as `free and fair'
had they taken place outside the international supervision of the OSCE.
The election conditions, in which there was a complete absence of
freedom of movement for minority communities, and many of the OSCE
election regulations covering the media and political parties, failed to
meet basic internationally accepted standards, such as those laid out in
the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Declaration on Democracy and Political
Pluralism.[viii] The following sections compare the claims of the OSCE
against the reality of Kosovo in more depth.
3. Creating Multi-Ethnic Society?
Without visiting the region it is difficult for outside observers to
imagine the depth of fear and insecurity which pervades the province
despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission. (2) There has been a
highly restricted number of Serb and minority returns to Kosovo, and the
UNHCR estimates that since the UNMIK administration took over more
minorities may have left the province than returned.[ix] One reason for
this is that Serb and other ethnic minorities still have no freedom of
movement in Kosovo. The lack of movement could be seen when we visited
the allegedly multi-ethnic `zone of confidence' in Mitrovica, which has
no Serb minority and is basically a Bosnian Muslim settlement policed by
a 24-hour UNMIK armed guard. Or when we walked further along the Ibar to
the uninhabited ruins of the Roma `Malhalla', formally the largest Roma
settlement in the Balkans, destroyed after the war. It is not yet
possible for any of the 7,000 former residents to return in safety.
The ethnic-apartheid ruled over by UNMIK (3) also had a direct impact
on the election campaign and election monitoring. The Council of Europe
election observation teams were told not to enter minority Serb or
Albanian areas within their allocated municipalities because it would be
too dangerous for their drivers and interpreters. Apart from indicating
the complete separation of the Serb and Albanian communities, this
instruction also meant that the `independent' observers had a highly
restricted view of the elections. One further impact of the lack of
security for ethnic minorities was the fact that the voters' list, the
basic tool to guide election campaigning, was considered to be sensitive
information. The voters' list was not available to be used by political
parties and could only be consulted if no notes or photographs were
taken, making full transparency impossible.[x]
Far from admitting to the failures of the Nato intervention or the
subsequent `peace-building' programmes of the UNMIK administration, and
the ethnic-apartheid, which is in place, the OSCE had boasted that the
elections were overcoming ethnic divisions. One reason for this
statement was that there were allegedly minority members on the polling
station committees.I was observing in the north of the Mitrovica area,
in Leposavic, a moderate-dominated Serb area, I saw no minority
committee members and asked an OSCE polling station supervisor if the
policy had been dropped. He replied that the polling station committee
were all minority community members as they were all Serbs. Classifying
mono-ethnic polling station committees as minority ones makes the OSCE
election organisation look artificially multi-ethnic. This artificial
`engineering' to create multi-ethnic institutions on paper is also
promoted as an important outcome of the elections themselves. Every
level of government, including the Presidency, the Ministries and the
Assembly will have reserved places for minority community members. These
minority members will be bussed in to meetings from minority enclaves
under heavy military guard. Multi-ethnic government will be created by
edict, but this will not reflect the divided society, nor help to break
down inter-ethnic barriers. The insecurities of minority and majority
communities are not caused by ignorance or irrational prejudice but by
rational concerns that the artificial and temporary nature of the
current settlement imposed by UNMIK can not be sustainable.
The lack of refugee return and poor treatment of non-Albanian minority
communities, was one reason for the low turn-out in some minority areas
of Kosovo, particularly in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar river
which divides the town of Mitrovica. At some polling stations turn-out
was under 10%.[xi] In Leposavic around a third of the 6,500 population
were refugees. I visited the refugee centres for Roma and Serbs
displaced from southern Kosovo. I spoke to Gushanig Skandir the head of
the Roma camp, who showed us around the overcrowded and poorly funded
site, where large families were forced to share single rooms and use
outside toilet and washing facilities despite the winter cold.He told me
that after waiting three years their centre had received a new roof 20
days ago, he believed this international aid was because he encouraged
the adults in the camp to register to vote and to encourage the Roma
refugees to vote on election day. He was sceptical about the elections
but felt the Roma might receive more aid from the international
community if they voted. The following day I saw him at the polling
station in the local school. Gushanig may have made the pragmatic choice
to vote but many other refugees and displaced people in similar
situations told us that voting could make no difference especially as
the leading Serb representatives would have seats in the Assembly
anyway.
In an attempt to portray the low turn-outs as unconnected to the lack
of freedom of movement and alienation of minority communities, Daan
Everts declared: `The only thing which marred what was a glorious day in
Kosovo's history was that some Serbs in the north of Kosovo were too
intimidated by other people in their own community to come out and
vote'.[xii] This claim was repeated on BBC World television, in
international press headlines and in the post-election International
Crisis Group report, which stated that `the intimidation of would-be
Serb voters marred the election in Serb-controlled region north of the
Ibar river'.[xiii] The intimidation claims were news to the independent
observers in the region. I attended the Mitrovica area debriefing for
the Council of Europe observers after the elections and intimidation was
not mentioned, the observation team for the north Mitrovica municipality
received not one report of intimidation. At a post election party for
internationals the mystery was clarified when I spoke to the OSCE
regional trainer for the Mitrovica area who told me that his boss's
claims of intimidation were based on highly dubious allegations `of
people staring outside polling stations and looking inside them'.
4. Political Pluralism, Free Press and Civil Society?
The OSCE and UNMIK regard the Kosovo political parties as a hindrance
rather than a help in addressing the problems of the province. They are
seen to be lacking maturity and in need of `continuous support from the
OSCE Democratization Department to enhance their organisational capacity
and to increase their political and social possibilities to advocate for
democratic changes'.[xiv] Daan Everts argued that the political parties
were so out of touch that the international community was, in effect,
more democratic and more representative of popular opinion. He stated
that the OSCE needed to inform the political parties of the concerns of
the people and to encourage them to respond to the demands of the
electorate.[xv]
As part of the process of making political parties more `accountable'
there are a host of restrictive regulations of the political sphere.
These include the fining of newspapers if they favour a major political
party. Epoka e Re was fined DEM 1,000 for `a clear bias in favour of the
PDK in its election political reporting' while Bota Sot was fined DEM
2,750 for coverage which was favourable to the LDK.[xvi] I asked Lucia
Scotton, the Council of Europe's Mission in Kosovo's media monitoring
officer, how these fines squared with the OSCE's claim to be encouraging
a free and independent media. Her view was that although it was an
international norm for a free press to take a political position
favouring a particular party in election campaigns, the fines were
`reasonable' because the press in Kosovo was not professional or mature
enough to act freely and independently yet.[xvii]
The OSCE Code of Conduct for political parties also breaches
internationally accepted democratic norms by holding political parties
responsible for the actions of their supporters.[xviii] I asked Adrian
Stoop, the Chief Commissioner of the OSCE Election Complaints and
Appeals Commission about whether this regulation complied with
international standards.[xix] He replied that `In Holland this law would
be unthinkable.' He explained that the internationally-appointed
Commissioners supported regulations which they would not accept in their
own countries because the international administrators found it hard `to
get a grip on what is happening' and `didn't speak the language'. In
order to give the international regulators greater control, the rules
had to be more pragmatic and flexible to try to influence the political
parties and the political climate.
The OSCE election `engineers' also sought to limit the influence of the
political parties once they got into power. Daan Everts stated at a
training session for Council of Europe observers that `these elections
force a certain degree of power-sharing', undermining the power of the
larger parties by restricting their positions and influence in the new
institutions.[xx]He added that the OSCE had learnt from the municipal
elections last year `to impose a bit more'. The flexible `framework' for
a `constitution' allows the line between international and domestic
responsibility to be easily blurred. Firstly, UNMIK has established
`international advisors' for the President, Prime Minister and ministers
and each ministry will also be overseen by an international `Principal
Advisor'. Secondly, the functions reserved for the UN's Special
Representative are so vaguely defined that they cover much of the
responsibilities `devolved' to the nine ministries. However, in the true
spirit of transparency and accountability the UNMIK spokesperson says
that at this stage `it is hard to describe' what powers will be needed
to carry out these reserved functions.[xxi]
While the political parties were being restricted at least it appeared
that one area of political life was booming, civil society. The growing
strength of civil society was indicated by the fact that this year there
was more than twice the number of domestic observers as last year,
representing 1% of the electorate. Daan Everts described the elections
as the `best monitored elections this century'.[xxii] In fact, according
to the OSCE, there `could be the highest proportion of election
observers to voters in the world'.[xxiii] One does not have to be a
hardened cynic to wonder why 1% of the population would be so keen to
observe the elections. I thought it would be interesting to find out.
When I asked the NGO observers more about how they got involved I was
surprised to find out that many did not know what `their' NGO did or
what its' initials stood for, and had got involved through being invited
by a friend. This was particularly true for those observing on behalf of
one of the best represented domestic NGOs, the KMDLNJ (Council for the
Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms) based in Pristina. The reason the
KMDLNJ had so many observers was probably because they were paying
people DEM 80 to take part. CeSID a Serbian-based NGO with close links
to the OTPOR student movement was paying people DEM 25 to observe. The
other NGO observers were paid somewhere between the two.
The dynamism of civil society, like every other aspect of these
elections was a fake. In the regional de-briefing back in Pristina, all
the observers noted that the domestic observers were rather
disinterested in the proceedings. It seems likely that the OSCE and its
international sponsors' actions of buying-in civil society NGOs will
have little positive impact in the longer run. It hardly encourages
people to take communal responsibility for democracy if people are paid
half-a-month's wages to `volunteer' to be part of the democratic
process. The statistics for domestic observers may have looked good on
paper but the OSCE's approach of artificially `engineering' the effect
it wanted may only set back any genuine attempt to involve the Kosovo
public in the political process. If civic NGO involvement is promoted as
an election-related job, like interpreting and driving for the
internationals, then this undermines, rather than promotes, the idea of
voluntary civic engagement.
5. Conclusion
The November 17 elections in Kosovo were phoney in every major respect.
They were phoney in that under the fiction of multi-ethnic government
they helped legitimise a society that provides no normal existence for
ethnic minorities, merely imprisonment in ethnic enclaves and military
escorts to visit family cemeteries or former homes and villages. They
were phoney in that through the fiction of `staring' Serbs the
responsibility for the low turn-out in some regions was seen to be the
fault of minorities themselves, rather than the ethnic segregation
overseen by the international community. They were phoney because under
the guise of promoting media freedom and independence, freedom of
expression and political debate were further restricted. They were
phoney because under the guise of promoting political pluralism,
majority rule was replaced by a consensus imposed by the UN's Special
Representative. They were phoney because under the fiction of a vibrant
civil society the OSCE and its partners corrupted the process of
encouraging civic engagement. Most importantly, they were phoney because
under the fiction of democratic autonomy for the people of Kosovo, they
legitimised a constitution that openly replaced the `popular will' with
the unaccountable power of an international protectorate.
The OSCE and UNMIK are celebrating the elections as a major
international success. They may have secured some international
legitimacy for their tin-pot protectorate and won kudos for their
`success' in encouraging `democracy' and `peace' in Kosovo. However,
phoney elections can only create phoney consultation bodies. The reduced
election turn-out among the Albanian voters and the low turn-out for the
Kosovo Serbs suggests that the domestic legitimacy of the international
protectorate may be the real sticking point for the future.
This report was compiled by Dr David Chandler, Policy Research
Institute, Leeds Metropolitan University. He is the author of Bosnia
Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000) and From Kosovo
to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press,
March 2002). He can be contacted at D.Chandler@....
[i] `First Official Results in Kosovo Election Announced', OSCE Mission
in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 19 November 2001.
[ii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001.
[iii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001, p.4.
[iv] For further background information on the framework for
provisional self-government, read: Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo:
State-Building and "Substantial Autonomy", International Peace Academy,
August 2001. Available from: <http://www.ipacademy.org/>; Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow-Up: Why Conditional
Independence? September 2001. Available from:
<http://www.kosovocommission.org/>; International Crisis Group, Kosovo
Landmark Election, November 2001. Available from:
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
[v] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[vi] International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans
Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.1.
[vii] `Kosovo Assembly Elections Bring Democracy Forward and Strengthen
regional Stability', Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in
Kosovo Press Release, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[viii] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the OSCE. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/docs>.
[ix] Interview with Leonard Zulu, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR,
Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[x] Information provided by Peter Urban, Director of Elections, OSCE,
Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina 13 November 2001.
[xi] Information provided by OSCE Spokesperson Claire Trevena, 21
November 2001.
[xii] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[xiii] Nicholas Wood, `Serbs "Face Threats at Polls"', Observer, 18
November 2001; International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election,
Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.i.
[xiv] Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xv] Daan Everts, `Foreword', Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices
(Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xvi] `Fines Given for Political Violence and Reporting Bias', OSCE
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 10 November 2001;
`Newspaper Sanctioned for Photo', OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press
Release, Pristina, 16 November 2001.
[xvii] Interview, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[xviii] `The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions,
Citizens' Initiatives, Independent Candidates, Their Supporters and
Candidates', Electoral Rule No.1 1/2001, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Central
Election Commission. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
[xix] At the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xx] Speech at the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xxi] UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR Press Briefing, 22 November 2001. UNMIK
Unofficial Transcript.
[xxii] `Calls for Kosova's Serbs to Vote', RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.5,
No.214, Part II, 9 November 2001.
[xxiii] `Plea to Election Observers: Be Patient', OSCE Mission in
Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 9 November 2001.
**********************************************
COMMENTS & FURTHER READING:
**********************************************
Prepared by John Flaherty and Jared Israel, Emperor's Clothes
1) UN Resolution 1244 guarantees that Kosovo will remain part of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) campaigned for the exact opposite during an earlier
provincial quasi-election. See "Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo
'Independence'" by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
* (Return to Report, above)
2) In his informative report on the Kosovo elections, posted above, Dr.
Chandler writes that Serbs have been subjected to a reign of terror in
Kosovo "despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission."
We in the NATO countries have been taught that our leaders are
basically decent, but make mistakes. We are told that if bad things
happen in countries undergoing NATO 'nation-building' it is in spite of,
not because of, NATO leaders.
But in Kosovo, the evidence on the ground is overwhelming. Kosovo has
suffered an unprecedented reign of terror by Albanian secessionists
because of - not in spite of - NATO and UN control.
Many articles on Emperor's Clothes document this with abundant
references from the mainstream media and from highly credible observers.
The following is a small but important sample:
* "TERRORISM AGAINST SERBIA IS NO CRIME" Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff
show how NATO and the UN have gone 100% against the promise, made
in UN Resolution 1244, to prevent Albanian secessionist terrorism in
Kosovo. Instead this terror has been encouraged. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
* 'What NATO Occupation Would Mean for Macedonia'. NATO's
nightmarish control of Kosovo is documented in interviews with three
women from the town of Orahovac. They describe NATO's lofty
promises prior to taking over the province; NATO's actual entrance,
alongside the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army; the transformation of
Orahovac into a death camp for Serbs and 'Gypsies' under NATO
management. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/savethe.htm
* 'Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel'. In this interview, three
Serbian women refute a Dutch Colonel's surreal description of life in
the brave new Kosovo town of Orahovac. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm
* 'Driven from Kosovo: Jewish Leader Blames NATO - Interview with
Cedda Prlincevic'. Mr. Prlincevic was President of the Jewish community
in Kosovo in the summer of 1999 when NATO - and the terrorist KLA -
took over. Mr. Prlincevic, at the time the chief archivist of Kosovo,
describes how he and thousands of others were driven from their homes
by the Albanian terrorists with NATO's approval.
* For those of us in the West, who tend to give our leaders the benefit
of the doubt, it is amazing to consider the career of the Kosovo
Protection Corps. Formed by top leaders of NATO and the UN in the fall
of 1999, from the outset it was comprised of members of a terrorist
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The terrorist nature of the UN-sanctioned Kosovo Protection Corps is
documented in "How Will You Plead at your Trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
The use of the terrorist Kosovo Protection Corps to invade Macedonia is
documented in 'SORRY, VIRGINIA, BUT THEY ARE NATO TROOPS, NOT 'REBELS'"
* (Return to Report, above)
3) Dr. Chandler argues that the West has introduced apartheid-like
conditions in Kosovo. This is discussed in the "Statement of President
Slobodan Milosevic on The Illegitimacy of The Hague 'Tribunal,'" which
the kidnapped and imprisoned Yugoslav leader tried to deliver when he
appeared before The Hague 'Tribunal' on 30 August 2001. We have all been
told that Milosevic is a demagogue whose speeches advocate religious and
ethnic hatreds, but how many have read his words? Whenever he tries to
speak at The Hague, they turn off his microphone. He can be read at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/aug30.htm
Speaking of Milosevic, the media campaign portraying him as a monster
began with a speech he gave in Kosovo in 1989. It is described as
inciting race war. Read it. He argues that Serbia's strength is its
ethnic diversity. 'What Milosevic Really Said at Kosovo Field (1989)'
can be read at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/milosaid.html
* (Return to Report, above)
Join our email list at http://emperors-clothes.com/f.htm. Receive about
one article/day.
www.tenc.net
[Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Can Democracy be Constructed Based on Terror &
Fraud? -
The BHHRG Report on the Kosovo 'Elections,' 17
November 2001
[This report was prepared by Dr. David Chandler. It is Posted with the
kind permission of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 28 November
2001. For some quite interesting Further Reading, go to end of page.]
=======================================
Faking Democracy and Progress in Kosovo
1. Background
"This was an extraordinary election."[i] The pronouncement of US
Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Mission chief, running the elections was
very apt. These elections were truly extraordinary in many respects.
One extraordinary aspect is that they were held in a legal vacuum.
Kosovo is neither an independent state nor any longer under the
government of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The question
of statehood is to be postponed to the indefinite future while the
United Nations assumes the responsibility for governing the province,
through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR) the former Danish
foreign minister, Hans Haekkerup.
The provincial government elected on 17 November reflects this lack of
international legal framework. The new post-election arrangements are
outlined in a document titled `A Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo'.[ii] This is not a constitution
but a `framework' for a constitution and not self-government but
`provisional' self-government. The ill-defined legal and political
status of the former Yugoslav province, reflects Western powers'
diminished respect for state sovereignty and the crumbling formal
framework of international legal and political equality. (1)
Kosovo is an `extraordinary' political experiment because the system of
`dual power' of an international governing administration alongside a
subordinate, domestically-elected administration, which developed in an
ad hoc manner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is here for the first time
officially institutionalised. The new framework for a `constitution' of
Kosovo, is the first modern political constitution to explicitly rule
out democracy. The preamble states that the `will of the people' is to
be relegated to just one of many `relevant factors' to be taken into
account by the international policy-makers.[iii]
The executive and legislative powers of the UN Special Representative
remain unaffected by the new constitutional framework. Chapter 8 of the
framework lists the powers and responsibilities reserved for the
international appointee, which include the final authority over finance,
the budget and monetary policy, customs, the judiciary, law enforcement,
policing, external relations, public property, communications and
transport, housing, municipal administration, and the appointment of
regulatory boards and commissions. And, of course, the power to dissolve
the elected assembly if Kosovo's representatives do not show sufficient
`maturity' to agree with his edicts.[iv]
2. Sham Elections
Many international plenipotentiaries, including US President George
Bush, Nato Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged the Kosovo public to turn out to
vote, particularly the Kosovo Serbs. When it emerged that around 60% of
the Albanian and 50% of the Serb voters had taken part, the elections
were loudly hailed by the international organisers and observers to be a
`glorious day in the history of Kosovo' and as a `huge success'.[v] The
question of why the international community chose to spend millions of
dollars holding elections for a provincial administration with token
office-holders with highly circumscribed powers was, unfortunately,
rarely asked.
These elections were extraordinary in the importance attached to them,
not just because of the lack of power awarded to the victors, but also
the fact that the results were largely irrelevant once the electoral
`engineering' of the OSCE and UNMIK was taken into account. The largest
party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova,
which won 46% of the votes, would not have been able to form the
government even if they had won a land-slide victory. This was because
the seats in the seven-member presidency and positions in the new
ministries were already divided in a fixed ratio in advance. For
example, the largest party and second largest party, the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hashim Thaci, with 25% of the votes, were to
have two seats in the presidency with the third party holding one seat,
the two remaining seats were reserved for Serb and other minorities.
This system of dividing the seats before the elections made the
international pressure on Belgrade to encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote, in
order that they might have more of a say in the future of the province,
rather bizarre. The Serb community was already guaranteed 10 reserved
seats in the 120 seat assembly, a seat on the presidency and at least
one of the nine ministries, regardless of whether any Serbs voted at
all.
I was monitoring the Kosovo elections on behalf of the British Helsinki
Human Rights Group with the official international observation mission
of the Council of Europe. It did not take long to see why the
extravagant hype had taken over from the mundane reality of the
elections. At the start of the Council of Europe observer training, Lord
Russell Johnstone, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, put the elections in the broader context of international
intervention today. `The international community needs to prove that
intervention was benign [in Kosovo and East Timor] and will create
better conditions. These elections are a proving exercise.' Lord
Johnstone is probably correct to see the November elections as little
more than a `proving exercise' for the international institutions
involved in the violation of Yugoslav sovereignty and the promotion of
`military humanitarianism' in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This would seem
to be confirmed in the stated concern of the OSCE organisers to achieve
an election that made the international mission appear `legitimate and
credible'.[vi]
Bearing in mind the international importance of the `success' of the
Kosovo elections, the `independent' observation mission of the Council
of Europe claims that the provincial elections were `free and fair'
should not necessarily be taken at face value.[vii] It is highly
doubtful that these elections would have been passed as `free and fair'
had they taken place outside the international supervision of the OSCE.
The election conditions, in which there was a complete absence of
freedom of movement for minority communities, and many of the OSCE
election regulations covering the media and political parties, failed to
meet basic internationally accepted standards, such as those laid out in
the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Declaration on Democracy and Political
Pluralism.[viii] The following sections compare the claims of the OSCE
against the reality of Kosovo in more depth.
3. Creating Multi-Ethnic Society?
Without visiting the region it is difficult for outside observers to
imagine the depth of fear and insecurity which pervades the province
despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission. (2) There has been a
highly restricted number of Serb and minority returns to Kosovo, and the
UNHCR estimates that since the UNMIK administration took over more
minorities may have left the province than returned.[ix] One reason for
this is that Serb and other ethnic minorities still have no freedom of
movement in Kosovo. The lack of movement could be seen when we visited
the allegedly multi-ethnic `zone of confidence' in Mitrovica, which has
no Serb minority and is basically a Bosnian Muslim settlement policed by
a 24-hour UNMIK armed guard. Or when we walked further along the Ibar to
the uninhabited ruins of the Roma `Malhalla', formally the largest Roma
settlement in the Balkans, destroyed after the war. It is not yet
possible for any of the 7,000 former residents to return in safety.
The ethnic-apartheid ruled over by UNMIK (3) also had a direct impact
on the election campaign and election monitoring. The Council of Europe
election observation teams were told not to enter minority Serb or
Albanian areas within their allocated municipalities because it would be
too dangerous for their drivers and interpreters. Apart from indicating
the complete separation of the Serb and Albanian communities, this
instruction also meant that the `independent' observers had a highly
restricted view of the elections. One further impact of the lack of
security for ethnic minorities was the fact that the voters' list, the
basic tool to guide election campaigning, was considered to be sensitive
information. The voters' list was not available to be used by political
parties and could only be consulted if no notes or photographs were
taken, making full transparency impossible.[x]
Far from admitting to the failures of the Nato intervention or the
subsequent `peace-building' programmes of the UNMIK administration, and
the ethnic-apartheid, which is in place, the OSCE had boasted that the
elections were overcoming ethnic divisions. One reason for this
statement was that there were allegedly minority members on the polling
station committees.I was observing in the north of the Mitrovica area,
in Leposavic, a moderate-dominated Serb area, I saw no minority
committee members and asked an OSCE polling station supervisor if the
policy had been dropped. He replied that the polling station committee
were all minority community members as they were all Serbs. Classifying
mono-ethnic polling station committees as minority ones makes the OSCE
election organisation look artificially multi-ethnic. This artificial
`engineering' to create multi-ethnic institutions on paper is also
promoted as an important outcome of the elections themselves. Every
level of government, including the Presidency, the Ministries and the
Assembly will have reserved places for minority community members. These
minority members will be bussed in to meetings from minority enclaves
under heavy military guard. Multi-ethnic government will be created by
edict, but this will not reflect the divided society, nor help to break
down inter-ethnic barriers. The insecurities of minority and majority
communities are not caused by ignorance or irrational prejudice but by
rational concerns that the artificial and temporary nature of the
current settlement imposed by UNMIK can not be sustainable.
The lack of refugee return and poor treatment of non-Albanian minority
communities, was one reason for the low turn-out in some minority areas
of Kosovo, particularly in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar river
which divides the town of Mitrovica. At some polling stations turn-out
was under 10%.[xi] In Leposavic around a third of the 6,500 population
were refugees. I visited the refugee centres for Roma and Serbs
displaced from southern Kosovo. I spoke to Gushanig Skandir the head of
the Roma camp, who showed us around the overcrowded and poorly funded
site, where large families were forced to share single rooms and use
outside toilet and washing facilities despite the winter cold.He told me
that after waiting three years their centre had received a new roof 20
days ago, he believed this international aid was because he encouraged
the adults in the camp to register to vote and to encourage the Roma
refugees to vote on election day. He was sceptical about the elections
but felt the Roma might receive more aid from the international
community if they voted. The following day I saw him at the polling
station in the local school. Gushanig may have made the pragmatic choice
to vote but many other refugees and displaced people in similar
situations told us that voting could make no difference especially as
the leading Serb representatives would have seats in the Assembly
anyway.
In an attempt to portray the low turn-outs as unconnected to the lack
of freedom of movement and alienation of minority communities, Daan
Everts declared: `The only thing which marred what was a glorious day in
Kosovo's history was that some Serbs in the north of Kosovo were too
intimidated by other people in their own community to come out and
vote'.[xii] This claim was repeated on BBC World television, in
international press headlines and in the post-election International
Crisis Group report, which stated that `the intimidation of would-be
Serb voters marred the election in Serb-controlled region north of the
Ibar river'.[xiii] The intimidation claims were news to the independent
observers in the region. I attended the Mitrovica area debriefing for
the Council of Europe observers after the elections and intimidation was
not mentioned, the observation team for the north Mitrovica municipality
received not one report of intimidation. At a post election party for
internationals the mystery was clarified when I spoke to the OSCE
regional trainer for the Mitrovica area who told me that his boss's
claims of intimidation were based on highly dubious allegations `of
people staring outside polling stations and looking inside them'.
4. Political Pluralism, Free Press and Civil Society?
The OSCE and UNMIK regard the Kosovo political parties as a hindrance
rather than a help in addressing the problems of the province. They are
seen to be lacking maturity and in need of `continuous support from the
OSCE Democratization Department to enhance their organisational capacity
and to increase their political and social possibilities to advocate for
democratic changes'.[xiv] Daan Everts argued that the political parties
were so out of touch that the international community was, in effect,
more democratic and more representative of popular opinion. He stated
that the OSCE needed to inform the political parties of the concerns of
the people and to encourage them to respond to the demands of the
electorate.[xv]
As part of the process of making political parties more `accountable'
there are a host of restrictive regulations of the political sphere.
These include the fining of newspapers if they favour a major political
party. Epoka e Re was fined DEM 1,000 for `a clear bias in favour of the
PDK in its election political reporting' while Bota Sot was fined DEM
2,750 for coverage which was favourable to the LDK.[xvi] I asked Lucia
Scotton, the Council of Europe's Mission in Kosovo's media monitoring
officer, how these fines squared with the OSCE's claim to be encouraging
a free and independent media. Her view was that although it was an
international norm for a free press to take a political position
favouring a particular party in election campaigns, the fines were
`reasonable' because the press in Kosovo was not professional or mature
enough to act freely and independently yet.[xvii]
The OSCE Code of Conduct for political parties also breaches
internationally accepted democratic norms by holding political parties
responsible for the actions of their supporters.[xviii] I asked Adrian
Stoop, the Chief Commissioner of the OSCE Election Complaints and
Appeals Commission about whether this regulation complied with
international standards.[xix] He replied that `In Holland this law would
be unthinkable.' He explained that the internationally-appointed
Commissioners supported regulations which they would not accept in their
own countries because the international administrators found it hard `to
get a grip on what is happening' and `didn't speak the language'. In
order to give the international regulators greater control, the rules
had to be more pragmatic and flexible to try to influence the political
parties and the political climate.
The OSCE election `engineers' also sought to limit the influence of the
political parties once they got into power. Daan Everts stated at a
training session for Council of Europe observers that `these elections
force a certain degree of power-sharing', undermining the power of the
larger parties by restricting their positions and influence in the new
institutions.[xx]He added that the OSCE had learnt from the municipal
elections last year `to impose a bit more'. The flexible `framework' for
a `constitution' allows the line between international and domestic
responsibility to be easily blurred. Firstly, UNMIK has established
`international advisors' for the President, Prime Minister and ministers
and each ministry will also be overseen by an international `Principal
Advisor'. Secondly, the functions reserved for the UN's Special
Representative are so vaguely defined that they cover much of the
responsibilities `devolved' to the nine ministries. However, in the true
spirit of transparency and accountability the UNMIK spokesperson says
that at this stage `it is hard to describe' what powers will be needed
to carry out these reserved functions.[xxi]
While the political parties were being restricted at least it appeared
that one area of political life was booming, civil society. The growing
strength of civil society was indicated by the fact that this year there
was more than twice the number of domestic observers as last year,
representing 1% of the electorate. Daan Everts described the elections
as the `best monitored elections this century'.[xxii] In fact, according
to the OSCE, there `could be the highest proportion of election
observers to voters in the world'.[xxiii] One does not have to be a
hardened cynic to wonder why 1% of the population would be so keen to
observe the elections. I thought it would be interesting to find out.
When I asked the NGO observers more about how they got involved I was
surprised to find out that many did not know what `their' NGO did or
what its' initials stood for, and had got involved through being invited
by a friend. This was particularly true for those observing on behalf of
one of the best represented domestic NGOs, the KMDLNJ (Council for the
Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms) based in Pristina. The reason the
KMDLNJ had so many observers was probably because they were paying
people DEM 80 to take part. CeSID a Serbian-based NGO with close links
to the OTPOR student movement was paying people DEM 25 to observe. The
other NGO observers were paid somewhere between the two.
The dynamism of civil society, like every other aspect of these
elections was a fake. In the regional de-briefing back in Pristina, all
the observers noted that the domestic observers were rather
disinterested in the proceedings. It seems likely that the OSCE and its
international sponsors' actions of buying-in civil society NGOs will
have little positive impact in the longer run. It hardly encourages
people to take communal responsibility for democracy if people are paid
half-a-month's wages to `volunteer' to be part of the democratic
process. The statistics for domestic observers may have looked good on
paper but the OSCE's approach of artificially `engineering' the effect
it wanted may only set back any genuine attempt to involve the Kosovo
public in the political process. If civic NGO involvement is promoted as
an election-related job, like interpreting and driving for the
internationals, then this undermines, rather than promotes, the idea of
voluntary civic engagement.
5. Conclusion
The November 17 elections in Kosovo were phoney in every major respect.
They were phoney in that under the fiction of multi-ethnic government
they helped legitimise a society that provides no normal existence for
ethnic minorities, merely imprisonment in ethnic enclaves and military
escorts to visit family cemeteries or former homes and villages. They
were phoney in that through the fiction of `staring' Serbs the
responsibility for the low turn-out in some regions was seen to be the
fault of minorities themselves, rather than the ethnic segregation
overseen by the international community. They were phoney because under
the guise of promoting media freedom and independence, freedom of
expression and political debate were further restricted. They were
phoney because under the guise of promoting political pluralism,
majority rule was replaced by a consensus imposed by the UN's Special
Representative. They were phoney because under the fiction of a vibrant
civil society the OSCE and its partners corrupted the process of
encouraging civic engagement. Most importantly, they were phoney because
under the fiction of democratic autonomy for the people of Kosovo, they
legitimised a constitution that openly replaced the `popular will' with
the unaccountable power of an international protectorate.
The OSCE and UNMIK are celebrating the elections as a major
international success. They may have secured some international
legitimacy for their tin-pot protectorate and won kudos for their
`success' in encouraging `democracy' and `peace' in Kosovo. However,
phoney elections can only create phoney consultation bodies. The reduced
election turn-out among the Albanian voters and the low turn-out for the
Kosovo Serbs suggests that the domestic legitimacy of the international
protectorate may be the real sticking point for the future.
This report was compiled by Dr David Chandler, Policy Research
Institute, Leeds Metropolitan University. He is the author of Bosnia
Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000) and From Kosovo
to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press,
March 2002). He can be contacted at D.Chandler@....
[i] `First Official Results in Kosovo Election Announced', OSCE Mission
in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 19 November 2001.
[ii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001.
[iii] `A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in
Kosovo', UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001, p.4.
[iv] For further background information on the framework for
provisional self-government, read: Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo:
State-Building and "Substantial Autonomy", International Peace Academy,
August 2001. Available from: <http://www.ipacademy.org/>; Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow-Up: Why Conditional
Independence? September 2001. Available from:
<http://www.kosovocommission.org/>; International Crisis Group, Kosovo
Landmark Election, November 2001. Available from:
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
[v] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[vi] International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans
Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.1.
[vii] `Kosovo Assembly Elections Bring Democracy Forward and Strengthen
regional Stability', Council of Europe Election Observation Mission in
Kosovo Press Release, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[viii] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the OSCE. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/docs>.
[ix] Interview with Leonard Zulu, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR,
Pristina, 13 November 2001.
[x] Information provided by Peter Urban, Director of Elections, OSCE,
Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina 13 November 2001.
[xi] Information provided by OSCE Spokesperson Claire Trevena, 21
November 2001.
[xii] `Kosovo's Election Hailed a Huge Success', OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 17 November 2001.
[xiii] Nicholas Wood, `Serbs "Face Threats at Polls"', Observer, 18
November 2001; International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Landmark Election,
Balkans Report, No.120, Pristina/Brussels 21 November 2001, p.i.
[xiv] Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices (Pristina: OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xv] Daan Everts, `Foreword', Kosovo's Concerns: Voters' Voices
(Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001), p.iii.
[xvi] `Fines Given for Political Violence and Reporting Bias', OSCE
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 10 November 2001;
`Newspaper Sanctioned for Photo', OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Press
Release, Pristina, 16 November 2001.
[xvii] Interview, Pristina, 18 November 2001.
[xviii] `The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions,
Citizens' Initiatives, Independent Candidates, Their Supporters and
Candidates', Electoral Rule No.1 1/2001, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Central
Election Commission. Available from: <http://www.osce.org/>.
[xix] At the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xx] Speech at the Council of Europe Training Programme, Pristina, 13
November 2001.
[xxi] UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR Press Briefing, 22 November 2001. UNMIK
Unofficial Transcript.
[xxii] `Calls for Kosova's Serbs to Vote', RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.5,
No.214, Part II, 9 November 2001.
[xxiii] `Plea to Election Observers: Be Patient', OSCE Mission in
Kosovo (OMIK) Press Release, Pristina, 9 November 2001.
**********************************************
COMMENTS & FURTHER READING:
**********************************************
Prepared by John Flaherty and Jared Israel, Emperor's Clothes
1) UN Resolution 1244 guarantees that Kosovo will remain part of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) campaigned for the exact opposite during an earlier
provincial quasi-election. See "Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo
'Independence'" by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
* (Return to Report, above)
2) In his informative report on the Kosovo elections, posted above, Dr.
Chandler writes that Serbs have been subjected to a reign of terror in
Kosovo "despite more than two years of government by the international
community's expansive `peace-building' mission."
We in the NATO countries have been taught that our leaders are
basically decent, but make mistakes. We are told that if bad things
happen in countries undergoing NATO 'nation-building' it is in spite of,
not because of, NATO leaders.
But in Kosovo, the evidence on the ground is overwhelming. Kosovo has
suffered an unprecedented reign of terror by Albanian secessionists
because of - not in spite of - NATO and UN control.
Many articles on Emperor's Clothes document this with abundant
references from the mainstream media and from highly credible observers.
The following is a small but important sample:
* "TERRORISM AGAINST SERBIA IS NO CRIME" Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff
show how NATO and the UN have gone 100% against the promise, made
in UN Resolution 1244, to prevent Albanian secessionist terrorism in
Kosovo. Instead this terror has been encouraged. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
* 'What NATO Occupation Would Mean for Macedonia'. NATO's
nightmarish control of Kosovo is documented in interviews with three
women from the town of Orahovac. They describe NATO's lofty
promises prior to taking over the province; NATO's actual entrance,
alongside the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army; the transformation of
Orahovac into a death camp for Serbs and 'Gypsies' under NATO
management. Can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/savethe.htm
* 'Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel'. In this interview, three
Serbian women refute a Dutch Colonel's surreal description of life in
the brave new Kosovo town of Orahovac. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm
* 'Driven from Kosovo: Jewish Leader Blames NATO - Interview with
Cedda Prlincevic'. Mr. Prlincevic was President of the Jewish community
in Kosovo in the summer of 1999 when NATO - and the terrorist KLA -
took over. Mr. Prlincevic, at the time the chief archivist of Kosovo,
describes how he and thousands of others were driven from their homes
by the Albanian terrorists with NATO's approval.
* For those of us in the West, who tend to give our leaders the benefit
of the doubt, it is amazing to consider the career of the Kosovo
Protection Corps. Formed by top leaders of NATO and the UN in the fall
of 1999, from the outset it was comprised of members of a terrorist
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The terrorist nature of the UN-sanctioned Kosovo Protection Corps is
documented in "How Will You Plead at your Trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
The use of the terrorist Kosovo Protection Corps to invade Macedonia is
documented in 'SORRY, VIRGINIA, BUT THEY ARE NATO TROOPS, NOT 'REBELS'"
* (Return to Report, above)
3) Dr. Chandler argues that the West has introduced apartheid-like
conditions in Kosovo. This is discussed in the "Statement of President
Slobodan Milosevic on The Illegitimacy of The Hague 'Tribunal,'" which
the kidnapped and imprisoned Yugoslav leader tried to deliver when he
appeared before The Hague 'Tribunal' on 30 August 2001. We have all been
told that Milosevic is a demagogue whose speeches advocate religious and
ethnic hatreds, but how many have read his words? Whenever he tries to
speak at The Hague, they turn off his microphone. He can be read at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/aug30.htm
Speaking of Milosevic, the media campaign portraying him as a monster
began with a speech he gave in Kosovo in 1989. It is described as
inciting race war. Read it. He argues that Serbia's strength is its
ethnic diversity. 'What Milosevic Really Said at Kosovo Field (1989)'
can be read at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/milosaid.html
* (Return to Report, above)
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